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Chapter 15: Philosophy in the Indian Academy: From “Swaraj in Ideas” to Saṃvāda

pramāṇa-prameya-saṃśaya-prayojana-dṛṣṭānta-siddhānta-avayava-tarka-nirṇaya-vāda-jalpa-vitaṇḍā-hetvābhāsa-chala-jāti-nigrahasthānānāṃ tattvajñānān niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ
The highest good is attained from knowledge of the truth about the means of knowledge, the objects of knowledge, doubt, purpose, example, established doctrine, the members of an inference, hypothetical reasoning, ascertainment, debate, disputation, cavil, pseudo-reasons, quibbling, futile rejoinders and the grounds of defeat.
— Nyāyasūtra 1.1.1

15.1 Introduction

The modern Indian thinkers of the previous chapters were, for the most part, teachers, reformers, poets and political leaders who wrote for a wide public. Alongside them a smaller group of professional philosophers worked in the universities that colonial rule had created and that independent India greatly enlarged. Their audience was narrower and their influence less visible, but they faced the question that runs through this volume in its sharpest form. They were trained to teach Locke, Kant and Bradley in English; many of them had also been brought up in, or later sought out, the Sanskrit śāstras taught by pandits in their own way and in their own language. What would it mean to do philosophy, rather than merely to report on it, as an Indian in that situation?

The chapter follows their answers from the colonial university to the end of the twentieth century. It treats the historians who fixed the modern picture of the “six systems”, the original philosophers of the colonial period, of whom K. C. Bhattacharya is the most important, the critics who rejected Radhakrishnan’s spiritual India from the left and from the analytic side, the attempts to make pandits and professors argue with one another as equals, and the phenomenologists and analytic philosophers who carried Indian arguments into international debate. Radhakrishnan himself is discussed in Chapter 9, and the international rise of comparative philosophy, with the work of Halbfass and Matilal abroad, in Chapter 8. The classical schools themselves are the subject of Volume 3 (Darśana Darpaṇa). Nalini Bhushan and Jay Garfield’s anthology and study are indispensable for the colonial period (Bhushan and Garfield 2011; Bhushan and Garfield 2017), and A. Raghuramaraju’s Debates in Indian Philosophy stages the arguments of the modern thinkers against one another (Raghuramaraju 2006).

15.2 The Colonial University and Its Philosophers

Philosophy was taught in Indian universities from the late nineteenth century, largely as Western philosophy in English. The Indian Philosophical Congress was founded in 1925, with Tagore presiding over its first session in Calcutta. Brajendranath Seal (1864–1938) pioneered a comparative method in his studies of Vaiṣṇavism and Christianity and his The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus (1915). Radhakrishnan’s histories made Indian philosophy a subject of study (Chapter 9). Many of the philosophers of this period were idealists, influenced by Hegel and the British idealists, and found in Vedānta a congenial counterpart.

The universities of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, founded in 1857, began as examining bodies on the model of the University of London, and for decades their courses in “mental and moral philosophy” followed British textbooks. Indian philosophy entered the syllabus slowly and, at first, as a historical subject. Two scholars did most to give it a modern shape. Surendranath Dasgupta (1887–1952), who taught at Chittagong and Calcutta and studied at Cambridge, wrote A History of Indian Philosophy in five volumes (1922–1955, the last published after his death), which remains the fullest survey in English and gives the Buddhist, Jain and medical traditions a place beside the Brahmanical schools (Dasgupta 1922–1955). M. Hiriyanna (1871–1950) of Mysore wrote in Outlines of Indian Philosophy (1932) a shorter and still much-used account, careful in its presentation of arguments; his essays on aesthetics treated rasa theory as a philosophy of art (Hiriyanna 1932). Together with Radhakrishnan’s two volumes these histories fixed the picture, still found in examination syllabi, of Indian philosophy as a set of “systems”, six orthodox and three heterodox, each with a fixed doctrine.

