Chapter 4: Vedāntic Psychology¶
brahma satyaṃ jagan mithyā jīvo brahmaiva nāparaḥ
Brahman is real, the world is false; the individual self is Brahman alone, not other.
— A half-verse traditionally attributed to Śaṅkara (from the Brahmajñānāvalīmālā, whose authorship is doubtful)
4.1 Introduction¶
Vedānta, “the end of the Veda”, is the name of the exegetical tradition that interprets the Upaniṣads, the Brahmasūtra and the Bhagavad Gītā (the “triple foundation”, prasthānatraya). Its most influential branch, Advaita (“non-dual”) Vedānta, received its classical formulation from Śaṅkara, whom most scholars now date to c. 700–750 CE; the conventional dates 788–820 derive from later hagiography and are best treated as traditional. Śaṅkara’s central thesis is that the self (ātman) is identical with Brahman, pure consciousness, and that the experience of being a limited, embodied individual results from ignorance (avidyā). This chapter describes the account of the mind that follows from that thesis, and then the rival Vedāntic schools that rejected it.
Advaita is a theology and a metaphysics, not a psychology in the modern sense. But because it locates the human predicament in a cognitive error, and because it prescribes a discipline of study and contemplation to correct it, it contains a detailed theory of perception, error, the self and the mind.
4.2 Superimposition¶
Śaṅkara opens his commentary on the Brahmasūtra with a preamble on superimposition (adhyāsa). Self and not-self, he says, are as opposed as light and darkness; yet in everyday life we constantly confuse them, saying “I am fat”, “I am blind”, “I am happy”, attributing the properties of body, senses and mind to the self, and the consciousness of the self to body, senses and mind. He defines superimposition as follows:
Śaṅkara, Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, preamble
smṛtirūpaḥ paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ
The appearance, in the form of memory, of something previously seen in something else.
The model case is perceptual error: a rope seen in dim light as a snake, mother-of-pearl as silver. Something previously experienced (snake, silver) is projected onto what is present. Śaṅkara argues that the mutual superimposition of self and not-self is of the same kind, but beginningless, and that all ordinary knowledge and action — including the use of scripture and ritual — presupposes it. Liberation is the removal of this superimposition by knowledge.
4.2.1 Error and the Indeterminable¶
What is the status of the snake seen in the rope? It is not real, since it is contradicted when the light improves; but it is not simply unreal like a “hare’s horn”, since it was actually experienced and caused fear. Later Advaitins called it “indeterminable” (anirvacanīya) — neither real nor unreal — and extended the description to the world as a whole. This theory of error (anirvacanīyakhyāti) set Advaita against the realist theories of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā described in Chapter 3.
4.2.2 Levels of Reality¶
Post-Śaṅkara Advaita systematised these ideas into three levels of reality: the ultimate (pāramārthika), which is Brahman alone; the empirical or transactional (vyāvahārika), the world of ordinary experience, valid for all practical purposes but sublated by knowledge of Brahman; and the apparent (prātibhāsika), the world of dreams and illusions, sublated even within ordinary experience. The scheme allowed Advaitins to affirm the practical validity of ordinary knowledge while denying its ultimate truth.
4.2.3 Veiling and Projection¶
Later manuals such as Sadānanda’s Vedāntasāra attribute two powers to ignorance: veiling (āvaraṇa), which conceals the real nature of the self, and projection (vikṣepa), which creates the appearance of something else in its place — as darkness conceals the rope and the mind projects a snake. Whatever its resemblance to accounts of self-deception, the “ignorance” in question is for Advaita a cosmic, beginningless principle, not a defence mechanism of an individual mind.
4.3 The Witness¶
If every experience is an appearance to consciousness, consciousness itself cannot be one of the appearances. Advaita therefore distinguishes the mind and its modifications, which change constantly, from the witness (sākṣin), the consciousness that is aware of them. The witness is described as:
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self-luminous (svaprakāśa): it does not need another awareness to be known;
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unchanging (kūṭastha): it is present unaltered in waking, dream and deep sleep;
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unattached (asaṅga): it is not affected by the pleasures and pains it witnesses;
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never an object: it is the knower, never the known.
