Chapter 19: Science, Famine and the State: Agricultural Research in India, 1870–1970¶
19.1 From Revenue to Improvement¶
For most of Indian history the state took an interest in agriculture chiefly as the source of its revenue. The Arthaśāstra’s superintendent of agriculture ran crown farms and recorded rainfall; Sultanate and Mughal officials measured fields and fixed cash rates for each crop; the early East India Company settled the land revenue with zamīndārs and ryots (Chapters 3 and 18). Rulers also built canals and tanks, laid out gardens, kept studs and promoted particular crops, as Tipu Sultan promoted mulberry silk in Mysore. But there was no permanent institution whose business was to study crops, soils, pests and animals and to change the way cultivators worked.
Between about 1870 and 1970 that changed. A colonial government that had seen itself mainly as a collector of revenue came, under the pressure of famine, of imperial demand for raw materials and later of Indian political opinion, to accept the improvement of agriculture as one of its duties. It created departments of agriculture, research institutes and colleges, crop-breeding stations, a statistical service and, in 1929, a central council for agricultural research. After independence these institutions were enlarged and redirected, and in the mid-1960s they carried out the programme of high-yielding varieties that came to be called the Green Revolution.
This history belongs in a volume on Indian knowledge of fields, plants and animals for two reasons. The new institutions studied Indian crops, soils and practices, sometimes with real respect for the knowledge of cultivators, as in the work of Voelcker and Howard (Chapters 7 and 10), and often without it. And the people who worked in them were increasingly Indian, so that by the middle of the twentieth century there was a body of Indian agricultural science — in sugarcane breeding, plant pathology, cotton technology and the statistics of crop surveys — whose results were used well beyond India. Historians disagree about how far colonial agricultural science served the cultivator rather than the treasury and the export trade (Kumar 1995; Arnold 2000); both motives are visible in what follows.
Several related subjects are treated elsewhere: revenue settlements, commercial crops, plantations, famines and peasant movements in Chapter 18; colonial irrigation in Section 8.12; the veterinary services and cattle breeding in Sections 13.6 and 13.12; colonial forestry in Chapter 11; monsoon forecasting in Chapter 3; and the economic history of the famines in Volume 19 (Vāṇijya and Samudra). The consequences of the Green Revolution for land, water and farmers are assessed in Chapter 20; this chapter tells how it came about.
19.2 Before the Departments: Gardens and the Transfer of Plants¶
Before there were departments of agriculture, the East India Company’s interest in plants was expressed through botanical gardens and learned societies, whose purpose was as much commercial as scientific. The Calcutta garden at Sibpur, founded in 1787 on the proposal of the army officer Robert Kyd, was intended to grow plants of commercial value, such as spices and timber trees, and to acclimatise useful plants from elsewhere; its botanical work under William Roxburgh and his successors is described in Section 6.9. In 1820 the Agricultural and Horticultural Society of India was founded in Calcutta on the initiative of the Baptist missionary William Carey. It distributed seed of vegetables, fruit trees, cottons and sugarcanes from other parts of the world, held shows and published transactions, and drew in Indian landholders as well as Europeans. Smaller gardens, such as the one at Saharanpur taken over by the Company in 1817, served as trial grounds for the north.
The most consequential of these early ventures was tea. The botanist John Forbes Royle, superintendent at Saharanpur, was among those who argued that tea could be grown in the Himalaya, and in 1834 the Governor-General, William Bentinck, appointed a Tea Committee to pursue the idea. Tea plants growing wild in upper Assam, whose leaves the Singpho and other hill peoples already used, were brought to the Company’s attention in the 1820s and 1830s; after initial doubts the Assam plant was accepted as a form of the tea plant, and the Assam Company began commercial planting in 1839. Between 1848 and 1851 Robert Fortune, working for the Company, collected tea plants and seed in China and brought Chinese tea makers to the north-western Himalaya. In the event the Assam plant and its hybrids came to dominate the plantations of the Brahmaputra valley, while Chinese types did best in the cooler hills of Darjeeling. The plantation system that followed, with its indentured labour, is described in Section 18.8.
Tea was one of many transfers. Cinchona was brought from the Andes to the Nilgiris and Darjeeling in the 1860s (Section 12.5), and seeds of the Pará rubber tree, collected in Brazil in 1876 and raised at Kew, were distributed to the gardens of Ceylon, Malaya and India; rubber plantations spread in Travancore and Malabar in the early twentieth century. Historians of empire have described the botanical gardens as the nodes of an imperial network for moving useful plants around the world (Drayton 2000; Grove 1995). In India that network rested on local knowledge at many points: the hill peoples who knew the wild tea, the gardeners (mālī) who propagated the plants, and the Indian artists and informants on whom the botanists depended.
19.3 Famine and the Making of Agricultural Departments¶
The immediate origin of the colonial agricultural services was famine. The Orissa famine of 1866, in which perhaps a million people died, was followed by official inquiries that blamed, among other things, the government’s ignorance of the state of the crops and of food stocks. In 1871 Lord Mayo’s government created a Department of Revenue, Agriculture and Commerce. Its first secretary, Allan Octavian Hume — known today as a founder of the Indian National Congress and as an ornithologist (Chapter 17) — wanted it to collect reliable agricultural statistics, run experimental farms and prepare for famine. The department was cut back for reasons of economy and Hume was removed from it in 1879, the year he published his argument for a reformed agricultural administration (Hume 1879).
