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Chapter 12: Adivasi Rights: Land, Forests, Identity and Knowledge

12.1 Introduction: Rights and Knowledge

The knowledge described in this volume cannot survive without the land, forests and water in which it is practised, the languages in which it is held, and the communities that hold it. A healer’s knowledge of forest plants is useless if the forest is closed to her; a sacred grove’s rules mean nothing if the grove is mined; seed knowledge is lost when the fields are submerged. Rights to land, forest and self-government are therefore preconditions of indigenous knowledge.

This chapter surveys those rights and the political thought that has claimed them: Adivasi ideas of self-rule from Jaipal Singh to the gram sabha movements, land and forest law, displacement, religion and identity, the history and knowledge of the Denotified and nomadic communities, the conflict in central India, and the protection of traditional knowledge. Its epigraph could be the slogan jal, jangal, zamīn (“water, forest, land”), associated with the Gond leader Komaram Bheem and taken up by Adivasi movements across India.

Adivasi organisations increasingly describe what is at stake as a community’s right to control its own knowledge: to decide who may learn, record and use it, and to share in any benefit from its use. That right is infringed in several ways: when knowledge is used commercially without consent, when records are kept beyond the community’s reach, when loss of land and forest stops people from practising what they know, and when schooling teaches children that their community’s knowledge is worthless.

12.2 Writing Adivasi History

Until the 1970s, Adivasi uprisings were mostly described in colonial terms, as outbreaks of “wild tribes” provoked by local grievances. K. S. Singh’s study of Birsa Munda (1966) and his edited volumes on tribal movements (1982) presented them as serious political and religious movements with their own leaders, ideas and aims (Singh 1966; Singh 1982). Ranajit Guha’s Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India (1983), a founding work of the Subaltern Studies school, drew heavily on the Santal hul to show how rebels’ religious beliefs, rumours and forms of action expressed a political consciousness of their own (Guha 1983). More recently, Shashank Kela has surveyed two centuries of Adivasi resistance in central and western India (Kela 2012), and historians such as David Hardiman, Ajay Skaria and Nandini Sundar have written regional histories that place Adivasi people at the centre (Hardiman 1987; Skaria 1999; Sundar 1997).

These histories have changed how Adivasi struggles are understood: no longer as “primitive” reactions, but as political action shaped by distinctive ideas of land, kingship, justice and the divine. They have also shown that Adivasi history is not only a history of resistance, but also of trade, state formation, religious change and everyday life.

12.3 Representation and Statehood

The Constitution reserves seats for Scheduled Tribes in the Lok Sabha and state legislatures in proportion to their population (47 of the 543 Lok Sabha seats after the delimitation of 2008), and provides for reservation in public employment and higher education (7.5 per cent in central institutions). Reservation has created an Adivasi middle class of officials, teachers, doctors and politicians, though its benefits have been unevenly distributed among communities, and many posts reserved for Scheduled Tribes have remained unfilled. Inclusion in the Scheduled Tribe list has itself become a contested prize: several communities have campaigned for inclusion, and existing Scheduled Tribes have often opposed them. In Manipur, a court direction in 2023 to consider including the Meitei in the list was followed by prolonged and deadly ethnic violence between Meitei and Kuki-Zo communities. Megan Moodie’s study of the Dhanka of Rajasthan shows the same contest from inside a listed community: its members work to present themselves as tribal in the terms the state recognises, while also seeking urban jobs and respectability (Moodie 2015).

Adivasi movements have also sought territorial autonomy (Munda and Bosu Mullick 2003; Corbridge et al. 2004). The demand for a separate state of Jharkhand, first raised by the Adivasi Mahasabha and Jaipal Singh’s Jharkhand Party in the 1930s–50s, was revived from the 1970s by the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha and other organisations. Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh were created as states in November 2000, with substantial Adivasi populations. In the North-East, Nagaland (1963), Meghalaya (1972), Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh (1987) became states (Chapter 1), and the Bodo movement in Assam led to the Bodoland Territorial Council (2003). Statehood has not by itself ended land alienation or displacement: some of the largest mining projects of recent decades have been in Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh. In Jharkhand, moreover, Scheduled Tribes made up only about a quarter of the population in 2011 (Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner, India 2013), so that the Adivasi state is one in which Adivasis are a minority.

12.3.1 Education

The literacy rate of Scheduled Tribes rose from under 9 per cent in 1961 to about 59 per cent in 2011, but remained well below the national rate of about 73 per cent, with especially low rates among women and among some communities (Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner, India 2013). Distance from schools, teaching in an unfamiliar language, teacher absence and the need for children’s labour all contribute. Education is the most widely shared aspiration in Adivasi communities, and also a source of anxiety, because schooling has often taught children to look down on their own languages and knowledge (Chapter 14).

12.4 Adivasi Political Thought

Adivasi movements are often described only through their uprisings and their demands. They also produced ideas: about who the Adivasis are, what they are owed, and what a just relation between a people, its land and the state should be. These ideas were set out in memoranda, speeches, pamphlets, songs and party programmes, and they have shaped Indian law (Chapter 11). This section traces the main lines of that thought in the Jharkhand region, where it was most fully worked out, and its parallels elsewhere.

