Chapter 17: Muslim Thought in Modern India: Reformers, Revivalists and Their Critics¶
inna llāha lā yughayyiru mā bi-qawmin ḥattā yughayyirū mā bi-anfusihim
God does not change what is in a people until they change what is in themselves.
— Qurʾān 13:11
17.1 Introduction¶
The Qurʾānic verse above was often quoted by the Muslim reformers of modern India. Thinkers of very different persuasions cited it to argue that the decline of Muslim power was not a divine decree but the consequence of Muslims’ own neglect, and that recovery depended on their own effort; they disagreed, often bitterly, about what that effort should be. This chapter is concerned with their arguments, and compares them with the Hindu, Sikh and anti-caste debates described elsewhere in this volume.
The movements themselves can be listed briefly. Shāh Walī Allāh of Delhi (Chapter 16), whose Persian Qurʾān let educated Muslims read scripture without depending on the ʿulamāʾ, left descendants and pupils who shaped Indian Islamic learning for a century. After the revolt of 1857, which ended the Mughal dynasty, the seminary founded at Deoband in 1866 trained ʿulamāʾ in a reformist curriculum; the followers of Aḥmad Riḍā Khān of Bareilly defended the veneration of the Prophet and the saints against it; Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s college at Aligarh (1875; a university from 1920) sought to combine Islamic loyalty with Western education; the Nadwat al-ʿUlamāʾ at Lucknow (1894) attempted a middle path; the Aḥmadiyya movement (1889) made claims about its founder that most Muslims rejected; the Tablīghī Jamāʿat (1926) began a lay preaching movement; and Mawdūdī founded the Jamāʿat-i Islāmī (1941) to work for an Islamic state (Figure 9.1). These movements did not form a single “Muslim response”; they disagreed with one another about law, devotion, education and politics as sharply as Hindu reformers did. During the Khilafat movement of 1919–24, when Indian Muslims campaigned to defend the Ottoman caliphate, many of them joined Gandhi’s Non-Cooperation Movement in the most extensive Hindu–Muslim political cooperation of the colonial period; its collapse was followed by a decade of communal riots.
Four questions ran through the debates. The first concerned authority: whether Muslims should follow the established schools of law and their scholars (taqlīd, “imitation”), or return to the Qurʾān and the reports of the Prophet’s sayings and practice (ḥadīth) and reason from them afresh (ijtihād). The second concerned reason and revelation: how far the findings of modern science and history could require the reinterpretation of scripture. The third concerned the status of India itself after the loss of Muslim rule: a famous legal opinion of the early nineteenth century, attributed to Shāh ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz of Delhi, held that a land governed by Christians under their own law had ceased to be an “abode of Islam”, and the question of what Muslims owed to such a state, and later to a secular democracy in which they were a minority, was never settled. The fourth concerned women: their education, seclusion and rights under Islamic law. Aziz Ahmad’s survey, Ayesha Jalal’s study of the tension between individual and community, and Muhammad Qasim Zaman’s work on the ʿulamāʾ are the best guides (Ahmad 1967; Jalal 2000; Zaman 2002).
17.2 Aligarh: Reason, Nature and the Community¶
17.2.1 Sayyid Ahmad Khan as theologian¶
Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817–1898), a former official of the Company, concluded after 1857 that Muslims must embrace Western education and science if they were to recover. The Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College that he founded at Aligarh in 1875, which became Aligarh Muslim University in 1920, is usually remembered as an educational project, and so it was; David Lelyveld has shown that its purpose was as much to form a self-conscious Muslim gentry able to hold its own in colonial India as to teach Western knowledge (Lelyveld 1978). Behind the college lay a theology. After the revolt of 1857 Sayyid Ahmad wrote an essay on its causes, arguing that the government’s ignorance of its subjects’ feelings, not a Muslim conspiracy, had brought it about; from 1862 he published a commentary on the Bible, often described as the first by a Muslim, intended to show that Muslims and Christians shared more than either supposed. A visit to England in 1869–70 convinced him that Indian Muslims needed both a new education and a new theology, and on his return he founded the journal Tahzīb al-Akhlāq (“The Refinement of Morals”) to argue for both.