The decisive document was the report of the Famine Commission of 1880, presided over by Richard Strachey, which followed the great famine of 1876–1878 (Indian Famine Commission 1880). Its best-known recommendations concerned relief: that the state should accept a duty to save life; that the able-bodied should be employed on public works at a subsistence wage and the infirm relieved without work; and that each province should have a Famine Code setting out in advance how scarcity was to be recognised and relief organised. Provincial codes followed from 1883. But the commission also recommended that each province should have a department of agriculture, whose first task would be to collect accurate information about crops, prices and the condition of the people, and whose second would be to improve agriculture. A reconstituted Department of Revenue and Agriculture was set up in the Government of India in 1881, and provincial departments were organised in the following years.
For two decades these departments did little research. Their energy went into land records and statistics; a few experimental farms, such as those near Madras and at Kanpur, tested imported implements and crops, often with poor results (Section 7.15). The famines of 1896–1897 and 1899–1900 produced two further commissions, in 1898 under James Lyall and in 1901 under Antony MacDonnell, and an Irrigation Commission (1901–1903). The 1901 commission argued that relief should begin early, before people had sold their cattle and implements, and pressed for agricultural improvement, irrigation and rural credit. The Co-operative Credit Societies Act of 1904, which provided for village credit societies, was one response. In this way famine policy and agricultural policy grew up together: the same reports that organised relief works also called for research into crops and soils.
19.4 Voelcker, Pusa and the Imperial Scientists¶
Voelcker’s report of 1893, whose findings on Indian practice are described in Section 7.5.2, also recommended that the government employ trained scientists, and in 1892 an agricultural chemist was appointed to the Government of India.
Research on a larger scale came under Lord Curzon (Viceroy 1899–1905). An Inspector-General of Agriculture was appointed in 1901. A gift of £30,000 from the American philanthropist Henry Phipps, placed at Curzon’s disposal, was used to found an Agricultural Research Institute and College on a government estate at Pusa in north Bihar, which had earlier served as a stud farm (Chapter 15); the institute opened in 1905. The name comes from the village. The story, still sometimes repeated, that “Pusa” is an acronym of “Phipps of USA” is a later invention. The institute was renamed Imperial in 1919, was damaged in the Bihar earthquake of 1934 and moved to New Delhi in 1936, where it became, after independence, the Indian Agricultural Research Institute.
Pusa was organised around a small number of imperial specialists, each responsible for a discipline across the whole of India. Some of their work became standard. E. J. Butler, the Imperial Mycologist, surveyed the fungal diseases of Indian crops and summarised them in Fungi and Disease in Plants (1918), the first systematic account of plant diseases in India (Butler 1918). H. Maxwell-Lefroy, the Imperial Entomologist, published Indian Insect Life (1909), a manual of the insects of the plains, many of them crop pests (Maxwell-Lefroy and Howlett 1909). Albert Howard and Gabrielle Howard, the imperial economic botanists, surveyed the wheats of India and began the breeding work described below. In the provinces, colleges of agriculture were founded or reorganised in the years around 1905–1910 at Poona, Kanpur, Lyallpur, Nagpur, Coimbatore and Sabour, and an Indian Agricultural Service was created for the senior staff.
The senior posts were held almost entirely by Europeans until the 1920s, and research priorities reflected imperial interests: export crops such as cotton, jute, wheat and indigo received more attention than millets and pulses, and very little was done for the rain-fed farming of the poorest regions. The fate of indigo shows the limits of science in the service of a declining trade. After synthetic indigo came on the market in 1897, the Bihar planters and the government financed research at Pusa and on the plantations into better varieties and processing, in the hope of making natural indigo competitive; the effort brought a brief revival during the First World War, when German dyes were cut off, but could not save the industry (Kumar 2012). Yet the institutions also trained Indian scientists, built up collections and field stations, and produced knowledge that later Indian governments used. Kumar (1995) has argued that colonial science was shaped above all by the needs of empire; even on that view its Indian heirs inherited working institutions.
The colleges founded in the first decade of the century had a difficult start. Their students came mostly from literate, landholding and often high-caste families, and most sought posts in the agricultural and revenue departments rather than returning to farm; the Royal Commission of 1928 was among those who observed that agricultural education had become a route to government service. The cultivators themselves were reached, if at all, through demonstration plots, agricultural shows, leaflets in the regional languages and the advice of the department’s field staff. The distance between the college-trained officer and the cultivator whose knowledge Voelcker had praised was a recurring weakness of the colonial system, and the extension services of the 1950s and the agricultural universities of the 1960s (Section 19.12) were in part attempts to close it.
19.5 Breeding Better Crops¶
Indian cultivators had always selected their seed (Section 9.14). What the research stations added was deliberate crossing between chosen parents, the testing of progeny in replicated field trials, and the multiplication and distribution of named varieties. Four crops illustrate the work and its results.
