Chapter 12: Śaiva Philosophy — The Siddhānta and the Doctrine of Recognition¶
Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā
kathaṃ cid āsādya maheśvarasya dāsyaṃ janasyāpy upakāram icchan
samastasaṃpatsamavāptihetuṃ tatpratyabhijñām upapādayāmi
Having somehow attained the servitude of the great Lord, and wishing to help others too, I establish the recognition of Him, the cause of attaining every fulfilment.
— Utpaladeva, Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā 1.1.1
12.1 Introduction: Śaiva Theology as Darśana¶
The schools treated so far in this volume grew out of the Vedic exegetical and ascetic traditions, or, in the case of the Buddhists, Jains and materialists, defined themselves against them. A further body of philosophy grew out of the revealed scriptures of the Śaivas, the Tantras or Āgamas, which their followers regarded as a revelation of Śiva distinct from, and for initiates superior to, the Veda. From about the end of the seventh century these scriptures acquired learned exegetes who argued for their doctrines in the common language of Indian philosophy — the language of pramāṇa, of pūrvapakṣa and siddhānta, and of the debate with Dharmakīrti’s Buddhist epistemology. Mādhava’s Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha (14th century) gives four of its sixteen chapters to Śaiva systems: the Nakulīśa-Pāśupata, the Śaiva (that is, the Siddhānta), the Pratyabhijñā (“Recognition”) and the alchemical Raseśvara system. The Brahmanical classification into āstika and nāstika (Section 1.3) has no place for them, which is one reason they are often left out of surveys of the “six systems”.
This chapter treats the two Śaiva schools that made the largest contribution to philosophical argument: the dualist Śaiva Siddhānta, and the non-dualist school of Recognition founded by Somānanda and Utpaladeva and systematised by Abhinavagupta. Both reached their classical form in Kashmir between the ninth and eleventh centuries, and they disagreed sharply with each other; the Siddhānta later acquired a distinct Tamil form (Section 12.2.6). The scriptures, ritual, yoga, cosmology of the thirty-six tattvas, the Spanda and Krama traditions and the later history of the Śaiva traditions are described in Volume 6 (Tantra–Āgama); Abhinavagupta’s aesthetics belongs to Volume 8 (Kāvya Kalpalatā). The concern here is with the arguments: what these philosophers held about the self, cognition, causality, relation, bondage and liberation, and why (Sanderson 1988).
An earlier Śaiva system deserves a sentence. The Pāśupatas, the oldest Śaiva ascetic order, possessed a Pāśupatasūtra with a commentary by Kauṇḍinya (the Pañcārthabhāṣya, probably of the mid-first millennium), which organises its teaching under five topics: effect (kārya), cause (kāraṇa), yoga, ritual injunction (vidhi) and the end of suffering (duḥkhānta). Its most debated philosophical thesis was that the Lord acts freely, independently of the karma of souls — a claim that Naiyāyikas and Siddhāntins alike felt obliged to discuss. The Pāśupata tradition itself is treated in Volume 6.
12.2 The Śaiva Siddhānta: A Realist Theology¶
12.2.1 The Exegetes¶
The Siddhānta, “the established doctrine”, was the mainstream of initiatory Śaivism across India. Its scriptures are the Siddhāntatantras, of which the Mṛgendra, the Kiraṇa, the Mataṅgapārameśvara and the Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṃgraha were the most important for philosophy. Its first great exegete, Sadyojyotis, is now placed in the late seventh or early eighth century (c. 675–725 on Sanderson’s argument); his short treatises — the Nareśvaraparīkṣā (“Examination of the Soul and the Lord”), the Mokṣakārikā, the Paramokṣanirāsakārikā (“Verses Refuting the Liberations of Others”) and the Bhogakārikā — defend the doctrine against Buddhists, Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṃsakas and Sāṃkhyas (Sanderson 2006). In tenth-century Kashmir Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha commented on the Mṛgendra, and his son Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha wrote commentaries on several scriptures and on Sadyojyotis’s Nareśvaraparīkṣā; these are the most philosophically demanding works of the school (Goodall 1998). King Bhoja’s Tattvaprakāśa (11th century) became a standard digest. From the eleventh and twelfth centuries the Siddhānta’s centre moved south, where Aghoraśiva of Cidambaram (12th century) commented on the earlier treatises, and where a Tamil school arose with Meykaṇṭār’s Civañāṉapōtam (Section 12.2.6).