12.4.1 The Mahasabha and Jaipal Singh

The first Adivasi political organisations of Chotanagpur were formed by the products of mission schools. Educated Oraon and Munda Christians founded the Chotanagpur Unnati Samaj in the 1910s, and by the late 1920s it was asking for a separate administration for the plateau, a request it put to the Simon Commission. These early bodies were small, mostly Christian and concerned with education, employment and the enforcement of the tenancy laws. The Adivasi Mahasabha, founded in 1938, broadened their base, and Jaipal Singh Munda became its president in 1939 (Chapter 1, Section 1.3).

Jaipal Singh’s lasting contribution was a vocabulary. The word ādivāsī carried a claim of prior settlement and therefore of prior right. The Mahasabha insisted that the Adivasis were a people with a homeland, Jharkhand, and not a backward section of Hindu society awaiting uplift; and in the Constituent Assembly Jaipal Singh turned the usual hierarchy around by presenting the Adivasi village assembly as a model of democracy rather than a survival from a primitive past. He distrusted both the paternalism of the colonial “excluded areas” and the assimilating outlook of much of the Congress, and he argued for reserved representation and the protection of Adivasi land as rights rather than favours. His memoir was published long after his death as Lo Bir Sendra. His speech of 1946 is the source of the quotation given in Chapter 1.

The protective provisions that the Assembly adopted, the Fifth and Sixth Schedules, are described in Section 11.4. Jaipal Singh’s own interventions often concerned the place of Adivasi custom in the new state. When the Assembly debated the directive principle calling for the prohibition of intoxicating drinks, he opposed it as an interference in Adivasi religious and social life, in which rice beer is offered to the ancestors and shared at every festival and every stage of agricultural work (Chapter 5). The argument was characteristic: he presented Adivasi practice not as a vice to be reformed but as part of a way of life with its own reasons.

In 1949–50 the Mahasabha was transformed into the Jharkhand Party and opened to non-Adivasis. In the first general elections of 1952 it won more than thirty seats in the Bihar Legislative Assembly and became the main opposition there. The States Reorganisation Commission (1955), which redrew India’s internal boundaries mainly on linguistic lines, rejected the demand for a Jharkhand state, observing that the region had no common language and that Adivasis would form a minority of its population. The party declined, and in 1963 Jaipal Singh merged it into the Congress, a step many of his followers regarded as a betrayal; several splinter Jharkhand parties continued. Stuart Corbridge has argued that the party’s programme rested on a picture of a distinct “tribal economy and society”, communal in land, egalitarian in its villages and separate from the market, which was already being undone by migration, mining and growing differences within Adivasi communities, and that the same picture shaped the protective policies of the state (Corbridge 1988).

12.4.2 The Second Jharkhand Movement

A new movement emerged in the early 1970s from three sources: campaigns among the Santals of the Dhanbad region, led by Shibu Soren, to recover land lost to moneylenders, in which villagers collectively harvested crops from alienated fields; the peasant politics of the Kurmi-Mahatos, led by the lawyer Binod Bihari Mahato; and the Marxist trade unionism of A. K. Roy in the coalfields. They came together in the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (founded in 1972–73).

The movement’s central idea was that Jharkhand was an internal colony. Its coal, iron ore, bauxite, forests and rivers fed national industry, while the skilled jobs went to migrants, the profits and taxes went elsewhere, and the local people bore the loss of land and the pollution. The old Mundari and Santali word dikū, used in Birsa Munda’s time for the moneylender, the trader, the landlord and the official who exploited the Adivasi, became a political category. Defined by conduct rather than birth, it allowed the movement to be regional rather than purely ethnic, so that long-settled non-Adivasi villagers (sadān) could join it. Critics pointed out that the internal-colony model overstated the unity of interests within the region and understated the role of local elites, Adivasi as well as non-Adivasi (Corbridge 1988).

In the 1980s the emphasis shifted towards culture. Ram Dayal Munda, the Nagpuri scholar B. P. Keshri and the student organisation AJSU (All Jharkhand Students Union, 1986) argued that Jharkhand was a cultural region with shared festivals such as Karam and Sarhul, a shared institution in the village dance ground (akhṛā) as a place of gathering and debate, and a link language in Nagpuri (Sadri), and that a “Jharkhandi” identity could therefore include sadāns. Susana Devalle’s study shows how songs, festivals and the writing of history served the movement as instruments of protest and self-definition (Devalle 1992). The Jharkhand Coordination Committee (1987) brought the various organisations together; the central government’s Committee on Jharkhand Matters (1989) and the Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council (1995) were steps towards the state created in 2000 (Section 12.3) (Munda and Bosu Mullick 2003).

The regional definition that made the movement broad also meant that the state it won was not an Adivasi state. Some Adivasi thinkers drew the conclusion that territorial power had to be combined with self-rule at the level of the village.