The doctrine draws on the Upaniṣadic arguments discussed in Chapter 2 and on verses of the Bhagavad Gītā that describe the self as unborn and indestructible:
Bhagavad Gītā 2.20
na jāyate mriyate vā kadācin nāyaṃ bhūtvā bhavitā vā na bhūyaḥ |
ajo nityaḥ śāśvato ’yaṃ purāṇo na hanyate hanyamāne śarīre ||
It is never born and never dies; it did not come into being and will not cease to be. Unborn, eternal, everlasting and primeval, it is not killed when the body is killed.
A careful philosophical study of the witness doctrine is Gupta (1998). The “observing self” of some modern therapies has a different history, drawn partly from Buddhist rather than Vedāntic sources (Section 13.14), and the Advaita doctrine has not been clinically tested.
4.4 The Analysis of the Three States¶
Advaitins developed the Upaniṣadic analysis of waking, dream and deep sleep (Chapter 2) into a standard method of argument, the “examination of the three states” (avasthātrayaparīkṣā). The method uses the whole of a person’s experience, not only waking life, as evidence about the self. Three steps are typical.
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The objects of waking experience are absent in dream, and the objects of dream are absent in waking; each state “sublates” the other. What varies from state to state cannot be the self.
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In deep sleep there are no objects at all, yet on waking one says, “I slept happily; I knew nothing.” The Advaitins (especially the Vivaraṇa school) took this remembrance as evidence that in deep sleep there was an experience — of bliss and of ignorance — and therefore an experiencer, since only what has been experienced can be remembered.
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The witness that is present in all three states, and that is aware of their coming and going, is the self.
The argument depends on contested premises — above all the claim that the waking report is a memory rather than an inference — and the Naiyāyikas and Buddhists rejected it (Chapter 2). But it is a serious attempt to take the whole range of human experience into account in thinking about the self, and it remains a central teaching method in Advaita.
4.5 The Individual Self¶
How is the one consciousness related to the many individual selves (jīva)? Advaitins answered with analogies, and the choice of analogy divided the later schools (Table 4.1).
| Analogy | Image | Point |
|---|---|---|
| Rope and snake | A rope seen as a snake | The individual self is an error superimposed on Brahman |
| Space in a pot (avaccheda) | Space enclosed by a pot is not different from space | The individual is consciousness “limited” by the mind; developed by Vācaspati Miśra’s Bhāmatī school |
| Reflection (pratibimba) | The one sun reflected in many pools | The individual is consciousness reflected in the mind; developed by the Vivaraṇa school |
| Dream | The dreamer appears as many characters | Plurality is an appearance within one consciousness |
On either the “limitation” or the “reflection” theory, the mind (antaḥkaraṇa) is what individuates: it is the adjunct (upādhi) through which the one consciousness appears as many. The mind is thus indispensable to the Advaita account of personhood, even though it is, ultimately, not the self.
4.5.1 The Fourfold Inner Instrument¶
Sāṃkhya names three inner faculties — intellect (buddhi), the I-maker (ahaṃkāra) and the mind (manas) (Section 3.2). The later Vedānta manuals add a fourth, citta, the faculty of memory, to form the fourfold model that is now the best-known Indian description of the mind’s functions.
The fourfold inner instrument (antaḥkaraṇa catuṣṭaya)
- manas
- The mind in the narrow sense: it attends to the reports of the senses and entertains alternatives (saṅkalpa–vikalpa), “is it this or that?”.
- buddhi
- The intellect: it ascertains and decides (niścaya, adhyavasāya).
- ahaṃkāra
- The “I-maker”: it appropriates experience as “mine” (abhimāna).
- citta
- The faculty of memory and stored impressions (smaraṇa).
Sadānanda’s Vedāntasāra (15th century) defines manas and buddhi as two modes (vṛtti) of a single inner organ — the one characterised by doubt, the other by certainty — and assigns citta and ahaṃkāra to them. The point of the scheme is not to locate separate organs but to distinguish functions of one instrument, which in Advaita remains, however subtle, an object of the witness and not the witness itself.