12.2.2 Lord, Souls and Bonds¶
The Siddhānta recognises three eternal and irreducible categories: the Lord (pati), souls (paśu, literally “beasts”, that is, beings tethered like sacrificial animals) and the bonds (pāśa) that hold them.
The Lord. Śiva is the agent of five acts — emission, maintenance and withdrawal of the world, concealment, and liberation — which the Mṛgendra (Vidyāpāda 2.3) names as the whole of his work. The Siddhāntins argue for his existence in a form close to the Nyāya proof (Section 2.10): the world, being made up of parts and arranged in a particular way, is an effect, and an effect requires an intelligent maker who knows its material. The Mṛgendra adds that this maker must be perfect by nature (svabhāvasiddha), for a maker who had himself become perfect would require a prior maker, and the series would have no end (2.4). Śiva, however, is only the efficient cause of the world. Its material cause is māyā, a real, eternal and insentient substance distinct from him, from which the impure levels of the universe evolve; and the karma of souls is the auxiliary cause that determines what each will experience. Śiva therefore does not transform himself into the world, as the Brahman of some Bhedābheda Vedāntins does (Section 8.2), nor is the world an appearance, as in Advaita.
Souls. Souls are many, eternal and all-pervading, and their nature is consciousness. The Siddhānta’s account of that consciousness is distinctive. “Consciousness has the form of seeing and doing (dṛkkriyā), and it is always present in the self”, says the Mṛgendra (2.5); since scripture describes the liberated soul as “facing in all directions”, the soul is by nature omniscient and omnipotent. This sets the Siddhānta apart from Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, for which consciousness is an adventitious quality that the self acquires only in conjunction with mind and body (Section 2.9), and from Sāṃkhya, whose puruṣa is a witness that does nothing (Chapter 4). In the Siddhānta the self is both knower and agent; what needs explaining is why its knowledge and agency are so limited.
Bonds. The explanation is the bonds. The root bond is mala (“impurity”), also called āṇava mala because it makes the soul an aṇu, a limited being. Mala is a single, beginningless substance (dravya) with many powers, one for each soul, which obstructs the soul’s innate powers of knowing and acting, much as a film covers the eye. To this are added karma and the products of māyā: the body, the faculties and the world, which the Lord supplies so that souls can experience the fruits of their actions and so that, over time, their impurity may “ripen” (malaparipāka). When a soul’s impurity is ripe, the Lord’s power “descends” on it (śaktipāta) and it becomes fit for initiation.
12.2.3 Why Knowledge Alone Does Not Liberate¶
From these premises follows the thesis for which the Siddhānta was best known among its rivals: liberation requires ritual action, and specifically the initiation (dīkṣā) in which the officiant, as the instrument of Śiva’s power, severs the soul’s bonds. The argument is philosophical, not merely sectarian. Knowledge removes ignorance, and ignorance is a cognitive state. But mala is not a cognitive state; it is a substance. A substance cannot be dissolved by a cognition, any more than a cataract can be cured by understanding what a cataract is. It can be removed only by an action, and the only agent able to act on it is the Lord, who acts through the rite. The Siddhāntins accordingly criticised the Sāṃkhyas, Advaitins and others who taught liberation through knowledge alone; Sadyojyotis’s Paramokṣanirāsakārikā is a review of the liberations proposed by other schools, each rejected as either not final or not liberation.
Liberation, on this view, is not union with Śiva. The soul’s innate omniscience and omnipotence become manifest, so that it becomes “equal to Śiva” (śivasama), but it remains a distinct soul; and, according to most Siddhānta authors, the liberated do not take over the Lord’s cosmic functions. A dualist realism about the world thus goes together with a dualism of souls and God that persists even in release (Goodall 1998).
