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Chapter 8: War and State in Medieval India, c. 600–1526

8.1 Introduction

Between the seventh century and the early sixteenth, the political map of South Asia was redrawn many times. The early medieval centuries were dominated by regional kingdoms that fought each other for control of the Ganges valley, the Deccan plateau and the river deltas of the south. From the late tenth century, armies from Afghanistan and Central Asia raided and then conquered much of the north, and the Delhi Sultanate, established in 1206, became for a time the most powerful state in the subcontinent. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries power fragmented again among regional sultanates and kingdoms, among them Vijayanagara in the south, the Bahmanī sultanate and its successors in the Deccan, the Rajput states of Rajasthan, the Gajapatis of Odisha and the Ahoms of Assam.

Military history in this period has often been written in communal terms, as a struggle between “Hindus” and “Muslims”. The sources do not support such a simple picture. Kings of every faith fought rivals of their own faith at least as often as rivals of another; armies recruited across religious and caste lines; and rulers borrowed weapons, tactics and titles from their enemies. Conquests were also often brutal: temples and cities were plundered, captives enslaved and populations massacred, by many armies. This chapter tries to describe both the warfare and its consequences without either apology or blame (Eaton 2019; Jackson 1999).

8.2 The Early Medieval Kingdoms, c. 600–1000

8.2.1 Kings, lords and military service

The early medieval kingdoms were organised around a king and a hierarchy of subordinate lords (sāmanta), who held land, owed military service and attended court. Inscriptions record grants to warriors and the titles of military officers, and the elaborate courtly culture of the period, studied by Daud Ali, was closely tied to the ethos of service and loyalty on which armies depended (Ali 2004). Armies were assembled from the king’s own troops and the contingents of his vassals, and their cohesion depended on the vassals’ loyalty, which was often fragile.

Hero-stones are among the most abundant evidence for warfare in this period. Thousands survive in Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Andhra, Maharashtra, Gujarat and Rajasthan. Typically divided into panels, they show the hero fighting, his death and his ascent to heaven attended by celestial women, often with an inscription naming him and recording the occasion — a cattle raid, a battle, the defence of a village. They show that warfare was not only the business of kings: herdsmen, villagers and local lords fought and died in the countless small conflicts that the royal inscriptions ignore.

8.2.2 The great kingdoms

In the Deccan and south, the Cāḷukyas of Bādāmi fought the Pallavas of Kāñcī through the seventh and eighth centuries. Pulakeśin II, who had checked Harṣa, was defeated and killed around 642 by the Pallava king Narasiṃhavarman I, who captured the Cāḷukya capital Vātāpi; the Cāḷukyas later took Kāñcī in their turn. The Rāṣṭrakūṭas, who replaced the Cāḷukyas in the mid-eighth century, raided deep into north India and the far south.

In the north, the period from about 750 to 950 is often described in terms of a “tripartite struggle” for Kanauj, the symbolic capital of the Ganges valley, between the Gurjara-Pratihāras of western India, the Pālas of Bengal and Bihar, and the Rāṣṭrakūṭas of the Deccan; how two of these powers looked to Arab observers is described in Section 8.4 (Thapar 2002).

8.2.3 The Arabs in Sindh

The Arab conquest of Sindh in 711–712 by Muḥammad ibn al-Qāsim, a general of the Umayyad caliphate, brought the first Muslim state to the subcontinent. The main narrative source, the Chachnāma, is a Persian work of the early thirteenth century based on earlier Arabic material, and must be used with care. The Arab advance beyond Sindh was checked in the eighth century by the Pratihāras, the Cāḷukyas of Gujarat and other kings, and Arab rule remained confined to Sindh and Multan for three centuries.

8.2.4 The Cōḻas

In the far south, the Cōḻa kings Rājarāja I (r. 985–1014) and Rājendra I (r. 1014–1044) built the most powerful south Indian state of the age, which is conventionally and fairly called the Cōḻa empire; what the evidence does not support is the later claim of a lasting overseas empire in Southeast Asia (Chapter 11). They conquered the Pāṇḍya and Cēra countries and much of Sri Lanka, fought long wars with the Cāḷukyas of Kalyāṇa in the Deccan, and in about 1022 Rājendra sent an army north along the east coast to the Ganges — the expedition commemorated in the name of his new capital, Gaṅgaikoṇḍacōḻapuram (“the city of the Cōḻa who took the Ganges”). Their naval raids on Southeast Asia are discussed in Chapter 11. Cōḻa inscriptions name many regiments, some of them recruited from particular communities or attached to particular kings, and record the grants made to them (Nilakanta Sastri 1955b). The Cōḻa–Cāḷukya wars of the eleventh century were fought with great ferocity; at the battle of Koppam in 1054 the Cōḻa king Rājādhirāja was killed on his elephant, and the battle was won by his brother.