4.6 The Advaita Theory of Perception¶
The most developed Advaita theory of perception is found in Dharmarāja Adhvarin’s Vedāntaparibhāṣā (17th century). In perception, the mind goes out through a sense organ to the object and takes on its form; this “mode” of the mind (vṛtti) removes the ignorance that conceals the object. Consciousness is then present in three forms — as delimited by the object, by the mental mode and by the mind — and when these coincide in one place, the object is directly perceived. The theory is designed to explain how a single, all-pervading consciousness can nonetheless know particular objects at particular times. It shares with the Sāṃkhya and Yoga accounts the idea that the mind “takes the form” of what it knows.
4.7 Means of Knowledge¶
Advaita adopted, with modifications, the epistemology of the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā, which recognised six means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa): perception, inference, comparison (upamāna), verbal testimony (śabda), postulation (arthāpatti) — as when one concludes that a man who is fat but does not eat by day must eat at night — and non-apprehension (anupalabdhi), by which one knows the absence of something. The Vedāntaparibhāṣā discusses each in turn. For Advaita, all of them are valid at the level of everyday experience; but knowledge of Brahman comes only from testimony, the sentences of the Upaniṣads, since Brahman is not an object of perception or inference. The theory gives Advaita a carefully argued place for ordinary knowledge within a philosophy that ultimately denies the reality of plurality.
4.8 The Path of Knowledge¶
For Advaita, liberation comes through knowledge (jñāna), and knowledge of Brahman comes through the Upaniṣads, studied with a teacher. The student must first be qualified by the fourfold preparation (sādhanacatuṣṭaya):
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discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal (nityānityavastuviveka);
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dispassion towards the enjoyment of rewards here and hereafter (ihāmutrārthabhogavirāga);
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the six virtues (śamādiṣaṭkasampatti): calm, self-control, withdrawal, forbearance, faith and concentration;
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the desire for liberation (mumukṣutva).
The list is an application of the principle of eligibility (adhikāra): a teaching is given only to a student who is ready for it. The Bhagavad Gītā states the qualities of such a student:
Bhagavad Gītā 4.39
śraddhāvāṃl labhate jñānaṃ tatparaḥ saṃyatendriyaḥ |
jñānaṃ labdhvā parāṃ śāntim acireṇādhigacchati ||
The one who has faith, who is intent on it and has mastered the senses, gains knowledge; having gained knowledge, he soon attains the highest peace.
The student then undertakes hearing (śravaṇa), reflection (manana) and contemplation (nididhyāsana). The three verbs come from Yājñavalkya’s words to his wife Maitreyī:
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 2.4.5
ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyo maitreyi
It is the self, Maitreyī, that should be seen, heard, reflected upon and meditated upon.
Advaita turned them into a discipline: śravaṇa, hearing the teaching from a competent teacher and determining the meaning of the texts; manana, removing doubts by reasoning; and nididhyāsana, sustained contemplation until the understanding becomes stable. A closely similar scheme appears in Buddhist thought, which distinguishes wisdom arising from hearing (śrutamayī), from reflection (cintāmayī) and from meditative cultivation (bhāvanāmayī prajñā); Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa (chapter 6) makes them successive stages of the path. The convergence suggests a widely shared Indian view of how understanding deepens — from received teaching, through critical reflection, to transformed experience — although the Advaita sequence is not a general theory of learning but a prescription for the study of the Upaniṣads by a qualified student. In Śaṅkara’s own view these are not stages of a meditative technique leading to a new experience: knowledge of Brahman arises directly from understanding the Upaniṣadic sentences, and reflection and contemplation serve to remove the doubts and contrary habits that obstruct it. Later Advaitins disagreed about how far contemplation is itself a cause of liberation.
4.8.1 Śaṅkara as Teacher¶
Śaṅkara’s independent work, the Upadeśasāhasrī (“A Thousand Teachings”), whose authenticity is generally accepted, opens its prose part with a chapter on “the method of enlightening the student”. The teacher, Śaṅkara says, should teach this knowledge to a student who has become dispassionate, is calm and self-controlled, has approached him in the prescribed way and has been examined as to his caste, conduct and qualities; he should teach repeatedly, until the student grasps it firmly. The teacher himself should be able to grasp arguments for and against, to retain what he has learned and to explain it, and should be calm, self-controlled, compassionate, free from pride, deceit and envy, and devoted to helping others. The following chapters are dialogues in which a student raises questions about the self, bondage and liberation, and the teacher answers by drawing out the implications of the student’s own experience — the method of reasoned instruction from the student’s standpoint that later Advaita teachers continued.
