Chapter 7: Strategy, Battle Arrays and Intelligence¶
7.1 Introduction¶
Indian political literature contains a sophisticated body of thought about war and peace. Its fullest statement is in the Arthaśāstra, which treats war as one instrument of policy among several, to be used when it serves the interest of the state and avoided when cheaper means are available. Kāmandaka’s Nītisāra, the Mahābhārata’s Śāntiparvan, the dharmaśāstras and later nīti works repeat and adapt this framework. The same literature describes the organisation of an army on the march, the laying out of a camp, the choice of a battlefield and the battle arrays (vyūha) in which the four arms were to be deployed. Finally, it gives a remarkable account of secret services and espionage.
This chapter examines these three subjects — strategy, battle arrays and intelligence — first as the texts present them and then, more briefly, in the light of what is known about actual warfare. The main sources are the Arthaśāstra in the translations of Kangle and Olivelle (Kangle 1960–1965; Olivelle 2013), and the studies of Chakravarti and Roy (Chakravarti 1941; Roy 2004).
7.2 The Theory of the State and Its Enemies¶
7.2.1 The seven constituents¶
The Arthaśāstra and later texts analyse the state into seven constituents (prakṛti): the ruler (svāmin), the ministers (amātya), the territory and its people (janapada), the fort (durga), the treasury (kośa), the army (daṇḍa, bala) and the ally (mitra) (AŚ 6.1). The list is often called the saptāṅga, the “seven-limbed” theory of the state. It is worth noting that the army is only one of the seven, and that it depends on the treasury: the Arthaśāstra states that the army has its root in the treasury, and it devotes far more attention to revenue than to tactics. War, in this view, is an expensive activity whose outcome depends on the strength of the whole state. The strength of a king is further analysed into three powers (śakti): the power of counsel (mantraśakti), the power of might, that is of treasury and army (prabhuśakti), and the power of energy or personal drive (utsāhaśakti) (AŚ 6.2).
7.2.2 The circle of kings¶
The Arthaśāstra’s theory of foreign relations is built on the figure of the “would-be conqueror” (vijigīṣu), a king who aims to extend his power. Around him lies a circle (maṇḍala) of other kings. The king whose territory adjoins his is his natural enemy (ari); the king beyond the enemy is his natural ally (mitra), since both have reason to fear the enemy between them; beyond that lie the enemy’s ally and the ally’s ally. Behind the conqueror lie the “rear enemy” who may attack him while he is engaged in front (pārṣṇigrāha), and the rear ally (ākranda) who can restrain him. To these the text adds a “middle” king (madhyama), strong enough to help or hinder both conqueror and enemy, and a neutral king (udāsīna), more powerful still and standing outside the circle (AŚ 6.2) (Kangle 1960–1965).
The theory is an abstraction. It is a way of thinking about the balance of power among neighbouring states, stating in schematic form the principle that “my neighbour’s neighbour is my friend”. It does not describe a particular historical situation, and it should not be pressed too far, but it shows a clear-eyed recognition that relations between states are governed by interest rather than sentiment.
7.2.3 The six measures and the four means¶
The Arthaśāstra identifies six measures (ṣāḍguṇya) available to a king in his relations with others (AŚ 7.1; Table 7.1):
| Measure | Meaning | When advised (in brief) |
|---|---|---|
| sandhi | Peace, treaty | When one is declining in relation to the enemy |
| vigraha | Hostility, war | When one is growing stronger than the enemy |
| āsana | Remaining stationary | When neither side can harm the other |
| yāna | Marching, attack | When one’s strength is clearly superior |
| saṃśraya | Seeking shelter with a stronger king | When one is weak |
| dvaidhībhāva | The double policy: peace with one, war with another | When one needs help to fight |
The general principle is that a king should choose the measure that will lead him from decline to stability and from stability to growth. War is one measure among six, appropriate only under certain conditions.
Alongside the six measures, Indian texts commonly list four means (upāya) of dealing with an opponent: conciliation (sāma), gifts or concessions (dāna), sowing dissension (bheda) and force (daṇḍa). The Manusmṛti and the epics recommend that force be used only when the other means fail (Olivelle 2005). The Arthaśāstra is more flexible, recommending whichever means is most effective in the circumstances, but it too treats force as the most costly option. Some modern writers describe this as an ancient theory of “graduated response”; the comparison is suggestive, but the four means were also a list of techniques for manipulating rivals, including bribery and subversion, not only a scale of moral restraint.