Outside the universities, the Indian Institute of Philosophy at Amalner in Khandesh, endowed in 1916 by the mill-owner Pratap Seth for the study of Advaita, gave a small group of philosophers fellowships and a journal, the Philosophical Quarterly, edited for many years by G. R. Malkani. In 1936 Radhakrishnan and J. H. Muirhead published Contemporary Indian Philosophy, in which Indian professors set out their own positions rather than the doctrines of the ancients (Radhakrishnan and Muirhead 1936). Bhushan and Garfield have recovered from these and other sources a lively debate, conducted in English, between idealists such as Hiralal Haldar and A. C. Mukerji, critics of idealism, and thinkers who tried to say what was distinctive about Indian thought without turning it into a national property.

15.3 K. C. Bhattacharya

Krishnachandra Bhattacharya (1875–1949), who taught at Calcutta University, was the most original Indian academic philosopher of the colonial period. In The Subject as Freedom (1930) he developed, in dialogue with Kant and with Vedānta, an account of the subject as that which can never be an object, and of philosophy as the progressive realisation of the subject’s freedom from objectivity (Bhattacharya 1930). He wrote original interpretations of Sāṃkhya, Vedānta and the Jain theory of many-sidedness, and of aesthetic experience.

His essay “The Concept of Philosophy”, contributed to Radhakrishnan and Muirhead’s volume of 1936, distinguished grades of theoretical consciousness. Science deals with facts that can be perceived and spoken of; philosophy begins where we speak of what is not a fact in that sense, and it has three regions: the philosophy of the object, the philosophy of the subject and the philosophy of truth. Each is reached by a kind of reflection that cannot be reduced to the one below it, and the higher regions can be spoken of only in symbols and denials. In another essay, “The Alternative Forms of the Absolute”, he argued that the absolute can be conceived as truth, as freedom or as value, according as the knowing, willing or feeling side of the subject is taken as primary, and that these are genuine alternatives, none of which can be shown to be the only correct one. The idea of alternation was itself an Indian borrowing used for a modern purpose: he found its model in the Jain doctrine that a thing may be described from several standpoints, and he insisted that such a doctrine was not a vague tolerance but a logical thesis that had to be made precise. His son Kalidas Bhattacharyya (1911–1984) developed the theme in Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy (1953).

His lecture “Swaraj in Ideas”, delivered around 1930 (it is dated variously to 1928 and 1931) and published only after his death, is the most penetrating Indian diagnosis of intellectual colonialism. Bhattacharya argued that political subjection was less dangerous than “cultural subjection”, the unconscious adoption by educated Indians of Western ideas that they had not assimilated and could not genuinely criticise; that the remedy was neither rejection of the West nor uncritical traditionalism but a reflective reckoning with both; and that genuine freedom in ideas would require Indians to think from within their own traditions while honestly confronting Western thought. Bhushan and Garfield have shown that the philosophers of this period, far from being mere imitators, were engaged in exactly this work (Bhushan and Garfield 2017).

The lecture is often quoted as a charter for a nativist programme, and that reading misses its point. Bhattacharya did not ask Indians to stop reading Western philosophy; he asked them to stop accepting it, or rejecting it, without thinking it through in terms that were genuinely their own. The same discipline, he implied, applied to the Indian inheritance: a traditional doctrine repeated without reflection was no more an exercise of freedom than an imported one. His own work, which reads Kant through Sāṃkhya and Sāṃkhya through Kant, is the best illustration of what he meant.

15.4 Reading the Classical Schools

The generation after Bhattacharya produced interpretations of the classical schools that are still read. T. R. V. Murti (1902–1986), who taught at Banaras Hindu University, published The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (1955), which presented the Madhyamaka of Nāgārjuna as a “dialectic” that criticises all views without holding one of its own, compared it at length with Kant’s antinomies, and argued that it was the pivot around which later Buddhist and Vedāntic thought turned (Murti 1955). The book did much to make Madhyamaka a subject for philosophers rather than only for philologists. Later scholars have objected that it reads Nāgārjuna through Kant and through an Advaitic expectation of an absolute beyond words, for the comparisons of this generation carried their own frames with them (Chapter 18 describes the later career of Buddhist philosophy in world philosophy).

In Banaras, Gopinath Kaviraj (1887–1976), principal of the Government Sanskrit College from 1923 to 1937, combined the methods of a modern historian of texts with a life of religious practice under tantric teachers; his studies of the history of Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika and of tantric literature, many of them in Hindi and Bengali, mark a different kind of bridge between the pandit’s learning and the university’s (Volume 6, Tantra–Āgama). In Calcutta the training of philosophers in Navya-Nyāya by traditional teachers continued, and it was from such teachers that B. K. Matilal and others learned the technical language they later brought to analytic philosophy.

