Chapter 4: Jñāna Yoga: Advaita Vedānta and Yoga¶
Bhagavad Gītā 3.3
loke'smin dvividhā niṣṭhā purā proktā mayānagha
jñānayogena sāṃkhyānāṃ karmayogena yoginām
In this world, O blameless one, a twofold path was taught by me of old:
the yoga of knowledge for the Sāṃkhyas, the yoga of action for the yogins.
4.1 A Name and Its History¶
“Jñāna Yoga”, the yoga of knowledge, is an old phrase with a modern career. The Gītā uses it in the verse above for the path of the Sāṃkhyas, those who seek liberation through discriminating knowledge, and sets it beside the yoga of action. The Bhāgavata Purāṇa names three yogas, of knowledge, action and devotion (11.20). But the idea that “Jñāna Yoga” is one of four parallel paths, alongside Rāja, Karma and Bhakti Yoga, is largely Vivekānanda’s: his lectures published as Jñāna Yoga (1899) presented Advaita Vedānta under that name, and modern teaching has followed him (Chapter 1, Section 1.9).
For the classical Advaitins themselves, knowledge was not one yoga among others. It was the only direct means of liberation, and their relation to yoga — to Patañjali’s system, to meditative technique, to the Haṭha practices of their own renunciant order — was complex: they rejected yoga as a philosophy, used it as a discipline, and argued about how far it could help. That relation is the subject of this chapter. The doctrines of Advaita (the unreality of difference, superimposition, the levels of reality, the theory of māyā) are treated in Volume 3, Darśana Darpaṇa, and are recalled here only as far as the argument requires.
4.2 Knowledge Alone: The Advaita Position¶
Advaita Vedānta’s classical exponent is Śaṅkara (c. 700–750 CE; the traditional date, 788–820, rests on later sources and long served as the conventional date in scholarship). His authentic works include commentaries on the principal Upaniṣads, the Brahmasūtra and the Bhagavad Gītā, and the independent Upadeśasāhasrī; hundreds of other works, including the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi and the Ātmabodha, are attributed to him by tradition, but most scholars doubt that he wrote them (Mayeda 1979). His central claim is that the self (ātman) is identical with the absolute (brahman), and that bondage is nothing but ignorance of this identity. It follows that liberation cannot be produced by any action, ritual or meditative, since whatever is produced by action is impermanent. It can only be revealed by knowledge, which removes the ignorance as light removes the appearance of a snake in a rope.
The means to that knowledge is the study of scripture under a teacher. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad’s injunction that the self “is to be seen, heard, reflected upon and meditated upon” (ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyo maitreyi, 2.4.5) gave the Advaitins their triad of hearing (śravaṇa) the great sayings of the Upaniṣads, such as tat tvam asi (“That thou art”, in the sixth chapter of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad), reflecting on them (manana) to remove doubt, and contemplating them (nididhyāsana) until the knowledge is firm. At the opening of his Brahmasūtra commentary Śaṅkara lists the qualifications of the student: discrimination between the eternal and the transient, dispassion, a group of six virtues beginning with calm and self-control, and the desire for liberation. Advaita was above all a tradition of renunciants, and it was socially restricted: following the Dharmaśāstra, Śaṅkara held that only twice-born men were entitled to study the Veda, and in his Brahmasūtra commentary (1.3.34–38) he denied śūdras access to Vedic knowledge, although he allowed that they might attain liberation through the epics and Purāṇas. Modern Advaita teachers have generally abandoned these restrictions.
4.3 Śaṅkara and Yoga¶
Śaṅkara’s attitude to yoga has two sides. As a philosophy, Patañjala Yoga was for him a rival. The Brahmasūtra itself, after refuting Sāṃkhya, adds that “by this, Yoga is refuted” (etena yogaḥ pratyuktaḥ, 2.1.3). Śaṅkara explains that the yoga tradition is rejected in so far as it teaches, with Sāṃkhya, an independent primal matter as the cause of the world and a plurality of selves liberated by discriminating them from matter. Liberation does not come, he insists, from knowing the self as separate from nature, but from knowing it as Brahman.
As a discipline, however, yoga was indispensable to him. His commentary on the sixth chapter of the Gītā, which teaches the yoga of meditation (dhyānayoga), treats posture, the steadying of the mind and the withdrawal of the senses as an aid to knowledge, the means by which the mind of the renunciant is made fit to receive it. In the Brahmasūtra commentary he accepts those parts of the yoga tradition that do not contradict the Veda, and he does not doubt that the yogin’s concentration can be real. What he denies is that any such state, however exalted, is liberation in itself. This placed him in a long dispute with other Vedāntins. Maṇḍana Miśra and others held that knowledge of Brahman must be made effective by repeated meditation (prasaṅkhyāna); Śaṅkara, in the Upadeśasāhasrī, rejects the idea that meditation produces a liberation that knowledge has not already given (Mayeda 1979).
