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Chapter 8: Self, Heart and Spirit: Islamic, Sufi and Sikh Psychology in India

āī panthī sagal jamātī man jītai jag jīt
Make the fellowship of all people your sect of yogis; conquer the mind, and you conquer the world.
— Guru Nānak, Japjī 28 (Guru Granth Sāhib, p. 6)

8.1 Introduction

The chapters so far have followed accounts of the mind composed in Sanskrit, Pali, Prakrit and Tamil. Arabic learning had reached Sindh with Arab rule in the eighth century, but it was from the eleventh century, with Ghaznavid rule at Lahore, that another body of thought about the inner life took lasting root in India. It was written in Arabic and Persian and, later, in Hindavi, Panjabi, Sindhi, Dakani and Urdu. Its roots lay in the Qurʾān, in the Greek philosophy and medicine that had been translated into Arabic, and in the Sufi literature of Iraq, Khurasan and Central Asia. By the sixteenth century it had become fully Indian, in the sense that some of its most influential works were written in Lahore, Delhi, Sirhind and Gulbarga by authors who never left the subcontinent. In the same period the Sikh Gurus, beginning with Guru Nānak (1469–1539), composed in the Panjab a body of devotional poetry with its own diagnosis of the human condition and its own discipline of the mind.

These traditions are often treated in surveys of “Indian psychology” as a postscript, or are absorbed into Vedānta as if they were variations on it. This chapter treats them on their own terms. It sets out the vocabulary of the self in the Qurʾān (Section 8.2); the faculty psychology and ethics that Muslim philosophers and physicians inherited from the Greeks and that were taught in Indian madrasas (Section 8.3); the psychology of the Sufi path as it was written and taught in India (Section 8.4); and the Sikh teaching on the mind (man) and on self-centredness (haumai) (Section 8.5). The general history of Islam, Sufism and Sikhism in India is given in Volume 24, Samanvaya, and the Sufi engagement with yoga, including Guru Nānak’s dialogue with the Nāth yogis, in Volume 5, Yoga Taraṅgiṇī. Neither is repeated here. The institutions in which these traditions were taught — the maktab, the madrasa, the Sufi hospice and the Sikh dharamsāl — are described in Chapter 11.

Two cautions apply throughout. First, the Arabic, Persian and Panjabi terms do not map neatly onto Sanskrit ones. Nafs is not ahaṃkāra, qalb is not manas, and haumai is not simply the Sāṃkhya “I-maker”, although each invites comparison. Secondly, these are religious psychologies. Their accounts of the self are inseparable from their accounts of God, revelation and grace, and they should not be stripped of that context to make them look like modern therapies.

8.2 The Qurʾānic Vocabulary of the Inner Person

The Qurʾān does not set out a theory of the mind, but it supplied the words in which every later Muslim theory was framed. Four are central.

Nafs means “self” or “soul”, and in ordinary Arabic simply “oneself”. Three Qurʾānic phrases became the basis of a moral psychology. In the story of Joseph the self is said to “command to evil” (al-nafs al-ammāra bi’l-sūʾ, 12:53); in another passage God swears by “the self that blames” (al-nafs al-lawwāma, 75:2); and a third addresses “the self at peace” (al-nafs al-muṭmaʾinna, 89:27) and bids it return to its Lord. Later writers read the three phrases as three conditions or stages of one self.

The three conditions of the self (nafs)

al-nafs al-ammāra bi’l-sūʾ (Qurʾān 12:53)
“The self that commands to evil”: the self ruled by its appetites.
al-nafs al-lawwāma (75:2)
“The self that blames”: the self that has begun to accuse itself.
al-nafs al-muṭmaʾinna (89:27)
“The self at peace”: the self that has come to rest in God and is bidden to return to its Lord.

A further passage (91:7–10) swears by the soul “and the One who proportioned it and inspired it with its wickedness and its righteousness”, and declares that whoever purifies it has succeeded. This verse made the purification of the self (tazkiyat al-nafs) a religious task.

Qalb, the heart, is in the Qurʾān the organ of understanding as well as of feeling. It is the heart that can be sealed, hardened or diseased, and that can also be guided and find rest. “It is not the eyes that are blind,” says one verse, “but the hearts within the breasts” (22:46); another declares that “in the remembrance of God hearts find rest” (13:28). On the Day of Judgement only the one who comes to God “with a sound heart” (qalb salīm, 26:89) will be saved. A well-known ḥadīth, transmitted in the collections of al-Bukhārī and Muslim, adds that there is a piece of flesh in the body which, when it is sound, keeps the whole body sound, and when it is corrupt, corrupts it — and that this is the heart. Islamic psychology is thus, from the start, a psychology of the heart, not of the head.

Rūḥ, the spirit, is what God breathed into Adam (15:29, 38:72). When people ask about it, the Prophet is told to answer that “the spirit is of the command of my Lord” (17:85), and that they have been given only a little knowledge. Many later writers took this as a warning against speculating about the spirit; the Sufis took the phrase “of the command” (min amr) as the starting point for a distinction between a world of command and a world of creation (Section 8.4.5).