19.5.1 Wheat and its rusts¶
Albert and Gabrielle Howard began by classifying the wheats actually grown in India, which turned out to be mixtures of many types. From them they selected pure lines and made crosses, and their varieties Pusa 4 and Pusa 12, valued for yield and for grain quality, were widely grown in the United Provinces and the Punjab in the 1910s and 1920s. In the Punjab canal colonies the breeders at Lyallpur produced their own varieties, among which C 591, released in the 1930s, remained in cultivation for decades and was used as a parent in later breeding.
The great enemy of wheat was rust. Three rust fungi — black (stem), brown (leaf) and yellow (stripe) rust — caused heavy losses in some years. K. C. Mehta of Agra College showed, in studies carried out from the 1920s to the 1940s, that the rusts could not survive the hot summer of the plains, and that infection was renewed each season from spores that persisted on wheat and grasses in the hills — the Himalaya in the north and the Nilgiri and Palni hills in the south — and were carried down by the wind. His work explained the pattern of rust epidemics and pointed to remedies, among them breeding for resistance. At the Imperial (later Indian) Agricultural Research Institute, B. P. Pal bred rust-resistant wheats of the NP (“New Pusa”) series in the 1940s and 1950s.
19.5.2 Sugarcane at Coimbatore¶
The canes long grown in northern India were thin, hardy and low in sugar; the thick “noble” canes of the tropics (Saccharum officinarum) were rich in sugar but did poorly in the cold winters and dry summers of the north (Section 9.8). In 1912 the Government of India appointed the botanist C. A. Barber as sugarcane expert at Coimbatore, chosen because there, unlike in the north, sugarcane flowers and sets seed, so that crosses can be made. The north Indian canes he studied were later named Saccharum barberi in his honour. Barber and his successor T. S. Venkatraman crossed noble canes with the wild S. spontaneum and with Indian canes, and in 1918 released Co 205, the first commercially grown variety derived from a cross between the noble cane and S. spontaneum. It combined much of the sugar content of the one with the vigour and hardiness of the other.
The Coimbatore (“Co”) canes spread across northern India in the 1920s and 1930s and raised yields of cane and sugar substantially. Together with the tariff protection given to the industry by the Sugar Industry (Protection) Act of 1932, they made possible the rapid growth of modern sugar factories in the United Provinces and Bihar, which within a decade made India largely self-sufficient in factory-made sugar. Coimbatore varieties and their descendants were also taken up by breeders in other cane-growing countries. The station became the Sugarcane Breeding Institute. Its work is perhaps the clearest case of an Indian research institution of the colonial period whose results changed agriculture far beyond India.
Coimbatore was also where one of the first Indian women in plant science made her name. E. K. Janaki Ammal (1897–1984), who had taken a doctorate in botany at the University of Michigan, worked as a geneticist at the sugarcane station in the later 1930s on crosses between sugarcane and related grasses, and on the chromosome numbers of the canes. She went on to write, with C. D. Darlington, the Chromosome Atlas of Cultivated Plants (1945), and after independence was invited back to reorganise the Botanical Survey of India.
19.5.3 Cotton for the mills¶
India’s indigenous cottons (Gossypium arboreum and G. herbaceum) produced short-staple fibre that suited hand-spinning and the Indian mills but not the machinery of Lancashire, which wanted the longer staple of American upland cotton (G. hirsutum). From the 1840s the East India Company and later the Cotton Supply Association tried to introduce American cotton, hiring American planters for the purpose. Most attempts failed, but “Dharwar-American” cotton took hold in the southern Maratha country, and in the early twentieth century American-type varieties bred at Lyallpur, such as 4F and 289F, spread through the Punjab canal colonies, while “Cambodia” cotton, another upland type, was established in parts of Madras.
An Indian Cotton Committee reported in 1919, and in 1921 the Indian Central Cotton Committee was set up, financed from 1923 by a cess on cotton. It funded breeding stations in the main cotton tracts, a technological laboratory at Matunga in Bombay for testing the spinning quality of new varieties, and the Institute of Plant Industry at Indore (1924), where Albert Howard developed the Indore method of composting (Section 10.7). Indian breeders improved the indigenous cottons as well as the American ones. After independence their work led to Hybrid-4, released in Gujarat in 1970 by C. T. Patel and often described as the first commercial cotton hybrid in the world.
19.5.4 Rice¶
Rice was India’s largest crop, but systematic research on it came later and was dispersed among the provinces. From the 1910s and 1920s Madras, Bengal, Bihar, the Central Provinces and other provinces set up paddy-breeding stations which selected pure lines from the immense number of local varieties (Section 9.3). Some of these selections, such as GEB 24 from Madras, became parents of many later varieties. The Japanese occupation of Burma in 1942, which cut off India’s imports of Burmese rice, and the Bengal famine of 1943 made rice research a national concern, and the Central Rice Research Institute was founded at Cuttack in 1946. In the 1950s it was the centre of an international indica–japonica hybridisation project sponsored by the Food and Agriculture Organization, whose hybrid material was distributed to the participating countries; the variety Mahsuri, selected from it in Malaysia, was later widely grown in eastern India.