12.4.3 Self-Rule from Below

That conclusion was argued most persistently by B. D. Sharma (1931–2015), a former Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes who was not himself an Adivasi, and by Adivasi activists who worked with him in the 1990s. They held that the gram sabha, the assembly of the whole village, and not the panchayat or the state, was the natural unit of Adivasi self-government, and they popularised the slogan māvā nāṭe māvā rāj (“our village, our rule”), which was also the watchword of Mendha-Lekha (Chapter 14, Section 14.5). Their arguments fed into the Bhuria Committee and the PESA Act of 1996 (Chapter 11). The pathalgaḍī stones of Khunti, inscribed with clauses of the Fifth Schedule, and the Dongria Kondh gram sabhas at Niyamgiri, which spoke of the hill as the domain of Niyam Rājā, a name usually understood as “the king of law”, both expressed this idea of self-rule, in the language of the Constitution and in the language of religion respectively (Sections 11.5 and 11.6) (Padel and Das 2010).

12.4.4 Movements of Western and Central India

In western India Adivasi politics grew less from the demand for a homeland than from struggles over land and labour. In the Thane district north of Bombay, the Warli rose in 1945–47 against landlords and moneylenders who held them in debt bondage and exacted unpaid labour; the movement was organised by the Kisan Sabha under Godavari Parulekar, whose Marathi account of it, Jevhā Māṇūs Jāgā Hoto (1970), became a classic of the literature of peasant struggle. In the 1970s the Shramik Sanghatana of the Shahada region in Dhule district organised Bhil agricultural labourers to recover land and to secure wages, building on an earlier Bhil reform movement led by Ambarsing Maharaj that had urged abstinence from liquor; women in the movement campaigned against drink and domestic violence. In the Bhil and Bhilala villages of Alirajpur in western Madhya Pradesh, the Khedut Mazdoor Chetna Sangath, formed in the 1980s, joined resistance to the extortions of forest officials with opposition to the Sardar Sarovar dam. Amita Baviskar’s study shows how its members moved between a local idiom of gods, land and honour and the national language of rights and environment, and how the two did not always fit (Baviskar 1995). These movements were often led or supported by non-Adivasi activists, Marxist, Gandhian or Christian, and a recurring question within them was how far Adivasis themselves set the agenda.

In central India a Gondwana movement from the 1980s and 1990s set out a Gond history centred on the Gond kingdoms (Chapter 1), a Gond religion (Koyā Punem; see Chapter 8) distinct from Hinduism, and the revival of Gondi and its Masaram script (Table 8.1); the Gondwana Gantantra Party was founded in 1991 by Hira Singh Markam. Some of the movement’s writings make claims about Gond antiquity that historians do not accept, but its main political point, that Gond identity need not be defined by Hindu or colonial categories, does not depend on them. The North-East followed a different path, in which Naga and Mizo thought was framed from the start in terms of nationhood (Chapter 1, Section 1.8); and since the 1980s Adivasi organisations from many regions have also spoken in the international language of indigenous peoples’ rights (Section 12.11).

Certain themes recur across these traditions: the claim of first settlement; land, forest and water understood together (jal, jangal, zamīn); the village assembly as a democratic institution; the figure of the dikū; and the refusal to be absorbed either into Hinduism or into an undifferentiated mass of the rural poor. So do tensions: between ethnic and regional definitions of the people, between Christian and Sarna Adivasis, between leaders and villagers, and between the men who have dominated Adivasi politics and the women who have often carried its struggles on the ground. Adivasi political thought is as varied and as argued over as any other political tradition.

12.5 Land

Loss of land has been the central fact of Adivasi history since the colonial period. Land passed to moneylenders, traders and settlers through debt and fraud; to the state through forest reservation; and, after independence, to dams, mines, industries and towns.

The law contains important protections. In Fifth Schedule areas, Governors may make regulations restricting the transfer of land, and several states have laws prohibiting or restricting the transfer of Scheduled Tribe land to non-tribals, among them the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act (1908) and Santal Parganas Tenancy Act (1949) in Jharkhand and the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulation (1959, strengthened in 1970). In Samatha v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1997) the Supreme Court held that mining leases to private companies in Scheduled Areas were void (Section 11.4.1). The Forest Rights Act of 2006 (Section 11.4.4) added rights to forest land that had never been recorded. The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, requires the consent of the gram sabha or panchayat before land is acquired in Scheduled Areas.

These protections have been weakened in practice by fraudulent transfers, benami transactions, transfers disguised as marriage or lease, and acquisition “for a public purpose”. Proposals to amend the Jharkhand tenancy laws in 2016 to ease the transfer of land for industry led to large protests and were withdrawn.

12.5.1 Muthanga

In Kerala, where Adivasis had lost much of their land in Wayanad and Attappadi to settlers, the Adivasi Gothra Maha Sabha led by C. K. Janu organised land occupations to press the state to fulfil its promises of land. In February 2003 the occupation of the Muthanga forest in Wayanad was broken up by police firing in which an Adivasi man and a policeman were killed. The episode drew national attention to the failure of land restoration in a state often praised for its social development (Bijoy and Raman 2003).