8.3 The Cōḻa Army

The Cōḻa inscriptions of the tenth to twelfth centuries are unusually informative about the army. They name dozens of regiments (paṭai), some called after the king who raised them, some after their function or their weapons, and some after the communities from which they were recruited; there were regiments of elephants, of cavalry, of archers and of infantry, and regiments of men from particular regions. The vēḷaikkārar regiments formed a royal guard whose members were bound by special vows of loyalty (Chapter 12). Regiments made gifts to temples and appear in temple inscriptions as corporate bodies with their own officers and property, suggesting that they were permanent institutions with a strong collective identity (Nilakanta Sastri 1955b).

The Cōḻa kings also used the military resources of their subordinate chiefs and of the merchant guilds, which maintained their own armed guards. The overseas expeditions to Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia (Chapter 11) and the long wars with the Cāḷukyas required large forces and substantial logistical organisation. The Cōḻa state’s military power rested, like that of other medieval kingdoms, on the rich agriculture of its core region in the Kaveri delta and on the revenues of temple-centred villages.

8.4 The Rāṣṭrakūṭas and Pratihāras in Arab Eyes

Arab geographers and travellers of the ninth and tenth centuries provide an external view of the early medieval Indian kingdoms. They describe the Rāṣṭrakūṭa king, whom they call the Balharā (from his title vallabharāja), as the greatest king of India, friendly to the Arabs and Muslims, with a large army and many elephants; and the Gurjara-Pratihāra king, whom they call the king of Jurz, as possessing excellent cavalry and as the greatest enemy of the Muslims among the Indian kings. These accounts confirm the impression given by Indian inscriptions of powerful states with large armies, and they show that the Arabs of Sindh, the Rāṣṭrakūṭas and the Pratihāras were part of a single political world, in which alliances crossed religious lines (Thapar 2002).

8.5 Kashmir: War in the Rājataraṅgiṇī

Kalhaṇa’s Rājataraṅgiṇī (1148–49) makes Kashmir the best documented region of early medieval India for military history. Its early books contain legendary material, but from the eighth century onward its account becomes more reliable. It describes the campaigns of Lalitāditya Muktāpīḍa (eighth century), whose expeditions, magnified by later tradition into a conquest of the world, are partly confirmed by Chinese sources that record his embassy to the Tang court; and in great detail the civil wars of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, in which kings fought the landholding lords called ḍāmaras, who maintained armed retainers and fortified houses.

Kalhaṇa describes sieges of fortified places in the mountains, the hiring of mercenaries — including Turkic soldiers in the service of Kashmiri kings — the burning of towns, the plundering of temples by kings in need of money, and the famines caused by war. His account of King Harṣa (r. 1089–1101), a gifted but erratic ruler who despoiled temple images for their metal, is one of the most vivid portraits of a king in Sanskrit literature. Kalhaṇa’s frankness about the misdeeds of Hindu kings and his sympathy for the sufferings of ordinary people make his work invaluable, and a warning against idealised pictures of Indian warfare.

8.6 Bengal and the East

In eastern India, the Pāla kings of Bengal and Bihar (eighth to twelfth centuries) were great patrons of Buddhism and builders of monasteries; their inscriptions also boast of military campaigns as far as Kanauj and beyond, and they maintained large forces of elephants from the eastern forests. They were succeeded in Bengal by the Sena dynasty, which fell to Muḥammad Bakhtiyār Khaljī’s sudden raid on Nadia around 1204 — a famous episode in which, according to the Persian historian Minhāj, Bakhtiyār entered the city with a small band of horsemen disguised as horse-traders and the aged king Lakṣmaṇasena fled (Jackson 1999).

Bengal, with its rivers, marshes and monsoon, was difficult for the cavalry armies of Delhi to hold, and its governors repeatedly declared independence. In 1342 the Ilyās Shāhī dynasty established an independent sultanate, and Fīrūz Shāh Tughluq twice besieged its fortress of Ekdala, in 1353 and 1359, without taking it. The Bengal sultans developed a powerful river fleet and fought the Ahoms, the kings of Odisha and the Arakanese (Eaton 2019).

