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Chapter 9: Dharma in the Epics — Hard Cases, Distress and Limits

dharma eva hato hanti dharmo rakṣati rakṣitaḥ /
tasmād dharmo na hantavyo mā no dharmo hato ’vadhīt //

— Manusmṛti 8.15

The verse of the Manusmṛti quoted above states the traditional conviction about dharma: “Dharma, when violated, destroys; dharma, when protected, protects. Therefore dharma must not be violated, lest violated dharma destroy us.” The narrative chapters of this volume have described the epics’ teachings episode by episode. This chapter asks a different question: what kind of moral thinking do the epics do? It looks at the cases in which duties conflict, at the doctrine of conduct in distress, at the rules of war and their breach, and at the limits that caste and gender set to the epic ethic.

9.1 What Dharma Means in the Epics

The Sanskrit concept of dharma — at once cosmic order, religious duty, law, custom and virtue — has no single English equivalent. Alf Hiltebeitel has argued that the word, relatively uncommon and specialised in the Vedic texts, became a central term of brahmanical thought only in the centuries around Mauryan rule, partly in response to its use by Aśoka and the Buddhists, and that the epics, together with the Dharmasūtras and the Manusmṛti, worked out its meaning in narrative (Hiltebeitel 2011). In the epics dharma is not a single code. There is a dharma common to all (sādhāraṇa dharma) — truthfulness, non-injury, compassion; the Mahābhārata repeatedly calls non-cruelty (ānṛśaṃsya) the highest dharma. Beside it stand the duties of one’s class and stage of life (varṇāśrama dharma), the duty of one’s own station (svadharma), as when Kṛṣṇa tells Arjuna that for a warrior nothing is better than a righteous war (Gītā 2.31), the duties of the king (rājadharma), of the lineage (kuladharma) and of women (strīdharma), and the special rules of distress (āpaddharma). These obligations vary with person and circumstance, and they can conflict, so that dharma must often be discerned afresh: the epic’s own term is “the subtlety of dharma” (Section 4.14).

The Purāṇas teach dharma differently. Instead of a single narrative full of dilemmas, they offer exemplary stories of devotees, sinners, kings and sages, tales attached to particular vows (vrata kathās) and places (tīrtha māhātmyas; Section 8.12), and direct instruction in dialogue. The hard cases are mostly the epics’.

9.2 Ideal and Hard Case: The Two Epics Compared

The tradition reads the Rāmāyaṇa as a poem of ideals and the Mahābhārata as a poem of dilemmas. The contrast is useful if it is not pressed too hard. Rāma’s acceptance of exile is the Rāmāyaṇa’s model of truth-keeping (satya), and the tradition reads it as a conscious choice to honour his father’s word at great cost; but Lakṣmaṇa’s angry objection that the promise was extorted, and Rāma’s reply, show that the poem itself recognised the question. Rāma’s compassion towards the vulture Jaṭāyu, whom he cremates with his own hands, towards Śabarī and towards Vibhīṣaṇa is equally part of the ideal. The ideal kingdom of Rāma, Rāmarājya, was invoked by Gandhi as a model of just and non-violent self-rule, and modern interpreters have drawn from it the principles that the king exists for the people and must heed the humblest subject. The Rāmāyaṇa’s own ideal kingdom, however, was one of hierarchical order: the Rāma who banishes Sītā because of a subject’s gossip is the Rāma who executes the Śūdra Śambūka (Sections 3.6.3 and 3.7.4).

The Mahābhārata makes the conflict of duties its subject. Arjuna’s refusal to fight his kin, Draupadī’s question in the dicing hall, Karṇa’s loyalty to Duryodhana, Bhīṣma’s silence and Yudhiṣṭhira’s half-truth are described in Section 4.12; the sections below take up the epic’s explicit reflection on such cases.

9.3 The Subtlety of Truth

Truth-telling is the virtue for which Yudhiṣṭhira is famous, and the Mahābhārata examines it most closely. In the Karṇa Parva, Arjuna, who has vowed to kill anyone who tells him to give his bow to another, is about to kill Yudhiṣṭhira for having done so in a moment of anger. Kṛṣṇa stops him with a discourse on the subtlety of truth: speaking the truth is good, but there are circumstances — to save a life, for instance — in which untruth is not wrong, and a truth that leads to the death of the innocent is not dharma. He illustrates the point with the story of the ascetic Kauśika, who had vowed always to speak the truth. When robbers pursuing some travellers asked him where they had gone, he told them, and the travellers were killed; Kṛṣṇa declares that Kauśika went to hell for it. Truth divorced from compassion and judgement is, on this view, not dharma but its perversion.