12.6 Displacement

Dams, mines, industries, power plants, roads and protected areas have displaced very large numbers of people since independence, and Adivasis have borne a heavily disproportionate share. The sociologist Walter Fernandes, on the basis of project-level data, estimated that some 60 million people were displaced or deprived of their livelihood by development projects between 1947 and 2004, about 40 per cent of them Adivasis, while Adivasis were only 8 per cent of the population (Fernandes 2008). Only a minority were resettled; many lost land without compensation because they had no legal title.

12.6.1 Rich Lands, Poor People

The regions where most Adivasis live hold much of India’s coal, iron ore, bauxite, manganese and other minerals, and much of its forest and hydroelectric potential. Yet poverty rates among Scheduled Tribes have consistently been the highest of any social group in official surveys (Government of India 2014). This paradox, of rich lands and poor people, is at the heart of Adivasi politics. A 2015 amendment to the mining law created District Mineral Foundations, funded by a levy on mining companies, to spend on the welfare of people affected by mining; critics have found that much of the money has been spent on general infrastructure rather than on those directly affected, and with little say for the gram sabhas.

12.6.2 The Narmada Valley

The Sardar Sarovar dam on the Narmada, in Gujarat, submerged villages of Bhil, Bhilala and other Adivasi communities in Gujarat, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh. The Narmada Bachao Andolan, led by Medha Patkar and others, organised resistance from the late 1980s; an independent review commissioned by the World Bank (the Morse report, 1992) was highly critical of the resettlement plans, and the Bank withdrew from the project in 1993. In 2000 the Supreme Court allowed construction to proceed. Amita Baviskar’s ethnography of Bhilala villages in the valley shows the complexity of the issues: the villagers’ relationship with the forest and river was not idyllic, and their resistance drew on both tradition and new political alliances (Baviskar 1995).

12.6.3 Conservation and Displacement: Kuno

Protected areas have also displaced Adivasi communities. Between 1998 and 2003, some two dozen villages, most of them of the Sahariya, a Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Group, were relocated from the Kuno sanctuary in Madhya Pradesh to make room for Asiatic lions to be brought from Gujarat. The lions never came; the relocated families struggled on poorer land with inadequate compensation. In 2022 cheetahs brought from Africa were released in what had become Kuno National Park. Kuno shows what conservation can cost the poorest forest dwellers, and it is the kind of case the Forest Rights Act had in mind when it required that relocation from protected areas be voluntary and with the consent of the gram sabha (Section 11.4.4). Some major sites of displacement and conflict are listed in Table 12.1.

Table 12.1. Some major sites of displacement and conflict
Project or region Communities Notes
Sardar Sarovar dam Bhil, Bhilala, Tadvi, Vasava Narmada Bachao Andolan; Supreme Court 2000 (Baviskar 1995)
Polavaram dam Koya, Konda Reddi Godavari; submergence in Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Odisha and Chhattisgarh
Coal and iron mining Santal, Munda, Ho, Oraon and others Jharkhand, Odisha, Chhattisgarh
Bauxite mining Kondh and others Niyamgiri and other hills of Odisha (Padel and Das 2010)
Protected areas Baiga, Soliga, Chenchu and others Relocation from tiger reserves and national parks

12.6.4 Resistance and Its Costs

Opposition to displacement has often been met with force. At Tapkara in Jharkhand in February 2001, police fired on Adivasis protesting against the Koel-Karo hydroelectric project, which would have submerged Munda villages and sacred sites, killing several people; the project, opposed by the villagers for more than two decades, was eventually abandoned. At Kalinganagar in Odisha in January 2006, police firing on Adivasis protesting against the construction of a steel plant on land acquired from them killed thirteen people. Such events have shaped Adivasi memory and politics as deeply as the colonial rebellions.

12.7 Religion and Identity

Questions of religion are among the most contested in Adivasi life. The census long recorded the religion of many Adivasis as “animist” or “tribal religion”; since independence most have been counted as Hindu unless they declared another religion.

12.7.1 Sarna and Other Indigenous Religions

Many Adivasis of Jharkhand, Odisha, Chhattisgarh and West Bengal describe their religion as Sarna, after the sacred grove at its centre (Chapter 3). They do not regard themselves as Hindus: they have their own deities, priests and festivals, and no temples, Brahmin priests or Sanskrit scriptures. Because the census has no code for Sarna, those who wish to record it must write it under “other religions and persuasions”; in the 2011 Census close to five million people did so (Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner, India 2013). In November 2020 the Jharkhand Legislative Assembly passed a resolution asking the central government to include a separate code for the “Sarna Adivasi” religion in the census. Similar movements exist for other indigenous religions, such as the Gond Koyā Punem.