ʿAql, reason or intellect, is curiously absent as a noun from the Qurʾān. The verb from the same root, “to understand, to use one’s reason”, occurs many times, usually in the challenge “will you not then understand?”. The noun entered the vocabulary through theology and philosophy, where it named the rational faculty and, in the Neoplatonic cosmology, the cosmic Intellect.

8.3 The Philosophers and the Physicians: Faculties of the Soul

8.3.1 The Internal Senses

The philosophers of Baghdad, Khurasan and Andalusia took over Aristotle’s account of the soul and refined it. The most influential version was that of Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna, 980–1037), whose Kitāb al-Nafs (“Book of the Soul”) and its abridgement in the Kitāb al-Najāt became the standard Islamic psychology (Rahman 1952). Ibn Sīnā distinguished the vegetative soul (nutrition, growth, reproduction), the animal soul (perception and voluntary movement) and the rational soul. Between the five external senses and the intellect he placed five internal senses, each assigned to a region of the brain’s ventricles:

  1. the common sense (al-ḥiss al-mushtarak), which unites the reports of the different senses into a single percept;

  2. the retentive imagination (khayāl), which stores the forms of things perceived;

  3. the compositive imagination (mutakhayyila), which combines and separates images, and which in human beings, when governed by reason, becomes the cogitative faculty (mufakkira);

  4. the estimative faculty (wahm), which grasps the non-sensible meanings in things perceived — the sheep’s perception that the wolf is to be fled;

  5. memory (ḥāfiẓa), which stores what estimation has grasped.

The scheme invites comparison with the Indian analyses of perception and memory (Chapters 3 and 5). Like Nyāya, it treats perception as a process in stages; like the Abhidharma, it gives a separate place to the grasping of a thing’s significance for the perceiver. Unlike either, it places the faculties in the organs of the body, and it subordinates them all to a rational soul that is immaterial and survives death.

In India this psychology was taught in two settings. In the madrasa it formed part of the philosophical curriculum, studied through Athīr al-Dīn al-Abharī’s thirteenth-century handbook Hidāyat al-Ḥikma and its commentaries, which remained set texts of the Dars-i Niẓāmī into the twentieth century (Chapter 11). In medicine it formed part of the theory of Unani (Yūnānī, “Greek”) physicians, for whom the “psychic” faculty (quwwa nafsāniyya) seated in the brain governed sensation, movement and thought (Volume 13, Āyurveda). The physicians described disorders of the mind in these terms: melancholia (mālīkhūliyā), attributed to an excess of black bile affecting the brain; madness (junūn); and, following Ibn Sīnā’s Qānūn, lovesickness (ʿishq) treated as a melancholic illness. The treatment combined regimen, diet and drugs with conversation, music and the management of the patient’s surroundings. The dār al-shifāʾ (hospital) founded by Sultan Fīrūz Shāh Tughluq in Delhi in the fourteenth century is among the earliest institutions in India for which the care of the sick in this tradition is recorded.

8.3.2 Ethics as the Medicine of the Soul

The most widely read psychological literature in Muslim India, however, was not the technical philosophy of the soul but the Persian literature of ethics (akhlāq). Its foundation was the Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq (“Refinement of Character”) of Miskawayh (d. 1030), which joined Plato’s division of the soul to Aristotle’s theory of virtue as a mean. Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī rewrote it in Persian as the Akhlāq-i Nāṣirī (1235), adding books on the household and on the state; Jalāl al-Dīn Dawānī’s Akhlāq-i Jalālī (late fifteenth century) restated Ṭūsī’s work in a more elegant style. Both were read throughout Mughal India, and Muzaffar Alam has shown how the akhlāq tradition shaped the outlook of the Mughal nobility and its Hindu and Muslim secretaries (Alam 2004). The literary and political sides of this literature are treated in Volume 8 and Volume 18; its psychology concerns us here.

Table 8.1. The faculties of the soul and the cardinal virtues in Ṭūsī’s Akhlāq-i Nāṣirī, after Miskawayh. Each virtue is a mean between two vices.
Faculty Virtue Vice of excess Vice of deficiency
rational (nāṭiqa) wisdom (ḥikmat) folly, misplaced cleverness (safah) stupidity (balah)
irascible (ghaḍabī) courage (shujāʿat) rashness (tahawwur) cowardice (jubn)
appetitive (shahwānī) temperance (ʿiffat) greed, licence (sharah) torpor (khumūd)
the three in harmony justice (ʿadālat) doing injustice (ẓulm) submitting to injustice (inẓilām)

The scheme is summarised in Table 8.1. Its psychological interest lies less in the table than in the therapeutics that followed it. Ṭūsī, following Miskawayh, describes the “diseases of the soul” — among them anger, fear, above all the fear of death, and grief — and prescribes their cure as a physician prescribes for the body. Health is preserved by keeping good company and good habits; disease is treated by opposites, and anger is cured by reflecting on its causes and consequences and by deliberately cultivating forbearance. Fear of death is analysed as a mistake arising from ignorance of what death is, and grief as the result of attachment to things that are by nature transient. The treatise also offers a theory of education: since character (khulq) is formed by habit, children must be trained early, praised for good conduct, kept from bad company and taught to love knowledge before they can understand its reasons (Ṭūsī 1964). The resemblance to the Indian medical idea of “conquering the mind” (sattvāvajaya, Chapter 3) is real, though the two traditions developed independently.