4.8.2 Knowledge and Meditation¶
Śaṅkara’s contemporaries and successors argued about the role of meditation in this process. Maṇḍana Miśra, in his Brahmasiddhi, held that the knowledge produced by the Upaniṣadic sentences is at first indirect and verbal, and must be made direct by repeated meditative contemplation (prasaṅkhyāna); Śaṅkara’s pupil Sureśvara rejected this, insisting that the sentences themselves produce direct knowledge in a qualified hearer. The debate concerns a question with obvious psychological interest: whether understanding a truth intellectually is enough to transform a person, or whether a further discipline is needed to make it effective. Later Advaita, as in Vidyāraṇya’s work discussed below, tended in practice to combine study with sustained meditative practice.
Advaitins also distinguished liberation in life (jīvanmukti), in which knowledge has removed ignorance while the body continues to live out the karma that produced it, “like a potter’s wheel that keeps turning after the potter has stopped”, from the final liberation that follows death (videhamukti).
The social limits of this path should be noted. Śaṅkara restricts the study of the Upaniṣads to men of the three upper classes who have undergone initiation; in his commentary on Brahmasūtra 1.3.34–38 he denies that Śūdras are eligible, citing the Dharmasūtra penalties for a Śūdra who hears the Veda (Section 9.12), while allowing that Śūdras may attain knowledge through the epics and Purāṇas. Here the pedagogical sense of adhikāra merges with its social sense, the right to study defined by caste and gender, and presentations that offer adhikāra only as an early version of “readiness for learning” leave out half of its history. Later Advaita teachers and modern exponents such as Vivekananda rejected or reinterpreted these restrictions.
4.9 Desire, Anger and the Collapse of Judgement¶
The Bhagavad Gītā, which all schools of Vedānta treat as authoritative, contains the best-known Indian analysis of how attachment leads to the loss of judgement:
Bhagavad Gītā 2.62–63
dhyāyato viṣayān puṃsaḥ saṅgas teṣūpajāyate |
saṅgāt saṃjāyate kāmaḥ kāmāt krodho ’bhijāyate ||
krodhād bhavati saṃmohaḥ saṃmohāt smṛtivibhramaḥ |
smṛtibhraṃśād buddhināśo buddhināśāt praṇaśyati ||
When a man dwells on the objects of sense, attachment to them arises; from attachment comes desire, and from desire anger. From anger comes delusion, from delusion the confusion of memory; from the loss of memory the ruin of the intellect, and with the ruin of the intellect he perishes.
The Gītā’s answer to the problem of desire is not the abandonment of action but a change in the motive of action. Kṛṣṇa tells Arjuna:
Bhagavad Gītā 2.47
karmaṇy evādhikāras te mā phaleṣu kadācana |
mā karmaphalahetur bhūr mā te saṅgo ’stv akarmaṇi ||
Your concern is with the action alone, never with its fruits. Do not let the fruit of action be your motive, and do not be attached to inaction.
This is the core of the “discipline of action” (karmayoga): one should do one’s duty with a mind that is even in success and failure (samatva, BG 2.48), offering the action to God and renouncing attachment to its results. Psychologically, the teaching locates freedom not in the absence of activity but in the absence of craving for outcomes; it also, in its original context, urges a warrior to fight and affirms the duties of one’s own social station (svadharma), a point that modern readers — including Gandhi and Ambedkar, who read the Gītā very differently — have debated intensely.
The same chapter describes the opposite condition, the person “of steady wisdom” (sthitaprajña, BG 2.54–72), who has withdrawn the senses from their objects:
Bhagavad Gītā 2.58
yadā saṃharate cāyaṃ kūrmo ’ṅgānīva sarvaśaḥ |
indriyāṇīndriyārthebhyas tasya prajñā pratiṣṭhitā ||
When he withdraws his senses from their objects entirely, as a tortoise draws in its limbs, his wisdom stands firm.
