Chapter 20: Economic Thought and Planning in Modern India, c. 1870–1956¶
Chapter Overview
Chapter 2 began this volume with the Arthaśāstra and the early Indian tradition of thinking about wealth, carried on in the Tirukkuṟaḷ and in the Indo-Persian writing on revenue (Section 2.9). This chapter follows the modern sequel: the economic thought that Indians developed between the 1870s and the first Five-Year Plans in response to colonial rule and to the economics of Europe. It looks at the critique of classical political economy by Ranade and his contemporaries, the founding of an Indian economics profession, the attempts to measure India’s national income, the long controversy over the rupee and the exchange rate, the economic writings of B. R. Ambedkar, the agrarian question, the development programmes of the princely states, the planning schemes of the 1930s and 1940s, socialist thought, and the strategy of the Second Five-Year Plan associated with P. C. Mahalanobis. The drain theory and the debates on deindustrialisation, which belong to the same intellectual history, are set out in Chapter 19; Gandhian economics and the cooperative movement are discussed in Chapter 21.
20.1 From Political Economy to Indian Economics¶
Modern economics reached India as part of the education of the colonial elite. The universities founded at Calcutta, Bombay and Madras in 1857 taught political economy from British textbooks, and the doctrines of Adam Smith, Ricardo and John Stuart Mill — free trade, the benefits of the division of labour, Ricardian rent, the self-correcting market — shaped the policies of the government of India (Chapter 19, Section 19.4.2) (Ambirajan 1978). The first generation of Indian economic writers were therefore critics from within: they had learned the classical doctrines, and they asked whether those doctrines fitted a poor, agrarian, colonial country.
Their answers formed what Bipan Chandra called the economic ideology of the early national movement (Chandra 1966). Its central claims were that India was poor and growing poorer; that the causes lay in the drain of resources to Britain, the ruin of handicrafts and a heavy and inflexible land revenue; and that the remedy lay in industrialisation promoted by the state, protection for Indian industry, lower military spending and a greater share for Indians in the services. Ajit Dasgupta’s history of Indian economic thought argues that this body of writing was more than a nationalist polemic: its authors developed recognisable positions on the theory of value, on the role of the state and on the measurement of poverty, and some of their questions anticipated those of later development economics (Dasgupta 1993). Manu Goswami has stressed a different point: in arguing about the drain and the national income, these writers helped to define “the Indian economy” as a single bounded territory with its own interests, distinct from the empire of which it was part (Goswami 2004).
20.2 Ranade and the Critique of Classical Economics¶
Mahadev Govind Ranade (1842–1901), a judge of the Bombay High Court and a social reformer, gave the most systematic statement of the critique. In a lecture on “Indian Political Economy” delivered at the Deccan College, Poona, in 1892, and reprinted in his Essays on Indian Economics (1898), he argued that the conclusions of English classical economics rested on assumptions — the dominance of self-interest, free competition, the mobility of labour and capital, a society organised by contract — that did not hold in India, where status, custom and caste still governed much economic life (Ranade 1898). A science built on those assumptions could not simply be applied to Indian conditions. Ranade drew on the German historical school and on the national economics of Friedrich List, which held that a late-developing country might need to protect its infant industries and that the state had a positive part to play in economic development. He pointed to the examples of the United States, Germany and Japan, which had industrialised behind tariff walls, and he urged the government of India to encourage industry, to make credit available to cultivators, and to treat the land revenue as a tax rather than a rent.
Ranade’s ideas were developed by a circle of writers in western India. Ganesh Vyankatesh Joshi wrote detailed critiques of the land revenue settlements of the Bombay Presidency and of the government’s finances, and Gopal Krishna Gokhale (1866–1915), as a member of the Imperial Legislative Council from 1902, used the annual budget debates to attack the government’s surpluses, the salt tax and the level of military expenditure, and to press for spending on education and for Indian employment in the higher services (Chandra 1966). The arguments of Dadabhai Naoroji and R. C. Dutt on the drain and on the economic history of British India, which belong to the same body of thought, are set out in Chapter 19.