Alongside the philosophical akhlāq stood al-Ghazālī’s (1058–1111) great synthesis of law, ethics and Sufism, the Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn (“Revival of the Religious Sciences”), whose books on “the wonders of the heart” and “the discipline of the soul” gave the Sufi psychology of the heart a systematic form. Its Persian abridgement, the Kīmiyā-yi Saʿādat (“Alchemy of Happiness”), was widely read in India. Al-Ghazālī compared the heart to a king, reason to his minister, and the appetites and anger to unruly servants and soldiers who must be governed rather than destroyed. The image of the self as a kingdom to be ruled, not a prison to be escaped, is characteristic of the Islamic ethical tradition. Indian thought had images of self-governance of its own, from the chariot of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad (Section 2.4) to the Gītā’s discipline of action (Section 4.9), but al-Ghazālī’s image gives the appetites a legitimate, governed place in a life lived within the religious law.

8.4 Sufi Psychology in India

8.4.1 The Vocabulary of the Path

From the thirteenth century, Sufi orders became one of the most important channels of religious teaching in India, and they brought with them a developed vocabulary of the self and its transformation. Drawing on the Qurʾān and on earlier Persian and Arabic Sufi writers, Indian Sufis distinguished levels of the lower self (nafs): the self that “commands to evil” (ammāra), the self that “blames” itself (lawwāma), and the self “at peace” (muṭmaʾinna). The heart (qalb) was the organ of spiritual perception, to be polished like a mirror. The path was described as a sequence of “stations” (maqām) attained by effort — repentance, abstinence, patience, trust in God, contentment — and of “states” (ḥāl) granted by grace, such as longing, intimacy and ecstasy.

The goal of the path was described in a pair of terms: the passing away (fanāʾ) of the self’s attributes in God, and the abiding (baqāʾ) in God that follows. Sufi writers disagreed about how these were to be understood — whether as the extinction of the self’s awareness of itself, as the replacement of its qualities by divine qualities, or as the return of a transformed self to ordinary life — and much of the Indian Sufi literature is concerned with that question. Annemarie Schimmel’s Mystical Dimensions of Islam remains the best introduction to the vocabulary (Schimmel 1975).

8.4.2 Al-Hujwīrī’s Unveiling of the Veiled

The first Sufi treatise written in India is also, as its translator called it, the oldest Persian treatise on Sufism. ʿAlī ibn ʿUthmān al-Hujwīrī, born near Ghazna, settled in Lahore, where he died about 1072 (some sources give a few years later); his shrine there, known as the Dātā Darbār, is still one of the most visited in South Asia. His Kashf al-Maḥjūb (“The Unveiling of the Veiled”) is a handbook for the seeker, translated into English by R. A. Nicholson in 1911 (al-Hujwīrī 1911). It begins with knowledge, poverty and the nature of Sufism, gives lives of the Prophet’s companions and of the early masters, and then surveys twelve “schools” of Sufis — ten of which Hujwīrī approves and two of which he condemns. Each school is identified with a characteristic doctrine, and the survey amounts to a typology of inner states: sobriety and intoxication, presence and absence, union and separation, the mortification of the self, passing away and abiding. The last part of the book is arranged as the lifting of a series of “veils”, from the knowledge of God and the profession of unity through prayer, almsgiving, fasting and pilgrimage to companionship, the technical language of the Sufis, and listening to music.

Three of Hujwīrī’s distinctions became standard in Indian Sufism. First, he insists on the difference between a station and a state: the station belongs to the seeker’s effort and conduct, the state is a gift that descends on the heart and cannot be acquired. Secondly, in the long-running debate between the partisans of “intoxication” (sukr), associated with Abū Yazīd (Bāyazīd) of Bisṭām, and of “sobriety” (ṣaḥw), associated with al-Junayd of Baghdad, he sides with sobriety: the ecstatic utterances of the intoxicated are to be excused, not imitated, and the higher condition is the one in which the seeker keeps full possession of his faculties and of the religious law. Thirdly, he treats the lower self as the chief obstacle on the path. His discussion of the school of Sahl al-Tustarī is an extended account of the “struggle against the self” (mujāhadat al-nafs), in which the self is to be disciplined by hunger, wakefulness and the opposition of its desires, but never trusted, because its tricks grow subtler as the seeker advances. These three themes — the gratuitousness of spiritual experience, the priority of sobriety, and the cunning of the self — run through the later Indian literature.