12.2.4 Scripture and Its Authority¶
The Siddhāntins also had to defend the authority of their scriptures, and here their opponents were Brahmanical. For the Mīmāṃsā the Veda is valid because it has no author, and therefore no author’s faults (Section 6.7); texts composed by persons, however revered, can have only a derived authority, and Kumārila, in his Tantravārttika (on MS 1.3), counted the Pāśupata and Pāñcarātra teachings, along with Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Buddhist and Jain works, among compositions of this kind that stand outside the Veda. The Śaivas answered on Nyāya rather than Mīmāṃsā principles. A statement is valid, they held, because its speaker is reliable, and no speaker is more reliable than an omniscient Lord; the Tantras are therefore authoritative precisely because they have an author. Many Siddhāntins added that the Veda too was spoken by Śiva, so that the two revelations are not rivals but stages: the Veda for all twice-born men, the Tantras for those whom Śiva’s grace has made fit for initiation. The Naiyāyika Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, writing in late ninth-century Kashmir, discussed whether the Śaiva and Pāñcarātra scriptures could be accepted as valid, and allowed them a place as long as they did not contradict the Veda — a compromise that reflects the social standing these traditions had already won.
The debate mattered because it decided who could be liberated, and how. Initiation into the Siddhānta was open, in principle, to members of all four classes and, with restrictions, to women; the scriptures set the initiate’s ritual duties according to his class, and the high offices of officiant and teacher were in practice reserved largely to Brahmins. The claim that a rite could free a soul regardless of its Vedic eligibility was one reason orthodox Mīmāṃsakas regarded the Tantras with suspicion; the retention of class distinctions within initiation is one reason modern historians do not describe the Siddhānta as a movement against caste (Sanderson 1988).
12.2.5 Rāmakaṇṭha and the Buddhist Denial of the Self¶
The Siddhāntins’ most important philosophical opponents were the Buddhist epistemologists, for whom the self is a construction imposed on a stream of momentary cognitions (Chapter 10). Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha’s reply, studied by Alex Watson, is notable for turning a Buddhist doctrine against the Buddhists (Watson 2006). Dharmakīrti had held that every cognition is aware of itself (svasaṃvedana). Rāmakaṇṭha accepts that awareness is self-revealing, but argues that it is not momentary. What we call different cognitions, he argues, are one continuing awareness distinguished only by the different objects it illuminates; the variety belongs to the objects, not to the awareness. That one continuing awareness is the self. In support he appeals to recognition in the ordinary sense — “I who saw this before now see it again” — which joins two experiences in a single subject, and which a series of discrete momentary cognitions, none aware of another, could not produce. The argument anticipates the Pratyabhijñā’s, and both schools drew on a common Kashmiri debate with the Buddhists; but where Rāmakaṇṭha concluded to an infinite number of permanent selves, the non-dualists concluded to one.
12.2.6 The Tamil Śaiva Siddhānta¶
In the Tamil country the Siddhānta met a devotional tradition older than itself and was transformed by it. From the seventh to the ninth centuries the Nāyaṉmār poets — Appar, Campantar and Cuntarar, whose hymns form the Tēvāram, and Māṇikkavācakar, author of the Tiruvācakam — sang of Śiva in Tamil as a personal Lord who saves by grace. Their hymns were later gathered, with other works, into a Tamil Śaiva canon of twelve “sacred books” (Tirumuṟai), which includes the Tirumantiram ascribed to Tirumūlar, a long and doctrinally mixed poem whose date is much disputed. When the Sanskrit Siddhānta moved south in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, it found a public for whom Śiva was already known through devotion rather than through ritual theory.
The result was a Tamil theology with its own canon of fourteen treatises, the Meykaṇṭa Cāttiram. Its foundation is Meykaṇṭār’s Civañāṉapōtam (13th century), twelve terse aphorisms in Tamil with brief explanations, traditionally regarded as a rendering of twelve Sanskrit verses said to come from the Raurava Āgama, a claim many scholars doubt. Meykaṇṭār’s pupil Aruṇanti’s Civañāṉa Cittiyār expounds it at length in two parts: a refutation of rival doctrines (parapakkam), which reviews and rejects the materialists, several Buddhist schools, the Jains and others, and a statement of the school’s own position (cupakkam). Umāpati Civācāriyar of Cidambaram (14th century) completed the canon (Dhavamony 1971).
