Chapter 5: Mahāyāna: The Great Vehicle¶
5.1 The Emergence of the Mahāyāna¶
The Mahāyāna (“Great Vehicle”) was one of the most far-reaching developments in Indian Buddhism. Emerging gradually within the early Buddhist schools between roughly the first century BCE and the second century CE — and remaining for several centuries a minority movement within Indian monasteries — the Mahāyāna introduced transformative new ideas about the nature of Buddhahood, the path to enlightenment, and the ultimate nature of reality.
The term Mahāyāna signifies the “Great Vehicle” — great in the sense that it aspires to carry all sentient beings to liberation, not merely the individual practitioner. This universal soteriological vision is embodied in the ideal of the Bodhisattva — the being who aspires to attain complete Buddhahood for the benefit of all beings.
5.1.1 Historical Development¶
The origins of the Mahāyāna remain a subject of scholarly debate. The earliest Mahāyāna sūtras, such as the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā (Perfection of Wisdom in 8,000 Lines), appear to have taken shape from about the first century BCE; the earliest dated Mahāyāna texts are Chinese translations made by Lokakṣema in the late second century CE (Williams 2009; Harvey 2013). Older theories that the movement was essentially led by lay people, centred on the worship of stūpas, are now widely doubted. Jan Nattier’s study of an early sūtra, the Inquiry of Ugra (Ugraparipṛcchā), shows a bodhisattva path conceived as a demanding vocation for a few, with the forest-dwelling monk as its model and the householder bodhisattva only a lesser case (Nattier 2003). Scholars now emphasise instead the aspiration of some monks to follow the Buddha’s own path to full Buddhahood rather than to arhatship; the development of the idea of the Buddha from historical teacher to a figure present in many worlds; visionary practices that were believed to bring the practitioner into the presence of Buddhas and so to authorise new scriptures; and the philosophical pressure of the earlier Abhidharma analyses, which the Perfection of Wisdom sūtras criticised. For several centuries Mahāyāna monks lived in the same monasteries, under the same Vinayas, as their non-Mahāyāna brethren (Chapter 13), and Joseph Walser has argued that early Mahāyāna authors such as Nāgārjuna had to write in ways acceptable to such mixed communities (Walser 2005).
5.2 The Bodhisattva Ideal¶
The Bodhisattva (literally “enlightenment-being” or “being [destined for] awakening”) is the central figure of the Mahāyāna path. The early schools also knew the bodhisattva path, but as the exceptional career of a future Buddha, and they held up the arhat — one who has attained liberation by following a Buddha’s teaching — as the goal for most practitioners; Theravāda still does so, while honouring the bodhisatta ideal. The Mahāyāna sūtras, which polemically called the arhat’s path a “lesser vehicle” (hīnayāna), urge every practitioner to aim for full Buddhahood: the bodhisattva, motivated by mahākaruṇā (great compassion), vows to attain awakening for the sake of all beings and to go on working in the world until they are liberated.
ākāśasya sthitir yāvad
yāvac ca jagataḥ sthitiḥ,
tāvan mama sthitir bhūyāj
jagadduḥkhāni nighnataḥ.
As long as space endures and as long as the world endures, so long may I endure, destroying the sufferings of the world.
— Śāntideva (8th century), Bodhicaryāvatāra 10.55
5.2.1 The Bodhisattva Vow (Praṇidhāna)¶
The Bodhisattva path begins with the generation of Bodhicitta — the “mind of enlightenment” or the aspiration to attain Buddhahood for the benefit of all beings. This aspiration is formalised in vows (praṇidhāna). In East Asian Buddhism the best-known formulation is the “Four Great Vows”, composed in Chinese (it is traditionally associated with the Tiantai master Zhiyi, 6th century) and recited daily in many monasteries:
Sentient beings are numberless — I vow to save them all.
Delusions are inexhaustible — I vow to end them all.
The Dharma gates are boundless — I vow to enter them all.
The Buddha way is unsurpassed — I vow to attain it.