8.4.3 The Chishtī Masters: Teaching by Conversation

Sufi teaching was organised around the relationship between master (shaykh, pīr) and disciple (murīd), and took place in the hospice (khānqāh). The conversations of the Chishtī master Niẓām al-Dīn Awliyāʾ (d. 1325) of Delhi, recorded between 1307 and 1322 by his disciple Amīr Ḥasan Sijzī in the Fawāʾid al-Fuʾād, show a teacher who instructed through anecdote, counsel and example, attending to the inner states of his hearers and emphasising humility, generosity and the service of others (Sijzī 1992). The Chishtīs also cultivated listening to music (samāʿ) as a means of inducing spiritual states, a practice that connected them with Indian musical traditions.

The Fawāʾid al-Fuʾād created a genre, the malfūẓāt or “utterances” of a master, which became the characteristic form of Indian Sufi teaching. The conversations of Niẓām al-Dīn’s successor Naṣīr al-Dīn Maḥmūd, “the Lamp of Delhi” (d. 1356), were recorded as the Khayr al-Majālis, and those of Sayyid Muḥammad Gēsū Darāz (d. 1422), who carried the Chishtī teaching to Gulbarga in the Deccan, by his son. Collections attributed to the earlier Chishtī masters, from Muʿīn al-Dīn of Ajmer to Farīd al-Dīn of Pakpattan, were judged by the historian Mohammad Habib and others to be later compositions; Ernst and Lawrence point out that they were nevertheless read as authoritative and shaped the image of those masters (Ernst and Lawrence 2002).

The psychological interest of the genre lies in its method. The master’s sayings are almost always addressed to a particular person in a particular condition, and the recorder notes the effect of a story on the hearers — tears, silence, a change of resolve. The master diagnoses the disciple’s state and prescribes accordingly: a proud man is set to menial service, an anxious one reassured, a scholar warned against the vanity of learning. The teaching also turns constantly on the management of emotion: on forgiving injuries, on bearing hostility without returning it, and on hope and fear of God held in balance. The Chishtī insistence on the conditions of samāʿ reflects a similar attention to state. The listener, the singer, the words sung and the company present all had to be fit, and Niẓām al-Dīn is reported to have disapproved of musical instruments, because music was a powerful means of moving the heart and could move it in the wrong direction.

8.4.4 Remembrance and the Heart

The central practice of the Sufi orders was remembrance (dhikr): the repetition of the profession of faith, of the name Allāh, or of other divine names, aloud (jahrī) or silently in the heart (khafī), alone or in assembly. The Chishtīs and Qādirīs in India practised vocal dhikr as well as silent; the Naqshbandīs were known for silent remembrance of the heart. The Qurʾānic promise that “in the remembrance of God hearts find rest” gave the practice its rationale, and Sufi manuals describe its stages: the repetition first occupies the tongue, then the heart, until the remembrance continues of itself and finally the one who remembers is absorbed in the One remembered. Dhikr was supported by contemplation and watchful attention (murāqaba), by examination of conscience (muḥāsaba), and by periods of seclusion, of which the forty-day retreat (chilla) was the best known; hagiographies attribute extreme forms of it to Farīd al-Dīn. Some Indian Sufis combined dhikr with the holding of the breath, and the extent to which this drew on yoga was debated among the Sufis themselves (Volume 5).

The comparison with the Indian practices of recollection — the Buddhist recollections (anussati), the smaraṇa and nāmasaṅkīrtana of the bhakti traditions, and the Sikh nām simran (Section 8.5.6) — is obvious, and was made by Indian Sufis and devotees themselves. The differences are equally important. Dhikr is directed to a personal God who is wholly other than the creature, and it is bound up with the observance of the religious law; its aim is not the discovery of an inner self identical with the absolute, but the purification of the heart so that it can reflect the divine attributes.

8.4.5 The Naqshbandī Subtle Centres and Aḥmad Sirhindī

The Naqshbandī order was brought to India from Central Asia by Khwāja Bāqī Billāh (1564–1603), who settled in Delhi around 1599. His most important disciple, Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī (1564–1624), gave the Indian Naqshbandīs — known after him as the Mujaddidīs, from his title Mujaddid-i Alf-i Thānī, “Renewer of the Second Millennium” — a distinctive psychology and a distinctive metaphysics. Both are set out in his Maktūbāt, more than five hundred letters to disciples and to nobles of the Mughal court (Friedmann 1971).

Sirhindī systematised a doctrine of subtle centres (laṭāʾif, singular laṭīfa) in the human being. Taking up the Qurʾānic distinction between God’s “command” (amr) and his “creation” (khalq), he taught that the human being is composed of ten subtle centres. Five belong to the “world of command”, whose roots lie beyond the created cosmos: the heart (qalb), spirit (rūḥ), secret (sirr), hidden (khafī) and most hidden (akhfā). Five belong to the “world of creation”: the self (nafs) and the four elements of the body. In Mujaddidī practice each of the first five was located at a point on the chest, as in Table 8.2, and the disciple was led through them one by one in a graded series of lessons. The master directed his concentrated attention (tawajjuh) to the disciple’s heart and the disciple performed silent dhikr at each centre in turn, until each was “awakened” and returned to its origin. Arthur Buehler has shown how this graded and supervised method made the Mujaddidī shaykh a “mediating” teacher, responsible for guiding the disciple’s inner experience step by step (Buehler 1998).