The Tamil school kept the three categories of Lord, souls and bonds, the three impurities and the necessity of grace, but it changed their balance. Where the Sanskrit exegetes made initiation the decisive act and the liberated soul “equal to Śiva” yet distinct (Section 12.2), the Tamil authors stressed Śiva’s grace (aruḷ), which works through the teacher and through the soul’s own devotion, and described liberation as a union in which soul and Lord are “not two” without being one. They called this relation advaita, but meant by it inseparability, not identity: in release the soul does not become Śiva but no longer exists apart from him. The soul itself was described as cat-acattu, “real-unreal”: not real as Śiva is, nor unreal as the bonds are, but taking on the character of whatever it is joined with. The parapakkam literature also gives a Tamil survey of the Indian systems that complements the Sanskrit doxographies of Haribhadra and Mādhava, and, like the Maṇimēkalai before it (Chapter 1), shows that the debate between the darśanas was carried on in Tamil as well as in Sanskrit (Zvelebil 1973).
The Tamil Siddhānta remained the dominant theology of Tamil Śaivism, sustained by non-brahmin monastic institutions (maṭams) such as those at Tiruvāvaṭuturai and Dharmapuram. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries it became an emblem of the Tamil revival, presented by its English-language interpreters as the original philosophy of the Tamils and set against a Brahmanical Vedānta; that modern use, like the modern use of Advaita described in Chapter 8, tells us more about its time than about the medieval texts.
12.3 Somānanda and the Beginnings of the Recognition School¶
The school of Recognition (pratyabhijñā) begins with Somānanda (c. 900–950), whose Śivadṛṣṭi (“The Vision of Śiva”) is the first philosophical defence of a strictly non-dual Śaivism (Nemec 2011). Its thesis is that everything is Śiva: not a part, a reflection or a transformation of Śiva, but Śiva himself, possessed of will, knowledge and action. Since each thing is Śiva in full, Somānanda can say that “everything has the nature of everything” (sarvaṃ sarvātmakam); the differences between a pot and a cloth are real as Śiva’s self-expression but do not divide him. The world is therefore neither an illusion, as for the Advaitins, nor the product of an independent material cause, as for the Siddhāntins.
Much of the Śivadṛṣṭi is polemic. Its second chapter is a sustained critique of the Grammarians who, following Bhartṛhari, identified the ultimate reality with speech at its subtle “seeing” level (paśyantī; see Section 6.18). Speech, Somānanda objects, is an instrument, and an instrument presupposes an agent who uses it; to make speech ultimate is to put the instrument before the agent. Later chapters argue against other Śaiva and non-Śaiva positions, and the last gives an account of the lineage through which the non-dual teaching was transmitted. Somānanda’s style is compressed and combative; it was his pupil who turned his “vision” into a systematic argument.
12.4 Utpaladeva’s Argument for Recognition¶
12.4.1 The Work and Its Plan¶
Utpaladeva (c. 925–975), son of Udayākara and pupil of Somānanda, wrote the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā (“Verses on the Recognition of the Lord”), with two commentaries of his own: a short Vṛtti, which survives, and a long Vivṛti, of which only fragments survive. He also wrote three short “proofs” (the Siddhitrayī: proofs of the conscious knower, of the Lord, and of relation) and the hymns of the Śivastotrāvalī. The Kārikā has about 190 verses in four sections (adhikāra), set out in Table 12.1; a verse near its close (4.16) presents the work as a new and easy path, already taught by Somānanda in the Śivadṛṣṭi, which Utpaladeva has now “made well-fitted” by reasoning (Torella 1994).
| Section | Verses | Main topics |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Knowledge (jñāna) | 1.1–1.8 | Purpose; the Buddhist objection (1.2); memory and the synthesis of cognitions (1.3–1.4); light and reflective awareness (1.5); I-awareness and conceptual thought (1.6); unity of the knower (1.7–1.8) |
| 2. Action (kriyā) | 2.1–2.4 | Time and space as sequence; relation and universals (2.2); the object as a bundle of manifestations, means of knowledge, error (2.3); causality as agency (2.4) |
| 3. Scripture (āgama) | 3.1–3.2 | The tattvas reinterpreted; Lord and bound soul; the three impurities; states of consciousness |
| 4. Summary (tattvasaṃgraha) | 4.1–4.18 | The one Lord as the self of all beings; liberation as recognition |
The title states the method. Recognition (pratyabhijñā) is the kind of cognition expressed in “this is that same Devadatta”: it does not discover a new object but identifies a present one with what was already known. The Lord, Utpaladeva argues, cannot be proved or disproved in the ordinary way, for he is the knower and agent presupposed by every act of proof: “Who, being conscious, could deny or establish the great Lord, who is the agent, the knower, one’s own self, established from the beginning?” (1.1.2). Yet, through delusion, the Lord is not noticed even though he is constantly experienced (1.1.3). The work therefore does not demonstrate an unknown God; it removes the obstacles to recognising a self that is already manifest, by pointing to its powers of knowing and acting.