The Gītā also classifies temperaments, foods, kinds of knowledge, action and happiness according to the three guṇas (chapters 14, 17 and 18): sattva is associated with clarity, knowledge and contentment, rajas with desire, activity and restlessness, tamas with confusion, sloth and negligence. The ideal is not the predominance of sattva as such but freedom from all three (nistraiguṇya, BG 2.45). Later Vedāntic and Āyurvedic writers built on this classification, and it remains influential in modern Indian discussions of personality and well-being.
An Upaniṣadic verse, much quoted in Vedāntic literature, sums up the view that bondage and freedom are matters of the mind:
Brahmabindu (Amṛtabindu) Upaniṣad 2
mana eva manuṣyāṇāṃ kāraṇaṃ bandhamokṣayoḥ |
bandhāya viṣayāsaktaṃ muktyai nirviṣayaṃ smṛtam ||
For human beings the mind alone is the cause of bondage and liberation: attached to objects it is held to lead to bondage; free of objects, to liberation.
4.10 Later Advaita Texts¶
4.10.1 The Pañcadaśī¶
The Pañcadaśī (“Fifteen Chapters”), attributed to Vidyāraṇya (14th century, associated with the Śṛṅgeri monastery and the early Vijayanagara court), is a widely studied verse manual of Advaita. Its chapters fall into three groups of five: on discrimination (viveka), on illumination (dīpa) and on bliss (ānanda). The last group discusses the bliss of Brahman under the headings of the bliss of yoga, of the self, of non-duality, of knowledge and of objects. It distinguishes the bliss of Brahman experienced in deep sleep, the residual “bliss of impressions” (vāsanānanda) that lingers on waking, and the bliss of objects (viṣayānanda), which it explains as a momentary glimpse of the self’s own bliss when desire is temporarily stilled. The analysis is a philosophical theory of happiness: pleasure from objects is real but derivative, a reflection of the bliss that is the self’s nature.
4.10.2 Liberation in Life: The Jīvanmuktiviveka¶
Vidyāraṇya also wrote the Jīvanmuktiviveka (“Discrimination of Liberation in Life”), a treatise on the condition of one who is liberated while still embodied and on the discipline that leads to it. It argues that knowledge of the truth (tattvajñāna) must be accompanied by two further practices: the “destruction of the mind” (manonāśa), meaning not its annihilation but the cessation of its restless fluctuation, and the “elimination of latent tendencies” (vāsanākṣaya). The three are said to support one another and to be practised together. Vidyāraṇya draws freely on the Yogasūtra and the Yogavāsiṣṭha, and his treatise shows how later Advaita integrated yogic methods of mental discipline into a path that, in principle, depends on knowledge alone. For the history of psychology it is notable as a sustained discussion of how insight, once gained, can be stabilised against the persistence of old habits — a problem that Śaṅkara himself had acknowledged.
4.10.3 The Yogavāsiṣṭha¶
The Yogavāsiṣṭha is a very long dialogue (traditionally of 32,000 verses) between the sage Vasiṣṭha and the young prince Rāma, full of stories in which worlds are revealed within worlds and dreams within dreams. Research by Walter Slaje has shown that it is a Vedāntic reworking (Slaje 1994) of an earlier Kashmiri work, the Mokṣopāya, composed around the tenth century. Its central teaching is that the world is a creation of the mind and that liberation comes through understanding (vicāra) rather than ritual or austerity. Its famous story of Queen Līlā, who travels in consciousness through the worlds contained in her dead husband’s memories, is discussed in Chapter 7. The work also describes seven stages of knowledge (jñānabhūmikā), from right desire (śubhecchā) and inquiry (vicāraṇā) to the “fourth” (turyagā) (Venkatesananda 1984).