5.2.2 The Six Pāramitās (Perfections)¶
The bodhisattva practises six perfections (pāramitā): generosity (dāna), morality (śīla), patience (kṣānti), effort (vīrya), meditation (dhyāna) and wisdom (prajñā). Expanded lists add four more — skill in means (upāya), vow (praṇidhāna), power (bala) and knowledge (jñāna) — to make ten, which correspond to the ten stages. The list overlaps with the Theravāda perfections (Chapter 2), but its emphasis differs: the sixth perfection, wisdom, is understood as insight into emptiness (śūnyatā), and the Perfection of Wisdom sūtras insist that the other five are perfections only when they are practised with that insight, without fixing on giver, gift or recipient as real entities.
5.2.3 The Ten Bhūmis (Stages)¶
The Daśabhūmika Sūtra and related texts map the bodhisattva’s career onto ten stages (bhūmi), each associated with the perfection of one of the ten perfections. The first, the “joyous” (pramuditā), begins with the arising of the mind of awakening and the practice of generosity; the stages then rise through the “stainless” (vimalā), “luminous” (prabhākarī), “radiant” (arciṣmatī), “difficult to conquer” (sudurjayā) and “facing” (abhimukhī) stages, in which morality, patience, effort, meditation and wisdom are perfected in turn. The seventh, “far-going” (dūraṅgamā), perfects skill in means; with the eighth, “immovable” (acalā), the bodhisattva can no longer fall back; and the ninth (sādhumatī, “good intelligence”) and tenth (dharmameghā, “cloud of Dharma”) lead to consecration as a Buddha. The scheme turned an aspiration that the earlier schools had reserved for a few future Buddhas into a path that any committed practitioner could, in principle, enter.
5.3 Prajñāpāramitā: The Perfection of Wisdom¶
The Prajñāpāramitā (“Perfection of Wisdom”) literature is the earliest body of Mahāyāna scripture and the source of its central philosophical idea. Ranging from the vast Śatasāhasrikā (100,000 lines) to the concentrated essence of the Hṛdaya Sūtra (Heart Sūtra), this literature expounds the central Mahāyāna insight into Śūnyatā (emptiness) (Conze 1973; Williams 2009).
Iha Śāriputra rūpaṃ śūnyatā,
śūnyataiva rūpam;
rūpān na pṛthak śūnyatā,
śūnyatāyā na pṛthag rūpam.
Yad rūpaṃ sā śūnyatā,
yā śūnyatā tad rūpam.
Here, O Śāriputra, form is emptiness, and the very emptiness is form; emptiness does not differ from form, form does not differ from emptiness; whatever is form, that is emptiness, whatever is emptiness, that is form.
— Prajñāpāramitā-hṛdaya Sūtra (Heart Sūtra)
The Heart Sūtra, a short text whose Indian origin some scholars have questioned, is chanted daily in monasteries from Japan to Tibet and Vietnam. Its paradoxical formulations state the central claim of the Perfection of Wisdom: that the ultimate nature of all phenomena is emptiness of inherent existence (śūnyatā), and that this emptiness is not a void apart from things but the way in which things themselves exist.
5.4 Śūnyatā: The Doctrine of Emptiness¶
Śūnyatā (“emptiness,” “voidness”) is the key philosophical concept of the Mahāyāna, and its proper understanding is essential for comprehending the Madhyamaka and, to a significant extent, the Yogācāra philosophies (Williams 2009; Siderits 2007).
Śūnyatā does not mean “nothingness” or “non-existence.” Rather, it signifies the absence of svabhāva (inherent existence, self-nature, own-being) in all phenomena. All things arise in dependence upon causes and conditions (Pratītyasamutpāda), and therefore no thing possesses independent, self-sufficient existence. This is what it means for something to be “empty” — empty of self-existence, but not empty of conventional existence and functional efficacy.