12.4.2 The Buddhist Objection¶
Before stating his own view Utpaladeva gives the opponent’s case in full (1.2), and it is the case of Dharmakīrti’s school. There are only two kinds of cognition: perception, which presents the bare particular (svalakṣaṇa), and conceptual thought (vikalpa), which is bound up with words. Neither presents a permanent seer; the notion “I” is about the body. Memory needs no lasting self, for it arises from the latent impression (saṃskāra) left by an earlier experience. Action, which seems to require a single agent persisting through a sequence, is only the arising of different things in different places. Causality is nothing more than “when this is, that comes to be”. Relations are unreal, for a relation would have to reside in two things at once and be dependent on what is already complete; and so the agent, too, is imagined (1.2.1–11).
12.4.3 Memory and the Synthesis of Cognitions¶
Utpaladeva’s reply begins with memory (1.3–1.4). Grant the Buddhist premise that every cognition is self-revealing and cannot be the object of another cognition. Then a memory, which is itself a new cognition, cannot reach the earlier experience; it can at most resemble it, and an appeal to the latent impression only explains that resemblance, not the memory’s being of the earlier experience. If cognitions were mutually separate and unaware of one another, the whole of everyday life, which rests on joining one cognition to another (anusaṃdhāna), would collapse — unless there is a single Lord, a body of consciousness, who holds the endless forms of the world within himself and has the powers of cognition, memory and exclusion (1.3.6–7). In memory, the earlier experience does not appear as a separate object, like the remembered thing; it appears as “I experienced this before”, taken up into the self (1.4.4). The unity of cognitions at different times is the knower (1.4.3).
This argument resembles the Nyāya argument from memory to a self (Section 2.9), and Utpaladeva knew it. The difference lies in what the self is. For Nyāya the self is a substance in which cognitions occur as qualities; in itself it is unconscious. For Utpaladeva the self is the very consciousness that cognises, and the unity that memory requires is the unity of that consciousness, not of a substrate behind it.
12.4.4 Light and Reflective Awareness¶
The heart of the work is its account of manifestation (1.5). Whatever appears, appears by being manifest. An object that was not of the nature of light (prakāśa) would remain unmanifest, as it was before it was known; and the light cannot be different from the object, for then the object would still not be manifest (1.5.2–3). Utpaladeva then reviews two Buddhist ways of accounting for the variety of experience. The Sautrāntika infers external objects from the fact that particular appearances arise unbidden; but the inference fails, for an inference can only reach what has been manifest at some time, and an external object, by definition, never has been (1.5.4, 8–9). The Yogācāra explains the variety by the awakening of latent impressions; but then what explains the variety of the awakenings (1.5.5)? Utpaladeva’s own answer is that the Lord, who is consciousness, by his own will manifests outwardly what lies within him, without any material cause, as a yogin creates objects by will alone (1.5.7).
So far the position might seem to be that of the Yogācāra itself, or of Advaita. What distinguishes it is the next step:
Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā 1.5.11
svabhāvam avabhāsasya vimarśaṃ vidur anyathā
prakāśo ’rthoparakto ’pi sphaṭikādijaḍopamaḥ
They know reflective awareness (vimarśa) to be the very nature of manifestation;
otherwise light, though coloured by objects, would be like an insentient crystal.
A crystal takes on the colour of what is placed next to it, but it does not know that it does so. If consciousness were only light — a pure, passive manifesting, like the witness-consciousness of Sāṃkhya or Advaita — it would be no different from such a reflector. What makes light conscious is vimarśa: a reflexive grasp of itself and of its contents, which in its fullest form is the awareness “I”. Utpaladeva’s Vṛtti says that without it there would be no camatkṛti, the savouring wonder of awareness — an idea that Abhinavagupta, under the name camatkāra, was later to apply to aesthetic experience. Consciousness is thus “reflective awareness, the supreme speech arising of its own accord”, and this is its freedom (svātantrya) and its sovereignty (1.5.13). The equation of vimarśa with the highest level of speech borrows Bhartṛhari’s conception (Section 6.18) while rejecting the Grammarians’ view of speech as ultimate in its own right.
