Skip to content

Chapter 1: Introduction: Samanvaya and the Comparative Study of Indian Traditions

indram mitraṃ varuṇam agnim āhur atho divyaḥ sa suparṇo garutmān
ekaṃ sad viprā bahudhā vadanty agniṃ yamaṃ mātariśvānam āhuḥ
They call it Indra, Mitra, Varuṇa and Agni, and it is the heavenly, well-winged Garutmant. What is one, the inspired poets speak of in many ways; they call it Agni, Yama, Mātariśvan.
— Ṛgveda 1.164.46

1.1 A Volume of a Different Kind

The twenty-three volumes that precede this one each take a field of knowledge and follow it through its texts, practitioners and institutions: the Vedic corpus, the Upaniṣads, the philosophical schools, the Buddhist and Jain traditions, yoga, tantra, the epics and Purāṇas, literature, music and theatre, language, mathematics, astronomy, medicine, chemistry, agriculture, architecture, crafts, law and polity, trade, warfare, geography, psychology and education, and the knowledge of tribal and folk communities. This last volume does not add another field. It asks three questions that cut across all of them.

The first is a question of comparison within India. Hindu, Buddhist and Jain thinkers, and later Muslim, Sikh and Christian ones, lived side by side for centuries, argued with one another, borrowed one another’s vocabulary and frequently used the same words — dharma, karma, mokṣa, loka — in quite different senses. What, precisely, did they share, and where did they disagree?

The second is a question of encounter. From the Persian translations commissioned at the Mughal court to the Sanskrit scholarship of British administrators, from the Hindu reform societies of nineteenth-century Bengal to the international reception of Gandhi, Indian ideas have been compared with those of other civilisations, by Indians and by outsiders, for purposes that were rarely neutral. How did that history shape the way Indian traditions are described today, including in this series?

The third is a question of synthesis. The Sanskrit word in the title, samanvaya, is often translated “synthesis” or “harmony”, and it has become a watchword of modern Indian self-description. This chapter examines what the word meant in the tradition that coined it, how its meaning shifted in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and what kind of synthesis an honest book can attempt.

1.2 What Samanvaya Meant

1.2.1 The Brahmasūtra and its commentators

The word samanvaya is formed from the verbal root i (“go”) with the prefixes anu (“after, along”) and sam (“together”). Its ordinary sense is “connection” or “coherence”: things that “go along together”. Its most influential technical use is in the fourth aphorism of the Brahmasūtra attributed to Bādarāyaṇa, a text usually placed in the early centuries CE:

Brahmasūtra 1.1.4

tat tu samanvayāt
But that [Brahman is known from the Upaniṣads], because of their coherent connection [with it].

The Brahmasūtra is a terse summary of the teaching of the Upaniṣads, written in the hermeneutical idiom of the Mīmāṃsā school of Vedic exegesis. Its first four aphorisms state the subject (inquiry into Brahman), define Brahman as the source of the world, name scripture as the means of knowing it, and then, in this fourth aphorism, answer an objection. The objection, raised from the Mīmāṃsā side, was that the Veda is a body of injunctions to act, so that statements about an already existing reality such as Brahman could have no independent purpose. The reply is that the Upaniṣadic statements, read together, have Brahman as their purport. Śaṅkara (c. 700–750 CE; traditional dates 788–820), in the commentary that became the foundation of Advaita Vedānta, explains samanvaya as the agreement of all the Upaniṣadic passages in conveying one meaning, Brahman, as their true intent (tātparya) (Potter 1981). Later Vedāntins listed formal marks by which the intended purport of a passage can be recognised — the agreement of its opening and close, repetition, novelty, stated result, praise and supporting reasoning — techniques borrowed directly from Mīmāṃsā.

Two points about this classical sense are worth keeping in mind. First, samanvaya in the Brahmasūtra is a principle for reading one body of texts, the Upaniṣads, as internally coherent. It is not a theory of the harmony of different religions or philosophies. Second, the Vedāntic commentators did not agree on what that coherent meaning was. Rāmānuja (traditionally 1017–1137) and Madhva (c. 1238–1317; traditional dates 1199–1278) commented on the same aphorism and found in the same texts a qualified non-dualism and a strict dualism respectively. The “harmony” of the texts was the conclusion of an argument, and the argument was contested.