8.7 The Rajputs

The term “Rajput” (from Sanskrit rājaputra, “son of a king”) came to describe a range of warrior clans that rose to prominence in western and central India between the seventh and twelfth centuries: the Pratihāras, Cāhamānas (Chauhans), Paramāras, Caulukyas (Solaṅkīs), Candellas, Gahaḍavālas and others. Rajput genealogies traced their ancestry to the sun and the moon, or to a fire-sacrifice on Mount Abu, but historians see Rajput identity as something that formed gradually, as lineages of diverse origin, some of them pastoral or tribal, established themselves as rulers and adopted the ideals of the kṣatriya (Talbot 2016). How far “Rajput” remained an open status in later centuries is discussed in Section 17.3.

Rajput warfare emphasised the cavalry charge and close combat with lance and sword, the defence of hill forts, and a strong ethic of honour and loyalty to one’s lord. The bardic literature that grew up around Rajput courts in later centuries celebrates heroic death in battle and the defence of forts to the last man. That literature also records the darker side of this ethic, including the collective self-immolation (jauhar) of women in besieged forts, discussed in Chapter 16.

8.8 The Ghaznavids and Ghurids

8.8.1 Maḥmūd of Ghazni

From the late tenth century, the Turkic rulers of Ghazni in Afghanistan raided north India. Maḥmūd of Ghazni (r. 998–1030) led some seventeen expeditions between about 1000 and 1027. He defeated the Hindu Śāhī kings of the north-west, whose last stand near Waihind, around 1008–9, ended when their army broke — according to the Persian accounts, after the king’s elephant took fright — and he raided cities and temples as far as Mathura, Kanauj and, in 1025–26, Somnath on the coast of Gujarat. His aims were above all plunder, to finance his wars in Central Asia; apart from the Punjab, he made no lasting conquests in India. The scholar al-Bīrūnī, who came to India in Maḥmūd’s train, wrote an extraordinary description of Indian learning and society and noted the hatred that the raids had created (Eaton 2019).

8.8.2 The Ghurid conquest and the battles of Tarain

At the end of the twelfth century the Ghurid ruler Muʿizz al-Dīn Muḥammad (often called Muḥammad of Ghur) invaded north India with a different aim: conquest. In 1191 he met the Cāhamāna king Pṛthvīrāja III at Tarain (Taraori), north of Delhi (Figure 1.1), and was defeated and wounded. He returned the next year and in the second battle of Tarain (1192) defeated and killed Pṛthvīrāja. According to the Persian accounts, he used his mobile horse-archers to harass and tire the Rajput army before delivering a decisive attack (Jackson 1999). In 1194 he defeated the Gahaḍavāla king Jayacandra of Kanauj at Chandawar. Over the following decade his commanders took Delhi, Ajmer, Gwalior and Kalinjar, and one of them, Muḥammad Bakhtiyār Khaljī, overran Bihar and western Bengal around 1200–1205. In the course of these campaigns Buddhist monasteries in Bihar were attacked. Minhāj’s account of the storming of a fortified place whose inhabitants were shaven-headed “brahmins” and whose buildings held many books is usually identified with the monastery of Odantapurī, and Nālandā was probably also attacked (Jackson 1999); the Tibetan pilgrim Dharmasvāmin, who visited Nālandā in the 1230s, found it damaged and largely deserted but still inhabited by a few monks (Roerich 1959). Organised Buddhist monastic life in the region declined rapidly in the following decades.

The figure of Pṛthvīrāja later became the subject of a large literature. The Pṛthvīrāj Rāso, composed in its surviving forms centuries after his death, and modern nationalist writing turned him into “the last Hindu emperor”. Cynthia Talbot has traced how this image was constructed over eight hundred years (Talbot 2016).

8.8.3 Why did the conquerors win?

Historians have long asked why the armies of north Indian kings, often larger than those of the invaders, were defeated. Several explanations have been offered, and most historians would combine them.

  • Horses and horse-archers. The Ghaznavid and Ghurid armies were built around Turkic horse-archers mounted on Central Asian horses, highly mobile and able to harass and outflank armies that relied on elephants and heavier cavalry. Their access to the horse markets of Central Asia gave them a decisive advantage in the supply of remounts (Digby 1971).

