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Chapter 5: Dharma: A Concept and Its Debates

dharma eva hato hanti dharmo rakṣati rakṣitaḥ
tasmād dharmo na hantavyo mā no dharmo hato ’vadhīt
Dharma, when violated, destroys; dharma, when protected, protects. Therefore dharma must not be violated, lest violated dharma destroy us.
— Manusmṛti 8.15 (spoken of the duty of judges)

5.1 A Word With Many Uses

No Indian word is more often called “untranslatable” than dharma. It can mean the order of the cosmos, the nature of a thing, the duties of a person’s class and stage of life, law and legal procedure, virtue, religious merit, a religious tradition, the teaching of the Buddha, a mental or physical phenomenon in Buddhist analysis, and, in Jain thought, the medium that makes motion possible. The word comes from the root dhṛ, “to hold, support, sustain”, and a much-quoted verse of the Mahābhārata explains it accordingly: dharma is so called because it “holds up” (dhāraṇa) creatures.

The claim of untranslatability is half true. No single English word covers all these senses, but in any given passage the sense is usually clear, and translators have rendered it as “law”, “duty”, “righteousness”, “religion” or “teaching” as the context requires. The danger in the claim is that it invites us to treat dharma as one timeless essence. In fact the meanings of the word changed greatly over two thousand years, and different traditions — Vedic, Brahmanical, Buddhist, Jain and modern — used it in competing ways. Patrick Olivelle’s collection of studies on its semantic history and Alf Hiltebeitel’s account of its early uses in law and narrative show how much those meanings were contested (Olivelle 2009; Hiltebeitel 2011). This chapter follows that history and then turns to the hardest questions it raises: the place of class (varṇa), caste (jāti), untouchability and gender in the Brahmanical law of dharma, and the critiques that the law provoked from within India.

5.2 From Ṛta to Dharma

5.2.1 Ṛta in the Ṛgveda

In the Ṛgveda the central term for order is ṛta: the regularity of the dawns and seasons, the right performance of ritual and the truthfulness of human speech and conduct, all conceived as aspects of one order. Its guardians are the gods Mitra and Varuṇa, who see all things through their spies and punish those who violate it; several hymns to Varuṇa express a sense of having offended against his ordinances and ask for release. The opposite of ṛta is anṛta, untruth. A late hymn, the Aghamarṣaṇa (“effacing of sin”), makes ṛta and truth (satya) the first products of cosmic heat:

Ṛgveda 10.190.1

ṛtaṃ ca satyaṃ cābhīddhāt tapaso ’dhy ajāyata
tato rātry ajāyata tataḥ samudro arṇavaḥ

Order and truth were born from heat as it was kindled; from that night was born, and from that the billowing sea.

5.2.2 Dharman and the rise of dharma

The word dharman also occurs in the Ṛgveda, more than sixty times, but in a narrower sense: a “foundation” or “support”, often the ordinance by which a god holds something in place. Joel Brereton’s study of these passages, published in Olivelle’s collection, shows that dharman was not yet a central ethical or religious category (Olivelle 2009). In the later Vedic literature the word becomes more prominent. A famous passage of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (1.4.14) says that the creator, finding that the ruling power was not enough, created dharma, “the ruling power of the ruling power”: “there is nothing higher than dharma; through dharma a weaker man may prevail over a stronger, as through a king” (Olivelle 1998). Here dharma is already law, a power that restrains even kings.

Olivelle has argued that the decisive step in making dharma the master concept of Brahmanical thought came in the last centuries BCE, partly in response to the Buddhists, who made dhamma the name for the Buddha’s teaching, and to the emperor Aśoka (r. c. 268–232 BCE), who made dhamma the centrepiece of his inscriptions (Olivelle 2009). Whether or not one accepts every part of this thesis, it is clear that the concept of dharma that dominates the epics and the legal texts was formed in a period of intense competition between Brahmanical, Buddhist and Jain visions of the good life.