4.10.4 The Vivekacūḍāmaṇi¶
The Vivekacūḍāmaṇi (“Crest-jewel of Discrimination”) is a popular verse manual cast as a dialogue between a teacher and a disciple who seeks release from the suffering of transmigration. It is traditionally attributed to Śaṅkara, but most modern scholars regard the attribution as doubtful, partly because its doctrine and vocabulary are closer to later Advaita. It is valued in the tradition for its systematic exposition of the five sheaths, the three bodies and the method of discriminating the self from what it is not (“not this, not this”, neti neti, a phrase from BU 2.3.6). It is sometimes called a “therapeutic” text today; it is better described as a manual of Advaita instruction whose structure — diagnosis of the student’s condition, instruction, practice, realisation — follows the logic of the soteriological path.
4.11 Other Vedāntas¶
Advaita was strongly contested within Vedānta itself, and the rival schools developed psychologies in which individual persons and their emotions are real.
4.11.1 Viśiṣṭādvaita: Rāmānuja¶
Rāmānuja (traditional dates 1017–1137, which most reference works retain; a later dating to c. 1077–1157 has been proposed but is a minority view) taught a “non-dualism of the qualified”: Brahman, identified with the personal God Viṣṇu–Nārāyaṇa, is one, but includes within himself the real individual selves and the real world as his body. In his Śrībhāṣya Rāmānuja attacked Advaita’s doctrine of ignorance with a series of objections (the “seven untenabilities”), arguing, among other things, that ignorance cannot reside either in Brahman, which is pure knowledge, or in the individual self, which is itself supposed to be a product of ignorance. His theory of error is that all cognition is of the real (satkhyāti). For Rāmānuja the individual self is a real knower whose knowledge expands and contracts, and liberation is a state of loving service to God; devotion (bhakti), understood as a continuous remembrance, is the means.
Rāmānuja’s account of knowledge differs from Advaita’s in a way that matters for psychology. For him consciousness is not the self’s essence alone but also its attribute: the self is a knower, and its knowledge is an “attributive consciousness” (dharmabhūtajñāna) that flows out towards objects and can expand or contract. In bondage this attributive knowledge is contracted by karma; in liberation it expands to embrace everything. Knowledge is thus always someone’s knowledge of something, and there is no pure, objectless consciousness of the Advaita kind. Rāmānuja also rejected the Advaita ideal of liberation in this life (jīvanmukti): as long as the body continues, he held, karma continues, and full liberation comes only after death.
4.11.2 Dvaita: Madhva¶
Madhva (c. 1238–1317, the dates argued by B. N. K. Sharma on epigraphic and literary evidence and given in most reference works (Sharma 2000); the Mādhva tradition’s own reckoning gives 1199–1278) taught an uncompromising dualism. There are five real and eternal differences (pañcabheda): between God and souls, God and matter, soul and soul, soul and matter, and matter and matter. Souls are eternally distinct and eternally dependent on God; Madhva even held that souls differ in their intrinsic natures, some being destined for liberation and others not — a doctrine unusual in Indian thought.
Madhva too spoke of a “witness” (sākṣin), but in a sense quite different from that of Advaita: for him the witness is the soul’s own faculty of intuitive awareness, by which it directly and infallibly knows itself, its own states and certain basic truths, such as the reality of time and space. Where the senses and the mind may err, the witness cannot. The same word thus names, in the two schools, the impersonal consciousness of Advaita and an individual soul’s intrinsic faculty of certainty.
Madhva’s theology also had a distinctive account of human difference. Because souls differ in their intrinsic natures, some are fit for liberation, some for continued transmigration and some for eternal darkness, and their dispositions show themselves in their attitudes to God and to truth. The doctrine has been much discussed by modern scholars as an Indian form of predestination; within the tradition it served to explain the observed variety of human character and devotion.
4.11.3 The Devotional Vedāntas¶
The Vedāntas of Nimbārka, Vallabha (1479–1531) and the school of Caitanya (1486–1534) developed theologies of devotion in which emotion is not something to be transcended but the very medium of relation to God. The Caitanya school’s “inconceivable difference-in-identity” (acintyabhedābheda) and Rūpa Gosvāmin’s theory of devotional rasa (Chapter 6) produced an elaborate analysis of the varieties of love. In these traditions the psychology of the devotee — longing, humility, the moods of servant, friend, parent and lover — becomes a central theological subject.