These writers were not opponents of markets as such. Most of them accepted private property and commerce and admired the industrial economies of the West; what they rejected was the doctrine that the state should leave the economy alone in a country where, as they saw it, the state was foreign and the market was weighted against Indian producers. Their programme of state-assisted industrialisation became the main line of Indian economic thought until independence and beyond.
20.3 The Economics Profession and Its Questions¶
20.3.1 Universities, Journals and Institutes¶
In the early twentieth century economics became an academic discipline in India. Chairs and departments were created in the universities, and in 1916 the Indian Journal of Economics began publication at Allahabad; the Indian Economic Association was founded in the following year. The Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics was founded at Poona in 1930, with D. R. Gadgil (1901–1971) as its director; the Indian Statistical Institute was founded at Calcutta by Prasanta Chandra Mahalanobis (1893–1972) in 1931, and its journal Sankhyā began in 1933. The Delhi School of Economics followed in 1949, founded by V. K. R. V. Rao. These institutions trained the economists who staffed the planning agencies after independence.
20.3.2 The Village and the Region¶
Much of the early work was empirical and rural. Harold Mann, an agricultural chemist who directed agricultural research in the Bombay Presidency, published in 1917 a detailed survey of a single Deccan village, recording its land, crops, debts and incomes household by household (Mann 1917); it was the first of a series of village surveys that became a tradition of Indian economics. Radhakamal Mukerjee (1889–1968), later a professor at Lucknow, argued in The Foundations of Indian Economics (1916) that Indian economic life had to be understood through its own institutions — the village community, the caste, the joint family and the handicraft workshop — and that development should build on them rather than sweep them away (Mukerjee 1916). His approach, which combined economics, sociology and what would later be called ecology, ran counter both to the classical tradition and to the planners who followed.
Gadgil’s The Industrial Evolution of India in Recent Times (1924) was one of the first systematic economic histories of India under British rule written by a professional Indian economist. It described the decline of the old urban handicrafts, the survival of village industries, the growth of factory industry and the changes in agriculture and transport, with a balance and attention to evidence that made it a standard text for decades (Gadgil 1924). Its measured judgements contrast with the sharper claims on both sides of the later debate on deindustrialisation (Chapter 19).
20.4 Measuring the National Income¶
How poor was India, and was it becoming poorer? The question could be answered only by estimating the national income, and Indian economists made the first attempts. Dadabhai Naoroji, in the papers collected in Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, estimated the income of British India in 1867–68 at about 20 rupees a head and argued that this was insufficient even for the bare necessities of life (Naoroji 1901). Officials replied with estimates of their own, generally somewhat higher, and the argument over the figures became a recurring feature of political debate. All these early estimates rested on rough assumptions about yields, prices and population, and their differences reflected method as much as reality.
The first estimate made on a systematic basis by modern methods was V. K. R. V. Rao’s study of the national income of British India for 1931–32, published in 1940, which built up the total by sectors from the best available statistics of output and income and discussed the margins of error at each step (Rao 1940). After independence a National Income Committee, chaired by Mahalanobis with Gadgil and Rao as members, was appointed in 1949 to establish official estimates; its reports laid the foundations of the national accounts of India. Modern reconstructions of the whole twentieth century, notably by S. Sivasubramonian, have used these and other sources to produce consistent series (Sivasubramonian 2000). They show that income per head grew little in the last half-century of colonial rule, a finding that underlies the assessment in Chapter 19.
The statistical tradition that Mahalanobis founded had wider consequences. The Indian Statistical Institute developed the methods of large-scale sample surveys, and in 1950 the government set up the National Sample Survey to collect data on consumption, employment and production across the country. India thus acquired, soon after independence, one of the most extensive systems of economic statistics among the poorer countries of the world. Its history is outlined in Volume 11, Gaṇita.