Two further arguments complete this part of the work. First, against Dharmakīrti’s doctrine that perception is wholly free of conceptual construction, Utpaladeva holds that reflective awareness is present even at the moment of direct perception: otherwise the quick, unreflecting responses of everyday life — running, for instance — could not be explained (1.5.19). Secondly, he distinguishes this awareness from conceptual thought in the Buddhists’ own terms. Conceptual thought, on the Buddhist apoha theory (Section 10.7.3), works by excluding an opposite: to think “pot” is to exclude what is not a pot. The pure “I” has no opposite and excludes nothing; it is therefore not a concept (1.6.1–3). The limited “I” that identifies itself with the body, the breath or the mind is a concept, formed by excluding others; and this, not the self, is what the Buddhists rightly deny (1.6.4–5).
The first section ends by drawing the consequences. Knowing a causal connection from repeated perception and non-perception, sublating a false cognition by a true one, and knowing the absence of a pot on the ground all require a single knower who holds several cognitions together (1.7). “Externality” is simply difference from the knower, and “internality” unity with it (1.8.8): objects are external in so far as they appear as other than the subject, but they have their being within consciousness.
12.4.5 Action, Relation and Causality¶
The section on action applies the same principle to the categories that the Buddhists had dissolved. Time and space are sequences of manifestations that the Lord projects (2.1). The notions of action, relation, universal, substance, direction and time are true, “because they are stable and serve a purpose”, and they are grounded in what is both one and many (2.2.1): relation is the unity, in a single knower, of things that appear separately (2.2.4). This is a direct answer to Dharmakīrti’s Sambandhaparīkṣā, which had argued that relations cannot be real; Utpaladeva’s Sambandhasiddhi takes up the question at length.
Utpaladeva also offers an original analysis of the object. A thing is a bundle of “manifestations” (ābhāsa) unified in one locus: the same thing can be manifest as long, round, upright, a man, smoke, sandalwood; or as existent, a pot, a substance, gold, bright (2.3.4–5). Each manifestation is a possible meaning of a word, and things perform different functions according to which of their manifestations are in play. The scheme does the work of the Vaiśeṣika universals (Chapter 3) without positing them as entities independent of consciousness. On this basis Utpaladeva defines a means of knowledge as the newly arisen manifestation through which a thing is fixed as “this, of such a kind” (2.3.1); and he concludes that the Lord, who is always manifest, is not the object of any means of knowledge (2.3.16). Error, too, is explained in terms of manifestations. In the shell mistaken for silver there really is a reflective awareness of silver, but the silver is not fixed in the shell, because the place does not agree (2.3.13); error is an incomplete manifestation, not the appearance of something unreal. Abhinavagupta later called this theory apūrṇakhyāti, “incomplete manifestation”, and placed it beside the theories of error described in Table 13.4.
The account of causality (2.4) is perhaps the boldest part of the work. An insentient thing cannot be a cause, for a cause would have to give existence, and what does not exist cannot take on existence while what already exists gains nothing by receiving it (2.4.2–3) — a dilemma that cuts against both the Sāṃkhya and the Nyāya theories of causation (Figure 13.2). Causation is therefore the relation of agent and act: the only true cause is a conscious agent who manifests as his act what was within him. The Lord is the cause even of a sprout; the potter makes a pot only within the order that the Lord has established; and a yogin can produce a pot without clay (2.4.8–10). Dharmakīrti’s formula “when this is, that comes to be” cannot hold between insentient things, each enclosed in itself, for the relation it expresses presupposes someone who connects the two (2.4.14–15).
12.4.6 Bondage and Recognition¶
The third section reinterprets the Śaiva scriptural categories. The knower is called “Lord” (pati) when the objects are his own limbs, and “bound soul” (paśu) when, through māyā, they appear as separate from him (3.2.3). The three impurities of the Siddhānta are redefined as modes of awareness. The āṇava impurity is twofold: a loss of the freedom of awareness, or a lack of awareness of one’s freedom (3.2.4). The māyīya impurity is the appearance of objects as different from the knower, and the kārma impurity belongs to an agent who acts without awareness of what he is (3.2.5). None of them is a substance.