  • Professional cohesion. The core of these armies was formed by slave-soldiers (ghulām, mamlūk) who had been bought young and trained as soldiers, loyal to their master and to each other, and paid from the treasury. Indian armies, in contrast, were often coalitions of the forces of many lords, each with his own interests (Jackson 1999).

  • Strategy and aims. The Ghurids came intending to conquer and hold territory; the north Indian kingdoms had long been accustomed to wars of raid and tribute among themselves.

Older writing sometimes added that Indian kings were defeated because they observed the rules of righteous war while their enemies did not. The evidence does not support this. Indian kings were quite capable of surprise attacks, stratagems and ruthlessness, as the Arthaśāstra recommends, and they used them against each other and against the invaders. Nor were the invaders always victorious: Muḥammad of Ghur was defeated at Tarain in 1191 and earlier in Gujarat, and later Indian rulers repeatedly defeated sultanate armies.

8.9 The Hindu Śāhīs and the Ghaznavid Frontier

Before the Ghaznavid raids reached the Ganges valley, they fell on the Hindu Śāhī kingdom of the north-west, which ruled the region between Kabul and the Punjab from its capital at Udabhāṇḍa (Hund) on the Indus. The Śāhī king Jayapāla fought Sabuktigīn, the founder of Ghaznavid power, in the late tenth century, and was defeated by Maḥmūd near Peshawar in 1001; according to the Persian accounts, he committed suicide on a pyre after his release, feeling disgraced by his defeat. His successors Ānandapāla and Trilocanapāla continued the struggle, at times with the help of other north Indian kings, until the kingdom was destroyed in the 1020s. Al-Bīrūnī wrote with respect of the Śāhī kings, noting their noble character (Eaton 2019). The Śāhīs’ long resistance delayed the Ghaznavid advance into India for a generation.

8.10 Indian Soldiers in Ghaznavid Service

The wars between the Ghaznavids and the kings of north India are often described as a simple conflict between “Turks” and “Hindus”. The armies themselves were more mixed. Maḥmūd of Ghazni and his son Masʿūd recruited Indian soldiers, called simply Hindūs in the Persian sources, into their armies. These troops had their own commanders, lived in their own quarter at Ghazni, and fought for the Ghaznavids not only in India but also in Khurasan and Central Asia, against Muslim enemies (Bosworth 1963).

The best-known of their commanders is Tilak, a man of humble origin, the son of a barber according to the historian Bayhaqī, who rose through his skill as a secretary and interpreter to become commander of the Indian troops under Masʿūd. In the 1030s Masʿūd sent him to suppress the rebellion of the Ghaznavid governor of Lahore, Aḥmad Niyāltigīn, and he succeeded. Bayhaqī’s account of his career, written by a contemporary who knew the court, is one of the clearest pieces of evidence for the place of Indian soldiers in a Turkic Muslim army (Bosworth 1963).

The employment of Indian troops by the Ghaznavids is the first of many examples of the military labour market described elsewhere in this volume. Later sultans of Delhi, the Bahmanīs and the Mughals all recruited Hindu soldiers and commanders, and Hindu kings such as those of Vijayanagara recruited Muslim horsemen and archers (Section 8.18). Soldiers followed pay and service; the religious language of the chronicles, which describes wars as between believers and unbelievers, must be read alongside the evidence of armies that were in practice drawn from many communities (Kolff 1990; Eaton 2019).

8.11 The Delhi Sultanate, 1206–1526

8.11.1 The slave sultans

After the death of Muḥammad of Ghur in 1206, his Turkic slave commander Quṭb al-Dīn Aybak became the first ruler of an independent sultanate at Delhi. Under Iltutmish (r. 1211–1236) and Balban (r. 1266–1287) the sultanate consolidated its hold on the Ganges valley, Punjab and parts of Rajasthan. Its rulers distributed the revenues of territories to their commanders as assignments (iqṭā), in return for which the assignees (muqṭī) maintained troops and governed their areas (Jackson 1999).

8.11.2 The Mongol threat

The greatest threat to the sultanate in the thirteenth century came not from Indian kings but from the Mongols, who conquered Central Asia, Iran and the Afghan borderlands from the 1220s and repeatedly invaded the Punjab. The wars on this frontier are described in Section 8.13.