Whether Śaṅkara also wrote a commentary on the Yoga Sūtra itself, the Vivaraṇa, is still debated (Chapter 2, Section 2.8.2). Paul Hacker’s suggestion that Śaṅkara had been a follower of Yoga before he became an Advaitin would explain both the commentary and the yogic flavour of some of his early works; it would also explain why the later Advaita order took yoga so readily into its practice.
4.4 Before and Around Śaṅkara: Gauḍapāda’s “Yoga of No Contact”¶
The oldest surviving Advaita work, the verses on the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad ascribed to Gauḍapāda (Māṇḍūkyakārikā, probably 6th–7th century), already has a yoga of its own. In its third book it calls the realisation of non-duality the “yoga of no contact” (asparśayoga, 3.39), a yoga that, it says, the yogins themselves find hard to see and fear, since they mistake its fearlessness for annihilation. The same book describes the discipline of the mind with a famous image: the mind is to be restrained tirelessly, like a man emptying the ocean drop by drop with the tip of a blade of grass (3.41). The mind must be roused when it sinks into torpor and calmed when it is distracted; and the yogin must not linger in the pleasure of absorption but pass beyond it (3.44–45). These verses, which echo Buddhist meditation manuals as well as Patañjali, became the model for the Advaita treatment of meditation: technique is needed to steady the mind, but its goal is a knowledge that no technique produces.
4.5 The Yogavāsiṣṭha¶
The most important text for the relation between Advaita and yoga is not a work of Śaṅkara’s school at all. The Yogavāsiṣṭha or Mahārāmāyaṇa, a dialogue in which the sage Vasiṣṭha instructs the young Rāma, despairing of the world, in the way to liberation, is a vast poem in six books (prakaraṇas) and some thirty thousand verses. Walter Slaje has shown that it grew out of an earlier Kashmiri work, the Mokṣopāya (“Means to Liberation”), composed around the tenth century, which was later reworked and given a Vedāntic colouring (Slaje 1994). An abridgement, the Laghuyogavāsiṣṭha, circulated widely, and it was this version that Niẓām al-Dīn Pānīpatī put into Persian for Prince Salīm in 1597 (Chapter 7, Table 7.12).
The work’s philosophy is a thoroughgoing idealism: the world is a projection of the mind, as real and as unreal as a dream, and bondage is the mind’s attachment to its own creations. Liberation is the stilling of the mind, and the mind is stilled by two means, which Vasiṣṭha names in the book on calming (Upaśama-prakaraṇa): yoga, the restraint of the mind’s movements, and knowledge, right seeing. Because mind and breath move together, the restraint of the breath is a means to the stilling of the mind. In one of the work’s best-known stories, the ancient crow Bhusuṇḍa explains that he has outlived the dissolutions of many worlds by fixing his attention on the movement of the breath. The text also gives the fullest pre-modern portrait of the person liberated in life (jīvanmukta), who acts in the world while inwardly free, and of the latent tendencies (vāsanā) whose exhaustion makes that freedom possible (Venkatesananda 1993). Its stories, more than its metaphysics, made it one of the most widely read books of later Hindu India, and through Vidyāraṇya it became an authority for Advaitins.
4.6 Vidyāraṇya’s Jīvanmuktiviveka¶
The work that built Patañjali’s yoga most explicitly into Advaita practice is the Jīvanmuktiviveka (“Discrimination of Liberation in Life”) of Vidyāraṇya, the fourteenth-century head of the Śṛṅgerī monastery to whom the Pañcadaśī is also attributed (his identity with the scholar Mādhava, minister at Vijayanagara, is traditional but debated). The book is written for the renunciant who already has knowledge but is not yet free of the old habits of the mind. Liberation in life, Vidyāraṇya argues, requires three things practised together: knowledge of reality (tattvajñāna), the destruction of latent tendencies (vāsanākṣaya) and the dissolution of the mind (manonāśa). Knowledge alone liberates in principle, but without the other two its fruit, the bliss and stability of the liberated person, is not secured.