15.5 Against the Spiritual Picture

Radhakrishnan’s presentation of Indian philosophy as a religion of the spirit culminating in Vedānta (Chapter 9) met resistance from several sides, and the resistance itself became one of the main currents of Indian philosophy after independence.

15.5.1 Materialist and Marxist readings

Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya (1918–1993) set out to recover the tradition that the spiritual picture left out. In Lokāyata: A Study in Ancient Indian Materialism (1959) he argued that the materialism of the Cārvākas, known almost entirely from the refutations of its opponents, was the learned form of a much older and wider popular outlook, rooted in agricultural fertility rites and preserved in parts of tantric practice, and that its suppression by the priestly schools was a social as well as an intellectual event (Chattopadhyaya 1959). In later books he examined the place of observation and experiment in the medical texts of Caraka and Suśruta and asked, in What Is Living and What Is Dead in Indian Philosophy (1976), which parts of the inheritance could support a secular and scientific culture. Many of his specific reconstructions are speculative, and specialists in the Cārvāka sources have questioned his use of ethnography to fill the gaps in the texts. His lasting achievement was to show that the classical record was a record of arguments between rival schools, some of which lost, rather than a single spiritual tradition.

The historian and mathematician D. D. Kosambi (1907–1966), son of the Buddhist scholar Dharmanand Kosambi (Chapter 18), made a similar point about the texts most often used to define the tradition. In Myth and Reality (1962) he read the Bhagavadgītā as a text whose synthesis of ways of salvation, and whose ideal of devotion to a lord, suited a society of overlords and dependants, and he argued that the ability of the Gītā to reconcile everything was also its weakness (Kosambi 1962). Readers who do not share Kosambi’s Marxism have still found his method valuable: it asks what work a doctrine did in the society that preserved it.

15.5.2 Three myths about Indian philosophy

Daya Krishna (1924–2007), who taught at Jaipur, was the most provocative of these thinkers. In an essay of 1966, “Three Myths about Indian Philosophy”, reprinted in Indian Philosophy: A Counter Perspective (1991), he challenged what he regarded as myths about Indian philosophy: that it was essentially spiritual and directed towards liberation, that its “orthodox” schools derived their doctrines from the authority of the Veda, and that it was organised into fixed “schools” each with an unchanging position (Daya Krishna 1991). He organised dialogues between traditional pandits and modern philosophers on philosophical questions, and argued that Indian philosophy should be treated as a living tradition of argument, open to questions its classical authors had not asked. His work is a direct challenge to the Neo-Vedāntic picture described in Chapter 9.

His arguments were deliberately sharp. If liberation was the goal of every school, he asked, why did the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā texts spend so little space on it and so much on inference, meaning and the authority of testimony? If the schools were fixed systems, why did their later authors disagree so openly with the founders whose sūtras they claimed to explain? And if the “orthodox” schools rested on the authority of the Veda, why did the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya texts make so little use of it in their arguments? He did not deny that Indian philosophers cared about liberation; he denied that this concern told us what their arguments were worth.

15.5.3 Ambedkar as a philosopher of religion

The most searching critic of the spiritual picture was not a professional philosopher at all, and for decades philosophy departments did not teach him. B. R. Ambedkar (Chapter 12) trained in economics and law at Columbia and London, but his unfinished and undated essay “Philosophy of Hinduism”, published only in the collected edition of his writings, set out a criterion for judging any religion that most philosophers of religion in India had avoided. A religion’s philosophy, he argued, should be judged not by the sublimity of its metaphysics but by the society it sanctions, and the test was justice, understood as liberty, equality and fraternity, together with social utility; by that test a doctrine of the oneness of all selves that coexisted with untouchability had failed, whatever its speculative merits. His later writings on the Buddha (Chapter 18) applied the same criterion in a positive direction. Since the 1990s Ambedkar has been read increasingly as a philosopher in his own right, and his challenge — that the ethical worth of a tradition is shown by how it treats those it excludes — is now part of the academic discussion of Indian philosophy.