19.5.5 Other crops and the commodity committees¶
The plantation industries financed their own research: the Indian Tea Association set up an experimental station at Tocklai in Assam in 1911, and a coffee experiment station was established at Balehonnur in Mysore in the 1920s. An Indian Lac Research Institute was founded at Namkum near Ranchi in 1925 to study the lac insect and its host trees (Section 17.5). After the desert-locust plagues of the late 1920s and early 1930s a Locust Warning Organisation was created in 1939 to watch the breeding grounds of the Thar and give warning of swarms — the modern successor of a calamity that the Sanskrit lists of īti had always included (Chapter 10).
The Indian Central Cotton Committee became the model for a series of “commodity committees”, each financed by a cess on its crop and each running its own research stations: for jute (1936), sugarcane, coconut, tobacco, oilseeds, arecanut and other crops in the 1940s. The Indian Central Jute Committee, for example, financed the breeding of jute at its own laboratories and paid for Mahalanobis’s sample surveys of the jute area (Section 19.8). Boards for the plantation crops followed after independence, among them a Rubber Research Institute at Kottayam in 1955. The commodity committees gave the growers and processors of particular crops a direct stake in research, but they also divided it crop by crop, and in 1965–1966 most were abolished and their institutes transferred to the reorganised Indian Council of Agricultural Research.
19.6 Dry Lands, Weeds and Pests¶
19.6.1 Research for rain-fed farming¶
Most of India’s cultivated land has always depended on rain alone, and the research stations’ early concentration on irrigated and commercial crops left this majority of farmers with little to gain. The famines of the Deccan, which struck above all the black-soil country of uncertain rainfall, eventually prompted research into “dry farming”. In the 1930s, with support from the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research, dry-farming stations were set up in the Bombay Presidency at Sholapur and Bijapur and in other provinces. From the Bombay experiments N. V. Kanitkar and his colleagues developed what became known as the Bombay dry-farming method: bunding of fields to hold rain where it fell, shallow cultivation to conserve moisture, lower seed rates and wider spacing so that plants did not exhaust the stored water, and modest applications of farmyard manure. Much of this codified what Deccan cultivators already did, and its main legacy was the programmes of contour bunding undertaken by the Bombay government from the 1940s. After independence a Central Arid Zone Research Institute was founded at Jodhpur in 1959 to study the Thar, and a co-ordinated research project on dryland agriculture followed in 1970. But rain-fed farming remained the poor relation of agricultural research through the Green Revolution, a neglect that later critics, and the millet-growing regions themselves, have often pointed out (Chapter 20).
19.6.2 Quarantine, weeds and pests¶
The movement of plants around the empire also moved pests and weeds. The Destructive Insects and Pests Act of 1914 gave the government powers to regulate the import of plants and to prevent the spread of pests, and so began plant quarantine in India. Some of the worst problems were plants introduced as ornamentals or curiosities. Water hyacinth (Eichhornia crassipes), a South American floating plant brought to Bengal as an ornamental in the late nineteenth century, spread through the rivers, tanks and rice fields of the delta so rapidly that the Bengal Water Hyacinth Act of 1936 required occupiers to destroy it on their land. Lantana, a South American shrub planted in gardens and hedges, invaded forests and pastures across the country, and the North American Parthenium weed, widely believed to have arrived with imported grain in the 1950s, became a serious weed of fields and wasteland and a cause of allergic illness.
Biological control had an early Indian chapter. Prickly pears (Opuntia), introduced from the Americas, had spread over large areas of dry land in southern India by the mid-nineteenth century. A cochineal insect (Dactylopius ceylonicus) that feeds on one of these species was deliberately transferred from northern to southern India in the 1860s and destroyed the infestations there; the episode is often cited as one of the first deliberate uses of an insect to control a weed. After the Second World War synthetic insecticides — DDT, BHC and their successors — came into use against crop pests as well as malarial mosquitoes, and their heavy and often unsafe use later became one of the main charges against the Green Revolution (Chapter 20).
19.7 Fish and Fertiliser¶
Two other fields of applied research show the same pattern of colonial beginnings and post-independence expansion, and the same mixture of borrowing from and replacing local practice. (The parallel history of the veterinary and dairy institutes is told in Sections 13.6 and 13.12.2.)
19.7.1 Fisheries¶
Fisheries were the last of the rural industries to receive official attention. In Madras, Frederick Nicholson, a civil servant already known for his advocacy of co-operative credit, organised a fisheries bureau from 1907 that studied the sardine and mackerel fisheries of the west coast, encouraged the curing of fish in yards supplied with salt, and experimented with fish oil and fish manure. Bengal held an inquiry into its inland fisheries in the same decade. Systematic research began only at independence: a Central Inland Fisheries Research Station was set up at Barrackpore near Calcutta and a Central Marine Fisheries Research Station, both in 1947; the marine station moved in 1949 to Mandapam on the Palk Bay. From 1952 the Indo-Norwegian Project in Kerala introduced mechanised boats, ice plants and new nets to the fishing villages around Quilon, beginning the motorisation of Indian sea fishing and, with the export boom in prawns that followed in the 1960s, the conflicts between trawler owners and traditional fishers described in Section 17.9.