In his commentary on the Qurʾān he argued that the word of God (scripture) and the work of God (nature) cannot contradict each other, so that apparent conflicts between the Qurʾān and science must be resolved by reinterpretation. The principle, which parallels the rationalism of the Brahmo reformers in Bengal, led him further than most of his contemporaries were willing to go. He treated many traditional reports of the Prophet as historically unreliable, accepted only those that met strict criteria, interpreted the angels of scripture as natural forces and Satan as the evil disposition within human beings, and read the miracles in ways consistent with natural law. Christian Troll’s study shows that this was a reinterpretation of Muslim theology from within, using the methods of the classical commentators for new ends, not a simple adoption of European rationalism (Troll 1978). His followers were nicknamed nēcharī, “naturalists”, and the name stuck.
17.2.2 The Aligarh circle¶
Sayyid Ahmad’s associates developed his ideas in different directions. Chirāgh ʿAlī (1844–1895), an official of the Hyderabad state, argued in A Critical Exposition of the Popular “Jihád” (1885) that the wars of the Prophet had been defensive and that the Qurʾān did not command aggressive war, and in other works that Islamic law was not a closed code but could be reformed by the community. Altāf Ḥusain Ḥālī (1837–1914) wrote the most influential poem of the movement, the Musaddas (“The Flow and Ebb of Islam”, 1879), a lament in six-line stanzas for the greatness of early Islam and the decline of Indian Muslims, which ended in a call to education and effort (Shackle and Majeed 1997); in his Muqaddama-i Shiʿr-o-Shāʿirī (1893) he argued that Urdu poetry should turn from the artifice of the ghazal to the truthful description of nature and society. Nazīr Aḥmad (1831–1912) wrote novels for the instruction of Muslim girls, beginning with Mirʾāt al-ʿArūs (“The Bride’s Mirror”, 1869), which made the educated, capable housewife a model of reformed Muslim domesticity.
The movement’s most formidable critic from outside was Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1838/39–1897), the itinerant pan-Islamic activist, who wrote a treatise against the nēcharīs in Persian while living in Hyderabad around 1881, later known in its Arabic version as the Refutation of the Materialists. He accused Sayyid Ahmad of dissolving religion into naturalism and of serving British interests by teaching Muslims to accept their rule. The exchange set a pattern that would recur: a reformer who sought accommodation with the colonial state was attacked both by the traditional ʿulamāʾ for his theology and by anti-colonial activists for his politics.
17.3 Shiblī Nuʿmānī and the Defence of Islamic History¶
Shiblī Nuʿmānī (1857–1914) taught Arabic and Persian at Aligarh from 1883 to 1898 and was close to Sayyid Ahmad and to the British orientalist Thomas Arnold, who taught there; but he came to disagree with the Aligarh programme. Where Sayyid Ahmad reinterpreted theology in the light of modern science, Shiblī sought to renew the classical scholarly tradition from within and to defend Islamic civilisation against the charges of its European critics. He wrote biographies of the great figures of early Islam — al-Fārūq, on the caliph ʿUmar, is the best known — and began the Sīrat al-Nabī, a multi-volume life of the Prophet completed after his death by his pupil Sayyid Sulaimān Nadvī. In essays on the library of Alexandria and on the poll-tax (jizya) he argued that European accusations against early Muslim rule rested on late and unreliable sources, and in ʿIlm al-Kalām and al-Kalām (1903–04) he proposed a new theology (kalām) that would answer modern objections as the classical theologians had answered those of their day. His history of Persian poetry, Shiʿr al-ʿAjam, remains a landmark of Urdu criticism.
From 1905 Shiblī directed studies at the Nadwat al-ʿUlamāʾ in Lucknow, which aimed to train scholars who knew both the religious sciences and something of modern learning, and he planned the academy of writers (Dār al-Muṣannifīn) at Azamgarh, founded in the year of his death, which continued his historical work. His career shows a third way between Aligarh and the traditional seminaries: modernisation through history and scholarship rather than through natural theology, and a confidence in the Islamic past that answered European contempt with evidence.
17.4 Deoband: Reform Through the ʿUlamāʾ¶
The seminary at Deoband (Chapter 16) is often contrasted with Aligarh as tradition against modernity. Barbara Metcalf’s study shows that it was itself a modern institution of reform (Metcalf 1982). Its founders, Muḥammad Qāsim Nānautavī (1832/33–1880) and Rashīd Aḥmad Gangohī (d. 1905), adopted the organisation of a British college — a fixed curriculum, examinations, a library, salaried teachers — and financed it not by grants from a ruler or by endowments but by annual contributions from ordinary believers, which made it independent of both the colonial state and the old aristocracy. Its scholars answered questions sent by Muslims all over India in legal opinions (fatwā), many of them printed, and so built up a body of practical guidance that reached far beyond the seminary. They taught that the law of the Ḥanafī school should be followed faithfully, and they attacked as innovations (bidʿa) many customs at saints’ shrines, extravagant weddings and death rites, and practices shared with Hindus. Nānautavī took part in public religious debates with Christian missionaries and Arya Samajists at religious fairs held at Chandapur near Shahjahanpur in the 1870s, a sign that the new public arena of print and debate shaped the ʿulamāʾ as much as it shaped the reformers they opposed.