Liberation follows. One who knows that “all this glory is mine” possesses the Lord’s nature even while concepts continue to arise (4.12); bound and liberated have the same world before them, but the bound see it as utterly different from themselves and the liberated as their own body (4.13). Utpaladeva’s last image is of a woman who has longed for a lover she knows only by report: when he stands beside her he gives her no joy until she recognises him (4.17). So the Lord, though always present as one’s own self, does not bring fulfilment until he is recognised. The Vṛtti on 4.16 draws the conclusion that through recognition alone one is liberated while living.
12.5 Abhinavagupta: Systematiser and Critic¶
Abhinavagupta (c. 950–1016), the pupil of Utpaladeva’s pupil Lakṣmaṇagupta, wrote two commentaries on Utpaladeva: the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī on the verses and the much longer Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī on the lost Vivṛti, which is the main source for that work’s arguments. His Tantrāloka, an encyclopaedic exposition of Trika Śaivism, is described in Volume 6. Three of his contributions matter most for philosophy (Pandey 1963; Sanderson 1988).
Knowledge, ritual and the two kinds of ignorance. At the opening of the Tantrāloka (1.36–51) Abhinavagupta settles the dispute with the Siddhānta over knowledge and ritual by distinguishing two kinds of ignorance. “Personal” ignorance (pauruṣa ajñāna) is the impurity itself: a pre-conceptual contraction of the self’s powers of knowing and acting. “Intellectual” ignorance (bauddha ajñāna) is a determinate but mistaken conviction in the intellect, of the form “I am such-and-such, and I know this”. Initiation destroys the first, but the second remains; an initiate who lacks knowledge is liberated only at the death of the body. When intellectual ignorance is removed by knowledge — for which the study of scripture is the chief means — liberation in life is “in the palm of the hand” (1.44). The Siddhānta’s claim for ritual is thus accepted, but subordinated to knowledge.
Impurity without a substance. Abhinavagupta defines the root impurity as the sense of being incomplete (apūrṇaṃmanyatā; Tantrāloka 9.62). It is “real” (vastubhūta), he says, only in the sense that it is Śiva’s own will to conceal himself (9.65–66). The Siddhānta’s independent substance is thereby replaced by a free act of the one consciousness, and the scriptural language of a separate impurity is read as a description of how that act appears to the bound.
Speech and aesthetic experience. Developing Utpaladeva’s identification of vimarśa with the highest speech, Abhinavagupta worked out a correspondence between the phonemes of Sanskrit and the stages of the self-manifestation of consciousness (Volume 6 and Volume 10). His theory that rasa is the savouring (carvaṇā) of a generalised emotion, free of the limits of the individual ego, applies to aesthetic experience the analysis of awareness developed in the Pratyabhijñā (Volume 8).
Abhinavagupta’s pupil Kṣemarāja (early 11th century) condensed the doctrine into the twenty sūtras of the Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya, whose opening sūtras are given in Volume 6; his works made the school’s ideas widely accessible but are less concerned with argument than Utpaladeva’s.
12.6 Dualists and Non-dualists in Debate¶
The disagreements between the two Śaiva schools, and between both and the Buddhists, can be laid out side by side (Table 12.2). Several are worth stating explicitly.