The most important single advance concerned the Indian major carps — rohu, catla and mrigal — which breed only in flooded rivers during the monsoon and will not spawn in still ponds. For generations the stocking of village ponds had depended on specialist spawn collectors, especially in Bengal, Bihar and Odisha, who knew the rivers, stretches and days on which the fish spawned, gathered the fertilised eggs and fry in fine cloth nets and sold them to pond owners. Their knowledge sustained pond culture but could not guarantee supply. In 1957 Hiralal Chaudhuri and K. H. Alikunhi, working at the inland fisheries station’s centre at Cuttack, induced carps to spawn in captivity by injecting them with extracts of fish pituitary glands (“hypophysation”). The method made hatcheries possible; Chinese carps were introduced from 1959; and from the 1970s “composite” culture of several Indian and Chinese carps that feed at different levels of the same pond multiplied the yield of inland aquaculture (Section 17.8). Here a scientific technique took over a task that had depended on the field knowledge of a small occupational community.
19.7.2 Manures and fertilisers¶
Indian cultivators had always manured their fields with dung, ash, oilcake, tank silt, sheep and goat penning, and green manures (Section 7.5). Voelcker’s report of 1893 identified the shortage of manure as one of the chief limits on Indian agriculture, blamed the burning of dung as fuel for want of firewood, and regretted the export of bones and oilcake that might have enriched Indian soils (Voelcker 1893). For the next half-century official advice concentrated on conserving and improving these organic manures — better storage of dung, composting, green manuring with sunn hemp and dhaiñcā — an emphasis that culminated in Howard’s Indore method (Section 10.7). Chemical fertilisers, chiefly imported ammonium sulphate, were used mainly on plantations and on high-value crops such as sugarcane.
Domestic production of nitrogen fertiliser began in the 1940s, at Alwaye in Travancore and, on a much larger scale, at Sindri in Bihar, which went into production in 1951. Consumption remained small until the high-yielding varieties, bred precisely to respond to heavy doses of nitrogen, made fertiliser the centre of the new package. Within two decades India had become one of the world’s largest users of chemical fertiliser, and the subsidies that kept it cheap became one of the most durable features of agricultural policy. The older advice on manures did not disappear; it re-emerged, with the problems of soil health discussed in Chapter 20, in the organic and natural-farming movements.
19.8 Counting Fields and Harvests¶
Every government that taxed land needed to know what was grown on it. The Mughal records of measured land and crop rates (Section 18.7) were succeeded by the colonial village papers: a register of fields maintained by the village accountant (paṭwārī), and seasonal crop inspections in which he recorded what was sown on each field. These gave reasonably good figures for the area under each crop. Yields were another matter. Officials estimated the condition of the standing crop in “annas” — sixteenths, as of the rupee — of a full or normal crop, according to provincial convention; these ānāvārī or “annewari” estimates were made by eye, were influenced by the wish of local officials to show (or to avoid showing) scarcity, and were widely recognised as unreliable. A modified form of the method has survived in some states’ procedures for declaring drought.
Indian statisticians made the crop survey into a science. P. C. Mahalanobis, who founded the Indian Statistical Institute in Calcutta in 1931, designed from 1937 a series of sample surveys of the area under jute in Bengal, in which the province was divided on the map into small cells, a random sample of cells was visited, and the share of jute in them was used to estimate the total. He extended the method to the yield of rice by “crop-cutting”: harvesting and weighing the grain from small plots chosen at random within randomly chosen fields. His long paper of 1944 in the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society set out the theory and practice of these surveys and made them known internationally (Mahalanobis 1944).
At the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research, P. V. Sukhatme, its statistical adviser from 1940, developed crop-cutting surveys for wheat and rice that were adopted across India in the 1940s and 1950s and became the basis of official yield estimates (Sukhatme 1954). The two men disagreed, sometimes sharply, about method, including the size of the plots to be harvested: Sukhatme’s experiments suggested that very small plots tended to overstate yields, and the official surveys used larger ones. The National Sample Survey, begun in 1950, carried the method into social and economic statistics generally. The randomised and replicated field trial, following the methods of R. A. Fisher, became standard in Indian agricultural experiments in the same years. Out of the administrative need to know the size of the harvest came one of India’s most widely adopted contributions to modern statistics.
19.9 Indian Critics and Rural Reconstruction¶
From the late nineteenth century Indian writers offered their own diagnosis of agrarian poverty, and it differed from the official one. Where officials stressed the cultivator’s methods, his debts and the pressure of population, the early nationalist economists pointed to the state’s demands. Dadabhai Naoroji’s argument that India suffered a “drain” of wealth to Britain, set out in Poverty and Un-British Rule in India (1901), and Romesh Chunder Dutt’s Economic History of India (1902–1904) laid much of the blame for poverty and famine on high and inflexible land revenue and on the decline of Indian manufactures, which drove more people onto the land. Dutt pressed the case in open letters to Lord Curzon in 1900, and Curzon’s government replied in its Land Revenue Resolution of 1902, denying that the revenue assessment caused famine. The controversy set the terms of a long debate in which, as Chapter 18 shows, the distribution of land and the burden on the cultivator were never separable from questions of technique.