Table 8.2. The ten subtle centres (laṭāʾif) of the Mujaddidī Naqshbandīs. Locations follow a common later scheme; manuals differ in detail.
Realm Subtle centre Location in practice
world of command heart (qalb) below the left breast
(ʿālam al-amr) spirit (rūḥ) below the right breast
secret (sirr) above the left breast
hidden (khafī) above the right breast
most hidden (akhfā) centre of the chest
world of creation self (nafs) the forehead (in some schemes, below the navel)
(ʿālam al-khalq) earth, water, fire, air the whole body

The laṭāʾif are sometimes equated in modern writing with the cakras of Tantric and Haṭha yoga (Chapter 3). The equation should be resisted. The laṭāʾif are not arranged along a central channel, are not associated with a rising energy, and are defined by their relation to the divine command, not to the elements of the subtle body. What the two systems share is a practice of fixing attention on points in the body as a way of training the mind, and a conviction that inner experience can be mapped and guided.

Sirhindī’s metaphysics was also, in part, a theory of experience. The dominant metaphysics of Indian Sufism, derived from Ibn ʿArabī (1165–1240), was the “unity of being” (waḥdat al-wujūd): only God truly exists, and the world is his self-manifestation. Sirhindī, who had himself passed through the experience of unity, argued that it was a stage on the path and not its end. The experience of oneness, he wrote, is real as an experience, but its content is a “unity of witnessing” (waḥdat al-shuhūd), not of being. When the sun rises the stars are no longer seen, but they have not ceased to exist; so the mystic overwhelmed by God no longer perceives the world, though the world remains distinct from God. Beyond the station of unity lay a higher station of servanthood (ʿabdiyya), in which the mystic returns to the world, recognises the distance between creature and Creator, and lives by the religious law. Sirhindī’s doctrine is, among other things, an argument that mystical experience cannot by itself establish metaphysical conclusions. It thus addresses a question that also divided the Advaitins from their Buddhist and Vedāntic opponents (Chapter 4).

Sirhindī is often remembered as the champion of Islamic orthodoxy against Akbar’s religious policies, and his letters to Mughal nobles do urge the restoration of the religious law. Yohanan Friedmann has shown, however, that this image owes much to later admirers; most of his letters concern the mystical path, and in his lifetime he was controversial chiefly for his claims about his own spiritual rank, for which the emperor Jahāngīr briefly imprisoned him (Friedmann 1971).

8.4.6 Shāh Walī Allāh

Shāh Walī Allāh of Delhi (1703–1762), the son of the founder of the Madrasa-yi Raḥīmiyya (Chapter 11), was the most systematic Muslim thinker of eighteenth-century India. His Arabic Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bāligha (“The Conclusive Argument from God”) sets out to explain the reasons behind the commandments of Islam, and to do so it develops an account of human nature (Walī Allāh 1996; Rizvi 1980).

Walī Allāh’s psychology has three elements. First, he describes a subtle vital body, the nasama or “breath”, arising in the heart from the finest vapours of the blood, through which the rational soul acts on the body. Secondly, he describes two opposing dispositions in every person, an “angelic” (malakiyya) and an “animal” (bahīmiyya) one. People differ according to the strength of each and the degree to which they are in harmony or conflict, and he offers a typology of characters built on these variables. Thirdly, he names four basic virtues through which the human being attains happiness: purity (ṭahāra), humble reverence before God (ikhbāt), magnanimity, or freedom from domination by base desires (samāḥa), and justice (ʿadāla). These are psychological capacities rather than rules, and the religious law is, in his account, a means of cultivating them in a whole community.

What distinguishes Walī Allāh is that he joins this individual psychology to a theory of society. Human beings, he argues, develop “supports” or arrangements of life (irtifāqāt) in four stages: the basic skills of livelihood, the household and its dealings, the city-state, and finally a universal order embracing many states. The virtues of the individual and the institutions of society are thus parts of one account of human flourishing. In the Sufi controversies of his time he argued that the “unity of being” and the “unity of witnessing” differed more in expression than in substance. His descendants and pupils shaped Indian Islamic learning for the next century.

8.4.7 Meeting Points

The encounter between Sufi and Indian ideas produced deliberate comparisons. The Mughal prince Dārā Shukōh argued in his Majmaʿ al-Baḥrayn (“The Meeting of the Two Oceans”, 1655) that the Sufi and Vedāntic vocabularies of the self and God express the same truths, and the Persian Sirr-i Akbar (“The Great Secret”, 1657), made under his direction, rendered fifty Upaniṣads for readers of Persian. Persian versions of the Yogavāsiṣṭha and other texts circulated widely. The resemblance that Dārā saw between the Sufi “unity of being” and Advaita is real at the level of formulas, but the Sufi doctrine came from Ibn ʿArabī and the Qurʾān, not from Vedānta. It also kept a personal God, a revealed law and a created world, and Sirhindī’s critique shows that it was contested within Indian Sufism itself. In the devotional poetry of the regional languages, Sufi and bhakti images of longing and of the inner beloved mingled freely. The Persian and Arabic works on yoga and the meetings of Sufis and yogis are described in Volume 5, and the general history of these exchanges in Volume 24.