The Sarna movement has also produced systematic statements of belief, a new genre for a religion transmitted by practice rather than scripture. Ram Dayal Munda set out, in a short book, the beliefs and rites of what he called Ādi Dharam (Munda 2014), the “original religion” shared in his account by the Munda-speaking peoples and the Kurukh-speaking Oraon: a supreme being known by such names as Siṅboṅgā or Dharmes, the spirits of village, grove and household, the ancestors, and the rites of the agricultural year and the life cycle, led by the village priest rather than by a priestly caste. Such codification answers a practical need, since a religion must be describable if it is to be recognised in the census and defended against absorption; it also tends to make uniform what was varied from village to village, a tension familiar from the history of other religions.

In the North-East, indigenous religious traditions have been reorganised as formal faiths in response to Christian missions: the Seng Khasi movement among the Khasi (founded 1899), the Heraka movement among the Zeliangrong Naga associated with Haipou Jadonang and Rani Gaidinliu in the 1920s and 1930s, and Donyi-Polo among the Adi and other communities of Arunachal Pradesh.

12.7.2 Christianity

Christian missions arrived in Chotanagpur from 1845 (the Lutheran Gossner mission) and later among the Santal and in the North-East. Missions brought schools, hospitals and literacy, and many Adivasis converted. In the 2011 Census, Christians formed about 88 per cent of the population of Nagaland, 87 per cent of Mizoram and 75 per cent of Meghalaya (Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner, India 2013). Christianity has become an integral part of Naga, Mizo and Khasi identity, and Adivasi Christians in Jharkhand, Odisha and elsewhere have been central to movements for Adivasi rights. Conversion has also divided villages, and missionaries often discouraged dances, songs, rice beer and other practices that are now being revalued.

That revaluation has been carried furthest by Adivasi Christians themselves. From the 1980s theologians in Chotanagpur and the North-East began to develop what they called a tribal theology, comparable to the Dalit theology developing at the same time. Among its best-known exponents are the Oraon Lutheran theologian and bishop Nirmal Minz, long associated with the Gossner Theological College in Ranchi, and the Ao Naga theologian Wati Longchar. They argued that the missions had mistaken Adivasi culture for paganism, that ideas central to Adivasi life, such as land held in common as a gift rather than a commodity, the community rather than the individual as the bearer of identity, and the kinship of people with the forest and its creatures, could be read as expressions of Christian faith, and that churches should defend Adivasi land and forest rights as a matter of belief. Many churches in Chotanagpur now use Adivasi drums, dances and song forms in worship. Tribal theology shows that conversion did not simply replace one culture with another: Adivasi Christians, like Sarna Adivasis, have argued over what in their tradition is essential and how it should be carried forward.

12.7.3 Conversion and the “Delisting” Demand

Conversion has also become a question of law and status. Since the late 1960s, when the Congress politician Kartik Oraon campaigned on the issue, some organisations have demanded that Adivasis who have converted to Christianity or Islam be removed from the Scheduled Tribe list, as Dalits who are not Hindu, Sikh or Buddhist are excluded from the Scheduled Caste list. Opponents argue that Scheduled Tribe status depends on membership of a community, not religion, and that delisting would divide communities and penalise individuals for their faith. The question remains politically charged in Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Odisha.

12.7.4 Hindu Nationalism and the “Vanvasi”

Hindu organisations have worked in Adivasi areas since the colonial period, and the largest today is the Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram, founded in 1952 at Jashpur in present-day Chhattisgarh and associated with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. In its own account, its purpose is the welfare of the forest communities and the defence of their faith and culture, which it regards as part of Hindu tradition. Its workers run hostels, schools, health and sports programmes and campaigns against Christian conversion, and allied organisations run one-teacher village schools across central and eastern India. They prefer the term vanvāsī (forest dweller) to ādivāsī, holding that Adivasis and Hindus share one civilisation and rejecting a separate claim to prior habitation. Ethnographers have studied this work at village level. Amita Baviskar has traced how Hindu nationalist organisations gained a following among Bhil and Bhilala villagers in western Madhya Pradesh, and what that following meant to the villagers themselves (Baviskar 2005); Peggy Froerer, working in a village of Chhattisgarh, describes how their arrival sharpened the division between Christian and non-Christian Adivasis (Froerer 2007). Critics, among them many Adivasi scholars, argue that the vanvāsī framing denies Adivasi religions their own identity (Xaxa 2008), and campaigns against conversion have been linked to communal violence, as in the attacks on Christians in Kandhamal, Odisha, in 2008. Adivasi religious life in practice is varied: many Adivasis worship both their own deities and Hindu ones, and the boundary between “tribe” and “caste” religion has always been porous (Ghurye 1943; Srinivas 1952).

12.8 The Denotified Tribes

The “criminal tribes” of colonial law (Chapter 1) were denotified in 1952, but their stigma did not end. Many of the communities concerned, now called Denotified, Nomadic and Semi-Nomadic Tribes, are not Scheduled Tribes, and they remain among the poorest and most harassed people in India. Policemen and neighbours still treat them as suspects; many lack documents, land and access to schemes (Radhakrishna 2001). G. N. Devy’s writings and the work of the Denotified and Nomadic Tribes Rights Action Group have drawn attention to their situation (Devy 2006). National commissions in 2008 and 2018 recommended constitutional protection and the repeal of the Habitual Offenders Acts.