5.5 Madhyamaka: The Middle Way Philosophy of Nāgārjuna¶
The philosophical school that most rigorously developed the doctrine of Śūnyatā is the Madhyamaka (“Middle Way”), founded by Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250 CE). Almost nothing certain is known of his life. Later legend made him the recoverer of the Perfection of Wisdom sūtras from the realm of the serpents (nāga), an alchemist and an abbot of Nālandā (Chapter 7); his letter of advice to a king, the Ratnāvalī, suggests that he worked under the Sātavāhanas of the Deccan, and Walser places him in a monastery of the Krishna valley (Walser 2005). His arguments set the terms of Mahāyāna philosophy for a millennium and drew sustained replies from the Nyāya and other schools.
5.5.1 Nāgārjuna and the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā¶
Nāgārjuna’s magnum opus, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (“Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way”), consists of 448 verses organised in 27 chapters. In this work, Nāgārjuna subjects every fundamental philosophical category — causation, motion, the self, time, the Buddha, and Nirvāṇa itself — to a rigorous dialectical analysis and demonstrates that none of them possesses svabhāva (inherent existence).
Na svato nāpi parato
na dvābhyāṃ nāpy ahetutaḥ
utpannā jātu vidyante
bhāvāḥ kva cana ke cana.
Neither from themselves, nor from another, nor from both, nor without cause do things ever arise anywhere.
— Mūlamadhyamakakārikā I.1
This verse, which opens the first chapter after the dedicatory verses, encapsulates the Madhyamaka method (Garfield 1995; Westerhoff 2009): a systematic examination and refutation of all possible theories of origination, demonstrating that no account of inherent causation can withstand philosophical scrutiny.
5.5.2 The Two Truths¶
Nāgārjuna’s arguments might seem to deny that anything exists at all. He answers the charge with the distinction between two truths. Conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya) is the level of everyday practice, at which things exist, function and interact under the names and categories of ordinary life; ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya) is the recognition that none of them exists by its own nature. The two are not two worlds. Emptiness is the ultimate nature of the very things that are conventionally real, and the ultimate can be taught only by relying on the conventional:
Dve satye samupāśritya
buddhānāṃ dharmadeśanā;
loka-saṃvṛti-satyaṃ ca
satyaṃ ca paramārthataḥ.
The Dharma taught by the Buddhas is based on two truths: the conventional truth of the world and the ultimate truth.
— Mūlamadhyamakakārikā XXIV.8
The same reasoning leads to the claim that saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are not ultimately distinct, since neither has a nature of its own that could separate it from the other:
Na saṃsārasya nirvāṇāt
kiṃcid asti viśeṣaṇam;
na nirvāṇasya saṃsārāt
kiṃcid asti viśeṣaṇam.
There is no distinction whatsoever between Saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa; there is no distinction whatsoever between Nirvāṇa and Saṃsāra.
— Mūlamadhyamakakārikā XXV.19
5.5.3 Later Madhyamaka¶
The Madhyamaka school underwent significant development after Nāgārjuna, branching into two main sub-schools:
- Prāsaṅgika
- Associated with Buddhapālita (c. 470–540 CE) and Candrakīrti (c. 600–650 CE), who held that a Mādhyamika should use only prasaṅga (reductio ad absurdum) arguments, drawing out the unwanted consequences of an opponent’s position without advancing an independent thesis.
- Svātantrika
- Associated with Bhāviveka (c. 500–570 CE), who criticised Buddhapālita and held that a Mādhyamika may also use independent (svatantra) inferences of the kind formalised by Dignāga.
These two labels were coined later by Tibetan scholars to classify Indian authors; the Indian thinkers themselves did not use them as names of schools (Williams and Tribe 2000). A later synthesis of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra was made by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla in the eighth century (Section 5.8.3).
5.6 Yogācāra: The Mind-Only School¶
The second great philosophical school of the Mahāyāna is the Yogācāra (“Practice of Yoga”), also known as Vijñānavāda (“Doctrine of Consciousness”) or Cittamātra (“Mind-Only”). Systematised by the brothers Asaṅga and Vasubandhu (4th–5th century CE; their exact dates are disputed), who drew on earlier texts such as the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra and teachings that tradition attributes to Maitreya, the Yogācāra school developed a detailed analysis of consciousness and its objects.