7.2.4 Kinds of conquest and kinds of war¶
The Arthaśāstra distinguishes three kinds of conqueror (AŚ 12.1): the righteous conqueror (dharmavijayin), who is satisfied with the submission of the defeated king; the greedy conqueror (lobhavijayin), who wants land and wealth; and the demonic conqueror (asuravijayin), who wants the life, family and possessions of the defeated as well. A weak king is advised to submit to the first, buy off the second, and resist the third by every means. The idea of “righteous conquest”, in which a defeated king is restored as a tributary, is found in many inscriptions, for example in Samudragupta’s claim to have captured and then released the kings of the south.
The text also distinguishes three kinds of war (AŚ 7.6): open war (prakāśayuddha), fought at an agreed time and place; concealed war (kūṭayuddha), using surprise attacks, ambushes, feigned retreats and other stratagems in the field; and silent war (tūṣṇīṃyuddha), the use of secret agents to subvert or kill enemy leaders without open hostilities. The Arthaśāstra regards all three as legitimate instruments of the state. This frank acceptance of deception sits uneasily beside the rules of fair fighting in the dharmaśāstras, a tension examined in Chapter 12.
7.3 After the Arthaśāstra: Kāmandaka and Later Nīti¶
Kāmandaka’s Nītisāra (Chapter 3) restates the Arthaśāstra’s doctrines in verse, with a stronger emphasis on the king’s self-discipline and on the moral qualities of rulers and ministers. It treats the circle of kings, the six measures and the four means in much the same way as the Arthaśāstra, but it softens some of its harsher recommendations, and it gives more space to the conduct of envoys and to the arrangement of the army for battle. The Nītisāra became the standard handbook of statecraft for many centuries, cited by commentators and imitated by later authors, and its adaptation in Java shows how widely Indian political ideas travelled.
Later works on polity — the political chapters of the Purāṇas, the Nītivākyāmṛta of the Jain author Somadeva (tenth century), the Mānasollāsa, and the many anthologies of political maxims — repeat the same framework with variations. The Nītivākyāmṛta, written in short prose aphorisms, is notable for its practical tone and its emphasis on the king’s duty to protect his subjects; it shows that Jain authors, despite their commitment to non-violence, wrote frankly about the use of force by kings. This continuity of political vocabulary across a thousand years and more is striking, though its relation to the practice of particular states is difficult to establish.
7.4 The Campaign¶
7.4.1 Preparation¶
The ninth book of the Arthaśāstra discusses the decision to march. The king should consider his own power, the place and the time; the seasons in which campaigns are possible (normally after the rains, when roads are passable and harvests stored); the strength and loyalty of the different kinds of troops — hereditary, hired, guild, allied, those won over from the enemy, and forest troops; and the dangers of revolt in the rear while the army is away (Kangle 1960–1965). It warns that the cost of a campaign in men, money and grain must be weighed against its expected gains, and that a march which gains little and costs much is a loss.
7.4.2 The march and the camp¶
The tenth book describes the camp (skandhāvāra). It should be laid out by experts on a suitable site, in a square, circular or rectangular plan, with the king’s quarters at the centre, surrounded by those of the treasury, ministers and household, and with the different arms, the stores and the market in assigned places. It should be protected by ditches, ramparts, palisades and guard posts, with roads running through it and gates on each side (AŚ 10.1) (Olivelle 2013). On the march (AŚ 10.2) the leader (nāyaka) goes in front, the king and his household in the centre, horses and picked troops on the flanks, and the commander-in-chief (senāpati) at the rear; the text discusses the speeds of march and the protection of the army at river crossings, in forests and in passes.
Later armies were organised in a broadly similar way. Persian sources describe the Mughal army’s camp as a carefully planned city, with the emperor’s tents at the centre and the encampments of the nobles laid out in fixed positions around it, so that each man knew where to go when the camp moved (Gommans 2002).
7.4.3 The choice of ground¶
The Arthaśāstra gives detailed advice on suitable ground for each arm: firm, level ground for chariots, with few trees or ditches; open ground with some cover for cavalry; ground with trees and water for elephants, which could break through obstacles; and broken ground for infantry (AŚ 10.4). It lists the tasks of each arm. Cavalry is to scout, to attack the flanks and rear, to pursue and to cut off supplies; elephants to lead the advance, to break into enemy formations, to destroy fortifications and to protect the army; chariots to protect the army, to repel attacks and to break the enemy line; infantry to fight in all places and at all times. This division of labour shows an understanding of combined arms, even if the categories are schematic.