Others turned to practical work in the villages. At Sriniketan, near Santiniketan in Bengal, Rabindranath Tagore founded an Institute of Rural Reconstruction in 1922, with the English agronomist Leonard Elmhirst as its first director; it combined agricultural demonstration, co-operatives, crafts, health work and education, in the belief that villagers should be helped to help themselves rather than be improved from above. Gandhi’s constructive programme placed village industries, cattle care and the production of compost and manure within a vision of self-reliant villages, and the All India Village Industries Association (1934) took up oil pressing, paddy husking by hand and other rural crafts that machines were displacing (Chapter 14). In the princely state of Baroda and elsewhere, rulers and their ministers sponsored agricultural departments and co-operative societies. Indian manufacturers, such as Laxmanrao Kirloskar with his iron ploughs (Section 7.15), sought to supply improved implements that cultivators could afford. These efforts were small beside the scale of rural India, but they kept alive an alternative idea of improvement — one that began from the village and its own resources — which reappeared in the community development programme of the 1950s and, later, in the movements for low-input farming discussed in Chapter 20.
19.10 The Royal Commission on Agriculture and Rural Uplift¶
By the 1920s rural indebtedness and the low productivity of Indian agriculture had become public questions. Malcolm Darling’s The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt (1925) showed that even in the prosperous canal colonies most cultivators were in debt to moneylenders, and traced the debt to the insecurity of agriculture, the growth of land values as security and the costs of social obligations (Darling 1925). F. L. Brayne’s “rural uplift” campaign in Gurgaon district in the 1920s tried, with much publicity and limited lasting effect, to change village practice by exhortation: better seed, manure pits, ploughs, sanitation and thrift. Under the constitutional reforms of 1919 agriculture became a provincial subject administered by Indian ministers, so that agricultural policy was now partly in Indian hands.
The Royal Commission on Agriculture in India was appointed in 1926 under the chairmanship of the Marquess of Linlithgow, later Viceroy, and reported in 1928 (Royal Commission on Agriculture in India 1928). Its terms of reference expressly excluded the ownership of land, the rights of landlords and tenants and the assessment of land revenue. Within those limits it surveyed nearly everything else: research and education, demonstration, cattle and fodder (Section 13.12.2), irrigation, forests, marketing, credit, co-operation and rural health. Its most important institutional recommendation was a central body to promote and co-ordinate research. The Imperial Council of Agricultural Research was established in 1929 (it became the Indian Council of Agricultural Research after independence), funding schemes in the provinces and drawing together work that had been scattered. Following the commission’s emphasis on marketing, an Agricultural Marketing Adviser was appointed in 1935, and the Agricultural Produce (Grading and Marking) Act of 1937 introduced the “Agmark” grades that are still in use.
The exclusion of land questions from the commission’s remit was criticised then and since. Indian nationalists and later historians argued that the distribution of land, rent and the burden of revenue and debt were the main obstacles to agricultural improvement, and that a commission forbidden to discuss them could treat only symptoms (Ludden 1999). Within a year of its report the world depression of 1929–1933 roughly halved the prices of many crops and deepened the indebtedness Darling had described.
19.11 War, Famine and “Grow More Food”¶
The Second World War brought food to the centre of policy. With Burmese rice cut off and the army’s demands rising, the government launched a “Grow More Food” campaign in 1942–1943 to persuade cultivators to shift land from cash crops to food grains and to supply seed, manure and help with minor irrigation. It came too late and was too small to prevent the Bengal famine of 1943, whose causes are discussed in Section 18.8 and in Volume 19. Wartime controls — procurement of grain, rationing in the cities and restrictions on movement between provinces — outlasted the war and shaped the food administration of independent India. Partition in 1947 then gave most of the canal-irrigated wheat and cotton land of the Punjab and Sind, and much of the jute land of eastern Bengal, to Pakistan, while India kept most of the population. The new state began life with a food deficit.
19.12 Planning for Food, 1947–1965¶
The first answer of independent India was extension rather than new technology. Benjamin Siegel has shown how food became a central question of Indian nationalism and planning in these years, as leaders argued over self-sufficiency, rationing, austerity and the dignity of a nation that depended on imported grain (Siegel 2018). A pilot project in Etawah district (from 1948), led by the American planner Albert Mayer, used village-level workers to bring improved seed, manure, implements and sanitation to cultivators. Its approach was generalised in the Community Development Programme, launched on 2 October 1952, and in the National Extension Service that followed in 1953, which sought to reach every village through block development officers and multi-purpose village-level workers. A Grow More Food Enquiry Committee (1952) had concluded that the wartime campaign failed because it treated food production as a narrow departmental matter rather than as part of the development of village life as a whole. Large dams and canals were built in the same years (Section 8.12), and the abolition of zamīndārī and tenancy reform were pursued with uneven success (Section 18.9).