One body of literature deserves mention here because it is, among other things, a psychology of love. The Sufi romances (premākhyān) composed in Avadhi between the late fourteenth and the mid-sixteenth centuries — among them Quṭban’s Mirigāvatī (1503), Malik Muḥammad Jāyasī’s Padmāvat (1540) and Manjhan’s Madhumālatī (1545) — tell stories of a prince who sees or hears of a beautiful woman, falls in love, becomes a yogi in search of her, and wins her after trials. Aditya Behl has argued that the poets fused the Sufi idea of the transforming power of love with the Indian aesthetics of rasa (Chapter 6), developing a “rasa of love” (prem-rasa) in which the hearer’s emotional response to the story became a means of spiritual education (Behl 2012). The literary history of these poems is given in Volume 8. For a history of Indian psychology they show how the Indian analysis of aesthetic emotion could be taken up into a different religious framework without losing its own technical vocabulary.

8.5 Sikh Teaching on the Mind

8.5.1 Sources and Interpretation

The primary source for Sikh teaching on the mind is the Guru Granth Sāhib, the scripture compiled by Guru Arjan in 1604 and, in its later recension, declared by Guru Gobind Singh to be the Guru after him. Its standard printed edition runs to 1,430 pages. It contains hymns of six of the Gurus and of earlier saints and court bards, arranged by musical mode (rāg); its history is given in Volume 24. The hymns are poetry, composed for singing, not treatises. Their language is a literary idiom that Christopher Shackle has called the “sacred language of the Sikhs” or “Sant Bhāṣā”, mixing old Panjabi, Hindavi and Braj forms with Sanskrit and Persian vocabulary (Shackle 1983). Many key terms are therefore polyvalent, and translation is already interpretation. The Vārāṅ of Bhāī Gurdās (d. 1636), which the tradition regards as a key to the scripture, are the earliest extended commentary.

Modern interpretation has taken several directions. The Singh Sabha scholars of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries produced influential works of exegesis and reference. W. H. McLeod’s Guru Nanak and the Sikh Religion (1968) gave the first analysis in English of Nānak’s thought as a coherent system — the nature of God, the condition of “unregenerate man”, the means of God’s self-revelation and the discipline of the name — and its categories have been widely used, even by those who reject his historical conclusions about Nānak’s life (McLeod 1968). Arvind-pal Singh Mandair has argued that the very act of rendering Sikh terms as “God”, “soul”, “salvation” or “ego” carried a Christian and colonial theology into Sikh self-understanding, and has proposed readings of haumai and nām that stay closer to the poetry’s own logic (Mandair 2013). Shackle and Mandair’s selection, Teachings of the Sikh Gurus, offers careful translations with this problem in view (Shackle and Mandair 2005), and Pashaura Singh has studied how the text was compiled and how its meanings were fixed (Singh 2000). The account below follows the scripture’s own vocabulary as far as possible and notes where readings differ.

8.5.2 Man: The Mind as Problem and as Place of Change

The word man (from Sanskrit manas) is among the most frequent in the Guru Granth Sāhib. It does not denote a faculty in the Sāṃkhya sense but the whole inner person: the seat of thought, desire, emotion and will. Many hymns address the mind directly, in the second person, scolding, pleading with and instructing it. The mind is restless and runs in all directions; it is ensnared by māyā, the world of attachment and illusion; it is driven by the five “thieves” or vices — lust (kām), anger (krodh), greed (lobh), attachment (moh) and pride (ahaṅkār). Yet the mind is also the place where the change happens. The Japjī declares that to conquer the mind is to conquer the world (man jītai jag jīt, stanza 28), and a hymn of Guru Amar Dās tells the mind that it is “an embodiment of the divine light” and bids it recognise its own origin (Guru Granth Sāhib, p. 441).

This double view of the mind — as the root of bondage and as itself divine in origin — recalls the Upaniṣadic saying that the mind is the cause of both bondage and liberation, and the Yogācāra and Kashmir Śaiva teachings that consciousness is obscured but not destroyed by its defilements. The Sikh view is, however, distinct in one respect. The mind is not to be stilled or dissolved into a witness-consciousness; it is to be turned around, from facing itself to facing the Guru. The Gurus describe the two orientations with a pair of terms. The manmukh, “one whose face is towards the mind”, follows his own will; the gurmukh, “one whose face is towards the Guru”, lives by the Guru’s word (sabad).