5.3 Aśoka’s Dhamma

Aśoka’s edicts, inscribed on rocks and pillars across the subcontinent, are the earliest substantial body of datable Indian writing. After his conquest of Kaliṅga, which he describes with remorse in the thirteenth major rock edict, he declared that his conquest would henceforth be by dhamma. The edicts describe this dhamma in practical, non-sectarian terms: obedience to parents and elders, generosity to Brahmins and ascetics, kindness to slaves and servants, restraint in killing animals, truthfulness and moderation in spending. They establish officers of dhamma and record works such as wells, shade trees and medical care for humans and animals. The twelfth rock edict asks members of all religious communities to restrain their speech, so that no one praises his own sect or disparages another’s without reason, and argues that whoever honours his own sect while disparaging others in fact damages his own (Thapar 2002).

Aśoka was personally a Buddhist lay follower, and his dhamma draws on Buddhist ethics; but he addresses it to everyone, and it is the first recorded Indian statement of a policy of mutual respect among religious communities. It is a better ancestor for modern Indian ideas of pluralism than the inclusivist formulas discussed in Chapter 1, because it asks for restraint and respect without claiming that all sects teach the same thing.

5.4 Dhamma for Buddhists and Dharma for Jains

In Buddhist usage dhamma (Sanskrit dharma) has three main senses. It is, first, the teaching of the Buddha, the second of the “three jewels” (Buddha, dhamma, saṅgha) in which every Buddhist takes refuge. It is, second, the truth or reality that the teaching reveals: the Buddha is said to have discovered a dhamma that holds whether or not Buddhas arise. And it is, third, in the Abhidharma analysis, the plural dhammas, the momentary physical and mental events of which experience is composed. None of these is the Brahmanical dharma of class and stage of life; the Buddhist texts frequently reject the claim that a person’s worth is determined by birth.

For Jains, dharma means first the religious path taught by the tīrthaṅkaras, summarised in the “three jewels” of right faith, right knowledge and right conduct and in the five great vows of non-violence, truthfulness, not stealing, celibacy and non-possession. It also has a technical meaning unique to Jainism: dharma is one of the six substances, the medium of motion, and adharma the medium of rest (Chapter 3). Here again the word is shared and the meaning is not.

5.5 The Literature of Dharma

5.5.1 Dharmasūtras and Dharmaśāstras

The Brahmanical science of dharma is set out in two genres (Table 5.1). The Dharmasūtras of Āpastamba, Gautama, Baudhāyana and Vasiṣṭha, prose texts associated with Vedic schools, belong according to Olivelle to roughly the third to first centuries BCE. The verse Dharmaśāstras, of which the Mānava Dharmaśāstra or Manusmṛti (c. 2nd century CE) is the most influential, were followed by the Yājñavalkya Smṛti (c. 4th–5th century) and the Nārada Smṛti, which is largely concerned with legal procedure. A vast commentarial and digest literature followed for more than a thousand years. P. V. Kane’s History of Dharmaśāstra remains the indispensable survey, and Olivelle’s critical edition and translation of Manu is now the standard text (Kane 1930–1962; Olivelle 2005). Volume 18 of this series treats the subject in detail.

Table 5.1. Principal texts of the Dharmaśāstra tradition (approximate dates)
Text or author Date Notes
Dharmasūtras of Āpastamba, Gautama, Baudhāyana, Vasiṣṭha c. 3rd–1st c. BCE prose; attached to Vedic schools
Manusmṛti c. 2nd c. CE the most influential verse code
Yājñavalkyasmṛti c. 4th–5th c. concise; basis of the Mitākṣarā
Nāradasmṛti c. 5th–6th c. legal procedure and the law of disputes
Parāśarasmṛti uncertain claims authority for the Kali age
Medhātithi’s commentary on Manu c. 9th–10th c. the earliest surviving full commentary on Manu
Vijñāneśvara, Mitākṣarā late 11th–early 12th c. commentary on Yājñavalkya; dominant in most of India in colonial law
Jīmūtavāhana, Dāyabhāga c. 12th c. on inheritance; followed in Bengal
Digests (nibandha), e.g. Lakṣmīdhara’s Kṛtyakalpataru 12th c. onward thematic compilations of rules from many sources