15.6 The Sanskrit Institutions After Independence

The traditional schools did not disappear when the professor displaced the pandit at the centre of intellectual life. Independent India created institutions for them: the Government Sanskrit College at Banaras, where Gopinath Kaviraj had taught, became the core of a Sanskrit university in 1958, now the Sampurnanand Sanskrit University; the Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan, founded in 1970 and since 2020 the Central Sanskrit University, maintains campuses in several states; and other Sanskrit universities were founded in later decades. In these institutions Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta, Vyākaraṇa and Jyotiṣa continued to be taught in Sanskrit, through the classical texts and commentaries, and scholars continued to write treatises and commentaries in the classical forms. The government also honoured eminent pandits with presidential awards.

These institutions preserved skills that would otherwise have been lost, above all the ability to read the technical literature of the later schools with its own teachers’ understanding. Their weakness, which their own scholars have often acknowledged, was isolation: few of their graduates learned the languages and methods of modern scholarship, few university philosophers learned Sanskrit well enough to read with them, and the employment open to their students was narrow. The dialogues described in the next section were an attempt to bridge this gap; the recent policy of bringing “Indian knowledge” into all university courses (Chapter 22) has given it a new urgency, since the courses can be taught well only by people who can read the sources.

15.7 Pandits and Professors: The Experiment of Saṃvāda

The separation of the pandit and the professor was one of the strangest legacies of colonial education. The pandit, trained in Sanskrit in a traditional school or a Sanskrit college, could read Gaṅgeśa or Śaṅkara with a precision that few university philosophers could match, but usually knew no Western philosophy and had no place in its institutions; the professor, trained in English, often knew the Indian schools only through the histories of Dasgupta and Radhakrishnan. Each regarded the other with some condescension.

From the 1980s a group of philosophers set out to bring them together. In 1983 a week-long seminar, planned by M. P. Rege, was held at Pune at which Sanskrit pandits trained in the traditional śāstras and philosophers trained in the Western tradition discussed a single question: whether, to explain how we understand sentences that are false or whose truth is unknown, we must suppose that there are “propositions” as entities distinct from sentences and facts. The proceedings were transcribed from the tapes and published as Saṃvāda: A Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions (1991), edited by Daya Krishna, M. P. Rege, R. C. Dwivedi and Mukund Lath (Daya Krishna et al. 1991). The question had been formulated in Western terms and was translated into the categories of the Sanskrit schools, and the pandits answered it from within their own theories of verbal knowledge (śābdabodha). The book records misunderstandings as well as agreements, which is part of its value. Its premise was that the pandits were not informants about a dead tradition but philosophers whose answers to a live question deserved to be heard.

The Indian Council of Philosophical Research, registered in 1977 and active from 1981, became the main sponsor of such work. Its journal, edited from 1990 until his death by Daya Krishna, opened sections for discussion and debate and for agendas of research, and carried exchanges in which classical Indian positions were treated as contributions to current questions. The same council’s founding chairman, the philosopher D. P. Chattopadhyaya (1933–2022), not to be confused with the author of Lokāyata, later directed the Project of History of Indian Science, Philosophy and Culture, launched around 1990, which commissioned many volumes from scholars of different disciplines on the history of Indian thought, science and society; its volumes are uneven, but they brought historians of philosophy, of science and of society into one enterprise, and one of them, edited by Daya Krishna, surveyed Indian philosophy from the eighteenth century onwards, a period that the standard histories had passed over. The experiment did not reverse the decline of traditional learning, and the number of pandits who could take part has fallen since; but it established a method — the dialogue of equals across languages and institutions — that is perhaps the most practical form of samanvaya described in this volume.