The same tension runs through the episode of Yudhiṣṭhira’s half-truth. Persuaded by Kṛṣṇa, he confirms to Droṇa that “Aśvatthāman is dead,” meaning the elephant of that name, and Droṇa lays down his arms. The epic does not let the deed pass: Yudhiṣṭhira’s chariot, which had always floated above the ground, touches the earth, and at the end of the poem he must glimpse hell before he enters heaven (Sections 5.7 and 5.18). The episode raises questions about the limits of truthfulness, the weight of consequences and the moral cost of victory that the epic leaves unresolved.

9.4 Vidura Nīti — The Wisdom of Vidura

Vidura, the wise counsellor born of Vyāsa and a servant woman (dāsī), is the voice of practical wisdom in the Mahābhārata. His counsel to Dhṛtarāṣṭra on a sleepless night before the war (Udyoga Parva, chapters 33–40 in the CE), part of the Prajāgaraparvan or “Book of the Vigil,” is a classic collection of maxims on nīti, the science of wise conduct. Its themes include the marks of the wise and the foolish, the choice of counsellors, the vices that ruin kings (gambling, drink, women and hunting), the dangers of greed and anger, the duty of a king to protect his subjects, the grounding of prosperity in dharma, and the folly of favouring a wicked son — a pointed lesson for its royal listener. One of its best-known verses lists the faults to be abandoned by anyone who seeks prosperity:

Vidura’s Six Faults — Udyoga Parva 5.33.66 (Critical Edition)

ṣaḍ doṣāḥ puruṣeṇeha hātavyā bhūtim icchatā /
nidrā tandrī bhayaṃ krodha ālasyaṃ dīrghasūtratā //
Translation:
“Six faults should be abandoned by a man who desires prosperity here: sleep, drowsiness, fear, anger, idleness and procrastination.”

The vigil continues with the more metaphysical teaching of the Sanatsujātīya (Section 11.3).

9.5 The Doctrine of Āpad Dharma: Ethics in Extremity

A distinctive contribution of the Mahābhārata to ethical thought is the doctrine of āpaddharma, conduct appropriate in times of extreme distress. Elaborated in the second section of the Śānti Parva (Section 5.12), it addresses what happens when normal rules conflict with survival itself, for kings in danger of losing their kingdoms and for individuals facing famine (Table 9.1).

Table 9.1. Normal Rules and Their Modification in Times of Distress (Āpad)
Normal Rule Modification in Distress Illustration
Brahmins live by teaching and sacrifice May take up the occupations of other classes Droṇa and Aśvatthāman live as warriors
Rules of diet and purity May be suspended to preserve life Viśvāmitra, starving in a famine, steals dog’s meat from an outcaste (caṇḍāla) and argues with him about dharma
A king must act openly and honestly May use stratagems and alliances of convenience to survive Bhīṣma’s teachings on the king in distress, such as the parable of the cat and the mouse

The Viśvāmitra story is the sharpest. The outcaste, not the sage, defends the rules of purity, and the sage answers that a man must first stay alive in order to practise dharma at all; the text lets the argument stand. The āpaddharma teaching, like the cases of truth above, illustrates the principle that dharma is “subtle” (sūkṣma) and must be discerned rather than read off from rules.

9.5.1 The Yakṣa Praśna

The Yakṣa Praśna (“Questions of the Yakṣa”; Āraṇyaka Parva 3.295–299 in the CE, 3.311–315 in the vulgate) gathers the epic’s ethical wisdom in the form of riddles. A Yakṣa, who is Dharma himself in disguise, has killed four of the brothers at a forest pool, and Yudhiṣṭhira wins them back by answering his questions (Table 9.2). Offered the life of one brother, he chooses Nakula, the son of his father’s other wife, so that each of Pāṇḍu’s queens should have a living son — an answer that the Yakṣa rewards by reviving them all.

Table 9.2. Selected Questions and Answers from the Yakṣa Praśna (rows marked * are found only in the vulgate)
Yakṣa’s Question Yudhiṣṭhira’s Answer
What is swifter than the wind? The mind (Manas)
What is the greatest wonder in the world?* That men see others dying daily, yet believe themselves immortal
What is the path?* The path is that which the great have walked; argument and scripture alone lead to no conclusion
What must one renounce to become beloved? Pride
What must one renounce to become wealthy? Desire
What makes a person a Brāhmaṇa?* Conduct, not birth or learning alone

Yudhiṣṭhira’s answer that conduct, not birth, makes a brahmin — repeated in his dialogue with the serpent Nahuṣa — is often quoted as evidence of the epic’s liberality. It must be read alongside the many passages that affirm hereditary hierarchy (Section 9.8).

9.6 The Ethics of War: Yuddha Dharma

The Mahābhārata examines at length when war is justified and how it may be fought. The Udyoga Parva debates whether war can be avoided, and Kṛṣṇa’s embassy dramatises the principle that peaceful means should be exhausted first. The conventions that the two sides agree at the start of the war (Section 4.15) require warriors to fight their equals, and forbid striking those who withdraw, surrender or are disarmed, those engaged with another, and charioteers and attendants; the rules of the mace duel forbid blows below the navel.