1.2.2 Doxography: placing the other schools

Indian thinkers also developed a second practice that resembles what is now called comparative philosophy: the doxography, a survey of the schools of thought arranged from a particular point of view. The Jain scholar Haribhadra (c. 8th century) wrote a brief Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya (“Compendium of the Six Systems”) presenting Buddhist, Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, Jain, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā views with notable fairness. The fourteenth-century Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha of Mādhava (Vidyāraṇya), from the Advaita side, arranges sixteen systems — beginning with the materialist Cārvāka and passing through the Buddhist, Jain, Vaiṣṇava, Śaiva, alchemical, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, grammarians’, Sāṃkhya and Yoga positions — in an order that leads towards Advaita, which the author treats as the culmination (Mādhava 1882). Such works were serious and informative, but they were not neutral: each school was given a place in a hierarchy defined by the author’s own position.

1.2.3 The modern sense

In the nineteenth century the word acquired a new life. Followers of Rāmakṛṣṇa (1836–1886) spoke of his sarvadharma-samanvaya, the “harmony of all religions”, on the strength of his reported practice of Vaiṣṇava, Śākta, Advaita, Islamic and Christian disciplines. Vivekananda gave the idea philosophical form and international reach (Chapter 10), and Radhakrishnan made it a central theme of his presentation of Hinduism to the West (Chapter 9). In this modern sense samanvaya means that the world’s religions are different paths to the same goal, and that Vedānta, being the most universal of them, can recognise the truth in all.

This modern idea has had a large and often beneficent influence, and Chapters 9–13 examine it with sympathy. But it is important to see that it is a modern position, with identifiable authors and arguments, and that it is open to objection. It is not the meaning of samanvaya in the Brahmasūtra; it was not shared by the classical Buddhist, Jain, Mīmāṃsā or Nyāya thinkers, who argued that their opponents were wrong; and it is not accepted by most Muslims, Sikhs, Christians or Ambedkarite Buddhists today, who do not regard their own traditions as partial approximations to Vedānta.

1.3 Argument as an Indian Tradition

Long before modern comparative philosophy, Indian intellectual life was organised around argument between rival positions. A classical Sanskrit treatise typically states the view of an opponent (pūrvapakṣa), refutes it, and only then establishes its own conclusion (siddhānta). The opponent’s view was often presented with care and at length, because a refutation of a weak version would convince no one. Commentaries on commentaries continued the debate across centuries, so that a sixteenth-century Navya-Nyāya text may respond to a Buddhist argument of the seventh century through a chain of intermediate replies.

The Nyāya school analysed debate itself. The Nyāyasūtra (perhaps 2nd century CE in its present form) distinguishes three kinds of discussion: vāda, an honest inquiry in which both parties seek the truth; jalpa, a contest in which each side seeks victory and may use sharp tactics; and vitaṇḍā, destructive criticism that attacks the opponent’s position without defending one of its own. It catalogues fallacious reasons and “points of defeat” at which a disputant may be judged to have lost. Buddhist logicians from Dignāga (c. 5th–6th century) and Dharmakīrti (c. 7th century) onward developed their own rules of debate, and Tibetan monastic education still trains monks through formal disputation derived from them (Matilal 1971; Ganeri 2001).

Debates were also public events. Buddhist and Jain narratives, royal inscriptions and later hagiographies describe disputations at royal courts, in which the defeated party might be required to convert or leave the kingdom; the stories are often partisan, but the institution was real. The sixth-century Tamil Buddhist epic Maṇimēkalai sends its heroine to hear in turn the exponents of the different systems of her day before she adopts the Buddhist teaching — a narrative doxography. In the Mughal period, Akbar’s “house of worship” staged debates among Muslims of different schools, Brahmins, Jains, Zoroastrians and Jesuits (Chapter 16). Amartya Sen has drawn attention to this “argumentative” tradition as a resource for modern Indian democracy, and to the heterodox and sceptical voices it preserved (Sen 2005).

Two features of this tradition matter for the present volume. First, comparison in classical India was usually adversarial: one studied another school in order to refute it, or to place it below one’s own. Second, the tradition preserved its opponents. The Cārvāka materialists are known almost entirely from the summaries of their adversaries; much of what we know of early Buddhist logic comes from Brahmanical and Jain refutations. A tradition of argument is a tradition of disagreement, and its value lies precisely there.