For the dissolution of the mind Vidyāraṇya turns to Patañjali. He quotes the Yoga Sūtra’s definition of yoga as the cessation of the mind’s fluctuations, its account of practice and dispassion and its distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive absorption, and he quotes the Yogavāsiṣṭha at length on the stilling of the mind and the breath. He also distinguishes two kinds of renunciation: the renunciation of one who seeks knowledge (vividiṣā-saṃnyāsa) and the renunciation of one who already knows (vidvat-saṃnyāsa), whose discipline is precisely the practice of yoga for the sake of liberation in life. Andrew Fort, who has traced the history of the idea of liberation in life from Śaṅkara to the moderns, shows how far this goes beyond Śaṅkara: what for him was a by-product of knowledge became for Vidyāraṇya a state to be cultivated by yogic means (Fort 1998). The Pañcadaśī, a verse summary of Advaita in fifteen chapters, likewise devotes a chapter to the “bliss of yoga” (yogānanda).
4.7 Yoga in Later Advaita¶
After Vidyāraṇya, Advaita and yoga were closely interwoven. Sadānanda’s Vedāntasāra (15th century), the most widely used introduction to Advaita, describes a non-dual absorption (nirvikalpa samādhi) whose auxiliaries are Patañjali’s eight limbs, and names four obstacles to it: falling into torpor (laya), distraction (vikṣepa), latent passion (kaṣāya) and enjoyment of the bliss of absorption (rasāsvāda) — the last an echo of Gauḍapāda’s warning. The Aparōkṣānubhūti, attributed to Śaṅkara but certainly later, teaches a fifteen-limbed yoga in which each limb is reinterpreted as an aspect of the knowledge of Brahman (Chapter 2, Table 2.6), and it recommends combining this yoga with Haṭha Yoga for those whose minds are not yet fully ripe. The Śivasaṃhitā frames Haṭha practice with an Advaita metaphysics, and the Yoga Upaniṣads, collected and commented on in the eighteenth century by the Advaita renunciant Upaniṣadbrahmayogin, present Haṭha Yoga as Vedāntic revelation (Chapter 7). In the same centuries the Daśanāmī renunciants of Śaṅkara’s order were among the principal practitioners of Haṭha Yoga.
Not every Vedāntin accepted this synthesis. Vijñānabhikṣu, the sixteenth-century commentator on the Yoga Sūtra, attacked Śaṅkara’s Advaita as a “crypto-Buddhist” doctrine of illusion and offered his own reconciliation of Sāṃkhya, Yoga and a theistic Vedānta (Chapter 2, Section 2.8.4). The theistic Vedāntins understood knowledge itself in yogic terms. Rāmānuja (traditionally 1017–1137) argues in his Śrībhāṣya that the “knowledge” that the Upaniṣads prescribe as the means to liberation is meditation (dhyāna, upāsana), a steady remembrance (dhruvā smṛti) of the Lord that ripens into devotion; and he, like the other theistic schools, rejected the Advaita ideal of liberation in life. Their positions are treated in Volume 3.
4.8 The Liberated Person¶
All these discussions turn on the figure of the person liberated in life (jīvanmukta), whom the Gītā had already described as the person of steady wisdom:
Bhagavad Gītā 2.55
prajāhāti yadā kāmān sarvān pārtha mano-gatān
ātmany evātmanā tuṣṭaḥ sthita-prajñas tadocyate
When a person completely abandons all desires of the mind, O Pārtha, and is satisfied in the Self by the Self alone — then that person is called sthita-prajña (one of steady wisdom).
For Śaṅkara the body of the liberated person continues only through the momentum of the karma that had already begun to bear fruit (prārabdha), as a potter’s wheel, in the image already used by the Sāṃkhyakārikā (67), goes on turning after the potter has stopped. For Vidyāraṇya and the Yogavāsiṣṭha liberation in life is a condition with its own marks and its own discipline, protected by yoga. The difference matters for the history of yoga, because the second view gave yogic practice a permanent place in the life of the Advaita renunciant.
4.9 Modern Advaita and Yoga¶
In the modern period the two strands separated again. Vivekānanda presented Rāja Yoga and Jñāna Yoga as distinct paths, the first a science of concentration open to people of any belief, the second the Advaita teaching of the self (Chapter 11). Bhagavān Rāmaṇa Maharṣi (1879–1950) of Tiruvaṇṇāmalai, the most widely revered Advaita teacher of the twentieth century, taught a direct “enquiry into the self” (ātma-vicāra): the practitioner traces the thought “I” (aham-vṛtti) back to its source, and finds that the individual ego has no independent reality. His short Tamil work Nāṉ Yār? (“Who am I?”) allows breath-control as an aid that quietens the mind, but only for as long as it is practised; enquiry, he held, ends the mind’s restlessness at its root. Like Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara, Rāmaṇa valued yogic technique as preparation and denied that it was the goal. The long Advaita conversation with yoga, from the “yoga of no contact” to the enquiry “Who am I?”, is thus a conversation about the limits of technique (Fort 1998).