7.5 The Kinds of Troops¶
The Arthaśāstra’s discussion of the kinds of troops available to a king (AŚ 9.2) is one of its most realistic passages, because it recognises that armies were assembled from many sources of differing reliability (Kangle 1960–1965; Olivelle 2013). Table 7.2 summarises its categories.
| Term | Meaning | Characteristics (as the text presents them) |
|---|---|---|
| maula | Hereditary troops | Long attached to the king; the most reliable |
| bhṛta | Hired troops | Paid soldiers; reliable while paid |
| śreṇī | Troops of corporations | Bodies of armed men organised in guilds or associations |
| mitra | Allied troops | Supplied by an ally; their reliability depends on the ally’s interest |
| amitra | Troops of the enemy | Won over from the enemy; to be used with caution |
| aṭavī | Forest troops | Forest peoples; useful in difficult terrain, but liable to plunder |
The text discusses which kinds of troops to use against which enemies and in which circumstances: hereditary troops when the enemy also relies on such troops, or when the campaign is long; hired troops when the campaign is short and the treasury full; forest troops to clear the way through forests or to harass the enemy; enemy troops against other enemies, so that their losses do not matter. The armies of hired and allied contingents that Kolff describes in early modern Hindustan (Chapter 17) fit these categories well (Kolff 1990), but the fit shows that the text’s authors analysed a recurring problem accurately, not that later commanders learned from them.
7.6 The Weak King: Strategy for the Weaker Side¶
The twelfth book of the Arthaśāstra addresses a problem that every small state faced: what should a king do when attacked by a stronger enemy? Its answer is a catalogue of the means available to the weak (Kangle 1960–1965; Olivelle 2013). The weak king should first try to submit to a righteous conqueror, or buy off a greedy one with land or treasure. If the enemy is of the “demonic” kind, he should resist by all means. He should seek allies, especially the enemy’s rear enemy; send envoys to sow dissension among the enemy’s ministers and allies; use secret agents to stir up revolts in the enemy’s territory, to kill his commanders and to set his stores on fire; take refuge in forts and forests; and attack the enemy’s army when it is tired, scattered or divided. If all else fails, he should retreat to a strong fort and hold out until the enemy’s resources are exhausted.
This book is the most practical in the Arthaśāstra, and its catalogue covers, in general terms, the methods that weaker Indian states used against stronger ones in later centuries: the Ahom defence of Assam, the Maratha resistance to Aurangzeb, the guerrilla campaigns of rebels and chiefs (Section 7.15). It shows that the text’s authors understood that military power depends on the whole state — its forts, its alliances, its intelligence and its capacity to endure — and not only on the size of its army.
7.7 Battle Arrays¶
7.7.1 The Arthaśāstra’s arrays¶
The word vyūha means an arrangement or disposition of troops. The Arthaśāstra describes the battle line as composed of a centre (uras, “chest”), two flanks (kakṣa) and two wings (pakṣa), with a reserve (pratigraha) behind (AŚ 10.5–6). It then describes four basic arrays (AŚ 10.6): the “staff” (daṇḍa), a line in which the troops are drawn up side by side; the “snake” (bhoga), in which the troops follow one another in column; the “circle” (maṇḍala), facing outwards on all sides; and the “dispersed” array (asaṃhata), in which units are placed separately. Each basic array has variants, defined by whether the wings, flanks or centre are advanced or held back and how strongly each part is manned (Kangle 1960–1965). The scheme is geometric and abstract, intended to give a commander a vocabulary for possible deployments.
7.7.2 The epic arrays¶
The Mahābhārata’s battle books name many arrays, often after animals or objects: the heron (krauñca), the sea-monster (makara), the hawk (śyena), the eagle (garuḍa), the thunderbolt (vajra), the needle (sūcī), the cart (śakaṭa), the circle (maṇḍala), the lotus (padma) and the wheel (cakra) (Hopkins 1889). Each day of battle begins with the commanders arranging their armies in one of these forms, and the poet describes which hero stood at the “beak”, “eyes” or “wings” of the bird. The most famous is the wheel-array (cakravyūha) formed by Droṇa on the thirteenth day of the battle, which Arjuna’s young son Abhimanyu breaks into but cannot leave; trapped inside, he is surrounded and killed by several warriors at once, in breach of the rules of fair fighting (Droṇaparvan).