8.11.3 ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Khaljī

ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Khaljī (r. 1296–1316) built the largest army the sultanate had yet maintained. According to the historian Baranī, he paid his cavalry in cash from the treasury, introduced the branding of horses (dāgh) and descriptive rolls of soldiers (ḥulya) to prevent fraud, and controlled the prices of grain, horses and other goods in the markets of Delhi so that the soldiers could live on their pay. Whether his market regulations worked as Baranī describes is debated, but there is no doubt that he maintained a very large army (Jackson 1999).

With it he conquered much of Rajasthan and the Deccan. Ranthambhor fell in 1301 and Chittor in 1303, both after long sieges. His general Malik Kāfūr led expeditions into the Deccan and the far south between 1307 and 1311, against the Yādavas of Devagiri, the Kākatīyas of Warangal, the Hoysaḷas of Dvārasamudra and the Pāṇḍyas of Madurai, returning with great quantities of plunder. These kingdoms were at first made tributary; under the Tughluq sultans in the 1320s most of them were annexed.

8.11.4 Decline

Muḥammad bin Tughluq (r. 1325–1351) briefly extended sultanate rule over almost the whole subcontinent, but rebellions broke out in the Deccan and the south, and by the mid-fourteenth century the Bahmanī sultanate and the kingdom of Vijayanagara had emerged as independent states. Fīrūz Shāh Tughluq (r. 1351–1388) made the iqṭās hereditary and the army’s discipline declined. In 1398 Tīmūr invaded India, defeated the sultan’s army outside Delhi — where, according to the accounts, his troops met the sultan’s elephants with caltrops, ditches and fire — and sacked the city. The sultanate survived under the Sayyid and Lodī dynasties, the latter of Afghan origin, until Bābur’s victory at Pānīpat in 1526.

8.11.5 Who fought for the sultans?

The sultanate’s elite was largely of Turkic, Afghan and Persian origin, but its armies were not. They included large numbers of Indian infantry (pāyak, from Sanskrit padātika), Indian archers and, increasingly, Indian commanders. Hindu chiefs served the sultans as tributaries and allies, and some rose to high office (Jackson 1999; Kolff 1990). Conversely, Hindu kings employed Muslim soldiers. The boundaries between “sultanate” and “Indian” warfare were thus never sharp.

8.12 Slaves, Converts and Social Mobility in the Sultanate

The Delhi Sultanate’s military elite was open to men of humble and foreign origin. Its first rulers were Turkic slave-soldiers, and the sultans continued to buy and train slaves who could rise to the highest offices. Among them were Indians. Malik Kāfūr, ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Khaljī’s most successful general and the conqueror of the south, was a eunuch slave originally from Gujarat; after ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn’s death in 1316 he briefly controlled the government before being killed. Khusrau Khān, a convert from the Barwārī community of Gujarat who had risen in the favour of Sultan Mubārak Shāh, killed his master in 1320 and ruled briefly before being overthrown by Ghiyāth al-Dīn Tughluq (Jackson 1999). Under Muḥammad bin Tughluq, men of many origins, including Indian converts and Hindus, received high appointments, to the indignation of the historian Baranī, who complained of the promotion of low-born men. The sultanate thus offered avenues of mobility through military service that cut across the hierarchies of birth, even as it maintained its own hierarchies of race and religion.

8.13 The Mongol Frontier

The Delhi Sultanate’s wars against the Mongols deserve a fuller account, because they are among its most remarkable achievements. From the 1220s, when Chinggis Khan pursued the ruler of Khwarazm to the Indus, Mongol armies were a constant threat on the north-western frontier. Punjab and the frontier were raided repeatedly, Lahore was sacked in 1241, and much of the region west of the Beas passed under Mongol control. Under ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Khaljī, Mongol armies of the Chaghatayid khanate invaded India several times. In 1299 a large Mongol army reached the outskirts of Delhi and was defeated at Kīlī; in 1303, while ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn was besieging Chittor, the Mongols besieged Delhi itself for two months before withdrawing; in 1305 and 1306 further invasions were defeated, and the captured Mongols were put to death in large numbers (Jackson 1999).

Peter Jackson argues that the sultanate’s ability to resist the Mongols, which few other states of the time achieved, owed much to its large professional cavalry, its fortified frontier towns and its supplies of horses, and that the Mongol threat was a major reason for the military reforms of ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn. Ironically, the sultanate itself was in some respects a product of the Mongol conquests, which drove soldiers and scholars from Central Asia and Iran to seek service in India.