1.4 Whose Knowledge?

“Indian knowledge” is not only Sanskrit knowledge. The traditions surveyed in this series were carried in many languages: Sanskrit, the Prakrits and Pali; Tamil, whose classical literature is among the oldest in India and independent of Sanskrit in its conventions; Persian, the language of administration and high culture in much of India for six centuries; Arabic, the language of Islamic learning; and the regional languages — Kannada, Telugu, Malayalam, Marathi, Bengali, Hindi, Punjabi, Gujarati, Odia, Assamese and others — in which devotional poetry, chronicles, technical manuals and law were written from the late first millennium onward. Volume 10 discusses the languages and scripts of India and Volume 8 their literatures.

Much knowledge, moreover, was never written down by those who held it. The skills of potters, weavers, metalworkers, boat-builders, healers, midwives, farmers and herders were transmitted orally and by practice, often within castes or families, and are known mainly through the observations of others (Volumes 15, 17 and 23). Women’s knowledge — of food, medicine, ritual, song and household economy — was rarely recorded in the classical texts. Any account of “Indian knowledge” based on Sanskrit treatises alone will therefore give the views of a learned, mainly Brahmin, male elite, and present them as the views of a civilisation. The chapters that follow try to keep this limitation in mind, and to give space to the voices that the classical texts leave out.

1.5 Inclusivism and Its Limits

The German Indologist Paul Hacker introduced the term “inclusivism” for a characteristic way in which Indian traditions dealt with rivals: by claiming that the rival’s central teaching is already contained, as a lower or partial truth, within one’s own (Hacker 1995; Halbfass 1988). A classic statement is in the Bhagavadgītā:

Bhagavadgītā 9.23

ye ’py anyadevatābhaktā yajante śraddhayānvitāḥ
te ’pi mām eva kaunteya yajanty avidhipūrvakam

Even those who are devoted to other gods and worship them with faith, son of Kuntī, worship me alone, though not according to the proper rule.

Inclusivism is generous compared with outright rejection, and it allowed many traditions to coexist. But it is not the same as recognising another tradition on its own terms. The worshippers of “other gods” in the Gītā are not asked whether they agree that they are really worshipping Kṛṣṇa. When the Buddha was absorbed into Vaiṣṇava theology as the ninth avatāra of Viṣṇu — in some Purāṇic accounts, an incarnation sent to mislead the wicked — Buddhists did not experience this as recognition. Buddhists and Jains had inclusivisms of their own: Jain authors retold the Rāmāyaṇa and the Kṛṣṇa story with the heroes as Jain laymen, and Buddhist texts present Brahmā and Indra as devotees of the Buddha.

Halbfass, whose India and Europe remains the best study of the subject, argued that the modern Hindu claim to a uniquely tolerant universalism was itself shaped by the encounter with Europe, and that its inclusivism could be as hierarchical as the European universalism it opposed (Halbfass 1988). This book therefore uses “synthesis” in a more modest sense. It sets traditions side by side, describes what they share, and states plainly where they differ. Where a modern thinker has argued that different traditions point to one truth, the argument is reported as that thinker’s argument. It is not adopted as the neutral standpoint of the book.

1.6 Naming the Traditions

Comparison begins with names, and the names used for Indian traditions have their own history. The word “Hindu” derives from the Persian form of the name of the river Indus (Sanskrit Sindhu); in Old Persian inscriptions of the Achaemenid kings it named a province, and for centuries Persian and Arabic writers used it for the people and land beyond the Indus, without distinction of religion. Al-Bīrūnī’s India (c. 1030) describes the beliefs of “the Hindus” as a learned outsider (Chapter 8). From about the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the word appears in Indian-language texts and inscriptions, sometimes in contrast to “Turk” or “Musalmān” — the poet Kabīr mocks the pretensions of both Hindu and Turk — and it gradually came to name a religious as well as a geographical community. The abstract noun “Hinduism” is an English coinage of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; Rammohun Roy used the form “Hindooism” in 1816. Whether the term names a single religion, a family of related traditions, or a category created by outsiders and colonial administrators has been debated at length. David Lorenzen has argued that a recognisable Hindu religious identity existed well before colonial rule, in contrast to scholars who stress its colonial construction; both sides agree that the boundaries of the category were sharpened by the census and by colonial law (Lorenzen 1999; King 1999).