The epic does not describe how these arrays were constructed in any detail, and modern diagrams showing the cakravyūha as a set of rotating concentric rings, or the padmavyūha as a flower with petals that close on attackers, are imaginative reconstructions. The Agni Purāṇa, Kāmandaka and later nīti works also list arrays, partly following the Arthaśāstra and partly the epic. Attempts to identify these arrays in historical battles — for example, to describe the deployment of Porus at the Hydaspes as a particular vyūha — are speculation, since no Indian account of those battles survives.
7.7.3 Arrays in practice¶
The armies of the Delhi Sultanate, the Mughals and their contemporaries drew up for battle in a form common to the Persian and Central Asian world: a vanguard (harāwal), a centre (qol) where the ruler stood, right and left wings (barānghār, juwānghār), flanking parties and a reserve (Gommans 2002). This arrangement — centre, wings and reserve — is not very different in principle from the Arthaśāstra’s centre, flanks, wings and reserve, which reflects the fact that the problems of deploying a large army on open ground have similar solutions everywhere. Bābur’s memoirs describe his use of the tulughma, a wide flanking movement by mobile cavalry around the enemy’s wings, combined with a centre protected by chained carts and guns (Thackston 1996).
One feature of Indian battles is repeatedly noticed in the sources: the importance of the commander’s visible presence. Commanders, often mounted on elephants, stood at the centre of the line where they could be seen, and the death, capture or disappearance of the leader frequently caused the collapse of the whole army. Ibrāhīm Lodī’s death at Pānīpat in 1526, the capture and execution of Rāma Rāya at the battle of Talikota (Rakshasa–Tangadi) in 1565, and the death of the Peshwa’s son Viśvāsrāv at the third battle of Pānīpat in 1761 each led to rout. Armies made up of the contingents of many chiefs, held together by loyalty to a single leader, were particularly vulnerable to this kind of collapse (Roy 2004).
7.8 Command, Signals and Morale¶
Armies were directed by signals. Drums, conch-shells and horns gave orders to advance, halt and retire; banners and standards marked the positions of commanders and units. The opening of the Bhagavadgītā describes the heroes of both armies blowing their named conches before the battle:
Bhagavadgītā 1.15
pāñcajanyaṃ hṛṣīkeśo devadattaṃ dhanaṃjayaḥ
pauṇḍraṃ dadhmau mahāśaṅkhaṃ bhīmakarmā vṛkodaraḥ
Kṛṣṇa blew the Pāñcajanya, Arjuna the Devadatta; Bhīma of terrible deeds blew the great conch Pauṇḍra.
The Arthaśāstra pays attention to morale. Before battle the king should address the troops; priests and astrologers should proclaim favourable omens; bards and panegyrists should describe the heaven that awaits the brave and the hell that awaits cowards; and a scale of rewards should be announced for killing enemy leaders and soldiers (AŚ 10.3) (Kangle 1960–1965; Olivelle 2013). The text recommends that the king himself remain in a protected position rather than expose himself to danger — advice that contrasts with the heroic ideal of the epics, in which kings fight in the front line.
The qualities of a commander (senāpati) are described in the Arthaśāstra and in the epics: knowledge of all arms and weapons, skill in riding elephants, horses and chariots, understanding of signals, terrain and seasons, and the ability to judge the right moment to advance or withdraw.
7.9 The Logistics of the March¶
The great problem of every pre-modern army was supply. An army of tens of thousands of men, with horses, elephants, oxen and camp-followers, consumed enormous quantities of grain, fodder, fuel and water every day, and it could not carry more than a few days’ supply with it. Indian armies solved this problem in several ways. They campaigned after the harvest, when grain was available; they bought supplies from the itinerant grain-carriers (Banjārā) and from the markets that travelled with the army (Chapter 6); they requisitioned or plundered the countryside; and they planned their routes along rivers and through fertile regions. The Arthaśāstra discusses the provisioning of an army on the march, the protection of supply convoys and the need to secure the support of the people of the territory through which the army passes (Kangle 1960–1965).
Logistics often determined strategy. The Mughal campaigns in the Deccan were limited by the difficulty of feeding armies in a dry region with poor communications; the Maratha strategy of cutting Mughal supply lines exploited this weakness; and the third battle of Pānīpat in 1761 was preceded by a long period in which the Maratha army, cut off from its supplies by Aḥmad Shāh Durrānī, was reduced to hunger before the battle (Gordon 1993; Gommans 2002). The East India Company’s success in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries owed much to its ability to organise supply, with contracts, depots, bullock trains and, later, river steamers and railways.