12.8.1 How Communities Were Notified

The Criminal Tribes Act of 1871 (Chapter 1, Section 1.8) applied at first to the North-Western Provinces, Oudh and the Punjab. Sanjay Nigam’s study of its origins shows how officials there combined two ideas: the campaign against “thuggee” in the 1830s, which had taught them to think of crime as the hereditary profession of organised fraternities, and the belief that in India occupation was fixed by caste, so that a community that had once lived by theft would always do so (Nigam 1990). Mobility itself was suspect. The communities notified were overwhelmingly those whose livelihoods required movement: carriers and petty traders, herders, hunters and trappers, entertainers, itinerant smiths and healers. Anastasia Piliavsky has shown that the colonial category had older roots: in western India some communities were recognised as professional thieves and raiders before British rule, and stood in established relations of protection and payment with kings and villages (Piliavsky 2015). The colonial innovation was to turn a negotiable social role, which applied to some members of some groups, into a legal status imposed on every member of a community from birth.

Under the consolidated Act of 1924, notified people had to register with the police, report at roll-calls and carry passes to travel. Many were confined to “settlements”, several of them run by the Salvation Army and other missions, where inmates were set to farm labour or, as at the Sholapur settlement in the Bombay Presidency, to work in mills and factories; the settlements were presented as reform and functioned as a supply of controlled labour (Tolen 1991). Meena Radhakrishna’s study of the Koravars and Yerukulas of the Madras Presidency shows how communities who had carried salt and grain on pack animals lost their trade to the salt monopoly and the railways, and were then criminalised for the shifts by which they survived (Radhakrishna 2001). The same pattern affected some Banjara groups, whose caravan trade is described in Volume 19, Vāṇijya and Samudra.

12.8.2 After Denotification

A committee of inquiry appointed in 1949 recommended the repeal of the Act, which followed in 1952; many communities now observe 31 August, the date associated with their denotification, as Vimukta Divas (“Liberation Day”). Repeal did not end the practices it had authorised. Habitual Offenders Acts passed by several states continued to allow the police to keep watch on individuals with records, and police manuals and local practice continued to treat whole communities as suspect. The death of Budhan Sabar in 1998 (Chapter 1) was one of many such cases; Devy’s A Nomad Called Thief collects his reflections on others (Devy 2006). Because the communities were listed differently in different states, some as Scheduled Tribes, some as Scheduled Castes or Other Backward Classes, and some not at all, they have often fallen between the categories through which the Indian state distributes protection.

National policy has recognised the problem only slowly. A National Commission for Denotified, Nomadic and Semi-Nomadic Tribes, chaired by Balkrishna Renke, reported in 2008, and a second commission, chaired by Bhiku Ramji Idate, in 2018. Both found that many such communities lacked the most basic documents (birth certificates, ration cards, caste certificates and records of residence) because they had no fixed address, and that this excluded them from schools, welfare schemes and voting. They recommended a full enumeration of the communities, a permanent commission and legal protection comparable to that given to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. A Development and Welfare Board for these communities was set up in 2019 and a scheme for their economic empowerment launched in 2022; international human-rights bodies have urged the repeal of the Habitual Offenders Acts. Activists point out that no reform will be complete until police practice changes, since the most damaging survival of the old Act is the habit of treating a person’s community as evidence of guilt.

Members of these communities have also told their own history. In Marathi, Laxman Mane’s Upara (1980), on the nomadic Kaikadi, Laxman Gaikwad’s Uchalya (1987), on a community branded as pickpockets, and Kishor Shantabai Kale’s Kolhatyacha Por (1994), on the Kolhati dancers and acrobats, are autobiographies that describe police raids, hunger and exclusion from school, and also the skills, family ties and humour of the communities concerned; all three are available in English translation (Mane 1997; Gaikwad 1998; Kale 2000). In Ahmedabad, young Chharas of Chharanagar, a former settlement, founded the Budhan Theatre in 1998 after Budhan Sabar’s death, with the support of Devy and Mahasweta Devi; its street plays about custodial violence and stigma have been performed across India and have made the theatre one of the best-known voices of the Denotified Tribes (Schwarz 2010).

12.8.3 Knowledge on the Move

The knowledge of nomadic and formerly notified communities is easily overlooked, because it does not belong to a place. Anthropologists have called many of them “peripatetic” communities: groups that move among settled populations to sell goods and services that settled people need occasionally but cannot supply themselves (Rao 1987). Their knowledge is of routes, seasons, markets and patrons; of animals and plants; and of performance.