The other names have histories too. “Buddhism” and “Jainism” are European terms for traditions whose followers spoke of the teaching (dharma, dhamma, śāsana) of the Buddha or of the Jina, and of themselves as followers (bauddha, jaina) or as hearers and lay people. “Sikh” means “disciple”. Islam names itself, but Indian Muslims were described in Sanskrit texts by ethnic terms such as yavana, turuṣka and mleccha before the religious category was adopted. Wilfred Cantwell Smith argued that the very concept of “a religion” as a bounded system of beliefs is a modern Western one, and that it distorts the traditions to which it is applied (Smith 1963). This volume uses the conventional names because there are no better ones, but it treats them as labels for overlapping and changing communities, not as essences.

The same caution applies to “philosophy”. Indian writers spoke of ānvīkṣikī (“investigation”), of darśana (“view”), of tarka (“reasoning”) and of mata (“doctrine”), and none of these maps exactly onto the European word. Wilhelm Halbfass showed how the modern equation of darśana with “philosophy” was itself a product of the colonial encounter, adopted by Indian scholars partly to claim for their tradition the prestige of European philosophy (Halbfass 1988). The equation is useful; it is also a translation, and like every translation it gains and loses.

1.7 Key Concepts Across Traditions

Many of the comparisons in this volume concern a small number of questions that the traditions answered in the same or similar words but with different meanings. Table 1.1 sets out some of the answers in simplified form, as a guide to the chapters that follow. It includes Islam and Christianity, whose long history in India is part of the subject of this volume, and it separates Advaita from the theistic Vedāntas, which differ on the very questions listed. Each cell compresses long internal debates, and every tradition contained dissenting voices.

Table 1.1. Some key questions and the answers of major traditions in India (simplified)
Tradition Scripture God Self After death Final goal Caste
Advaita Vedānta Veda as revelation Brahman without attributes; a personal God real only empirically identical with Brahman rebirth by karma knowledge of identity, possible in life sanctioned by the law-books
Theistic Vedānta Veda, Gītā, devotional canons a personal God, Viṣṇu or Śiva many selves, dependent on God rebirth; karma dispensed by God communion with God through devotion and grace sanctioned by the law-books; denied by devotional critics
Buddhist the Buddha’s word; Veda rejected no creator no permanent self rebirth by intentional action nirvāṇa rejected as a measure of worth
Jain the Jinas’ teaching; Veda rejected no creator innumerable eternal souls rebirth; karma as fine matter the soul, freed of karma, rises to the top of the universe rejected in principle; persisted socially
Sikh Guru Granth Sahib one formless Creator soul longing for God rebirth, overcome by grace and the divine name union with God within worldly life rejected in principle; persisted socially
Islam Qurʾān and the Prophet’s practice one God, the Creator a created soul one life; resurrection and judgement paradise, by God’s mercy none in law; social hierarchy persisted
Christian Bible one God, the Creator; the Trinity a created soul one life; resurrection and judgement salvation by grace none in doctrine; persisted in some churches

The table shows that “Indian religions” do not share a single set of answers, even where they share a vocabulary, and that the line between traditions of Indian and of west Asian origin is not the only one that matters: on the self, Advaita stands as far from Rāmānuja as Rāmānuja stands from Islam.

1.8 How Indian Texts Were Made and Transmitted

Comparison depends on texts, and Indian texts were made and transmitted in distinctive ways that affect how they should be read. The oldest, the Vedic hymns, were composed and transmitted orally for many centuries before they were written down; the elaborate methods of recitation that preserved them — reciting each word separately, in pairs, and in more complex patterns — are justly famous, and Vedic chanting was inscribed by UNESCO in 2008 on its list of the intangible heritage of humanity (Volume 1). Brahmanical tradition distinguished “what was heard” (śruti), the eternal Veda, from “what is remembered” (smṛti), the law-books, epics and Purāṇas, composed by human authors and authoritative only so far as they agreed with the Veda. Buddhists and Jains had their own canons, transmitted orally and later written down, and their own controversies about which texts were authentic.