Food production rose in the 1950s, mainly because more land was cultivated and irrigated, but not fast enough. From 1956 India imported large quantities of American wheat under the PL-480 programme (Chapter 20). In 1959 a team sponsored by the Ford Foundation, in its report India’s Food Crisis and Steps to Meet It, predicted a serious food gap by the mid-1960s and recommended concentrating fertiliser, credit, improved seed and extension in districts with assured water. The resulting Intensive Agricultural District Programme began in 1960–1961 in seven districts and was later extended.
The research system was rebuilt at the same time. Agricultural universities on the model of the American land-grant colleges, combining teaching, research and extension in one institution, were founded with help from American universities: the first at Pantnagar in Uttar Pradesh in 1960, followed by the Punjab Agricultural University at Ludhiana in 1962 and others in most states. “All-India co-ordinated” projects, in which stations across the country tested the same material under a common plan, began with maize in 1957; the first Indian maize hybrids were released in 1961, a hybrid sorghum (CSH-1) in 1964 and a hybrid pearl millet (HB-1) in 1965. The millet hybrids, built on a narrow genetic base, later suffered serious epidemics of downy mildew, an early warning of the risks of uniformity. A National Seeds Corporation was set up in 1963 to multiply and distribute certified seed, and the Indian Council of Agricultural Research was reorganised in 1965–1966 under B. P. Pal to take charge of the central research institutes.
19.13 The High-Yielding Varieties¶
The semi-dwarf wheats that transformed Indian agriculture had a long international pedigree. Dwarfing genes from the Japanese variety Norin 10 were brought to the United States after the Second World War, and crossed into the spring wheats of the programme led by Norman Borlaug in Mexico, supported by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Mexican government. The Mexican semi-dwarfs had short, stiff straw that did not fall over under heavy fertiliser, responded strongly to nitrogen and water, and were insensitive to day length, so that they could be grown far from Mexico.
At the Indian Agricultural Research Institute, M. S. Swaminathan sought out this material, and Borlaug visited India in March 1963. Small quantities of seed were tested in the winter of 1963–1964 and in national demonstrations on farmers’ fields in the following seasons. After the drought of 1965, the government, with C. Subramaniam as minister for food and agriculture, decided on a large-scale programme: about 250 tonnes of Mexican seed were imported in 1965 and some 18,000 tonnes of the varieties Lerma Rojo 64A and Sonora 64 in 1966. Indian breeders selected from the Mexican material amber-grained wheats closer to the taste of Indian consumers, released in 1967 as Kalyan Sona and Sonalika, which soon covered much of the irrigated wheat land of the north-west. India’s wheat harvest more than doubled between 1964–1965 and 1971–1972.
Rice followed more slowly. The semi-dwarf Taichung Native 1 from Taiwan and IR8, released by the International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines in 1966, gave high yields under irrigation and fertiliser, but were susceptible to pests and diseases in Indian conditions and their grain was not liked. An All-India Co-ordinated Rice Improvement Project, begun in 1965, produced Indian semi-dwarf varieties, beginning with Jaya in 1968, and the spread of high-yielding rice to the eastern and rain-fed rice regions took two more decades. The term “Green Revolution” itself was coined in 1968 by William Gaud of the United States Agency for International Development.
The new seeds were promoted as part of a package — fertiliser, pesticides, irrigation, credit, guaranteed prices through the Agricultural Prices Commission and procurement by the Food Corporation of India (both created in 1965) — whose long-term consequences are discussed in Chapter 20. Table 19.1 lists the principal institutional landmarks of the century described in this chapter.
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1871 | Department of Revenue, Agriculture and Commerce (A. O. Hume, secretary) |
| 1880 | Report of the Famine Commission: Famine Codes and provincial departments of agriculture |
| 1893 | Voelcker’s Report on the Improvement of Indian Agriculture |
| 1905 | Agricultural Research Institute opens at Pusa, Bihar |
| 1911 | Tea research station at Tocklai, Assam |
| 1912 | Sugarcane breeding begins at Coimbatore; Co 205 released in 1918 |
| 1921 | Indian Central Cotton Committee; Institute of Plant Industry, Indore, 1924 |
| 1928 | Report of the Royal Commission on Agriculture in India |
| 1929 | Imperial (later Indian) Council of Agricultural Research |
| 1937 | Sample surveys of jute begin in Bengal; Agricultural Produce (Grading and Marking) Act |
| 1946 | Central Rice Research Institute, Cuttack |
| 1952 | Community Development Programme |
| 1960 | First agricultural university, Pantnagar; Intensive Agricultural District Programme |
| 1963 | Borlaug’s first visit; National Seeds Corporation |
| 1965–1966 | Food Corporation of India and Agricultural Prices Commission; import of Mexican wheat seed |
| 1967–1968 | Kalyan Sona and Sonalika wheats; Jaya rice |
19.14 Histories of the Green Revolution¶
The Green Revolution has had many historians, and they tell different stories. The first and most familiar is the story of scientific success. In this account a combination of international science (Borlaug and the Mexican programme, the International Rice Research Institute), American foundations and Indian scientists and ministers transformed a famine-threatened country into one that fed itself; Borlaug received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1970. Economists who have measured the effects of the new varieties across the developing world have found large gains in yields and in food supply, and lower food prices, compared with what would otherwise have happened (Evenson and Gollin 2003; Pingali 2012).