The most widely read Deobandi work was written for women. Ashraf ʿAlī Thānawī (1863–1943) wrote the Bihishtī Zēwar (“Heavenly Ornaments”), first published in the early twentieth century, a comprehensive guide to belief, ritual, law, household management, letter-writing and health, intended to enable women to read and to practise their religion correctly without depending on custom (Metcalf 1990). It assumed that women and men had the same moral capacity and the same obligations to God, and it taught women to reject many customs that men regarded as harmless; it also took for granted seclusion and the authority of husbands. Metcalf reads it as a work that “perfected” women by making them reformed Muslims like men, a very different strategy from Rokeya’s (Chapter 14). It is still given to brides in many South Asian families.
In politics, many Deobandi scholars opposed British rule. Their association, the Jamʿiyyat-i ʿUlamāʾ-i Hind (1919), supported the Khilafat movement and then allied with the Congress against the demand for Pakistan, a choice whose theological defence is discussed below.
17.5 Devotion Defended: Barelwīs, Ahl-i Ḥadīth and Aḥmadīs¶
The Deobandi critique of shrine customs provoked a vigorous defence. Aḥmad Riḍā Khān of Bareilly (1856–1921), a prolific jurist and poet, defended the veneration of the Prophet as a being of light with knowledge of the unseen, the intercession of saints, the celebration of the Prophet’s birthday and the annual commemorations at saints’ tombs; he regarded these not as innovations but as expressions of love sanctioned by the tradition. In 1906 he obtained the endorsement of scholars in Mecca and Medina for a legal opinion declaring certain Deobandi leaders and Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad to be unbelievers, and the bitterness between the two schools has lasted to the present. Usha Sanyal has shown that his movement was no less a modern reform than Deoband’s, using print, organisation and the training of scholars to define a “devotional Islam” that most South Asian Muslims recognised as their own (Sanyal 1996).
At the other extreme, the Ahl-i Ḥadīth (“People of the Ḥadīth”), led by scholars such as Nawāb Ṣiddīq Ḥasan Khān of Bhopal (1832–1890), rejected adherence to any of the four schools of law and insisted that every practice be justified directly from the Qurʾān and authenticated reports, a position close to that of the Wahhābīs of Arabia. And in the Punjab Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad of Qadian (c. 1835–1908), who first became known for his defence of Islam against Christian and Arya Samaj polemic in the Barāhīn-i Aḥmadiyya (1880–84), went on to claim that he was the promised Messiah and Mahdī. His followers understood his status in different ways, and they divided in 1914 into the Qadian and Lahore branches; the Lahore branch regarded him as a renewer rather than a prophet. Yohanan Friedmann has shown how the Aḥmadī idea of a continuing, subordinate prophecy drew on medieval Sufi and theological sources (Friedmann 1989). Most other Muslims rejected the claim, and in Pakistan the Aḥmadīs were declared non-Muslims by constitutional amendment in 1974; in India they are a small community that regards itself as Muslim.
These disputes are sometimes treated as sectarian quarrels of no wider interest. They were in fact arguments about the same questions that divided Hindu reformers: the authority of custom against scripture, the place of saints and intermediaries, the continuity of revelation, and who had the right to interpret.
17.6 Preachers, Sufis and Poets¶
Not all the important movements of the period were led by theologians or politicians. In 1926 Mawlānā Muḥammad Ilyās (1885–1944), a scholar trained in the Deobandi tradition, began a movement of lay preaching among the Meos of Mewat, south of Delhi, a community that had kept many customs shared with its Hindu neighbours. His method was simple: groups of ordinary Muslims would leave home for a few days or weeks, at their own expense, to travel to other Muslims and invite them to the basic practices of prayer and remembrance, learning by teaching. The Tablīghī Jamāʿat that grew from this beginning deliberately avoided political questions and doctrinal controversy, and became, after partition, one of the largest Muslim movements in the world, with its centre still at the Nizamuddin quarter of Delhi. The most widespread form of Muslim revival in modern South Asia was thus pietist and apolitical, not Islamist.