7.10 Roads, Rivers and Routes¶
Armies moved along routes shaped by geography. Invaders from the north-west came through the passes of the Hindu Kush and the Sulaiman range — the Khyber, the Kurram, the Gomal and the Bolan — into the Indus plains, and from there along the corridor between the Thar desert and the Himalaya towards Delhi and the Gangetic plain. This corridor explains why so many decisive battles were fought in the same small region around Tarain, Pānīpat and Karnal (Figure 1.1, inset). The Vindhya hills and the forests of central India divided north from south; armies crossed them by a few routes, of which the passage by Burhanpur on the Tapti, the “gate of the Deccan”, was the most important for the Mughals.
States that could build and maintain roads gained a military advantage. Megasthenes, as reported by the Greek geographer Strabo, mentions Mauryan officials responsible for roads, who set up pillars at intervals to mark distances and side-roads (Thapar 2002). In the sixteenth century Sher Shāh Sūr is remembered for building or improving a road from Bengal to the Punjab, with resting places (sarāʾī) at regular intervals, wells and trees; the Mughals maintained this route and marked the road between Agra and Lahore with brick milestones (kos mīnār), some of which still stand (Richards 1993). These roads served trade, the post and the movement of officials as well as armies.
Rivers were both barriers and highways. The great rivers of the north could be crossed in the dry season at fords, but during and after the monsoon they were impassable except by boat. Armies built bridges of boats lashed together: Bābur describes building such a bridge across the Ganga in 1528 to attack an Afghan army on the far bank, under fire from the enemy (Thackston 1996). The collapse of a bridge of boats could be catastrophic, as it was for the Sikh army at Sobraon in 1846 (Chapter 19). Rivers also carried heavy supplies and artillery, and control of river traffic — on the Ganga, the Indus and the Brahmaputra — was an important element of strategy (Chapter 11).
The seasons governed everything: campaigns ran from the end of the rains to the next monsoon, as Chapter 1 explained. The Marathas exploited this cycle by raiding after the harvest and returning home before the rains; the Mughals, whose armies could stay in the field for years, were nevertheless slowed by it (Gommans 2002; Gordon 1993).
The British transformed the geography of war by building metalled roads and, from the 1850s, railways. The railway allowed troops to be moved across India in days rather than months, and after 1857 the planning of the railway network took account of military needs, including the defence of the north-west frontier. In this, as in much else, the colonial state continued an old pattern — the use of communications to hold a large territory — with new technology.
7.11 Decision and Chance in Battle¶
Indian strategic literature recognised the role of chance. The Arthaśāstra distinguishes between human effort (mānuṣa) and fate or providence (daiva), and it advises the king to rely on human effort while taking precautions against misfortune. Kings consulted astrologers and omens before campaigns, and the timing of battles was often fixed by astrological calculation; the Arthaśāstra itself, though sceptical of those who rely only on the stars, allows the use of astrologers and omens to encourage the troops (Section 7.8).
The course of battles in Indian history often turned on accidents: an elephant that panicked, a commander struck by an arrow, a contingent that changed sides at the critical moment. Besides the cases noted above (Section 7.7), the second battle of Pānīpat (1556) and the battle of Samugarh (1658) were each decided by what happened to a commander on his elephant (Sections 9.2 and 9.8). The texts’ emphasis on the protection of the commander and on the maintenance of reserves, and Bābur’s and the Company’s reliance on disciplined, cohesive forces, were in part responses to this fragility.
7.12 Intelligence and Espionage¶
7.12.1 The Arthaśāstra’s secret service¶
The Arthaśāstra treats intelligence as a permanent function of government, directed as much at the king’s own officials and subjects as at foreign enemies. It describes two groups of secret agents (AŚ 1.11–12) (Kangle 1960–1965; Olivelle 2013). The first group are “establishments” (saṃsthā), agents placed in a fixed position:
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the kāpaṭika, an agent posing as a student;
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the udāsthita, an agent posing as a renouncer who has given up the ascetic life;
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the gṛhapatika, an agent posing as a householder or farmer;
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the vaidehaka, an agent posing as a trader;
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the tāpasa, an agent posing as an ascetic with shaved head or matted hair.
The second group are roving agents (sañcāra):
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the sattrin, “classmate” agents, usually orphans raised and trained by the state;
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the tīkṣṇa, “fiery” agents, men ready to risk their lives, used for violent tasks;
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the rasada, poisoners;
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the parivrājikā, a wandering female ascetic, who could gain entry to the households of officials.