8.14 Ranthambhor and the Rajput Sieges

The sieges of Rajput forts by the Delhi sultans in the early fourteenth century became central episodes of later Rajput memory. Ranthambhor, held by the Cauhan ruler Hammīra, was besieged by ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn’s armies in 1301 and fell after a long siege. Hammīra was later celebrated in the fifteenth-century Sanskrit poem Hammīra-mahākāvya of the Jain poet Nayacandra Sūri and in Rajasthani and Hindi works, which made him an example of a king who kept his word to those who sought his protection, at the cost of his kingdom and his life. Chittor fell in 1303, and the story of its siege was later transformed into the legend of Padminī (Chapter 16). These sieges show the strength of the Rajput hill forts and the persistence of the sultan’s armies, which could sustain long sieges with the help of trebuchets, mining and blockade (Jackson 1999; Talbot 2016).

8.15 The Kingdoms of the Deccan before 1300

In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the Deccan and the south were divided among the Yādavas of Devagiri, the Kākatīyas of Warangal, the Hoysaḷas of Dvārasamudra and the later Pāṇḍyas of Madurai. These kingdoms fought each other constantly, and their inscriptions record the campaigns of their kings and commanders and the deaths of heroes (Nilakanta Sastri 1955a). Cynthia Talbot’s study of Kākatīya Andhra shows how the Kākatīya kings built their power on a network of warrior lineages and military commanders, many of them of peasant or pastoral origin, who held lands in return for service (the nāyaṃkara system), and on the expansion of agriculture through tank irrigation in the dry uplands (Talbot 2001). Warangal, the Kākatīya capital, was protected by concentric circuits of earthen and stone walls; its siege by the armies of ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn in 1309–10 and its fall to the Tughluqs in 1323 ended the dynasty.

The southern campaigns of Malik Kāfūr in 1307–1311 brought these kingdoms under Delhi’s influence, and within two decades most of them had been annexed. Their fall was followed, in the 1330s, by revolts that led to the foundation of Vijayanagara and of the Bahmanī sultanate, both of which drew on the military personnel and traditions of the older kingdoms.

8.16 The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries

8.16.1 Vijayanagara and the Bahmanīs

Two states that emerged from the collapse of sultanate rule in the Deccan dominated the peninsula for two centuries: the kingdom of Vijayanagara, founded around 1336 on the Tungabhadra, and the Bahmanī sultanate, founded in 1347. They fought repeatedly over the rich Raichur doab between the Krishna and Tungabhadra rivers. Both used large cavalry forces and both depended on imported horses (Stein 1989; Eaton 2005).

The army of Vijayanagara was organised around military chiefs (nāyaka) who held territories in return for maintaining troops for the king — a system that Burton Stein compared with the iqṭā of the sultanates (Stein 1989). The kings recruited Muslim horse-archers and gave them land and freedom of worship; Devarāya II (r. 1424–1446) is said to have done so to match the Bahmanī cavalry. Phillip Wagoner has shown how the Vijayanagara court adopted the dress, titles and courtly culture of the Islamicate world, its kings styling themselves “sultan among Hindu kings” (hindūrāya-suratrāṇa) (Wagoner 1996). After 1500 the Portuguese at Goa became important suppliers of horses to Vijayanagara.

8.16.2 Rajasthan, Gujarat and Malwa

In the fifteenth century the Sisodiya kings of Mewar, especially Rāṇā Kumbhā (r. 1433–1468), fought the sultans of Malwa and Gujarat and built or rebuilt many forts, including Kumbhalgarh. The tower of victory at Chittor commemorates his wars. His successor Rāṇā Sāṅgā (r. 1508–1528) was the most powerful ruler in north India when Bābur invaded. The sultanates of Gujarat and Malwa were wealthy states with strong armies; Gujarat was also a maritime power, and its fleet fought the Portuguese at Diu.