20.5 Money, Exchange and the Rupee¶
20.5.1 Keynes and the Gold Exchange Standard¶
The fall in the gold price of silver after 1873, the closing of the mints to silver in 1893 and the fixing of the rupee at 1 shilling 4 pence by 1898–99 (Chapter 19, Section 19.4.3) created a currency system that had no exact parallel elsewhere. The rupee remained a silver coin, but its value was held to a fixed rate in sterling by the government’s management of reserves in London and of the supply of rupees in India. John Maynard Keynes, who had worked in the India Office, made this system the subject of his first book, Indian Currency and Finance (1913). He argued that India had arrived, without design, at a “gold exchange standard” — a currency convertible not into gold coin but into claims on a gold currency abroad — and that this was an economical and modern arrangement which other countries might adopt (Keynes 1913). Keynes served in the same year on the Royal Commission on Indian Finance and Currency, which broadly endorsed the system. Anand Chandavarkar’s study of Keynes’s long engagement with Indian questions shows how much his early monetary thinking owed to the Indian case (Chandavarkar 1989).
20.5.2 The Ratio Controversy¶
The First World War upset the arrangement. The price of silver rose above the value at which rupees could be coined, and in 1919 a committee recommended a new rate of 2 shillings in gold; the attempt to hold it collapsed in 1920. In 1925–26 the Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance, chaired by Edward Hilton Young, recommended that the rupee be stabilised at 1 shilling 6 pence, on a gold bullion standard, and that a central bank be created to manage the currency and credit. One of its Indian members, the Bombay merchant Sir Purshotamdas Thakurdas, dissented, arguing for the older rate of 1 shilling 4 pence. The Currency Act of 1927 adopted 1 shilling 6 pence.
The choice of rate became a nationalist grievance. Indian business and nationalist opinion held that the higher rate made imports cheaper and exports dearer, injured Indian industry and agriculture, and lightened the burden of the government’s sterling payments at the expense of Indian producers; the government and its supporters replied that it held down prices and that the rate had already been established in the market. In the depression of the 1930s, when Britain left the gold standard in 1931 and the rupee was tied to sterling, the outflow of gold from India — “distress gold” sold by hard-pressed cultivators and others — helped Britain to meet its obligations, and was criticised in India as a further drain. G. Balachandran’s study places these controversies in the setting of Britain’s own monetary difficulties between the wars (Balachandran 1996). The Reserve Bank of India, established under an Act of 1934, began operations on 1 April 1935 as a shareholders’ bank; it was nationalised on 1 January 1949.
During the Second World War the position was reversed. The government of India spent heavily on behalf of Britain and was paid in sterling credited in London, and India, which had been a debtor, ended the war as a large creditor of Britain. The use of these “sterling balances” after independence was one of the first questions of Indian economic policy.
20.6 Ambedkar as Economist¶
B. R. Ambedkar (1891–1956) is remembered above all as the leader of the Dalit movement and the chief architect of the Constitution, and his life and social thought are treated in Volume 24, Samanvaya. But his training was in economics, at Columbia University and the London School of Economics, and much of his early published work was economic.
In “Small Holdings in India and Their Remedies” (1918) he argued that the fragmentation of holdings was not the cause of agricultural poverty but a symptom of the pressure of surplus labour on the land, and that the remedy lay in industrialisation, which would draw labour off the land and allow holdings to grow. The Evolution of Provincial Finance in British India (1925), based on his Columbia dissertation, analysed the division of revenues between the central and provincial governments and criticised the centralised, revenue-driven character of colonial finance (Ambedkar 1925). The Problem of the Rupee (1923), his London thesis, entered the currency debate against Keynes. Ambedkar argued that the gold exchange standard left the issue of currency to the discretion of the government and had permitted a rise in prices that hurt the poor; he preferred a gold standard with a gold currency, under which the issue of money would be limited by rule rather than by official judgement (Ambedkar 1923). His position was a minority one, and the standard he advocated was soon to be abandoned everywhere, but the book is an informed contribution to an international argument about rules and discretion in monetary policy.
Ambedkar’s later economic writing was bound up with his politics. He argued that the village economy, far from being a model, was the foundation of caste and of the dependence of untouchable labourers on landholders (Chapter 21), and in his memorandum States and Minorities (1947), submitted to the Constituent Assembly, he proposed that key industries and agricultural land be owned by the state and that the state socialism this implied be written into the Constitution. The Assembly did not adopt the proposal, but it shows an economist for whom economic organisation and social equality were inseparable.