5.6.1 The Eight Consciousnesses¶
The Yogācāra school posits eight types of consciousness (vijñāna; Table 5.1).
| No. | Consciousness | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 1–5 | Five Sense Consciousnesses | Visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactile consciousness |
| 6 | Mano-vijñāna | Mental consciousness: the discursive, conceptual mind |
| 7 | Manas (or Kliṣṭamanas) | The “afflicted mind”: the deep, unconscious layer of self-grasping that underlies the sense of a permanent “I” |
| 8 | Ālaya-vijñāna | The “storehouse consciousness”: the fundamental ground consciousness that stores the seeds (bīja) of all experiences and karmic imprints |
The storehouse consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna) answers a problem that the earlier Abhidharma had left open: if every mental event lasts only a moment, where are the traces of past actions kept until they ripen? It functions as a repository of karmic seeds (bīja) that ripen under appropriate conditions to produce the manifold appearances of the world. Modern scholars have compared the Yogācāra analysis of consciousness with themes in phenomenology, while debating whether the school should be read as an idealism (Williams 2009).
5.6.2 The Three Natures (Trisvabhāva)¶
The doctrine of the three natures (trisvabhāva) is the Yogācāra counterpart of the two truths. The “imagined” nature (parikalpita) is the way things appear to the unawakened mind, as independent objects set over against an independent subject; it is a conceptual superimposition with no reality of its own. The “dependent” nature (paratantra) is the flow of experience itself, arising from causes and conditions. The “consummate” nature (pariniṣpanna) is the dependent nature seen free of the imagined one — experience without the duality of subject and object. The scheme allowed Yogācāra authors to say, against what they saw as a nihilistic reading of the Madhyamaka, that something is real (the dependent flow of consciousness) even though the world as we ordinarily construe it is not.
5.7 The Tathāgata-garbha Doctrine¶
A third major strand of Mahāyāna philosophical thought, alongside Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, is the Tathāgata-garbha (“Buddha-womb” or “Buddha-embryo”) doctrine. This teaching holds that all sentient beings possess within themselves the garbha (womb, seed, matrix) of Buddhahood — an inherent potential for enlightenment that is obscured by adventitious defilements but never destroyed.
The Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra illustrates this teaching with nine similes: the buddha-nature in beings is like honey surrounded by bees, a grain inside its husk, gold fallen into filth, or a treasure buried beneath a poor man’s house (Williams 2009). The sūtra’s formula “all beings are tathāgatagarbhas”, that is, contain the Tathāgata as an embryo (sarvasattvās tathāgatagarbhāḥ, quoted in Sanskrit as the Buddha’s words in the commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga, since the sūtra itself survives only in Chinese and Tibetan), is taken up and systematised in the Ratnagotravibhāga.
The key texts of this tradition include the Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra, the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, the Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanāda Sūtra, and the Ratnagotravibhāga (attributed in Tibetan tradition to Maitreya and Asaṅga, in Chinese tradition to Sāramati). The doctrine had its greatest influence in East Asia, where, mediated especially by the Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna, it was an important influence on Chinese Huayan (whose scriptural basis was the Avataṃsaka Sūtra) and on the Japanese idea of “original enlightenment” (hongaku).
Tathāgatagarbha, Madhyamaka and Yogācāra
How the Tathāgatagarbha doctrine relates to Madhyamaka and Yogācāra was debated for centuries, above all in Tibet. Tsongkhapa (1357–1419) and the Gelug school identified the garbha with the emptiness of the mind: because the mind lacks inherent existence, its defilements can be removed and awakening is possible. On this reading, sūtra passages that speak of a permanent essence endowed with the qualities of a Buddha are of interpretable meaning (neyārtha), not to be taken literally. The Jonang school of Dolpopa (1292–1361) held the opposite. The ultimate, the luminous nature of mind (prabhāsvara-citta) endowed with the qualities of Buddhahood, is permanent and real; it is “empty of other” (gzhan stong) — of the adventitious, conventional phenomena that are extraneous to it — but not empty of its own nature, whereas conventional phenomena are “empty of self” (rang stong) (Williams 2009).