These nine types of agent, with variations, run through the whole Arthaśāstra. They report on the loyalty of officials, the mood of the people and the activities of foreign agents; they test the integrity of ministers; they spread rumours and sow discord in enemy states; and in time of war they gather information, mislead the enemy and, in “silent war”, kill its leaders. The text recommends that information be confirmed by three independent reports before it is believed.
7.12.2 Testing the ministers¶
The Arthaśāstra describes four secret tests (upadhā) of a minister’s integrity (AŚ 1.10): the test of righteousness (dharmopadhā), in which an agent suggests that the king is unrighteous and should be replaced; the test of wealth (arthopadhā), an offer of gain; the test of desire (kāmopadhā), an approach by a woman agent; and the test of fear (bhayopadhā), a suggestion that the minister is in danger and should join a plot. Ministers are to be assigned to offices according to the tests they pass. The Arthaśāstra does not hide that the tests are entrapment.
7.12.3 Envoys¶
Diplomacy and intelligence overlapped. The Arthaśāstra distinguishes three grades of envoy (AŚ 1.16): the envoy with full powers to negotiate (nisṛṣṭārtha), the envoy with limited powers (parimitārtha), and the bearer of a message (śāsanahara). An envoy should observe the enemy’s forts, army, treasury and allies, cultivate the disaffected at the enemy’s court, and report on everything he sees. The epic embassy of Kṛṣṇa to the Kaurava court, in the Udyogaparvan, combines a last attempt at peace with an assessment of the enemy’s resolve.
7.12.4 Myths and literary motifs¶
Some popular accounts attribute to the Arthaśāstra the “poison maiden” (viṣakanyā), a woman supposedly made immune to poison from childhood so that her embrace would kill. The motif is found in later literature, notably in Viśākhadatta’s political drama Mudrārākṣasa, in which Cāṇakya is the hero, and in story collections; it has no basis in pharmacology and should be treated as a literary device. Equally, claims that ancient Indian spies used invisible inks, mirror signals or carrier pigeons as a regular system are not supported by the texts. The Kāmasūtra does list cipher-writing (mlecchita-vikalpa) among the sixty-four arts, and the Arthaśāstra describes the use of signs and codes by agents, but the details are sparse.
7.12.5 Intelligence in later states¶
Later Indian states also maintained intelligence services. The Delhi sultans and, on a larger scale, the Mughals stationed news-writers in the provinces and with the armies, linked to the court by relays of runners (harkāra) and post-stations (ḍāk chaukī); the Mughal system is described in the next section (Bayly 1996; Richards 1993). The Marathas relied on networks of harkāras and local informants; Maratha tradition remembers Bahirjī Nāik as the chief of Śivājī’s spies.
7.13 The Mughal Information Order¶
The Mughal state developed an elaborate system for gathering and transmitting information, which C. A. Bayly has called the Mughal “information order” (Bayly 1996). News-writers (wāqiʿa-nawīs, akhbār-nawīs) attached to provincial governments, armies and cities sent regular reports to the court; the court circulated newsletters (akhbārāt) recording the emperor’s daily proceedings; and confidential reporters (sawāniḥ-nigār, khufiya-nawīs) watched the officials. Runners (harkāra) and relays of post-stations carried the reports across the empire. The system was used not only by the emperor but by nobles, bankers and merchants, who maintained their own news-writers and agents.
The successor states of the eighteenth century inherited and adapted this system, and the East India Company in turn took it over, employing Indian news-writers and runners. Bayly argues that the Company’s success depended in part on its ability to tap these networks, and that its failure to understand the information flowing through them contributed to its surprise at the rising of 1857 (Bayly 1996). Intelligence, as the Arthaśāstra had insisted, remained one of the foundations of power.
7.14 Diplomacy in Practice¶
7.14.1 Envoys and embassies¶
The exchange of envoys was a constant feature of relations between Indian states. Megasthenes at the Mauryan court, the Chinese envoys to Harṣa, the embassies exchanged between Indian kings and the rulers of Persia, China and Southeast Asia, the envoys of the Delhi sultans and of the Bahmanī and Vijayanagara courts, and the ambassadors of European powers to the Mughal court — among them Sir Thomas Roe, the English ambassador to Jahāngīr from 1615 to 1619 — are among the best known. Envoys carried letters and gifts, negotiated treaties, observed the strength of the host state, and sometimes acted as spies, as the Arthaśāstra expected (Section 7.12).