Much intellectual work took the form of commentary. A terse root text (sūtra or kārikā) was explained by a commentary (bhāṣya), which was in turn explained by sub-commentaries; new ideas were often presented as the correct interpretation of old texts. This makes Indian intellectual history look more conservative than it was: innovation was dressed as exegesis. Texts circulated in manuscripts copied by hand on palm leaf, birch bark and later paper, and every copy could introduce variants; the epics and Purāṇas in particular exist in many versions, and the “critical editions” prepared in the twentieth century (Chapter 8) reconstruct the oldest recoverable form rather than a single original. Authorship was often attributed to legendary sages, and dating is frequently uncertain within centuries. All these features call for caution when a verse is quoted, a date given or an idea assigned to “the tradition”.

1.9 Three Further Temptations

Comparative writing about India has repeatedly fallen into three other traps. Naming them at the outset will help the reader see why so many popular claims are not repeated in this volume.

1.9.1 Presentism and priority claims

The first is presentism: reading ancient texts as though their authors were answering modern questions. Its commonest form is the priority claim, that some modern scientific discovery was “anticipated” in the Veda, the Purāṇas or the Jain canon. Claims of this kind appear in popular writing about quantum mechanics, cosmology, evolution, genetics and computing. They usually rest on a coincidence of numbers (the length of a kalpa and the age of the Earth), a loose verbal parallel (Purāṇic “many universes” and the physicists’ multiverse), or a misattributed quotation. Chapters 2, 3 and 19 examine several such claims in detail. The principle adopted throughout is simple: a comparison between an Indian idea and a modern one is retained only when it is framed as an analogy drawn by a modern writer who can be named, and never as evidence that the ancient author knew the modern result.

This is not a matter of modesty imposed from outside. The real achievements of Indian science — the place-value numerals and the arithmetic of zero, the Kerala series for the sine and for \(\pi\), the grammar of Pāṇini, the surgical and pharmacological knowledge of the medical classics — are described in Volumes 10–14 of this series, and they need no inflation. Inflated claims damage them, because a reader who discovers that one claim is false is entitled to doubt the rest.

1.9.2 The spiritual East and the material West

The second trap is essentialism: the idea that civilisations have fixed characters, so that “India” is spiritual, contemplative and holistic while “the West” is material, analytical and fragmented. The idea has a history. It was elaborated by European Romantics who wanted an alternative to their own industrial society, adopted by Indian reformers who wanted to answer colonial claims of superiority, and repeated in countless books on both sides (Chapter 8). It flatters both parties and is false to both. India produced the materialism of the Cārvākas, a vast technical literature on statecraft, economics, erotics, metallurgy and medicine, and rigorous traditions of logic and grammar; Europe produced Plotinus, Eckhart and the Romantics. Amartya Sen’s The Argumentative Indian is a useful corrective to the stereotype from within (Sen 2005).

1.9.3 The silent majority

The third trap is to let the most articulate voices stand for the whole. Most of the surviving texts on dharma, cosmology and liberation were written by men of the literate upper castes, and the institutions that preserved them often excluded women and lower castes from learning. To speak of “the Indian view” of dharma on the basis of those texts alone is to forget the people they ruled out. The chapters that follow therefore give room to the critics of caste — Buddhist, Jain, Vīraśaiva, sant, Sikh, and modern thinkers such as Jotirao Phule and B. R. Ambedkar — and to the Muslim, Sikh and Christian communities whose history in India runs for many centuries. They are presented as participants in Indian intellectual history, not as appendices to it.

1.10 Comparison as a Discipline

The modern academic comparison of religions and philosophies took shape in the second half of the nineteenth century, and India was central to it. Max Müller, who edited the Ṛgveda and the Sacred Books of the East (Chapter 8), argued in his Introduction to the Science of Religion (1873) that religion could be studied comparatively, as language was, and adapted Goethe’s remark about languages to religion: he who knows only one knows none. The “science of religion” that he and others founded assumed that the religions of the world could be arranged in a developmental sequence, from nature-worship to ethical monotheism, and that the oldest Indian texts gave privileged access to the early stages. Both assumptions have been abandoned; the comparative method has survived.