Sufism, attacked by reformers of several kinds, also found modern spokesmen. The shrines of Delhi, Ajmer and many other places continued to draw pilgrims of every community (Chapter 22), and writers attached to them defended their customs in print against Deobandi and Ahl-i Ḥadīth criticism. A different path was taken by Hazrat Inayat Khan (1882–1927), a musician of Baroda initiated into the Chishtī order, who travelled to the United States in 1910 and spent the rest of his life teaching in Europe and America. He presented Sufism as a universal path of love, harmony and beauty, open to members of every religion and not bound to the observance of Islamic law, and founded an order for his Western followers. His universalism, like Vivekananda’s Vedānta, was a modern reformulation for a Western audience, and it had a similar double reception: admired abroad as the essence of a tradition, and regarded by many in that tradition as a departure from it.
The poets who had served the Aligarh movement were followed by poets and writers who rejected religious authority altogether. In 1932 four young writers, among them Sajjad Zaheer and Rashid Jahan, published Angāre (“Embers”), a collection of Urdu stories that satirised the hypocrisy of clerics and the seclusion of women; it provoked protests and was banned by the government of the United Provinces in the following year. Its authors were among the founders of the Progressive Writers’ Association, whose first conference at Lucknow in 1936 was presided over by Premchand. The progressive writers, Muslim and non-Muslim, made Urdu literature a vehicle of socialist and secular thought for a generation, and they stand at the beginning of the secular Muslim voices discussed below.
17.7 Regional Voices: Bengal and Kerala¶
Most accounts of modern Indian Islam are written from the Urdu-speaking north, where the great seminaries, Aligarh and the political leadership were concentrated. But most Indian Muslims lived elsewhere, and the regional languages produced debates of their own. In Bengal, where Muslims formed a majority of the population, a Bengali Muslim literature grew up in the late nineteenth century; Mir Mosharraf Hossain’s Biṣād Sindhu (“The Ocean of Sorrow”, 1885–91), a prose epic on the martyrdom of Ḥusain at Karbala, showed that Islamic sacred history could be told in the literary Bengali shaped largely by Hindu writers. Kazi Nazrul Islam (1899–1976), the “rebel poet”, wrote both Islamic devotional songs and songs to the goddess Kālī, attacked religious hypocrisy in Hindus and Muslims alike, and became after 1971 the national poet of Bangladesh; his work is the most vivid example in the twentieth century of a Muslim writer who used the whole religious vocabulary of his region without surrendering his own.
In 1926 a group of Muslim teachers and students of the new University of Dhaka, among them Abul Hussain and Kazi Abdul Wadud, formed the Muslim Sāhitya Samāj (“Muslim Literary Society”) and published the journal Śikhā. Their programme, which they called the emancipation of the intellect (buddhir mukti), asked Bengali Muslims to judge custom and religious authority by reason and to take part in a common Bengali culture of letters. The movement was small and met the hostility of religious leaders, but it was an early statement of the rationalist and linguistic Bengali Muslim identity that later shaped the politics of East Pakistan and Bangladesh.
In Kerala, where Islam had arrived by sea and the Māppiḷa community spoke Malayalam (Chapter 16), reform took a different course. Sanāullāh Makti Taṅṅaḷ (1847–1912) answered Christian missionary polemic in Malayalam, and Vakkom Abdul Khadir Maulavi (1873–1932) founded the newspaper Svadēśābhimāni (1905), later famous for its criticism of the Travancore government under its editor K. Ramakrishna Pillai, and campaigned for modern and religious education, for the use of Malayalam in religious instruction and against customs he regarded as un-Islamic. The reform associations that followed from the 1920s combined Islamic reform with the movement for education and social uplift that was transforming Kerala society as a whole, and they show the same pattern as Narayana Guru’s movement among the Ezhavas (Chapter 14): religious reform as a path to modern education and public life.
17.8 Boundaries Drawn in Court: The Khojas and the Aga Khan Case¶
The questions of identity that the reformers argued in print were sometimes settled in the colonial courts, and one case shows the process with unusual clarity. The Khojas, a trading community of Gujarat, Kutch and Sindh, had for centuries followed the Satpanth (“true path”), a tradition of devotional hymns (ginān) in Gujarati, Sindhi and related languages attributed to Ismāʿīlī preachers (pīr). The gināns expressed the teaching of the Shīʿa Imām in the vocabulary of the region; one of them, the Dasa Avatāra, presented the Imām ʿAlī as the tenth avatāra of Viṣṇu, completing the series that Hindu tradition expected. Many Khoja families also followed Hindu customs of inheritance.