5.5.2 The sources of dharma

The Dharmaśāstras’ own answer to the question “how is dharma known?” — the Veda, the tradition and practice of those who know it, the conduct of the good and, last, what satisfies oneself (Manu 2.6, 2.12) — and the narrow reading the commentators gave to that last item are examined in Volume 18 (Rājanīti and Dharmaśāstra). Two points matter for comparison. The list grounds duty in revealed text and in the practice of the learned rather than in reason or individual conscience, and that is where Brahmanical dharma parts company most clearly with theories of natural law (see below). And the list describes the law the śāstras claimed, not the law most people lived under: Donald Davis has shown that the main practical source of law in classical and medieval India was the custom of regions, castes, families, guilds and religious orders, which the texts acknowledged (Manu 8.41) rather than created (Davis 2010).

5.5.3 Common dharma and particular dharma

Like many legal traditions, the Dharmaśāstras separate duties owed by everyone from duties tied to a station — here class (varṇa) and stage of life (āśrama). Manu’s brief “dharma for all four classes” (10.63) names non-injury, truthfulness, not stealing, purity and sense-control, and his list of the ten marks of dharma is the passage modern writers quote most often:

Manusmṛti 6.92

dhṛtiḥ kṣamā damo ’steyaṃ śaucam indriyanigrahaḥ
dhīr vidyā satyam akrodho daśakaṃ dharmalakṣaṇam

Resolve, forbearance, self-control, not stealing, purity, restraint of the senses, wisdom, learning, truthfulness and freedom from anger: these are the ten marks of dharma.

Set beside the cardinal virtues of Greek and Christian ethics or the Buddhist and Jain precepts, these lists show how much moral vocabulary the traditions shared. Their place in the text tells a different story. The ten marks are addressed to twice-born men passing through the stages of life, and the particular dharmas — what each class may do, whom one may marry, who may hear the Veda — fill far more of the book than the common ones. In the Brahmanical system the universal virtues were real but subordinate. Paul Hacker argued that the modern emphasis on “common dharma” as the core of Hinduism is largely a product of the reform movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Hacker 1995).

5.5.4 Svadharma

The Bhagavadgītā gives the principle of one’s own duty (svadharma) its most memorable form:

Bhagavadgītā 3.35

śreyān svadharmo viguṇaḥ paradharmāt svanuṣṭhitāt
svadharme nidhanaṃ śreyaḥ paradharmo bhayāvahaḥ

Better one’s own dharma, though imperfectly done, than another’s dharma well performed. Better death in one’s own dharma; another’s dharma brings danger.

In its context the verse is spoken to Arjuna, a warrior who is reluctant to fight, and svadharma means the duty of his class; the Gītā later (18.41–48) relates the duties of the four classes to the qualities born of their nature. Modern interpreters — Tilak, Aurobindo, Gandhi and many others — read svadharma as the vocation that suits an individual’s nature, independent of birth. That reading has inspired many people, but it is an interpretation, and Ambedkar argued that it served to soften the ancient link between the Gītā’s ethics and the class system (Chapter 12).

5.6 Varṇa, Jāti and Untouchability

5.6.1 The texts

The four classes are often presented, in modern apologetic writing, as a harmonious division of labour in which each contributed its virtue to the whole. That picture cannot be sustained from the texts, and an honest account must say so. The Puruṣa hymn (Ṛgveda 10.90.12) derives the four classes from the mouth, arms, thighs and feet of the cosmic person, and the Dharmaśāstras build on this hierarchy. The Śūdra’s duty, according to Manu (1.91), is to serve the three higher classes “without resentment”. Śūdras were excluded from the Veda: the Gautama Dharmasūtra (12.4) prescribes that molten tin or lac be poured into the ears of a Śūdra who listens to a Vedic recitation. Punishments were graded by class: for the same insult, Manu (8.267–272) prescribes a fine for a Brahmin and mutilation for a Śūdra. Manu (10.4) states that there is no fifth class, yet he describes groups below the four — above all the Caṇḍālas — who must live outside the village, use broken vessels, wear the clothes of the dead and not be seen in villages at night (10.51–56). The Chinese pilgrim Faxian, who travelled in India around 400 CE, reported that Caṇḍālas had to strike a piece of wood when entering a town so that others could avoid contact with them (Olivelle 2005; Thapar 2002).