5.8 Buddhist Logic: Dignāga and Dharmakīrti¶
The logicians Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, both Mahāyāna monks, created a system of epistemology and logic (pramāṇa) that became a common point of reference for Indian philosophers of every school. Their aim was not logic for its own sake: by showing what can be known by perception and inference alone, they sought to establish the Buddhist doctrines of momentariness and non-self, and the reliability of the Buddha’s teaching, on grounds that an opponent could not reject.
5.8.1 Dignāga’s Reforms¶
Dignāga (c. 480–540 CE), sometimes called the “father of Buddhist logic”, reshaped Indian epistemology with his Pramāṇasamuccaya (“Compendium of Valid Cognition”). He held that there are only two means of valid knowledge, perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna), because there are only two kinds of object: the unique particular, grasped by perception free of concepts, and the general characteristic, grasped by inference and conceptual thought. Testimony and comparison, which the Naiyāyikas counted separately, are reduced to inference. His theory of meaning by exclusion (apoha) explained how words can refer without real universals: the word “cow” does not name a positive “cowness” but excludes everything that is not a cow. He reformulated the inference-for-others from the five members of the Nyāya syllogism to three, and he set out precise conditions for a valid reason (hetu) in his “wheel of reasons” (hetucakra; Table 5.2). The wheel classifies the nine possible ways in which a reason can be present in, or absent from, the “similar cases” (sapakṣa, where the property to be proved is known to occur) and the “dissimilar cases” (vipakṣa, where it is known not to occur); only two of the nine give valid inferences, two give contradictory reasons, and the rest are inconclusive (Hattori 1968; Williams and Tribe 2000).
| In all similar cases | In some similar cases | In no similar case | |
|---|---|---|---|
| In no dissimilar case | Valid (no. 2) | Valid (no. 8) | Inconclusive, “uncommon” (no. 5) |
| In some dissimilar cases | Inconclusive (no. 3) | Inconclusive (no. 9) | Contradictory (no. 6) |
| In all dissimilar cases | Inconclusive (no. 1) | Inconclusive (no. 7) | Contradictory (no. 4) |
5.8.2 Dharmakīrti’s Elaboration¶
Dharmakīrti (6th–7th century) further developed Dignāga’s system in his Pramāṇavārttika (“Commentary on Valid Cognition”), which became the standard textbook of logic and epistemology in Tibetan monasteries (Dunne 2004). (Frauwallner’s long-accepted dates of c. 600–660 have been revised by some recent scholars to the later sixth century; this volume uses the broader range.) Dharmakīrti made the distinction between the unique particular (svalakṣaṇa) and the general characteristic (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) the basis of an ontology: only what is capable of causal efficacy is ultimately real, and that is the momentary particular. He gave a causal theory of perception, in which a valid perception must be produced by its object, and he grounded inference in a necessary connection (vyāpti) between reason and property, which can rest only on identity of nature (svabhāva) or on causality (kārya); the third kind of reason, non-perception (anupalabdhi), establishes absence. On these foundations he argued that whatever exists is momentary (kṣaṇikatva).
arthakriyāsamarthaṃ yat
tad atra paramārthasat;
anyat saṃvṛtisat proktaṃ,
te svasāmānyalakṣaṇe.
Whatever is capable of causal efficacy is here ultimately real; anything else is said to be conventionally real. These are, respectively, the particular and the universal characteristic.
— Dharmakīrti, Pramāṇavārttika 3.3 (= 2.3 in Miyasaka’s chapter order)
The Buddhist logical tradition shaped all later Indian epistemology. Brahmanical philosophers — the Naiyāyikas Uddyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra and Udayana, and the Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila — wrote extensive refutations of Buddhist positions, and the sharpening of Nyāya technique in these debates prepared the way for the “new” Nyāya (Navya-Nyāya) of Gaṅgeśa in the fourteenth century. The Jain logicians Akalaṅka and Vidyānanda similarly engaged with Buddhist logic while developing their own system (Chapter 9).