When the first Aga Khan, Ḥasan ʿAlī Shāh, the hereditary Imām of the Nizārī Ismāʿīlīs, settled in Bombay in the 1840s and claimed the community’s allegiance and dues, a group of Khojas resisted, arguing that they had always been Sunnī Muslims. In 1866 Justice Joseph Arnould of the Bombay High Court decided the case in the Aga Khan’s favour: relying largely on the gināns, he held that the Khojas were and always had been Shīʿa Imāmī Ismāʿīlīs, owing allegiance to the Aga Khan as their Imām. Teena Purohit has argued that the judgment fixed a single religious identity on a community whose practice had been plural, and that it read a local, vernacular Islam through the categories of Middle Eastern sectarian history (Purohit 2012); other historians have shown that divergent practices, especially in inheritance, persisted long afterwards. Some Khojas became Sunnī or Ithnāʿasharī (Twelver) Shīʿa, and the Ismāʿīlī community under the third Aga Khan, Sulṭān Muḥammad Shāh (1877–1957), developed its own institutions of education and welfare and a modern constitution. The case is a parallel to the Singh Sabha debates over Sikh identity (Chapter 16) and to the census classifications described in Chapter 8: in each, a colonial institution asked a community to state what it had always been, and the answer changed the community.
17.9 Women’s Rights in Muslim Reform¶
Muslim reformers, like Hindu ones, debated the education and status of women, and here too the most radical positions came from unexpected quarters. Sayyid Mumtāz ʿAlī (1860–1935), a scholar trained in the religious sciences, wrote Ḥuqūq-i Niswāṅ (“The Rights of Women”, published in 1898), which argued from the Qurʾān and the law that men were not superior to women, that the seclusion practised in India went beyond what scripture required, and that women were entitled to education, to choice in marriage and to the rights that the law gave them over property and divorce. According to Gail Minault’s account, Sayyid Ahmad Khan, shown the manuscript, was so disturbed by it that he tore it up, and Mumtāz ʿAlī published it only after the older man’s death. With his wife, Muḥammadī Bēgam, he founded in the same year Tahzīb-i Niswāṅ, a weekly for women that ran for decades (Minault 1998).
Minault shows a spectrum of positions among the reformers of women’s education, from Nazīr Aḥmad’s capable housewife and Thānawī’s reformed believer to Mumtāz ʿAlī’s equality under scripture and the schools founded by reforming couples and by women themselves, such as the school for girls at Aligarh founded in 1906 by Shaikh Abdullah and Wahid Jahan Begum, which grew into a women’s college, and Rokeya’s school in Calcutta. As with the Hindu reformers and the women writers (Chapter 14), the decisive questions were who was to define women’s proper knowledge, and whether reform meant a return to scripture, an accommodation with custom or a challenge to both.
17.10 Muhammad Iqbal: The Self and the Reconstruction of Religious Thought¶
Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938), born in Sialkot in Punjab, studied philosophy at Cambridge and in Germany, where he wrote a dissertation on the development of metaphysics in Persia (1908). In Urdu and Persian poetry he became the leading voice of Indian Muslims; his early poem “Tarāna-e-Hind” (1904), beginning sāre jahāṃ se acchā hindostāṃ hamārā, is still sung in India. His Persian poems, notably Asrār-i Khudī (“The Secrets of the Self”, 1915), developed a philosophy of the self (khudī) as a creative, striving individuality, against what he saw as the passive, self-annihilating mysticism of later Sufism and the Vedāntic doctrine of the illusory self (Chapter 4). In lectures delivered in Madras, Hyderabad and Aligarh in 1928–29 and published as The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, he engaged with Bergson, Whitehead, Nietzsche and modern physics in an attempt to reformulate Islamic theology for the modern age, arguing for the principle of independent reasoning (ijtihād) (Iqbal 1934). His presidential address to the Muslim League at Allahabad in 1930, proposing a consolidated Muslim state in north-western India, made him a founding figure of the idea of Pakistan.
Iqbal was one of the most original philosophers of modern India, whose engagement with European thought paralleled and rivalled that of Aurobindo and Radhakrishnan, and his rejection of the Vedāntic dissolution of the self, made from within a South Asian Islamic tradition, shows that Neo-Vedānta’s harmony of religions was not accepted by all Indians. His politics drew him into the debate about the nation that is the subject of the next section.