On women the texts are divided. Manu can say that “where women are honoured, there the gods rejoice” (3.56), and later, in the ninth book, that “a woman is not fit for independence” (9.3), being guarded by her father in childhood, her husband in youth and her sons in old age. Women were generally excluded from Vedic study, their ritual life was mediated by their husbands, and widow remarriage was discouraged or forbidden in most of the later literature. Uma Chakravarti has shown how the control of women’s sexuality was bound up with the maintenance of caste boundaries (Chakravarti 2003).

5.6.2 Varṇa and jāti

The four varṇas are a textual scheme. The social reality of India was, and is, a much larger number of jātis: endogamous groups, usually associated with a hereditary occupation, ranked locally in relation to one another, numbering in the thousands. How the two were related, and how the system developed, are among the most debated questions in Indian history. Louis Dumont analysed caste as a system founded on the opposition of purity and pollution; Brian K. Smith showed how the varṇa scheme was used in Vedic ritual texts to classify the whole universe, not only society; Nicholas Dirks argued that colonial ethnography and the census hardened and systematised caste in the nineteenth century (Dumont 1980; Smith 1994; Dirks 2001). These views are not mutually exclusive. What is not in doubt is that hereditary inequality, enforced by law and custom and justified by appeal to dharma, shaped the lives of most Indians for many centuries, and that untouchability was its most degrading form. Crafts and the castes associated with them are discussed in Volume 17, and law in Volume 18.

5.6.3 Critics from within

The Brahmanical claim was contested from the start. The Buddhist discourses repeatedly deny that birth makes a Brahmin: in the Vāseṭṭha Sutta (Sutta Nipāta 3.9) the Buddha argues that, unlike plants and animals, humans do not differ by species, and that a person is a Brahmin by conduct, not by birth; the Assalāyana Sutta (Majjhima Nikāya 93) ridicules the Brahmins’ claim to be born from Brahmā’s mouth, since they are visibly born from women. The Vajrasūcī, attributed to the Buddhist poet Aśvaghoṣa, attacks the class system with arguments drawn from Brahmanical texts. Jain teachers admitted people of all classes to the monastic order. In twelfth-century Karnataka the Vīraśaiva movement around Basava rejected caste distinctions among devotees, and a marriage between a Brahmin and an untouchable devotee is remembered as having provoked violent repression. The devotional poets of the sant tradition — Ravidās the leatherworker, Kabīr the weaver, Cokhāmeḷā the Mahar — denied that caste had any place before God. These critiques did not overturn the system; but they show that the Brahmanical dharma was never the only Indian voice on the subject.

In the nineteenth century Jotirao Phule (1827–1890) attacked the Brahmanical texts as instruments of domination in Gulāmgirī (“Slavery”, 1873) and founded the Satyashodhak Samaj; Rosalind O’Hanlon’s study remains the fullest account of his thought (O’Hanlon 1985), and Chapter 14 compares his counter-history with those of Iyothee Thass, Narayana Guru and Periyar. In 1927, at Mahad, B. R. Ambedkar and his followers publicly burned a copy of the Manusmṛti. His Annihilation of Caste (1936) argued that caste could not be reformed because it was sanctioned by the very scriptures that defined Hindu dharma, and that the remedy was to destroy the authority of those scriptures (Ambedkar 1936). Chapter 12 discusses his debate with Gandhi. The Constitution of India (1950), of whose drafting committee Ambedkar was chairman, abolished untouchability (Article 17) and prohibited discrimination on grounds of caste.