5.8.3 After Dharmakīrti¶
Dharmakīrti’s work was the starting point of a school that lasted five centuries, and it was this later tradition, more than Dignāga and Dharmakīrti themselves, that the Brahmanical and Jain philosophers of the late first millennium were answering. Commentators such as Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi expounded the Pramāṇavārttika; Dharmottara (8th century), whose commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Nyāyabindu was widely read in Kashmir, refined the theory of perception; and Prajñākaragupta’s Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra read Dharmakīrti as a defender of the Buddha’s authority as well as of logic (Dunne 2004; Williams and Tribe 2000).
In the eighth century Śāntarakṣita, a Nālandā scholar who helped to found the first Tibetan monastery (Chapter 6), wrote the Tattvasaṅgraha, a verse compendium that examines and rejects, one by one, the doctrines of the rival schools — a creator God, Sāṃkhya’s primordial nature, the permanent self of the Naiyāyikas and Jains, the eternal Veda of the Mīmāṃsakas, real universals — and ends with a defence of the Buddha’s omniscience against Kumārila. His pupil Kamalaśīla’s commentary (Pañjikā) quotes many of the opponents’ works, some of them otherwise lost. Śāntarakṣita also joined Dharmakīrti’s epistemology to Madhyamaka, treating the Yogācāra analysis as a stage on the way to the recognition that nothing has intrinsic nature (McClintock 2010).
The last great phase of the school belongs to Vikramaśīla in the late tenth and eleventh centuries. Jñānaśrīmitra and his pupil Ratnakīrti wrote treatises proving momentariness (kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi), restating the theory of exclusion and refuting proofs of God and of other minds; Mokṣākaragupta’s Tarkabhāṣā later summarised the system as a handbook. The Naiyāyika Udayana’s Ātmatattvaviveka and Nyāyakusumāñjali, the classic Brahmanical defences of the self and of God, were written largely against these authors. When the eastern monasteries were destroyed around 1200 (Chapter 7), the school ended in India, but its texts were translated into Tibetan, and its arguments survived in the works of its Nyāya and Jain opponents.
5.9 The Concept of Upāya (Skilful Means)¶
One of the most distinctive and practically significant doctrines of the Mahāyāna is upāya-kauśalya (“skill in means”) — the principle that the Buddha and advanced Bodhisattvas adapt their teachings and methods to the capacities, temperaments, and circumstances of the beings they are guiding. The doctrine allowed Mahāyāna authors to explain the diversity of Buddhist teachings, including the older teachings they claimed to surpass, as adaptations to different audiences; critics, ancient and modern, have noted that it also made almost any innovation defensible.
The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra (Lotus Sūtra) articulates this principle through its famous parables, including the Parable of the Burning House: a father, seeing his children playing inside a burning house, lures them out by promising them different types of carriages (goat-carts, deer-carts, ox-carts), only to give them all the finest carriage (the Great White Ox-Cart). The different vehicles represent the diverse Buddhist paths, while the great carriage represents the one supreme vehicle (ekayāna) of the Mahāyāna.
5.10 Key Mahāyāna Sūtras¶
The Mahāyāna produced a vast body of sūtra literature, much of it surviving only in Chinese and Tibetan translation. Besides the Perfection of Wisdom sūtras, which supplied the Madhyamaka with its themes, the most influential were the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka (Lotus Sūtra), with its teaching of the one vehicle (ekayāna) and of the Buddha’s immeasurable life; the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa, whose hero is a lay bodhisattva who answers the question of non-duality with silence; the Avataṃsaka, with its vision of the interpenetration of all phenomena; the Laṅkāvatāra, important for Yogācāra and for Chan and Zen; and the Sukhāvatīvyūha sūtras, the basis of devotion to the Buddha Amitābha and his “Pure Land”. Several of these became the founding scriptures of East Asian schools, so that the Mahāyāna known in China and Japan was in large part built on Indian texts that had little institutional weight in India itself. The Buddhist schools are placed among the other Indian philosophical systems in Volume 3 of this series (Darśana Darpaṇa).