17.11 Composite Nationalism and Its Critics¶
The most consequential Muslim debate of the late colonial period concerned the nation. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad (1888–1958), a religious scholar and journalist who was twice president of the Congress and became independent India’s first Minister of Education, argued in his Urdu commentary on the Qurʾān, Tarjumān al-Qurʾān (1930s), that the essential teaching of all prophets was the same — belief in one God and righteous action — and that the religions differed in law and ritual rather than in their core. His “unity of religion” was argued from within the Qurʾānic tradition, not from Vedānta, and it shows that Indian ideas of religious harmony had Islamic as well as Hindu sources. In politics he moved from the pan-Islamism of his journal al-Hilāl (from 1912) to a lifelong defence of a united India in which Muslims were full partners. He is remembered for declaring, at a special session of the Congress in 1923, that Hindu–Muslim unity mattered more to him than the immediate gift of self-rule, and in his presidential address to the Congress at Ramgarh in 1940 he described the Muslim inheritance as an inseparable part of a common Indian nationality built up over a thousand years.
The theological case for this position was made by Ḥusain Aḥmad Madanī (1879–1957), from 1927 the senior teacher of ḥadīth at Deoband and later president of the Jamʿiyyat-i ʿUlamāʾ-i Hind. In Muttaḥida Qaumiyat aur Islām (“Composite Nationalism and Islam”, 1938) he argued that a qaum, a nation, could be formed by a shared homeland, and was not the same as the millat, the community of faith; Muslims could therefore belong to a territorial Indian nation together with Hindus and others while remaining fully Muslim in religion. He found a precedent in the compact by which the Prophet at Medina had joined the Muslims and the Jewish tribes of the city in a single political community. Barbara Metcalf’s study shows that Madanī’s nationalism was grounded not in secularism but in an Islamic understanding of a plural polity, in which Muslims would be free to follow their law (Metcalf 2009).
Iqbal, by then the leading intellectual voice of Muslim separatism, attacked Madanī’s view in Persian verses in which he accused him of not understanding the faith if he taught that nations were made by homelands. A mutual acquaintance, Ṭālūt, intervened by correspondence; Madanī explained that he had described the political facts, not prescribed a religious ideal, and Iqbal, shortly before his death in April 1938, publicly withdrew his personal criticism while maintaining his view that Islam could not be subordinated to territorial nationalism. The exchange is one of the clearest statements on both sides of the argument that ended in partition, and it shows that Muslim opposition to Pakistan, like Muslim support for it, was argued in Islamic terms.
17.12 The Two-Nation Argument¶
The argument that Madanī opposed had a history. In speeches of the 1880s Sayyid Ahmad Khan warned that representative institutions on the British model, in which a majority ruled, would place Muslims permanently under a Hindu majority, and he spoke of Hindus and Muslims as two “nations” with distinct interests, though he used the word loosely and also described them as the two eyes of a single India. The separate electorates introduced in 1909, after a Muslim deputation to the Viceroy at Simla in 1906 led by the Aga Khan, gave the idea of a distinct Muslim political community a legal form. Iqbal’s Allahabad address of 1930 (Section 17.10) proposed a consolidated Muslim state in the north-west within or outside the empire, and in 1933 the Cambridge student Choudhary Rahmat Ali coined the name “Pakistan”.
The decisive formulation came from Muhammad Ali Jinnah, a secular lawyer who had once been hailed as an ambassador of Hindu–Muslim unity. In his presidential address to the Muslim League at Lahore in March 1940, the session that adopted the resolution demanding independent states in the Muslim-majority regions, he argued that Hindus and Muslims belonged to two different religious philosophies, social customs and literatures, rarely intermarried or ate together, and drew their inspiration from different histories and heroes, so that to yoke them in a single state under a numerical majority would end in discontent and destruction. The argument was, in form, a theory of civilisations rather than of theology; Jinnah himself was no religious scholar. The ʿulamāʾ were divided: Madanī and most of the Jamʿiyyat-i ʿUlamāʾ-i Hind opposed him, while other Deobandi scholars, among them Thānawī and Shabbīr Aḥmad ʿUthmānī, supported the League; Mawdūdī rejected his secular leadership for different reasons. Historians continue to debate how far the Lahore resolution was a bargaining position for a federal settlement and how far a demand for full separation (Jalal 2000). For a volume on samanvaya, the two-nation argument is the starkest modern denial that the traditions of India could share a political home, and it was answered, on Islamic grounds, by Muslims as well as by others.