8.5.3 Haumai

The fundamental disorder of the manmukh is haumai, a compound of two forms of the first-person pronoun, “I” and “me”. It is usually translated “ego” or “self-centredness”, and McLeod defines it as the self-assertion that binds a person to the round of birth and death because it sets the individual against the divine order (McLeod 1968). It is not a belief that can be refuted, nor a single emotion, but a pervasive orientation. In a famous ślok of the Āsā kī Vār Guru Nānak lists the acts of a human life — coming and going, being born and dying, giving and taking, earning and losing, speaking truth and falsehood — and says of each that it is done “in haumai”. A second ślok, by Guru Aṅgad, adds that haumai is a chronic disease but that its remedy also lies within it (Guru Granth Sāhib, p. 466): the same self that is turned in on itself can be turned towards God.

The diagnosis has a structural similarity to the Buddhist analysis of craving and of the conceit “I am” (Chapter 5), and to the Sāṃkhya and Yoga accounts of the “I-maker” and the affliction of “I-am-ness” (asmitā, Chapter 3). The difference lies in the cure. For the Buddhist the conceit “I am” is uprooted by insight into the impersonal flow of events; for Yoga the seer is discriminated from the seen. For the Gurus haumai is overcome by recognising the divine order and the divine name, through the Guru’s word and by grace. The self is not shown to be unreal; it is reoriented.

8.5.4 Hukam, Grace and the Limits of Effort

The Japjī, Guru Nānak’s composition that opens the scripture and is recited daily, begins by examining the means by which a person might hope to become “true”. Its first stanza rejects them one by one. Cleansing (or thinking) a hundred thousand times does not achieve what is sought — the key word, soch, is read either as “purity” or as “thought”, and the ambiguity has generated much commentary — nor does keeping silence bring inner silence, nor do the riches of the worlds satisfy hunger, nor will any amount of cleverness go along with one at the end. The stanza ends with the answer: to walk in the divine will or order (hukam). The second stanza adds that everything is within the hukam, and that “one who understands the hukam”, in Nānak’s words, “does not speak in haumai”.

The psychological point is subtle. Effort — ritual, ascetic, intellectual — cannot by itself overcome self-centredness, because effort undertaken by the self tends to strengthen the self. The fourth stanza of the Japjī adds that “by deeds one obtains the garment” of a body, “but by grace (nadar) the door of liberation”. Grace does not, however, make effort pointless. The Sikh tradition holds the two together, much as Sufi writers held together the station acquired by effort and the state given by grace.

8.5.5 The Five Realms

Stanzas 34–37 of the Japjī describe a sequence of five “realms” (khaṇḍ), which later Sikh writers and modern scholars have read as stages of spiritual growth.

  1. The realm of duty (dharam khaṇḍ): the earth, set amid the seasons and the elements as a place of moral action, where each is judged by deeds.

  2. The realm of knowledge (giān khaṇḍ): the dawning awareness of the vastness of creation, its countless worlds, gods and teachers, which humbles the self.

  3. The realm of saram: translated by McLeod as “effort”, by others as “beauty” or “spiritual endeavour”. Here, the stanza says, the mind, intellect and understanding are fashioned anew.

  4. The realm of grace (karam khaṇḍ): karam here is the Persian word for grace, not the Sanskrit karma. It is the realm of power and of those filled with the divine.

  5. The realm of truth (sach khaṇḍ): the dwelling of the Formless One, which the stanza says is “hard as iron” to describe.

The interpretation of the third realm illustrates the problem of translation noted above. Read as “effort”, it makes the sequence a progression from moral action and knowledge through discipline to grace; read as “beauty”, it makes the transformation of the mind an aesthetic and devotional event. Either way the sequence moves from outward action to the reshaping of the mind itself, and ends in a condition that cannot be described.

8.5.6 Nām Simran, Sahaj and the Householder’s Life

The discipline that overcomes haumai is nām simran, “remembrance of the name”. Nām is not simply a word for God but, in McLeod’s analysis, the whole of the divine self-expression in creation; to remember it is to bring the mind into accord with the order that runs through everything. The practice ranges from the repetition of a divine name such as Vāhigurū to the singing of the scripture in congregation (kīrtan) and to a continuous inward awareness. It is related to the smaraṇa of the bhakti poets and to the Sufi dhikr (Section 8.4.4), and the scripture itself includes the verses of Kabīr, Nāmdev and Bābā Farīd. The Sikh tradition nevertheless insists that the Gurus’ teaching is a revelation in its own right, not a combination of others (Volume 24).

The fruit of the discipline is sahaj, a word inherited from the Nāth and Sant traditions and meaning “natural” or “spontaneous”. In the Guru Granth Sāhib it names a state of equipoise in which the turmoil of the mind has ceased and the person lives in harmony with the divine order. McLeod treats it as the ultimate condition of the Sikh path, beyond adequate description (McLeod 1968). It is attained in the midst of ordinary life. The Gurus rejected the renunciation of the yogi (Volume 5) and of the ascetic orders: the householder who earns an honest living (kirat karnī) and shares with others (vaṇḍ chhakṇā) is the model, and the mind is to be disciplined within family and work, not by leaving them.