8.16.3 The east: Odisha and Assam

The Gajapati kings of Odisha are treated in Section 8.19. In the Brahmaputra valley the Ahoms, a Tai people who had entered Assam in the thirteenth century under their leader Sukaphā, built a kingdom whose military strength rested on a system of compulsory service: every adult man (paik) was enrolled in a unit and served the state for part of the year, as soldier or labourer, in return for land (Gait 1906). In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the Ahom kings expanded at the expense of the Chutiya and Kachari kingdoms and repulsed invasions from Bengal; in the 1530s Suhungmung, known as the Dihingiya Rājā, defeated the Bengal sultan’s general Turbak, an event recorded in the Ahom chronicles. The paik system, river fleets and skill in building earthworks and stockades made the Ahom state one of the most durable in medieval India, and it later held off the Mughals (Chapter 9).

8.17 The Bahmanī Army

The Bahmanī sultanate of the Deccan (1347–c. 1527) recruited its nobility and soldiers from two main groups: the “Deccanis” (dakhnī), Muslims settled in the Deccan, many of them descendants of the soldiers who had come south with the Tughluqs, together with Ethiopian (ḥabshī) soldiers; and the “newcomers” (āfāqī), Persians, Turks and Arabs recruited from overseas. The rivalry between these two groups shaped Bahmanī politics and military affairs. The greatest Bahmanī minister, Maḥmūd Gāwān (c. 1411–1481), a Persian merchant who rose to become chief minister, led campaigns that took Goa and extended the sultanate to both coasts, reorganised the provinces and the army, and checked the power of provincial governors; he was executed in 1481 on the basis of a forged letter, and the sultanate soon broke into five successor states (Eaton 2005).

The later Persian historian Firishta states that the Bahmanīs used artillery against Vijayanagara as early as the 1360s. Iqtidar Alam Khan and other historians doubt this early date, arguing that Firishta, writing around 1600, projected the weapons of his own time back into the past; firearms are reliably attested in the Deccan only from the fifteenth century (Khan 2004). The case shows the care needed in using later chronicles as evidence for earlier technology.

8.18 Vijayanagara at War

Vijayanagara reached the height of its power under Kṛṣṇadevarāya (r. 1509–1529), who campaigned against the Gajapati kingdom of Odisha (Section 8.19) and defeated the sultan of Bijapur at Raichur in 1520. The Portuguese chronicler Fernão Nuniz, who was in Vijayanagara in the 1530s, gives a detailed account of the Raichur campaign: the enormous size of the king’s army, its contingents commanded by nāyakas, its elephants and cavalry, the Portuguese musketeers who helped in the siege, and the crowds of camp followers, merchants and women who accompanied it (Stein 1989). The figures he gives for the army — hundreds of thousands of men — cannot be taken literally, but his description conveys the scale of a great Indian army on campaign.

The Vijayanagara kings presented themselves as protectors of the southern Hindu traditions against the sultanates, but their wars were driven as much by competition for the Raichur doab, for ports and for horses as by religion; they allied at different times with different sultans, and they employed Muslim soldiers in large numbers (Wagoner 1996).

8.19 The Gajapatis of Odisha

The Gajapati kings of Odisha, who ruled from the early fifteenth to the mid-sixteenth century, were among the most powerful rulers of eastern India. Kapilendra (r. c. 1434–1467) founded the dynasty and claimed conquests as far south as the Kaveri, and north against the sultans of Bengal and Jaunpur; his successors fought the Bahmanīs and Vijayanagara for control of the eastern Deccan and the Andhra coast. The Gajapatis drew on the military service of the paika peasant-soldiers (Chapter 15) and on the elephants of the Odisha forests, from which their title, “lord of elephants”, derived. Kṛṣṇadevarāya of Vijayanagara took the Gajapati forts of Udayagiri and Kondavidu in 1513–1515 and married a Gajapati princess as part of the peace settlement. The kingdom fell in 1568 to the Afghan sultan of Bengal, and Odisha later became a Mughal province.

8.20 The Western Coast and the Portuguese

On the western coast, the arrival of the Portuguese in 1498 introduced a new kind of warfare. The sultan of Gujarat, in alliance with the Mamluk sultan of Egypt, fought the Portuguese at sea at Chaul (1508) and Diu (1509); the Portuguese seized Goa from Bijapur in 1510; and in 1538 a combined Gujarati and Ottoman force besieged the Portuguese fortress at Diu unsuccessfully. Chapter 11 discusses these wars. They mark the beginning of the European military presence that would transform Indian warfare over the next three centuries (Pearson 1987; Subrahmanyam 1993).