Some examples show its range. The Banjara (Lambada, Lambani) caravans organised large camps (ṭāṇḍā) under a headman (nāyak) and managed thousands of pack cattle across the Deccan; after the railways destroyed their trade, many ṭāṇḍās settled as cultivators and cattle breeders, as Bhangya Bhukya, a historian from the Lambada community, has shown for the Nizam’s Hyderabad (Bhukya 2010). The community’s religious life centres on figures such as the eighteenth-century saint Sevalal, whose shrine at Pohradevi in Maharashtra is a place of pilgrimage. Its legal status shows how the categories of the state can divide one people: Banjaras are listed as a Scheduled Tribe in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, as a Scheduled Caste in Karnataka, and among the denotified communities in Maharashtra, and in Telangana Gond and Koya organisations have opposed the Lambadas’ tribal status, arguing that they have taken a disproportionate share of reserved posts. Banjara women’s embroidered and mirror-worked dress is among the best-known textile traditions of the Deccan, and Banjara sky knowledge is discussed in Chapter 6. The Pardhi of central and western India were hunters and trappers, skilled in snaring birds and small game and in imitating animal calls; notified under the Act, they lost the legal basis of their livelihood again when the Wild Life (Protection) Act of 1972 prohibited most hunting, and they remain among the most harassed of the Denotified Tribes. The Paṇḍvānī singer Teejan Bai comes from a Pardhi family (Chapter 8), and Pardhi star knowledge has been studied alongside that of the Gond (Chapter 6). The snake-catching and music of the Kalbelia of Rajasthan, and the effect of wildlife law on them, are described in Volume 15, Kṛṣi and Jīva Vijñāna. The Gadia Lohar of Rajasthan and the north are itinerant blacksmiths who travel and live in decorated bullock carts; their own tradition traces their wandering to a vow made after Mewar’s loss of Chittor, a story that expresses the community’s sense of its dignity rather than a documented event. Rope-walkers and acrobats such as the Nat and Kolhati, impersonators (bahurūpī), keepers of performing monkeys and bears, and travelling sellers of herbal remedies such as the Vaidu of Maharashtra complete a picture of mobile specialists on whom village India long relied for entertainment, tools and cures.

Much of this knowledge has been made illegal or uneconomic. Laws protecting wild animals, banning animal performances and regulating medicines had good reasons, and the end of the dancing-bear trade, completed in the late 2000s through a rehabilitation programme that also retrained bear-keeping families, shows that such change can be managed with care for the people concerned. More often the law has prohibited a livelihood without offering another, and the communities concerned have been left with the stigma of their old occupations and without their skills’ market. The Irula snake-catchers’ co-operative (Chapter 2) shows the alternative: a hereditary knowledge put to a new and lawful use, under the community’s own control.

12.9 Conflict in Central India

Since the 1980s, the forests of central India, especially southern Chhattisgarh (Bastar) and parts of Jharkhand, Odisha, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh, have been the main theatre of the Maoist insurgency. The Maoists gained support among Adivasis by opposing forest officials, traders and contractors who had exploited them; the state responded with large police and paramilitary operations. Adivasis have been caught between the two sides.

The movement has its roots in the Naxalbari rising of 1967 in northern West Bengal, in which Santal and other sharecroppers took part, and in the Maoist groups that spread to Andhra Pradesh and then into the forests of Bastar from the 1980s; the main groups merged in 2004 as the Communist Party of India (Maoist). Maoist violence has been severe: attacks on security forces, such as the killing of seventy-six paramilitary personnel near Chintalnar in Dantewada in 2010; attacks on politicians; and the killing of villagers accused of being police informers. Security operations have in turn led to killings of civilians, arrests of villagers and activists, and allegations of sexual violence.

In 2005 a state-backed vigilante campaign called Salwa Judum was launched in Bastar against the Maoists. Villages were burned and their inhabitants moved into roadside camps; many fled to Andhra Pradesh. Adivasi youths were armed as “special police officers”. In Nandini Sundar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2011) the Supreme Court held the arming of these officers unconstitutional and ordered their disbanding. Nandini Sundar’s account of the war in Bastar documents killings, sexual violence and displacement by both sides (Sundar 2016a). Alpa Shah’s ethnography of Jharkhand shows the ambiguous relationships between villagers, the state and insurgents (Shah 2010), and her later account of a march with a Maoist guerrilla platoon describes from close quarters why young Adivasis joined the movement and how it treated them (Shah 2018). The essays in Bates and Shah (2014) place the conflict in the longer history of tribal insurgency in India. Any discussion of Adivasi knowledge in these regions must reckon with the fact that its holders have lived through decades of violence.

12.10 Intellectual Property and Traditional Knowledge

The WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS, 1994) requires member countries to provide patent protection in most fields of technology. Patent law is designed for new, individual inventions; traditional knowledge is often collectively held, orally transmitted and old. Two problems follow: traditional knowledge cannot easily be protected by patents, and others may patent inventions derived from it. Vandana Shiva and others called the second problem “biopiracy” (Shiva 1997).