15.8 Phenomenology and Hermeneutics

After 1947 Indian philosophy developed in several directions. Jitendranath Mohanty (1928–2013), trained in both Nyāya and Husserlian phenomenology, moved between the two traditions with unusual ease. His Gaṅgeśa’s Theory of Truth (1966) edited and translated the discussion of the validity of cognitions (prāmāṇyavāda) in Gaṅgeśa’s Tattvacintāmaṇi, the foundational text of Navya-Nyāya, with an introduction that set the Nyāya view, that the validity of a cognition is established from outside it, by a further inference, beside the Mīmāṃsā view that cognitions are intrinsically valid (Mohanty 1966). At the same time he wrote studies of Husserl’s theory of meaning and taught for many years in the United States. In Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought (1992) (Mohanty 1992) and later essays, written against the stereotype of Indian philosophy as anti-rational, he argued that the centre of Indian philosophy was the theory of the means of knowledge (pramāṇa), not a set of metaphysical conclusions, and that the soteriological framing of the texts did not prevent their arguments from being rational in the ordinary sense. He asked, as a phenomenologist would, how the Indian schools understood the relation between consciousness and its objects, and he found in them positions — the self-luminosity of consciousness in Advaita and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, its intentionality in Nyāya — that could be argued about with Husserl and his critics.

Jarava Lal Mehta (1912–1988), who taught at Banaras and later at Harvard’s Center for the Study of World Religions, wrote one of the first comprehensive studies of Heidegger and used Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s hermeneutics to ask how a modern Indian could understand a tradition that was both his own and alien to him. Ramchandra Gandhi (1937–2007), a grandson of the Mahatma who studied at Oxford, wrote on the conditions of communication and religious language in The Availability of Religious Ideas (1976), and in Sita’s Kitchen (1992), written in response to the dispute at Ayodhya, read Advaita as a philosophy of the self’s openness to others (Gandhi 1976).

15.9 Matilal and the Analytic Turn

Bimal Krishna Matilal (1935–1991), trained by Navya-Nyāya pandits in Calcutta and then at Harvard, where he came into contact with W. V. O. Quine, showed in a series of books that Indian logic and epistemology could be studied with the tools of analytic philosophy (Chapter 8). Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis (1971) showed how Nyāya, Buddhist and grammatical theories of meaning and inference could be stated precisely and compared with modern logic (Matilal 1971). Perception (1986) reconstructed the long debate between Nyāya realists and Buddhist idealists and phenomenalists about whether we perceive external objects, and treated it as a contribution to the same problem that occupied Russell and his successors (Matilal 1986). The Word and the World (1990) did the same for the philosophy of language (Matilal 1990). In 1970 he founded the Journal of Indian Philosophy, which became the main international forum for such work. His later essays on the moral dilemmas of the Mahābhārata and on the ethics of the epics (Matilal 1989; Matilal 2002) argued that the epic’s refusal to give simple answers was itself a form of ethical thought, and that Indian ethics had been neglected because it was conducted in narrative rather than in treatises.

Matilal’s programme was sometimes criticised from two sides: by traditional scholars who felt that it translated the schools into an idiom that changed what they said, and by philosophers who felt that it treated Indian arguments as early versions of Western ones. Matilal’s answer was that every interpretation translates, and that the alternative — treating the texts as inaccessible or merely religious — denied their authors the respect due to fellow philosophers. His insistence that “mysticism” was the wrong category for most Indian philosophy, and that its rigour should be shown rather than asserted, shaped the work of his students and successors, including Jonardon Ganeri and Arindam Chakrabarti.

15.10 Is There an Indian Way of Thinking?

In a well-known essay, the poet and scholar A. K. Ramanujan asked whether there is “an Indian way of thinking”. He suggested that classical Indian culture tended to be “context-sensitive”, formulating rules for particular persons, places and times (as in the dharma of class and stage of life), where modern Western thought aspired to context-free universals, and that modern India was moving between the two (Ramanujan 1989). The essay is tentative and playful, and Ramanujan was careful to call his generalisation a tendency, not an essence. It is the kind of comparison this volume tries to make: a hypothesis about patterns, offered for testing against particular cases, rather than a claim about a fixed national mind.

Its question has received two very different kinds of answer since. One, associated with the critics of the previous sections, holds that there are Indian philosophers and Indian arguments but no Indian way of thinking, any more than there is a single European one; the search for a national mind repeats the Orientalist habit of describing civilisations by their essences. The other, associated with some recent writing in the “Indian Knowledge Systems” movement (Chapter 22), holds that Indian thought has a distinctive and unified character that colonial education obscured. Ramanujan’s own answer lay between them: patterns can be real without being essences, and the test of any such claim is whether it helps us read particular texts better.