17.13 Mawdūdī and the Islamic State¶
A third position rejected nationalism of every kind. Abul Aʿlā Mawdūdī (1903–1979), born in Aurangabad and trained as a journalist and in the religious sciences largely by private study, first became known for al-Jihād fī al-Islām (serialised in 1927), a defence of the Islamic law of war against the charge that Islam was spread by the sword. From 1932 his monthly Tarjumān al-Qurʾān developed the ideas for which he is known. Islam, he argued, was not a private religion but a complete order of life (niẓām); sovereignty (ḥākimiyya) belonged to God alone, so that a state whose laws were made by human majorities, whether Indian or Muslim, set up humans as rivals to God; and the four key terms of the Qurʾān — God (ilāh), lord (rabb), worship (ʿibāda) and religion (dīn) — had to be understood in this comprehensive, political sense. On these grounds he opposed both the Congress’s composite nationalism and the Muslim League’s demand for a state of Muslims led by secular politicians. In 1941 he founded the Jamāʿat-i Islāmī at Lahore as a disciplined vanguard of the “Islamic revolution”; after partition he moved to Pakistan, where he campaigned for an Islamic constitution and developed the idea of a “theo-democracy” in which an elected government ruled within the limits of divine law (Nasr 1996).
Mawdūdī’s writings were translated into Arabic and read across the Muslim world, and they influenced the Egyptian thinker Sayyid Quṭb and later Islamist movements. Within South Asia his systematic and lucid prose made him one of the most widely read Muslim authors of the century. His critics, Muslim and non-Muslim, have argued that his conception of a total Islamic order was itself modern, closer to the ideologies of the twentieth century than to the plural legal and political practice of the Islamic past, and that it left no place for those who did not share it.
17.14 Critics of Political Islam and the Jamāʿat in Indian Democracy¶
The sharpest critique of Mawdūdī came from within his own movement. Mawlānā Waḥīduddīn Khān (1925–2021), for fifteen years a member of the Jamāʿat-i Islāmī Hind, corresponded with Mawdūdī in 1962–63 and then published Taʿbīr kī Ghalaṭī (“The Error of Interpretation”, 1963). He argued that Mawdūdī had inverted the order of the Qurʾān: by reading the faith as a political system he had made the state the goal of religion, whereas the Qurʾān’s centre was the individual’s relation to God, from which a just society might follow. He left the Jamāʿat, and over the following decades, through his monthly al-Risāla (from 1976) and many books, developed a theology of patience, dialogue and peace that urged Indian Muslims to give up the politics of grievance. The scholar Abul Ḥasan ʿAlī Nadwī (1914–1999), rector of the Nadwa, also criticised the political reading of Islam, while founding in 1974 a movement for goodwill between communities, Payām-i Insāniyat (“The Message of Humanity”).
The Jamāʿat itself changed. Reconstituted in India in 1948 as the Jamāʿat-i Islāmī Hind, it at first regarded participation in a secular state as illegitimate and forbade its members to vote. Irfan Ahmad has traced how, over the following decades, it came to accept secular democracy as the best available protection for Indian Muslims, permitted voting from the 1980s and eventually supported a political party of its own; he argues that participation in democratic politics transformed an Islamist movement more than the movement transformed politics (Ahmad 2009). The Indian case is one of the clearest examples of a revivalist organisation remade by the constitutional order it once rejected.
17.15 Secular and Liberal Voices After 1947¶
Independence and partition left Indian Muslims a much smaller minority, deprived of much of their educated leadership, and under suspicion of divided loyalty. Several thinkers tried to define a place for them in a secular republic. Mohammad Mujeeb (1902–1985), for a quarter of a century vice-chancellor of the Jamia Millia Islamia — the university founded in 1920 by nationalist Muslims who left Aligarh during the Non-Cooperation movement — wrote in The Indian Muslims (1967) a history that emphasised their roots in Indian society and their contributions to a shared culture (Mujeeb 1967). Asaf A. A. Fyzee (1899–1981), a jurist and scholar of Ismāʿīlī law, argued in A Modern Approach to Islam (1963) that the moral and spiritual teaching of Islam should be distinguished from the historical law built upon it, so that the law could be reformed while the faith was kept.