4.12 The Psychology of Devotion¶
Devotion (bhakti) is the most widespread form of Indian religious life, and its literature contains a rich psychology of emotion. Its roots lie in the Bhagavad Gītā, which offers devotion as a path open to all, “even women, Vaiśyas and Śūdras” (BG 9.32) — a sentence that at once widens access and reflects the hierarchy of its time. From the sixth century onwards the Tamil poet-saints, the Vaiṣṇava Āḻvārs and the Śaiva Nāyaṉmārs, composed hymns in which the devotee’s longing for God is expressed in the language of human love, especially the love of a woman separated from her beloved (viraha). The Bhāgavata Purāṇa (perhaps 9th–10th century) made the love of the cowherd women (gopī) for Kṛṣṇa the model of devotion and listed nine forms of devotional practice:
Bhāgavata Purāṇa 7.5.23
śravaṇaṃ kīrtanaṃ viṣṇoḥ smaraṇaṃ pādasevanam |
arcanaṃ vandanaṃ dāsyaṃ sakhyam ātmanivedanam ||
Hearing about Viṣṇu, singing his praise, remembering him, serving his feet, worshipping him, saluting him, being his servant, being his friend, and offering oneself to him.
The Nāradabhaktisūtra, a later aphoristic text, defines devotion as “supreme love” (paramapremarūpā, sūtra 2) for God and describes its signs: the devotee is absorbed in God, finds all else tasteless, and is “like one intoxicated”. The theologians of the Caitanya school gave the most elaborate analysis, applying the categories of rasa theory to the devotee’s emotions (Chapter 6).
The devotional movements in the regional languages — from the Vārkarī poets of Maharashtra to the sants of north India and the Vīraśaivas of Karnataka — also had a social dimension. Many of their poets came from artisan, peasant or “untouchable” communities, composed in the vernacular rather than Sanskrit, and questioned the value of ritual and caste in the face of devotion. At the same time devotion often coexisted with caste hierarchy in practice, within the devotional communities as well as outside them. The psychology of bhakti — its emphasis on emotion, surrender, longing and the equality of devotees before God — is thus also a social history.
The meeting of Vedānta and devotion with the Sufi psychology of the heart, in Dārā Shukōh’s comparisons and in the poetry of the regional languages, is described in Section 8.4.7.
4.13 Vedānta in Modern Thought¶
Vedānta, especially Advaita, became in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the most widely known form of Indian philosophy, largely through the work of Swami Vivekananda (1863–1902), who presented it as a universal religion compatible with science, and through modern teachers such as Ramana Maharshi (1879–1950), whose method of self-inquiry (“Who am I?”) is a simplified form of Advaitic discrimination. Sri Aurobindo (1872–1950) developed an “integral” philosophy in which consciousness evolves through matter, life and mind towards a “supramental” level; his followers have written extensively on its implications for psychology and education (Dalal 2001).
Vedāntic ideas have also influenced Western humanistic and transpersonal psychology. Two cautions apply. First, the Vedānta that reached the West was largely the modern, universalised Vedānta of Vivekananda and his successors, which differs in important respects from that of Śaṅkara. Secondly, the claim that Vedānta “solves” the hard problem of consciousness, or that its account of the witness has been confirmed by therapy research, goes beyond the evidence. Vedānta offers a serious philosophical position — that consciousness is fundamental and cannot be reduced to its objects — which deserves discussion on its merits.
The variety of the Vedāntic schools is itself instructive. Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, Dvaita and the devotional Vedāntas all claimed to interpret the same Upaniṣads, the same Brahmasūtra and the same Gītā, and they reached opposite conclusions about the reality of the individual self, the value of emotion and the nature of liberation. Any presentation of “the Vedāntic view of the mind” should therefore specify which Vedānta is meant.
Further Reading¶
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Deutsch (1969): a concise philosophical reconstruction of Advaita.
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Potter (1981): summaries of the works of Śaṅkara and his early followers, with a long introduction.
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Gupta (1998): the Advaita doctrine of the witness.
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Dasgupta (1922): still useful for the later Vedāntic schools (volumes 3 and 4 of the full work).
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Venkatesananda (1984): an abridged translation of the Yogavāsiṣṭha.