15.11 Recent Directions

Since the end of the twentieth century the study of Indian philosophy has moved in several new directions. Jonardon Ganeri’s The Lost Age of Reason (2011) turned attention to the Navya-Nyāya philosophers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, above all Raghunātha Śiromaṇi of Navadvīpa, and argued that they had opened a “new reason” that broke with the authority of earlier masters in ways comparable to the early modern philosophers of Europe (Ganeri 2011). The work belongs to a wider recovery of the period immediately before colonial rule, which had often been dismissed as an age of mere commentary. The Dalit philosopher’s question about who is entitled to theorise experience, raised by Gopal Guru and Sundar Sarukkai (Chapter 14), has asked the profession to examine its own social composition. And the growth of “cross-cultural” or “fusion” philosophy abroad has made it common to use Indian arguments on contemporary problems of the self, consciousness and knowledge, sometimes without much concern for the history from which they came.

The public thinkers of the previous chapters have also become subjects of academic philosophy. Raghavan Iyer’s The Moral and Political Thought of Mahatma Gandhi (1973) treated Gandhi’s ideas of truth, non-violence, means and ends and individual conscience as a systematic political philosophy rather than as the sayings of a saint (Iyer 1973), and Bhikhu Parekh’s critical examination of his political philosophy did the same with greater scepticism (Parekh 1989) (Chapter 12). Later philosophers have read Gandhi’s refusal to generalise his own moral choices into rules for others as a distinctive account of moral judgement by example, and have taken Tagore’s arguments against nationalism and Ambedkar’s against caste as contributions to political theory. The boundary between “Indian philosophy” and “modern Indian thought” that the colonial university drew has thus become less sharp.

Within India, departments of philosophy have struggled for students and posts, and the gap between Sanskrit scholarship and university philosophy, which Saṃvāda tried to bridge, has in many places widened again. The movement for “Indian Knowledge Systems” has created new courses and funds, and has also revived the question that Bhattacharya posed a century ago: whether an inheritance can be made one’s own by celebration, or only by thinking it through.

Table 15.1. Some Indian academic philosophers of the twentieth century
Philosopher Representative work Approach
Surendranath Dasgupta (1887–1952) A History of Indian Philosophy (1922–1955) comprehensive history of the schools, including medicine
M. Hiriyanna (1871–1950) Outlines of Indian Philosophy (1932) exposition of arguments; aesthetics
K. C. Bhattacharya (1875–1949) The Subject as Freedom (1930) original metaphysics in dialogue with Kant and Vedānta; “swaraj in ideas”
T. R. V. Murti (1902–1986) The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (1955) Madhyamaka as dialectic, compared with Kant
Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya (1918–1993) Lokāyata (1959) materialist and Marxist recovery of suppressed traditions
Daya Krishna (1924–2007) Indian Philosophy: A Counter Perspective (1991) critique of received pictures; dialogue with pandits
J. N. Mohanty (1928–2013) Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought (1992) phenomenology; pramāṇa theory as the core
B. K. Matilal (1935–1991) Perception (1986) analytic reconstruction of Indian epistemology and logic

15.12 Assessment

Table 15.1 lists some of the philosophers discussed in this chapter. Their work refutes two common assumptions: that modern Indian philosophy consisted of Neo-Vedāntic apologetics, and that the only alternative to apologetics was imitation of the West. Bhattacharya’s alternation of standpoints, Chattopadhyaya’s materialism, Daya Krishna’s dialogues, Mohanty’s phenomenology and Matilal’s analysis were different ways of claiming the freedom in ideas that Bhattacharya had asked for. None of them treated the classical schools as a single wisdom to be admired; all of them treated the schools as arguments to be understood, tested and continued. That, more than any thesis about an Indian way of thinking, is their legacy for a volume on samanvaya.

Further Reading

  • Bhushan and Garfield (2011) and Bhushan and Garfield (2017): Indian philosophy in English in the colonial period.

  • Raghuramaraju (2006): the modern Indian thinkers in debate with one another.

  • Dasgupta (1922–1955) and Hiriyanna (1932): the classic histories.

  • Murti (1955) and Chattopadhyaya (1959): two influential readings of classical schools.

  • Daya Krishna (1991) and Daya Krishna et al. (1991): Daya Krishna’s critique and the dialogue with the pandits.

  • Mohanty (1992) and Matilal (1986): phenomenological and analytic approaches.