20.7 The Agrarian Question: Revenue, Debt and Land¶
Most Indians lived by agriculture, and the economists’ most persistent questions concerned the land. The first was the land revenue. In his open letters to the Viceroy, Lord Curzon, published in 1900, R. C. Dutt argued that the frequent revision and heavy level of the assessments in the temporarily settled provinces left cultivators without reserves, and that this explained the severity of the famines of the 1890s; he urged that the revenue be fixed for long periods or permanently. Curzon’s government replied in 1902 with a resolution on land revenue policy that denied the connection, pointed to the failure of the rains and to the cultivators’ indebtedness, and defended the existing settlements. The exchange is an early instance of a pattern that recurred throughout the period: Indian economists explained poverty by policy, officials by nature and by the habits of the people (Chandra 1966; Ambirajan 1978).
The second question was debt. The riots of 1875 in the Deccan, directed against moneylenders who had acquired cultivators’ land through the courts (Chapter 19, Section 19.5), made rural indebtedness a central concern of policy, and a series of laws tried to protect cultivators by restricting the transfer of land and the enforcement of debts. The most influential study came from an official, Malcolm Darling, whose The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt (1925) argued that debt in the Punjab had grown not with poverty but with prosperity: rising land values had made the peasant creditworthy, and moneylenders lent freely against the security of land. The Royal Commission on Agriculture of 1926–28 and the provincial banking enquiries of 1929–31 (Chapter 6) gathered a mass of evidence on rural credit, and in the depression of the 1930s several provinces created debt conciliation boards to scale down debts that falling prices had made unpayable.
After independence the question became one of reform. The Congress Agrarian Reforms Committee, chaired by J. C. Kumarappa, recommended in 1949 the abolition of intermediaries between the state and the cultivator, security for tenants and limits on the size of holdings. The abolition of zamīndārī followed in the early 1950s in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and other states; when the courts questioned the compensation provisions, the First Amendment to the Constitution (1951) placed these laws beyond challenge. The All-India Rural Credit Survey, whose report appeared in 1954, found that cooperatives and the government supplied only a small fraction of the credit that cultivators used and that the moneylender remained dominant. It recommended a state partnership in cooperative credit and the conversion of the Imperial Bank of India into a state-owned bank with a mandate to extend banking into the countryside; the State Bank of India was created in 1955. Tenancy reform and ceilings on holdings proved much harder to enforce, and the debate over cooperative farming, which divided the Congress at the end of the decade, showed how far the planners’ agrarian programme lagged behind their industrial one (Hanson 1966; Chakravarty 1987).
20.8 Development in the Princely States¶
Some of the earliest Indian-directed programmes of economic development were carried out not in British India but in the princely states, whose rulers and ministers had more freedom to spend on development than the provincial governments of British India. Two examples stand out.
In Baroda, Sayajirao Gaekwad III (r. 1875–1939) made primary education compulsory throughout the state in 1906, well before any British Indian province, encouraged industry and cooperatives, and sponsored the foundation of the Bank of Baroda in 1908. In Mysore, a succession of dīwāns used the revenue of a well-administered state to build public works and industries. Visvesvaraya, as chief engineer and then as dīwān (1912–1918), directed the building of the Krishnarajasagara dam on the Kāverī, begun in 1911, and as dīwān saw the founding of the Bank of Mysore (1913) and the University of Mysore (1916) and planned the state iron works at Bhadravati, which began production in the 1920s; the hydro-electric works at Śivasamudram, commissioned in 1902, had already made Mysore one of the first places in Asia to use electric power on a large scale. Visvesvaraya’s later writings on planning (Section 20.9.1) grew out of this experience.
These states were not models of popular government: their rulers were autocrats, and the resources they invested came from land revenue and from monopolies as in British India. But their record mattered to the debate. Nationalist economists pointed to Mysore and Baroda as evidence that an Indian government with control over its own revenue could invest in education, irrigation, power and industry, and that the failure of the government of India to do so on a comparable scale was a matter of policy rather than of Indian incapacity.
20.9 Planning before Independence¶
20.9.1 Early Proposals¶
The idea that the economy as a whole could be planned reached India in the 1930s, under the influence of the Soviet Five-Year Plans and of the depression, which discredited reliance on the market. The engineer and former dīwān of Mysore, M. Visvesvaraya (1861–1962), had long argued for industrialisation as the remedy for Indian poverty; in Planned Economy for India (1934) he proposed a ten-year plan to double the national income, to be prepared by a national economic council (Visvesvaraya 1934). The Indian National Congress, at its Karachi session in 1931, adopted a resolution on fundamental rights and economic policy that called for state ownership or control of key industries and services, relief for peasants and protection for labour.