Twentieth-century scholars refined it. The phenomenologists of religion, such as Gerardus van der Leeuw and Mircea Eliade, compared “sacred” phenomena across cultures, sometimes at the cost of detaching them from history. Wilfred Cantwell Smith questioned whether “religions” exist as bounded systems at all (Smith 1963). Jonathan Z. Smith argued that every comparison is an act of the scholar’s imagination, made for a purpose, and that the comparer must say what is being compared, in what respect and why (Smith 1982). In philosophy, the East–West conferences and journals described in Chapter 8 sought to set Indian, Chinese and Western thinkers in dialogue; their successors, under the names of “comparative”, “cross-cultural” or “global” philosophy, have increasingly preferred to compare specific arguments rather than whole civilisations (Ganeri 2001).

India’s own traditions offer a complementary model. The doxographies and debate manuals discussed above compared schools by setting out their positions on the same questions — the means of knowledge, the nature of the self, the existence of God — and examining the arguments for each. This volume borrows from both models. It compares positions on shared questions, it names its comparisons and their purpose, and it tries to keep historical connection distinct from structural resemblance.

1.11 How the Comparisons Are Made

The method of this volume can be summarised in a few rules.

  1. Compare like with like. A Purāṇic description of the cosmos is compared with a Buddhist or Jain one, not with modern astrophysics, which answers different questions with different methods.

  2. Name the speaker. “Indian thought holds…” is replaced, wherever possible, by “the Vaiśeṣika school holds…” or “Śaṅkara argues…”. Where a view was disputed, the dispute is described.

  3. Date the source. Ideas changed. The dharma of the Ṛgveda is not that of the Manusmṛti, still less that of Gandhi. Dates follow the series standard: the academic range is given first and traditional dates are labelled.

  4. Quote only what can be checked. Verses and modern quotations are given only when the wording and the reference could be confirmed. Many passages that circulate in popular books fail this test.

  5. Report the scholarship. Where historians and philosophers have argued about a question — the origins of caste, the meaning of nirvāṇa, the influence of the Kerala school — the main positions are summarised and their authors cited.

The philosophers B. K. Matilal and Jonardon Ganeri have shown that classical Indian arguments can be studied with the same analytical seriousness as Greek or European ones, without either assimilating them to modern Western categories or treating them as exotic (Matilal 1986; Ganeri 2001). That is the spirit in which the comparisons here are attempted. The rules are not repeated in the chapters that follow; their practical counterpart, a short guide to checking a claim, closes the volume (Section 22.13).

1.12 A First Example: The Self

An example shows what this method yields. The question “what is the self?” was debated by every Indian school. The early Upaniṣads sought the self (ātman) as the inner reality of the person; Advaitins identified it with Brahman, theistic Vedāntins counted many selves dependent on God, Sāṃkhya many inactive witnesses, Nyāya many substances in which consciousness is only a passing quality; the Buddha taught that no permanent self is to be found (anātman), and the Jains that there are innumerable souls the size of their bodies. The same word and the same question did not produce a common answer; the disagreements were argued with care over many centuries; and the comparison with modern philosophy is fruitful not because the classical thinkers anticipated modern views but because they reasoned about problems that remain open. Chapter 4 sets out this debate, and the debate about the means of knowledge on which it depended, in full.

1.13 What This Volume Does Not Claim

Because the subject is contested, it may help to state plainly some claims that this volume does not make.

  • It does not claim that all Indian religions teach the same thing, or that they are all paths to the same goal. Some Indian thinkers held that view; many did not, and their disagreement is part of the history.

  • It does not claim that Indian traditions are “spiritual” and Western ones “material”. Both kinds of civilisation produced mystics and materialists, metaphysicians and engineers.

  • It does not claim that ancient Indian texts anticipated modern science. Indian scholars made real discoveries in mathematics, astronomy, medicine and linguistics, which are described as they were, not as premature versions of later science.

  • It does not claim that Indian traditions were uniquely tolerant or uniquely oppressive. They contained resources for both, and the record shows both.

  • It does not claim that colonial scholarship was simply an instrument of domination, or that it was simply disinterested science. It was both, in proportions that varied from scholar to scholar.

  • It does not treat any single tradition — Vedānta, Buddhism, Islam, the Constitution — as the standard by which the others are judged. Where it makes judgements, they are judgements about evidence and argument.