8.5.7 Sevā, Saṅgat and Chaṛhdī Kalā

Sikh psychology is also a social psychology. Selfless service (sevā) — cooking and serving in the community kitchen (laṅgar), cleaning the shoes of the congregation, tending the gurdwara — is understood not only as charity but as a direct discipline against haumai, since it is done without reward and often in humble roles. The congregation (saṅgat) is the place where the mind is shaped by the company of the faithful and by the singing of the scripture; the Sufi insistence on companionship (ṣuḥbat) offers an obvious parallel. The daily congregational prayer (Ardās) ends with a petition for “rising spirits” (chaṛhdī kalā) and for the welfare of all. The ideal of chaṛhdī kalā — an undefeated, optimistic resilience grounded in trust in the divine will — is associated in Sikh memory with the persecutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and is often cited by Sikhs today as a resource for facing adversity.

The scripture’s teaching on the mind is addressed to all human beings, and Guru Nānak’s verse asking why woman should be called inferior, when kings are born of her (Āsā kī Vār, Guru Granth Sāhib, p. 473), is often cited as evidence of its egalitarian intent. Nikky-Guninder Kaur Singh has drawn attention to the feminine imagery of the divine and of the soul in the scripture (Singh 1993). Doris Jakobsh has shown, however, that Sikh social practice did not always follow the scripture, and that the place of women in Sikh history was reshaped in the colonial period (Jakobsh 2003). As in the other traditions surveyed in this volume, the psychology of the texts and the social history of their communities must be distinguished.

8.6 Comparing the Vocabularies

Table 8.3 sets the Sufi and Sikh accounts beside three of the Indian accounts discussed in earlier chapters. The table simplifies traditions that are internally diverse, and its columns name analogous roles, not equivalent concepts.

Table 8.3. What obscures the self, where change takes place, and how: five accounts compared (simplified).
Tradition The disorder Locus of change Main practice Goal
Yoga (Ch. 3) ignorance and the afflictions (kleśa) citta and its fluctuations practice and dispassion; the eight limbs isolation of the seer (kaivalya)
Advaita (Ch. 4) superimposition (adhyāsa) the inner instrument hearing, reflection, contemplation knowledge of identity with brahman
Abhidharma (Ch. 5) craving, ignorance, latent tendencies citta and mental factors calm and insight nibbāna
Sufism the self that commands to evil the heart and the subtle centres dhikr, watchfulness, companionship with a master passing away and abiding in God; the self at peace
Sikh teaching haumai and the five vices man, turned from manmukh to gurmukh nām simran, sevā, saṅgat sahaj, union by grace in the householder’s life

Three contrasts stand out. First, the Islamic and Sikh traditions locate the decisive transformation in the heart or the whole inner person rather than in a cognitive faculty, and treat emotion — love, longing, fear, hope — as the material of the path rather than as an obstacle to be quietened. In this they are closer to the bhakti traditions (Chapter 4) than to classical Yoga or Advaita. Secondly, both give grace a place that the classical Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Abhidharma accounts do not, while still demanding sustained effort. Thirdly, both insist on the life of the community — the religious law and the Sufi hospice in one case, the congregation, kitchen and household in the other — as the setting of inner change. None of these contrasts is absolute. Devotional Vedānta gives grace a central place, the Buddhist and Jain monastic orders are communities of practice, and Sufis were among the most austere renouncers of medieval India.

8.7 Assessment

Indo-Islamic and Sikh thought about the mind has often been left out of histories of Indian psychology, either because it was not written in Sanskrit or because it was assumed to be derivative. Neither reason holds. The Persian and Arabic literature of India includes what is often called the oldest Persian treatise on Sufism, an influential Persian ethics of the soul, the Mujaddidī psychology of subtle centres and Shāh Walī Allāh’s theory of human nature and society. The Sikh scripture contains a sustained and original analysis of self-centredness and its cure. These works deserve to be read alongside the Upaniṣads, the Yogasūtra and the Abhidharma, with the same attention to their own categories and the same caution about easy equivalences. The Indian traditions of the mind were, from the eleventh century at least, multilingual and multi-religious, and their meetings — in Dārā Shukōh’s comparisons, in the Sufi romances, in the shared vocabulary of the Sant poets and the Gurus — are part of their history.

Further Reading

  • Schimmel (1975): the standard introduction to Sufi thought and practice, with much on the Indian masters; Schimmel (1980) surveys Islam in the subcontinent.

  • al-Hujwīrī (1911): the Kashf al-Maḥjūb in R. A. Nicholson’s English translation.

  • Sijzī (1992): the conversations of Niẓām al-Dīn Awliyāʾ, translated by Bruce Lawrence; Ernst and Lawrence (2002) on the Chishtī order.

  • Friedmann (1971) and Buehler (1998): Sirhindī’s thought and the Mujaddidī method of guidance.

  • Walī Allāh (1996): Marcia Hermansen’s translation of the Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bāligha, with an introduction to Walī Allāh’s psychology.

  • Ṭūsī (1964) and Alam (2004): Ṭūsī’s ethics and its place in Mughal India.

  • McLeod (1968), Shackle and Mandair (2005) and Mandair (2013): Guru Nānak’s thought, the Sikh scriptures in translation, and the problems of translating Sikh concepts.