In 1938 the Congress president, Subhas Chandra Bose, set up a National Planning Committee with Jawaharlal Nehru as chairman and the economist K. T. Shah as secretary. The Committee brought together industrialists, economists, scientists and politicians, and worked through a large number of sub-committees on agriculture, industry, finance, labour, education, health and other subjects. Its work was interrupted by the war and by the imprisonment of its members, and its reports were published only in the later 1940s, but it established planning as part of the programme of the national movement and laid down principles — a leading role for the state in heavy industry, the coordination of investment, and the protection of cottage industries — that the planners of independent India inherited (Zachariah 2005).
20.9.2 The Plans of 1944¶
In 1944 three very different plans were published. The first, A Plan of Economic Development for India, usually called the Bombay Plan, was signed by eight leading businessmen and economists, among them Purshotamdas Thakurdas, J. R. D. Tata, G. D. Birla, Ardeshir Dalal, Kasturbhai Lalbhai and John Matthai. It proposed a fifteen-year programme of investment, much of it in basic industries and power, financed in large part by the state and by the sterling balances, with the aim of doubling income per head. That India’s leading capitalists proposed so large a role for the state surprised contemporaries. Vivek Chibber has argued that the businessmen wanted the state to provide infrastructure, protection and finance, but not to discipline private firms, and that this ambivalence shaped the limits of planning after independence (Chibber 2003).
The second, the Gandhian Plan of Shriman Narayan Agarwal, set out an economy of self-sufficient villages, cottage industries and decentralised production, in line with the ideas of Gandhi and J. C. Kumarappa (Chapter 21). The third, the People’s Plan, issued by the Indian Federation of Labour associated with M. N. Roy, gave priority to agriculture and consumer goods and to the redistribution of land. The colonial government itself created a Planning and Development Department in 1944, with Ardeshir Dalal as its member, which asked the provinces to prepare post-war development schemes. The range of these proposals shows that by the end of the war almost every political tendency in India accepted that the state would plan the economy; the argument was about what the plan should contain (Zachariah 2005; Chakravarty 1987).
20.10 Socialist Thought and the “Socialistic Pattern”¶
Alongside the liberal nationalism of Ranade and the business planning of 1944, a socialist current shaped Indian economic thought from the 1920s. Marxist writers analysed the colonial economy as a system of imperialist exploitation in which British capital, Indian landlords and moneylenders shared the surplus extracted from the peasantry; R. Palme Dutt’s India Today (1940), written from London by a leader of the British Communist Party, gave the most influential statement of this view and drew heavily on the nationalist economists’ evidence. Within the Congress, the Congress Socialist Party, founded in 1934 by Jayaprakash Narayan, Acharya Narendra Deva and others, argued that political independence must be accompanied by the abolition of landlordism, the nationalisation of key industries and the organisation of workers and peasants; Jayaprakash Narayan’s Why Socialism? (1936) set out its programme.
Nehru, though never a member of the Socialist Party, shared much of its outlook, and his influence ensured that planning after independence was framed in socialist language. In December 1954 Parliament adopted the “socialistic pattern of society” as the objective of economic policy, and the Congress endorsed it at its Avadi session in January 1955. The phrase was deliberately loose. It committed the state to reducing inequality and to a leading role in investment, but not to the abolition of private property or of the private sector, which remained responsible for most of agriculture, trade and consumer industry. The mixed economy that resulted combined a public sector in heavy industry, infrastructure and finance with an extensively regulated private sector; its strengths and weaknesses are part of the history of independent India (Chakravarty 1987; Zachariah 2005).
20.11 The Planning Commission and the Mahalanobis Strategy¶
20.11.1 The First Plans¶
The Planning Commission was set up by a resolution of the government in March 1950, with the Prime Minister as chairman. The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1948 had already divided industry into sectors reserved for the state, sectors open to both state and private enterprise, and the rest. The First Five-Year Plan (1951–56) was largely a programme of public investment in agriculture, irrigation and power, many of whose projects had been prepared before independence; it was framed in terms of the relation between saving, investment and growth that economists of the time used, and its modest targets were broadly met (Hanson 1966).