The most radical reformer was the Marathi writer Hamid Dalwai (1932–1977). In April 1966 he led seven women who had been divorced by unilateral repudiation (ṭalāq) to the government secretariat in Bombay to demand a reform of Muslim personal law, and in 1970 he founded at Pune the Muslim Satyashodhak Mandal, whose name deliberately recalled Phule’s Truth-Seekers’ Society (Chapter 14). Dalwai argued for a common civil code and for the secular reform of the community from within; he was attacked by religious leaders as an enemy of Islam and is now claimed by many Indian liberals as a pioneer. Asghar Ali Engineer (1939–2013), a reformer within the Dāʾūdī Bohra community, wrote extensively on communal violence and on the rights of women, arguing in The Rights of Women in Islam (1992) that the Qurʾān’s ethical intent favoured equality and that much of the law of marriage and divorce reflected the patriarchal societies in which it had been formulated (Engineer 1992). The controversy over the Shah Bano judgment of 1985 and the law that followed it (Volume 18, Rājanīti and Dharmaśāstra) showed how sharply these questions divided the community and how readily they became instruments of national politics. Mushirul Hasan’s study traces these post-independence debates (Hasan 1997).
17.16 Muslim and Hindu Reform Compared¶
The parallels between Muslim and Hindu reform in colonial India were noticed at the time, and Kenneth Jones’s survey treats them together (Jones 1989). Table 17.1 sets out some of them. The parallels arise from shared conditions — a colonial state that claimed neutrality in religion while classifying communities, missionary criticism, printing presses, English education and a new public sphere of journals and debates — rather than from imitation, and each tradition worked them out in its own vocabulary. The parallels also had a darker side: reformers on each side defined their communities more sharply against one another, and the competitive mobilisation of religious identities that resulted is part of the history of partition (Chapter 16).
| Position | Hindu examples | Muslim examples |
|---|---|---|
| Return to scripture against custom | Arya Samaj (the Vedas alone) | Deoband (the Ḥanafī law, purified of custom); Ahl-i Ḥadīth (Qurʾān and ḥadīth alone) |
| Reason and science as the test of interpretation | Brahmo Samaj; Vidyāsāgar | Sayyid Ahmad Khan; Chirāgh ʿAlī |
| Defence of devotional custom | Sanātana Dharma associations | Aḥmad Riḍā Khān and the Barelwīs |
| Renewal through history and scholarship | Bankimchandra’s Kṛṣṇacaritra; the Orientalist-trained historians | Shiblī Nuʿmānī; the Nadwa |
| Composite nationalism | Gandhi; Nehru | Azad; Ḥusain Aḥmad Madanī |
| Religion as the basis of political community | Savarkar’s Hindutva (a cultural nation) | Mawdūdī (the sovereignty of God); Iqbal (a Muslim homeland) |
| Social reform against religious authority | Phule’s Satyashodhak Samaj | Mumtāz ʿAlī; Hamid Dalwai’s Muslim Satyashodhak Mandal |
The table simplifies, and several of its pairings are imperfect. Savarkar’s Hindutva was a theory of a cultural and territorial nation and did not require religious belief, while Mawdūdī rejected nationalism altogether in the name of divine sovereignty; they belong in the same row only because both made religion, in different senses, the basis of political belonging. The comparison is useful because it shows that “the Muslim response” to modernity was as plural as “the Hindu response”, and that the lines of disagreement within each community often ran parallel to those within the other.
17.17 Assessment¶
Modern Indian Muslim thought produced, within a century, a natural theology (Sayyid Ahmad), a historical apologetics (Shiblī), a reform of the ʿulamāʾ (Deoband), a defence of devotional Islam (Aḥmad Riḍā Khān), a philosophy of the creative self (Iqbal), a theology of composite nationalism (Madanī), an Islamist ideology (Mawdūdī) and its critique from within (Waḥīduddīn Khān), and a secular reformism (Fyzee, Dalwai, Engineer). These positions were argued with the same seriousness, and against the same pressures, as the Hindu positions that dominate most accounts of modern Indian thought. A history of Indian ideas that omitted them would be not only incomplete but distorted, for many of the debates described in this volume — about the nation, about scripture and reason, about women, about the relation of religion to the state — were conducted on both sides at once, sometimes in conversation and sometimes in opposition.
Further Reading¶
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Ahmad (1967) and Jalal (2000): surveys of modern South Asian Muslim thought.
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Lelyveld (1978) and Troll (1978): Aligarh and Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s theology.
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Metcalf (1982), Sanyal (1996) and Zaman (2002): Deoband, the Barelwīs and the ʿulamāʾ.
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Tareen (2020): the Deobandi and Barelwī debates about the Prophet.
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Ahmad (2009) and Hasan (1997): Indian Muslims since independence.