These disclaimers are not a refusal to judge. The chapters that follow make many judgements: that a verse is spurious, a date mistaken, a comparison misleading, an argument strong. They try to make them on grounds that readers of any tradition can inspect.

1.14 This Volume and the Series

Because this volume draws on the whole series, it does not repeat the detailed treatment of any subject. Table 1.2 lists the volumes of Bhāratīya Jñāna Paramparā; cross-references in the chapters that follow point to them.

Table 1.2. The volumes of Bhāratīya Jñāna Paramparā
Vol. Title Where it bears on this volume
1 Veda Prakāśa: The Vedic Corpus ṛta, early cosmogonies (Ch. 2, 7)
2 Upaniṣad Dīpikā: The Upaniṣads ātman, brahman, karma (Ch. 6, 9)
3 Darśana Darpaṇa: Schools of Indian Philosophy the schools and their debates (Ch. 9, 15)
4 Buddha–Jina Prabhā: Buddhist and Jain Traditions cosmology, ethics, decline and revival (Ch. 3, 18)
5 Yoga Taraṅgiṇī: Yoga Traditions classical and modern yoga (Ch. 20)
6 Tantra–Āgama: Tantric and Āgamic Traditions Śaiva cosmology and the subtle body (Ch. 2)
7 Itihāsa–Purāṇa: Epics and Purāṇas Purāṇic cosmography, yuga theory (Ch. 2, 5)
8 Kāvya Kalpalatā: Literature and Poetics rasa, bhakti and sant poetry (Ch. 16, 21)
9 Saṅgīta–Nāṭya: Music, Theatre and Dance music and dance abroad (Ch. 21)
10 Śabda Vidyā: Language, Grammar and Scripts Pāṇini and formal grammar (Ch. 19)
11 Gaṇita: Mathematics numerals, zero, Kerala series (Ch. 19)
12 Khagola Jyotiṣa: Astronomy astronomical time-reckoning (Ch. 2)
13 Āyurveda: Medicine and Healing Traditions Āyurveda today (Ch. 20)
14 Rasāyana: Chemistry and Metallurgy metals in medicine and their dangers (Ch. 20)
15 Kṛṣi and Jīva Vijñāna: Agriculture, Plants and Animals sacred groves, ecology (Ch. 21)
16 Vāstu–Śilpa: Architecture and Sculpture temple, cosmos and image (Ch. 21)
17 Śilpa–Kāru: Crafts and Textiles craft knowledge and caste (Ch. 5)
18 Rājanīti and Dharmaśāstra: Polity and Law dharma, varṇa, law (Ch. 5, 12, 17)
19 Vāṇijya and Samudra: Economy, Trade and Seafaring routes of transmission (Ch. 16, 21)
20 Yuddha and Dhanurveda: Military Traditions ethics of war and non-violence (Ch. 7)
21 Bhūgola: Geography and Travel cosmography and travellers’ accounts (Ch. 2, 8)
22 Manas and Śikṣā: Psychology and Education psychology and education (Ch. 20, 22)
23 Jana–Jāti: Tribal and Folk Knowledge Adivasi and folk traditions (Ch. 21, 22)
24 Samanvaya: Comparative Perspectives and Synthesis this volume

The series has gaps: there is no volume on Sikh traditions, on Indo-Islamic and Indo-Persian learning, or on Christian and Jewish communities in India. Chapter 16 of this volume gives a short account of these traditions, including Indo-Persian learning before 1800 and the modern Sikh reformers, and Chapter 17 follows modern Muslim thought in India; Chapter 14 adds the religious and political voices of Adivasi communities, whose knowledge is the subject of Volume 23. These chapters are an introduction, not a substitute for the volumes that remain to be written.

1.15 The Plan of the Book

Part I: Shared frameworks and real differences (Chapters 2–7).

Chapter 2 describes the cosmology and time-reckoning of the Purāṇas and of Vedic and philosophical sources; Chapter 3 sets beside them the very different Buddhist and Jain cosmologies and the debate about a creator. Chapter 4 compares the schools’ answers to the questions on which they argued most closely: the nature of the self and the means of knowledge. Chapter 5 follows the idea of dharma from the Ṛgveda to the Dharmaśāstras and the Buddhist and Jain usages, and gives an honest account of varṇa, caste and untouchability. Chapter 6 examines the four aims of life and the doctrines of karma and rebirth, and Chapter 7 the ideals of non-violence and truth.