20.11.2 The Second Plan¶
The Second Plan (1956–61) was more ambitious and more distinctive. Its framework was prepared by Mahalanobis, then statistical adviser to the cabinet. In a short paper of 1953 he presented a model in which the economy was divided into two sectors, one producing capital goods and one producing consumer goods, and showed that, in a closed economy, the long-run rate of growth depended on the share of investment devoted to the capital-goods sector (Mahalanobis 1953). In 1955 he extended the model to four sectors, separating factory consumer goods from household and small-scale industry and from services, and used it to draw up a “plan-frame” (Mahalanobis 1955). The strategy that followed gave priority to heavy industry — steel, machinery, power — largely in the public sector, while relying on labour-intensive household and small industries to supply consumer goods and employment in the meantime. The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 enlarged the sector reserved for the state.
The strategy had critics from the start. A Panel of Economists consulted on the plan-frame in 1955 broadly supported it, but B. R. Shenoy wrote a dissenting note warning that deficit financing on the planned scale would cause inflation and that the plan neglected agriculture and the market. In Planning for an Expanding Economy (1956), C. N. Vakil and P. R. Brahmananda argued that the binding constraint in a poor economy was the supply of “wage goods”, above all food, which the employed labour force would consume, and that investment should therefore be directed first to raising agricultural output. Gandhian critics objected to the emphasis on large-scale industry altogether.
20.11.3 Assessment¶
How the planning strategy should be judged is a question for the economic history of independent India, which lies beyond this volume. Its defenders point to the creation, within two decades, of a broad industrial base, of institutions of science and technology, and of a capacity for public investment that India had lacked. Its critics, of whom Jagdish Bhagwati and Padma Desai gave the most influential early statement, argue that the system of industrial licensing and import controls that grew up around the plans produced inefficiency and slow growth (Bhagwati and Desai 1970). Sukhamoy Chakravarty, himself a planner, gave a balanced account of what the strategy achieved and where it failed, notably in agriculture and in employment (Chakravarty 1987). For the purposes of this volume the point is a historical one: the planning strategy of the 1950s was the culmination of seventy years of Indian economic thought, from Ranade’s call for state-assisted industrialisation to the Bombay Plan, and it answered, in its own way, the nationalist diagnosis of colonial poverty.
20.12 Continuities and Contrasts¶
It is tempting to look for a straight line from the Arthaśāstra to the Planning Commission, since both describe a state that directs economic life. The resemblance is superficial. The Arthaśāstra’s king ran mines, workshops and crown farms to fill his treasury (Chapter 2); the planners of the 1950s sought to raise the income of a whole population through investment and industrialisation, using concepts — national income, saving, the capital stock — that had no equivalent in pre-modern thought. The modern Indian economists drew on List, Marx, Keynes and Soviet practice as much as on any Indian tradition.
What they did draw from the Indian past was a set of questions. They asked how a society organised by caste, custom and the joint family could be reconciled with a modern economy, as Ranade, Mukerjee and Ambedkar did from very different standpoints. They asked what place the village, the craftsman and the small producer should have, a question that divided Gandhi and Kumarappa from Nehru and Mahalanobis. And they asked how a poor country could obtain the capital and the technology for growth without surrendering control of its economy, the question that had begun with the drain theory. These questions, rather than any particular institution, are the link between the economic thought of the national movement and the long history traced in the earlier chapters of this volume.
Further Reading¶
Dasgupta (1993) is the best general history of Indian economic thought, and Chandra (1966) remains the standard study of the early nationalists; Goswami (2004) offers a different perspective. Ranade (1898) and Naoroji (1901) are the classic primary texts. On currency, see Keynes (1913), Ambedkar (1923), Chandavarkar (1989) and Balachandran (1996). On national income, Rao (1940) and Sivasubramonian (2000). On the ideas behind planning, Zachariah (2005) and Chibber (2003); on the plans themselves, Hanson (1966), Chakravarty (1987) and Bhagwati and Desai (1970).