  • Neem: in 1994 the European Patent Office granted a patent to the US Department of Agriculture and the company W. R. Grace for a method of controlling fungi on plants with neem oil. After an opposition filed by Vandana Shiva’s Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Ecology, the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements and others, showing that neem had long been used in India for such purposes, the patent was revoked in 2000, a decision upheld on appeal in 2005 (Shiva 1997).

  • Turmeric: a US patent granted in 1995 to two researchers at the University of Mississippi Medical Center for the use of turmeric in wound healing was revoked in 1997 after the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research showed prior use, citing among other sources old Sanskrit texts.

  • Basmati: a US patent granted in 1997 to the company RiceTec on rice lines and grains was challenged by India, and most of its claims were withdrawn or narrowed.

International law. The Convention on Biological Diversity (1992), which India ratified in 1994, has three objectives: the conservation of biological diversity, its sustainable use, and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits from the use of genetic resources. Its Article 8(j) requires each party, subject to its national legislation, to respect and maintain the knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities relevant to conservation, to promote their wider use with the approval and involvement of their holders, and to encourage the equitable sharing of benefits. The Nagoya Protocol (adopted 2010, in force 2014; ratified by India in 2012) requires prior informed consent and mutually agreed terms for access to traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources.

Biological Diversity Act, 2002. India’s implementing law (Section 11.4) requires those who use biological resources and associated knowledge commercially to share benefits with their holders. In practice benefit-sharing payments have been small and have rarely reached the communities whose knowledge was used. The amendments of 2023, which eased the requirements for companies using codified traditional knowledge and for Indian AYUSH manufacturers, were criticised by community organisations for weakening benefit-sharing further.

Traditional Knowledge Digital Library. The TKDL (2001) makes formulations from classical texts available to patent examiners as prior art (Chapter 7). It covers codified textual traditions, not oral Adivasi knowledge.

Geographical Indications. The Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999, in force from 2003, protects names of products linked to a place; Darjeeling tea was the first Indian GI. Several tribal and folk arts and foods have since been registered. GIs can help against false labelling but cover only marketed products.

Benefit-sharing. The best-known Indian example remains the Kani arrangement of the 1990s (Section 7.5); such arrangements are still rare.

12.10.2 Community Protocols

Some communities, with the support of organisations such as Natural Justice and Kalpavriksh, have written biocultural community protocols, documents that set out who they are, how they use and manage their resources and knowledge, and on what terms outsiders may access them. One of the first in India was prepared in 2009 by the Raika camel herders of Rajasthan. Protocols have no specific legal status, but they can be used in negotiations under the Biological Diversity Act and in dealings with researchers and companies.

12.11 International Standards

India ratified the International Labour Organization’s Convention 107 on Indigenous and Tribal Populations (1957), which reflected the integrationist thinking of its time. It has not ratified the later Convention 169 (1989), which recognises the right of indigenous and tribal peoples to control their own institutions and development and requires consultation on measures that affect them. India voted in favour of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007, while maintaining that the concept of “indigenous peoples” does not apply in India in the same way as in settler states, since the whole population is indigenous. Many Adivasi organisations, which participate actively in international indigenous forums, reject this position.

Key Points

  • Land loss and displacement have been central to Adivasi experience; Adivasis have borne a disproportionate share of development-induced displacement.

  • Rights to land have been protected in law since the colonial tenancy acts but eroded in practice; the Forest Rights Act (Section 11.4.4) added rights to unrecorded forest land.

  • Religious identity is contested: Sarna and other indigenous religions, Christianity and Hindu nationalist “vanvāsī” framings coexist and clash.

  • Adivasi movements produced a political thought of their own: prior settlement, the homeland, the dikū, the internal colony and village self-rule.

  • Denotified Tribes, criminalised as communities from birth and still stigmatised, hold a mobile knowledge of routes, animals, crafts and performance that law has often made illegal without offering an alternative; they and the communities caught in the conflict in central India face particular injustice.

  • Intellectual property law protects oral traditional knowledge poorly; benefit-sharing remains rare.

Further Reading

  • Baviskar (1995): Adivasis and the Narmada dam.

  • Sundar (2016a): the conflict in Bastar.

  • Shah (2010): Adivasi politics, environmentalism and insurgency in Jharkhand.

  • Fernandes (2008): the scale of development-induced displacement.

  • Shiva (1997): a critique of intellectual property regimes.

  • Devy (2006): Adivasi and Denotified Tribe experience and silence.

  • Devalle (1992): culture and protest in the Jharkhand movement.

  • Corbridge (1988): the ideology of the Jharkhand Party and of tribal policy.

  • Schwarz (2010): the making of the “criminal tribe” and the Budhan Theatre of the Chharas.

  • Bhukya (2010): a Lambada historian’s account of his community under the Nizams.

  • Shah (2018): the Maoist insurgency seen from within a guerrilla platoon.

  • Munda (2014): Ram Dayal Munda’s statement of Adivasi religious belief.

  • Sundar (2016b): essays on the politics, identities and policy of the Scheduled Tribes.