A second story concerns politics and inequality. Francine Frankel’s district studies, published in 1971, found that the gains went disproportionately to larger farmers who could afford the inputs and that the new technology was sharpening tensions between landowners and tenants and labourers (Frankel 1971). One of her districts was Thanjavur, where a wage dispute ended in December 1968 in the killing of forty-four Dalit agricultural labourers, most of them women and children, at Kilvenmani. Later research showed that small farmers did adopt the new seeds once credit and inputs reached them, and that labour demand and wages rose in the irrigated north-west; but the regional and social inequalities Frankel described did not disappear.
A third story places the Green Revolution in the Cold War. Cullather (2010) shows how American foundations and governments presented hunger in Asia as a threat to political stability, and how the United States in 1965–1967 used its food aid as a lever on Indian economic policy, releasing grain shipments a few months at a time. On this view the programme was as much a political as a technical project, and its narrative of imminent famine averted by science served the interests of its promoters. Recent revisionist work goes further: Stone (2019) argues that the growth of Indian food-grain production after 1966 was not much faster than the trend of the preceding fifteen years, and that much of the increase in wheat came from expanding irrigation and from land shifted out of pulses and other crops, so that the claim of a famine averted by the new seeds is overstated. Defenders reply that yields, not merely area, rose sharply where the new seeds were adopted, and that the counterfactual of continued dependence on imports in the 1970s was real.
A fourth story stresses continuity and Indian agency. The programme of the 1960s rested on institutions built over the previous sixty years — research institutes, agricultural statistics, seed farms, extension services — and on Indian scientists who adapted the foreign material, as in the selection of Kalyan Sona and Sonalika. And the decisive investments were made by cultivators themselves, above all in the private tubewells that gave the Punjab, Haryana and western Uttar Pradesh the assured water on which the new seeds depended (Section 20.3).
Debate: Who Made the Green Revolution?
For its admirers, the Green Revolution was the triumph of plant breeding: semi-dwarf wheats and rice, bred by Borlaug’s team, the International Rice Research Institute and Indian scientists, ended the threat of famine. For its critics it was a political programme, shaped by American foundations and Cold War aims, that favoured larger farmers and irrigated regions and laid up ecological trouble for the future. Revisionists doubt that production really accelerated as much as the story claims. Each view rests on evidence. The seeds were real and the yield gains large; so were the political pressures, the regional inequality and the dependence on groundwater and subsidised inputs. The historical record also shows a longer chain of causes than any single hero or villain: famine commissions, Pusa, Coimbatore, the statisticians of Calcutta and Delhi, the extension workers of the 1950s and, above all, the farmers who sank tubewells and took the risk of new seed.
Summary¶
Between 1870 and 1970 the Indian state turned from a collector of revenue into a sponsor of agricultural research. Botanical gardens had already moved tea, cinchona and rubber; famine was the spur to a permanent service: the Famine Commission of 1880 recommended both Famine Codes and provincial departments of agriculture. Voelcker’s report, the founding of Pusa in 1905 and the appointment of imperial specialists in mycology, entomology and economic botany began systematic research, though it was long directed mainly at export crops and staffed at the top by Europeans. Breeders produced the Pusa and Lyallpur wheats, the Coimbatore sugarcanes — beginning with Co 205 in 1918, an interspecific hybrid whose descendants spread worldwide — improved American and indigenous cottons and selected rices; K. C. Mehta explained the annual recurrence of wheat rusts from hill foci. Carps were bred in captivity from 1957. Mahalanobis and Sukhatme turned crop estimation into a science of random sampling. Indian critics from Naoroji and Dutt onwards blamed the revenue demand rather than the cultivator, and Tagore’s Sriniketan and Gandhi’s village industries offered an improvement that began from the village. The Royal Commission on Agriculture (1928), forbidden to discuss land, led to the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research (1929). War, the Bengal famine and partition left independent India short of food; community development, intensive district programmes, agricultural universities and co-ordinated crop projects followed, and from 1963 to 1968 the semi-dwarf wheats and rices were introduced and adapted. Historians still debate whether the Green Revolution was chiefly a scientific achievement, a political project, an overstated story, or the product of a long chain of Indian institutions and cultivators’ investment.
Further Reading¶
For colonial science and agriculture see Kumar (1995) and Arnold (2000); for indigo and science Kumar (2012); for the agrarian background Kumar (1983) and Ludden (1999). Darling (1925) is a classic contemporary study of rural debt, and the report of the Royal Commission (Royal Commission on Agriculture in India 1928) remains a mine of information. On the history of crop surveys see Mahalanobis (1944) and Sukhatme (1954). For food policy after independence see Siegel (2018). For the Green Revolution and its interpretations see Frankel (1971), Cullather (2010), Evenson and Gollin (2003), Pingali (2012) and Stone (2019), together with the critique of Shiva (1991).