7.14.2 Treaties, hostages and marriages¶
Treaties ended wars and defined new relationships. They often involved the surrender of territory or forts, the payment of tribute or indemnity, and the giving of hostages. In 1665, for example, Śivājī, besieged at Purandar by the Mughal general Jai Singh of Amber, agreed to surrender twenty-three of his forts and to send his son Sambhājī to serve the Mughals; the treaty led to his visit to Agra and his famous escape (Gordon 1993; Sarkar 1919). Marriage alliances were another instrument of policy: the marriages of Rajput princesses into the Mughal imperial family from the 1560s sealed the alliance between the Mughals and many Rajput houses, as earlier marriages had sealed alliances among Indian dynasties.
7.14.3 Tribute and subordinate alliance¶
A recurring pattern of Indian statecraft was the conversion of defeated rivals into tributary allies rather than their elimination — the “righteous conquest” of the texts. This pattern can be seen in Samudragupta’s treatment of the southern kings, in the Cōḻa and Rāṣṭrakūṭa practice of receiving tribute from defeated kings, in the Mughal incorporation of Rajput rulers as manṣabdārs, and in the Maratha collection of cauth from territories they did not directly govern. The East India Company adapted it in the “subsidiary alliance” system, developed by Governor-General Wellesley around 1800, under which Indian rulers kept their thrones but paid for Company troops stationed in their territories and accepted British control of their foreign relations (Roy 2011). In each case, indirect rule allowed a conqueror to extend his power at a lower cost, though it also left potential rivals in place.
7.15 Strategy in Practice: Four Examples¶
The theory of the texts can be compared with the strategy of actual rulers. Four examples, discussed in more detail elsewhere in this volume, illustrate the range of Indian strategic practice. One caution applies to all of them, and to every comparison of this kind in the volume. When the practice of a later ruler resembles the advice of the Arthaśāstra, the resemblance is analytical, not genealogical: it shows that the text described the situation of a weaker or a stronger state accurately, not that the ruler had read it or inherited its teaching. There is no evidence that any of the rulers below consulted the text.
The Ahoms against the Mughals.
The Ahom kingdom of Assam faced a much larger and richer enemy in the Mughal empire. Its strategy, as described in the Ahom chronicles, combined defence of the narrow Brahmaputra valley with forts and stockades, the use of the river and of a strong fleet of boats, delay until the monsoon and disease weakened the invader, and counter-attack when the enemy was exhausted. The Mughal invasions of the 1660s and the battle of Saraighat (1671) are described in Section 9.11 (Gait 1906).
Śivājī and the Mughals.
Śivājī’s strategy relied on the strength of hill forts, the mobility of light cavalry, surprise attacks on enemy commanders and wealthy towns, and a willingness to negotiate and to submit temporarily when necessary, as at Purandar in 1665. His raids on Surat financed his state, and his escape from Agra in 1666 restored his freedom of action. This combination of military pressure and diplomacy is the course that the Arthaśāstra lays out for a weaker king (Gordon 1993).
The Mughal Deccan wars.
Aurangzeb’s strategy in the Deccan after 1681 was one of attrition: the capture of every fort and the destruction of every Maratha field army. It failed because the Marathas had no single centre whose capture would end the war, because the Mughal army’s enormous size made it slow and expensive, and because Mughal commanders in the Deccan could often be bought or persuaded to make private arrangements with the enemy (Richards 1993).
The East India Company.
The Company’s strategy in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries combined military force with alliances, subsidiary treaties, the exploitation of succession disputes and the purchase of local support. Its wars were financed by the revenues of the territories it had already acquired, so that each conquest paid for the next (Roy 2011; Peers 1995).
These examples show that Indian rulers, like rulers everywhere, combined force, diplomacy, deception and money in the pursuit of their aims. The Arthaśāstra’s categories provide a useful vocabulary for analysing their choices.
7.16 A Comparison: The Arthaśāstra and the Sunzi¶
The Arthaśāstra is often compared with the Chinese military classic attributed to Sunzi (The Art of War), compiled probably in the fifth or fourth century BCE. The two works share several ideas: that war is a matter of state that must be undertaken only after careful calculation; that it is best to win without fighting, by diplomacy, subversion or the threat of force; that deception is fundamental to war; and that intelligence about the enemy, gathered by spies, is essential. The Sunzi’s last chapter describes five kinds of spies, and the Arthaśāstra describes nine.