Part II: Encounters (Chapters 8–18).

Chapter 8 tells the story of how India was studied and imagined by outsiders, from al-Bīrūnī to the Orientalists and their critics. Chapter 9 follows Vedānta from Śaṅkara’s synthesis to the reform movements, Neo-Vedānta and Hindu nationalism before and after 1947. Chapters 10–12 are devoted to Vivekananda, Aurobindo, and Gandhi and Ambedkar with the political thinkers who followed them. Chapter 13 turns to Tagore and to other poets, nationalists and independent thinkers, and Chapter 14 to the voices from below: the anti-caste thinkers from Phule and Iyothee Thass to Periyar, the women writers Tarabai Shinde, Pandita Ramabai and Rokeya Sakhawat Hossain, and Adivasi religious and political movements. Chapter 15 follows the academic philosophers from K. C. Bhattacharya to Matilal and Daya Krishna. Chapter 16 turns to Islam and Indo-Persian learning, Sufism, the devotional poets, Sikhism and Christianity in India, including the Singh Sabha and the modern definition of Sikh identity; Chapter 17 examines the arguments of modern Indian Muslim thinkers, from Aligarh, Deoband and Iqbal to Mawdūdī and his critics; and Chapter 18 turns to the modern history and modern thinkers of Buddhism and Jainism.

Part III: Indian knowledge in global conversation (Chapters 19–22).

Chapter 19 examines the history of comparisons between Indian thought and modern science, separating genuine history from myth. Chapter 20 treats the global careers of yoga, meditation and Āyurveda, with attention to evidence and safety. Chapter 21 considers Indian traditions in environmental thought and in the arts. Chapter 22 discusses the present “Indian Knowledge Systems” movement and the arguments of its advocates and critics, and closes the volume.

1.16 Conventions

Sanskrit, Pali and Prakrit words are given in the International Alphabet of Sanskrit Transliteration (IAST); Tamil words in the scheme used in Volume 8; Arabic and Persian words in a simplified scholarly transliteration (ʿ for ʿayn, ʾ for hamza); and modern Indian names in their usual English spelling (Vivekananda, Aurobindo, Rabindranath Tagore). Titles of works are italicised. Dates are CE unless marked BCE. Where a date is uncertain, “c.” marks an approximation and a range is given. Translations of primary texts can be checked against the standard editions and translations listed in the bibliography, among them those of the Ṛgveda, the Upaniṣads, the Mahābhārata and Bhagavadgītā, the Brahmasūtra with Śaṅkara’s commentary, Manu and the Viṣṇu Purāṇa (Jamison and Brereton 2014; Olivelle 1998, 2005; Sukthankar et al. 1933–1966; van Buitenen 1981; Thibaut 1890; Wilson 1864–1870); of the Pali discourses and the Dhammapada (Walshe 1995; Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 1995; Bodhi 2000, 2012; Norman 1997); of the Jain Ācārāṅga and Tattvārthasūtra, Nāgārjuna and Aśoka’s edicts (Jacobi 1884; Umāsvāti 1994; Nāgārjuna 1995; Hultzsch 1925); of the Tirukkuṟaḷ, the Guru Granth Sahib and the Qurʾān (Tiruvaḷḷuvar 1886; McLeod 1984; Singh 2000; Abdel Haleem 2004). Two of the epigraphs (Chapters 4 and 14) were checked against the GRETIL and SuttaCentral texts.

Further Reading

  • Halbfass (1988): the fundamental study of how India and Europe have understood each other, including Indian doxography and inclusivism.

  • Hacker (1995): essays on inclusivism, dharma and Neo-Vedānta, edited with an introduction by Wilhelm Halbfass.

  • Sen (2005): essays on Indian traditions of argument and heterodoxy.

  • Ganeri (2001) and Matilal (1986): classical Indian philosophy read as philosophy.

  • Radhakrishnan and Moore (1957) and Embree and Hay (1988): anthologies of primary sources in translation, the second extending to modern Indian thought.

  • Ganeri (2017): a guide to current scholarship on Indian philosophy.