8.21 Gunpowder and the Military Labour Market

Two developments of the fifteenth century prepared the way for the warfare of the Mughal age. The first was gunpowder. Firearms began to appear in Indian warfare in the fifteenth century, first in the Deccan and Gujarat, and spread through the sixteenth (Khan 2004). Siege guns made forts more vulnerable and encouraged the building of thicker walls and bastions (Chapter 10).

The second was the growth of what Dirk Kolff calls the military labour market (Kolff 1990). In north India, especially in the eastern Ganges valley, large numbers of peasants took up soldiering as seasonal or permanent employment (naukarī), hiring themselves to any ruler or commander who would pay. Bands of armed men under their own leaders moved across north India in search of service; Afghan soldiers from the Lodī period onward and “eastern” (pūrbiyā) soldiers from Bihar and eastern Uttar Pradesh were among the best known. Kolff argues that identities such as “Rajput” and “Afghan” were often adopted by men who entered this market, and that the line between peasant and soldier was fluid. This vast reservoir of armed men shaped the politics of north India for four centuries and was later tapped by the Mughals and by the East India Company; Chapter 17 examines it in detail.

8.22 Major Battles and Sieges, c. 600–1526

Table 8.1 lists some of the major battles and sieges of the period covered in this chapter. Dates are those generally accepted; for many early medieval battles only approximate dates are known. Several of the sites are shown in Figure 1.1, and the forts in Figure 10.10.

Table 8.1. Some major battles and sieges, c. 600–1526
Date Battle or siege Combatants and outcome
c. 618–634 Narmada Pulakeśin II (Cāḷukya) checks Harṣa’s advance into the Deccan
c. 642 Vātāpi Narasiṃhavarman I (Pallava) defeats and kills Pulakeśin II and takes his capital
711–712 Sindh Muḥammad ibn al-Qāsim conquers Sindh for the Umayyad caliphate
c. 1001 Peshawar Maḥmūd of Ghazni defeats the Śāhī king Jayapāla
c. 1008–9 Waihind Maḥmūd defeats Ānandapāla
1025–26 Somnath Maḥmūd raids and plunders the temple town
c. 1025 Kaḍāram, Śrīvijaya Cōḻa overseas raid under Rājendra I
1054 Koppam Cōḻas defeat the Cāḷukyas of Kalyāṇa; the Cōḻa king Rājādhirāja killed
1178 Kāsahrada (Gujarat) The Caulukyas defeat Muḥammad of Ghur
1191 First Tarain Pṛthvīrāja III defeats Muḥammad of Ghur
1192 Second Tarain Muḥammad of Ghur defeats and kills Pṛthvīrāja III
1194 Chandawar Muḥammad of Ghur defeats Jayacandra of Kanauj
c. 1204 Nadia Bakhtiyār Khaljī surprises the Sena capital
1299 Kīlī ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Khaljī’s army defeats a Mongol invasion near Delhi
1301 Ranthambhor ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn takes the fort of Hammīra Cauhan
1303 Chittor ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn takes Chittor after a siege of several months
1309–10 Warangal Malik Kāfūr makes the Kākatīyas tributary
1323 Warangal Tughluq forces annex the Kākatīya kingdom
1353, 1359 Ekdala Fīrūz Shāh Tughluq fails to subdue the Bengal sultanate
1398 Delhi Tīmūr defeats the Tughluq army and sacks Delhi
1509 Diu (sea) The Portuguese defeat the Gujarati–Mamluk fleet
1520 Raichur Kṛṣṇadevarāya of Vijayanagara defeats the sultan of Bijapur

8.23 Assessment

Two points from these nine centuries carry forward. The first is that the decisive variable was rarely courage or doctrine but access to horses and the means to pay the men who rode them: the states that controlled the horse trade and could pay their cavalry in cash or assignments — the Ghurids, the Khaljīs, Vijayanagara, the Bahmanīs — prevailed over those that relied on loose coalitions of semi-independent lords. The second is that the religious language of the chronicles is a poor guide to the composition of armies, which recruited across every line of faith and caste. The Mughals inherited both lessons.

Further Reading

  • Jackson (1999): the political and military history of the Delhi Sultanate.

  • Eaton (2019): a balanced history of India from 1000 to 1765.

  • Talbot (2016): Pṛthvīrāja Cāhamāna in history and memory.

  • Stein (1989) and Eaton (2005): Vijayanagara and the Deccan.

  • Kolff (1990): the military labour market in north India.

  • Digby (1971): horses and elephants in the sultanate’s armies.