The differences are also significant. The Sunzi is a short work devoted to war; the Arthaśāstra is a long treatise on the whole of government, in which war is one subject among many. The Sunzi speaks to the general; the Arthaśāstra to the king and his ministers. The Arthaśāstra devotes much more attention to economics, administration and law, and its discussion of foreign policy through the circle of kings has no exact equivalent in the Sunzi. The comparison is illuminating, but it should not be taken to show that one work influenced the other; there is no evidence of contact. Both are products of states at war and of thinkers who had reflected on its nature.
7.17 Kauṭilya and Machiavelli¶
Since the rediscovery of the Arthaśāstra in the early twentieth century, its author has often been called “the Indian Machiavelli”. The sociologist Max Weber, in his lecture “Politics as a Vocation” (1919), remarked that compared with the Arthaśāstra, Machiavelli’s Prince seemed harmless. The comparison captures the Arthaśāstra’s frank acceptance of deception, espionage, assassination and the manipulation of religion for political ends.
It can also mislead. Machiavelli wrote a short work addressed to a particular political situation in Renaissance Italy; the Arthaśāstra is a long, systematic treatise on the whole of government, most of which concerns administration, revenue, law and economic management. Its ruthlessness serves an explicit end: the security and prosperity of the kingdom and its people, which it repeatedly identifies as the purpose of royal power. It also accepts the authority of dharma in many matters, and its methods include the welfare of subjects, the protection of the weak and the promotion of agriculture and trade. Scholars such as Mark McClish and Patrick Olivelle have emphasised that the Arthaśāstra should be read as a work of political economy and administration, not merely as a manual of intrigue (McClish and Olivelle 2012; Olivelle 2013).
7.18 Is There an Indian Strategic Tradition?¶
Since independence, scholars and officials have debated whether India possesses a tradition of strategic thought on which modern policy can draw. In 1992 George Tanham, an American analyst, published an influential essay arguing that Indian elites had historically shown little inclination to think systematically about strategy, an absence he attributed to geography, to the fragmentation of political authority before British rule, and to cultural factors (Tanham 1992). Indian writers objected that Tanham had ignored both the long textual tradition of statecraft, from the Arthaśāstra onwards, and the practical strategic achievements of Indian states, and that the absence of a modern body of published strategic theory did not mean an absence of strategic thinking. Stephen Rosen approached the question from another side, asking how the social structures of Indian societies, from caste to the organisation of the Mughal and colonial states, shaped the military power that their armies could generate (Rosen 1996).
Later scholarship has taken a more differentiated view. A collection edited by Kanti Bajpai, Saira Basit and V. Krishnappa examined Indian “grand strategy” through texts such as the Arthaśāstra and the Mahābhārata, the practice of the Mughals and the British, and the policies of independent India, and found not a single tradition but several, often in tension: a realist tradition of power and advantage, a moral tradition of restraint, and the Gandhian and Nehruvian emphasis on non-alignment and the limits of force (Bajpai et al. 2014). Historians such as Kaushik Roy have argued that Hindu, Islamic and colonial traditions of war interacted over centuries and should be studied together rather than as separate civilisational blocks (Roy 2012). Indian military academies now teach the Arthaśāstra alongside Sunzi, Clausewitz and modern strategic studies. Such teaching can enrich strategic education, provided the texts are read historically, as products of particular times and societies with their exceptions and contradictions, rather than mined for slogans or presented as anticipating modern doctrine.
7.19 Assessment¶
The chapter suggests an answer to the question just posed. There was a tradition of strategic analysis in India, and its central text, the Arthaśāstra, is as clear-eyed as any classical work about the costs of war, the uses of deception and the dependence of armies on revenue. But the tradition was a tradition of analysis, not of doctrine. Its battle arrays were schematic, its lists of measures and means were frameworks for thought, and there is no evidence that later commanders fought by them. What continued was not the text but the problems it described — supply, the loyalty of hired and allied troops, the weakness of a coalition held together by one leader, the value of information — and the practical solutions that Indian rulers worked out for them, which the following chapters trace.
Further Reading¶
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Kangle (1960–1965) and Olivelle (2013): the Arthaśāstra on foreign policy, war and espionage.
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McClish and Olivelle (2012): selections with a helpful introduction.
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Chakravarti (1941): battle arrays, camps and marches in ancient Indian texts.
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Gommans (2002): the Mughal army on the march and in battle.
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Bayly (1996): intelligence and information in late Mughal and colonial India.
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Bajpai et al. (2014): essays on Indian grand strategy from the Arthaśāstra to the present.