| Question | Dharmakīrti | Śaiva Siddhānta | Pratyabhijñā |
|---|---|---|---|
| Self | A construction on momentary cognitions | Many eternal selves, by nature omniscient and omnipotent | One consciousness, the Lord, appearing as many knowers |
| Cognition | Momentary and self-aware | One continuing self-aware awareness, varied by its objects (Rāmakaṇṭha) | Light (prakāśa) that is also reflective awareness (vimarśa) |
| World | Momentary particulars | Real; evolved from māyā, a substance distinct from Śiva | Real as the manifestation of consciousness within itself |
| Relation and causality | Constructed; “when this is, that comes to be” | Real; Śiva is the efficient cause, māyā the material cause | Unity in one knower; causality is agency |
| Bondage | Craving and ignorance | Mala, a beginningless substance | Contraction of awareness; the sense of incompleteness |
| Liberation | Cessation of the defilements | Equality with Śiva, remaining distinct | Recognition of oneself as the Lord |
| Means | Insight | Initiation, as Śiva’s act | Recognition; initiation with knowledge |
First, both Śaiva schools reject the Buddhist dissolution of the subject, and both use the Buddhists’ own doctrine of self-awareness to do so; the argument from memory and recognition is common to Rāmakaṇṭha and Utpaladeva. They part over its conclusion. For the Siddhānta the self-aware subjects are many and remain many in liberation; for the Pratyabhijñā their plurality is the Lord’s self-limitation. Secondly, they differ over what bondage is, and so over how it is removed. If impurity is a substance, liberation needs a rite; if it is a contraction of awareness, recognition is enough, and ritual becomes a means of producing or expressing it. Thirdly, they differ over the world. The Siddhānta needs māyā as a material cause because it holds that an intelligent being cannot itself be the stuff of the world; the Pratyabhijñā answers that a conscious agent can manifest objects without material cause, as the yogin’s power shows, and that only a conscious agent can be a cause at all.
The Pratyabhijñā’s relation to other non-dualisms is equally instructive. Like the Yogācāra, it denies that there are objects outside consciousness; unlike it, it holds that consciousness is one rather than a stream of moments, that it is reflexively aware of itself as “I”, and that the world it manifests is real. Its differences from Advaita — above all the dynamic, active character of consciousness and the reality of māyā as a power of Śiva — are set out in Table 12.3.
| Issue | Kaśmīr Śaivism | Advaita Vedānta |
|---|---|---|
| Ultimate Reality | Paraśiva: dynamic, creative consciousness | Nirguṇa Brahman: actionless (niṣkriya), attributeless consciousness |
| Status of the world | Real manifestation of Śiva’s creative power | Mithyā (apparent; ultimately unreal) |
| Māyā | One of Śiva’s powers; it conceals but is real | Inexplicable; neither real nor unreal |
| Liberation | Recognition (pratyabhijñā) of one’s identity with Śiva | Knowledge (jñāna) of identity with Brahman |
| Nature of consciousness | Dynamic, creative, possessing svātantrya (absolute freedom) | Pure witness (sākṣin); actionless |
Abhinavagupta’s critique of Advaita centres on the charge that Śaṅkara’s Brahman, being utterly devoid of activity and creative power, cannot adequately explain the dynamic reality of experience. For the Kaśmīr Śaivas, consciousness is not merely a passive witness but an active, creative force (vimarśa) that freely manifests the entire universe within itself, like a mirror reflecting images without being affected by them. The Pratyabhijñā authors argued above all against the Buddhist epistemologists, and their engagement with Advaita was less direct; but the contrast became a commonplace of later writing on both traditions.
Modern interpreters have read Utpaladeva’s argument as a transcendental argument, which shows that the Lord is the condition of the possibility of ordinary cognition and action (Lawrence 1999), and as a careful theory of the relation between self and other (Ratié 2011).
12.7 Legacy¶
In Kashmir the non-dual tradition continued after Kṣemarāja through commentators such as Jayaratha (13th century), and the Siddhānta flourished in the Tamil country, where Meykaṇṭār and his successors gave it a Tamil theological form (Section 12.2.6). Pratyabhijñā ideas passed into the Śrīvidyā tradition and into Śaiva and Śākta writing across India (Volume 6). Modern study began with the Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, published at Srinagar from 1911, and with K. C. Pandey’s study of Abhinavagupta (Pandey 1963); critical editions and translations of Utpaladeva (Torella 1994), studies of Somānanda (Nemec 2011) and of the Siddhānta exegetes (Goodall 1998; Watson 2006) have since shown how closely these Śaiva philosophers engaged the Buddhist, Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā debates treated elsewhere in this volume.
The Nyāya arguments for God and the self that the Siddhānta adapts are in Chapter 2; Bhartṛhari’s philosophy of the word, which Somānanda criticises and Utpaladeva adapts, in Chapter 6; Dharmakīrti’s epistemology in Chapter 10; and the Śaiva theories of error and causation are compared with those of the other schools in Chapter 13.