The narrative of the eighteen days then records how these conventions give way, on both sides. Abhimanyu is surrounded and killed by several great warriors at once. Fighting, which normally ceased at sunset, continues through the fourteenth night by torchlight. Bhīṣma falls because the Pāṇḍavas, on his own advice, place Śikhaṇḍin before Arjuna: Bhīṣma has vowed not to fight one who was born a woman, lowers his weapons, and is shot down from behind Śikhaṇḍin — a stratagem that turns the old warrior’s own code against him. Droṇa is deceived by the half-truth about his son and beheaded after he has laid down his arms; Karṇa is shot while he struggles to free his chariot wheel; Bhīma breaks Duryodhana’s thighs with a blow below the navel, to the fury of Balarāma. On the Kaurava side, Aśvatthāman’s massacre of the sleeping camp breaks every rule at once. Several of the Pāṇḍava breaches are made on Kṛṣṇa’s advice, and when they are denounced he defends them on the ground that the Kaurava champions could not have been killed in fair fight and had themselves broken the rules first. The epic records the defence without quite endorsing it: the victory is real, and so is its moral cost.

9.7 Forgiveness and Compassion: Kṣamā

The epics also praise forgiveness (kṣamā) as one of the highest virtues. In the Āraṇyaka Parva, Draupadī and Bhīma argue passionately that the Pāṇḍavas should take revenge on the Kauravas; Draupadī cites the teaching of Prahlāda to his grandson Bali that there is a time for forbearance and a time for force. Yudhiṣṭhira replies by praising forgiveness, quoting verses that declare forgiveness to be dharma, sacrifice and truth itself (kṣamā dharmaḥ kṣamā yajñaḥ, 3.30.36). The text gives both sides their full weight, and the war that follows shows the costs of both justice and mercy.

9.8 Dharma, Caste and Gender: The Limits of the Epic Ethic

An honest account of the epics’ moral teaching must acknowledge that their dharma is the dharma of a hierarchical society. The duties they prescribe are differentiated by varṇa and by gender, and the narratives often enforce those differences.

  • Ekalavya: In the Ādi Parva, a Niṣāda (tribal) youth who has taught himself archery before a clay image of Droṇa is asked by Droṇa for his right thumb as the teacher’s fee, so that Arjuna may remain the greatest archer. Ekalavya gives it.

  • Karṇa: At the tournament of the princes, Karṇa is mocked as a charioteer’s son and told he may not compete with princes; his humiliation drives him into Duryodhana’s camp.

  • Śambūka: In the Rāmāyaṇa’s Uttarakāṇḍa, the ideal king executes a Śūdra for practising austerities (Section 3.7.4).

  • Women: The Anuśāsana Parva’s teachings on the duties of women (strīdharma) present the wife’s devotion to her husband as her highest religious duty, and Sītā’s and Draupadī’s sufferings are framed by a patriarchal order — even as both women challenge it in speech (Chapter 10).

At the same time, the epics contain voices that question the hierarchy: Yudhiṣṭhira’s answers to the Yakṣa and to Nahuṣa, the Gītā’s promise of liberation to women and Śūdras (9.32), Draupadī’s challenge in the assembly, and the devotional traditions that made Śabarī and other low-born devotees into exemplars. Modern readers have responded in different ways: B. R. Ambedkar treated the epics as charters of caste; Dalit writers have adopted Ekalavya and Śambūka as emblems of the denial of knowledge to the oppressed; and feminist historians such as Uma Chakravarti have analysed how epic and Dharmaśāstra norms linked the control of women’s sexuality to the maintenance of caste (Ambedkar 1987; Chakravarti 2003). Recognising these limits does not cancel the epics’ ethical depth; it situates it historically.

9.9 Modern Uses of the Epics’ Ethics

The epics’ teachings on dharma are widely invoked in modern public life, and the ways in which they are used are themselves part of their history. Gandhi made Rāmarājya the name of his ideal of self-rule and anāsakti, non-attachment, the key to the Gītā; Tilak read the same text as a call to selfless political action (Section 6.13). Writers on public administration cite Bhīṣma’s teachings on royal duty, and writers on negotiation the Udyoga Parva’s account of Kṛṣṇa’s embassy. Environmental campaigns invoke the sacredness of rivers and forests in the epics and Purāṇas (Section 12.7). A large popular and management literature presents the Gītā’s svadharma and action without attachment as an ethic for professional life. That use reinterprets the texts: the classical commentators understood svadharma as the duty of one’s hereditary station (Section 6.5), and its modern reading as individual vocation is a twentieth-century development. Against all these stand the Dalit and feminist readings described above, for which the same texts are evidence of what modern India must leave behind. The epics continue, in short, to provide the vocabulary in which Indians argue about right action, whichever side of the argument they take.