5.7 Women and Dharma

The duties of women (strīdharma) were a recurring topic of the legal literature, and the texts are more varied than either their defenders or their critics sometimes allow. The core teaching is that a woman’s dharma is fulfilled through service to her husband, whom she should honour as a god; that she should be protected and controlled by male relatives at every stage of life; and that her ritual life is subordinate to his. The fullest statement is a treatise written in eighteenth-century Thanjavur, the Strīdharmapaddhati of Tryambakayajvan, which collects earlier rules into a manual of the perfect wife; Julia Leslie’s study shows how it combined severe prescriptions with occasional recognition of women’s independent religious practice (Leslie 1989).

On particular questions the texts disagreed, and the disagreements were exploited by later reformers. The burning of widows (satī) was praised in some Purāṇic and legal texts, discouraged or condemned in others; some commentators regarded it as a form of suicide forbidden by the Veda. Widow remarriage was generally forbidden among the higher castes in the later literature, yet a verse of the Parāśara Smṛti, a law-book that claims to be the authority for the Kali age, lists five circumstances — the husband’s disappearance, death, renunciation, impotence or loss of caste — in which “another husband is ordained for women”. The Bengali scholar Īśvaracandra Vidyāsāgar used this verse in his campaign for widow remarriage, which led to the Hindu Widows’ Remarriage Act of 1856. In both cases, colonial-period reform proceeded not by rejecting the śāstra but by arguing over its interpretation — the same method by which the śāstra had always developed.

5.8 Dharma in Tamil: Aṟam

The Tamil word usually translated as “virtue” or “dharma” is aṟam, and its classic expression is the first book of the Tirukkuṟaḷ (c. 5th century), the “Book of Virtue” (Aṟattuppāl). Its couplets praise the life of the householder, hospitality, gratitude, patience, truthfulness and non-killing, and condemn envy, slander and meat-eating; they say almost nothing about the duties of particular castes. A couplet in the later book on wealth states that all living beings are equal at birth, and that distinctions arise only from the different quality of their deeds. The Tirukkuṟaḷ’s religious affiliation is disputed — Jain, Buddhist, Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava readers have all claimed it — and it has been honoured in modern Tamil Nadu as a universal ethical text precisely because it does not tie virtue to caste. In India “dharma” was never only the dharma of the Sanskrit law-books (Volume 8).

5.9 Dharma, Colonial Law and the Constitution

When the East India Company took over the administration of justice in Bengal, Warren Hastings’s judicial plan of 1772 provided that in suits concerning inheritance, marriage, caste and religious usage, Hindus should be governed by “the laws of the Shaster” and Muslims by “the laws of the Koran”. Colonial courts consulted pandits and maulvis as law officers until 1864, and English translations of Sanskrit legal texts and digests — including the Manusmṛti and the two great medieval treatises on inheritance, Jīmūtavāhana’s Dāyabhāga and Vijñāneśvara’s Mitākṣarā — became the basis of “Anglo-Hindu law”. Scholars have argued that this process gave the texts a fixed and uniform authority they had not possessed before, displacing the flexible customary law that had governed most people’s lives (Cohn 1996; Davis 2010).

Legislation then modified the textual law: the prohibition of satī (1829), the Widows’ Remarriage Act (1856), the raising of the age of consent (1891) and, after independence, the Hindu Code — the Hindu Marriage Act (1955), the Hindu Succession Act (1956) and related laws — which introduced monogamy, divorce and women’s rights of inheritance. The first version of the Hindu Code Bill, piloted by Ambedkar as Law Minister, met fierce opposition from conservatives who argued that it violated dharma; it was passed only after his resignation, in a series of separate acts. The Constitution guarantees freedom of religion while allowing the state to regulate secular activities associated with religious practice and to open Hindu religious institutions to all classes of Hindus; Muslims, Christians and Parsis retain their own personal laws, a situation that remains politically contested. The long history of dharma as law thus ends, for the present, in a secular constitution that both draws on and constrains it (Volume 18).

Islamic law in India had a parallel history. The sharīʿa as applied by the qāḍīs of the Sultanate and Mughal states was the work of jurists interpreting the Qurʾān, the traditions of the Prophet and the legal literature of the Ḥanafī school, adapted to local circumstances and supplemented by royal regulations and custom. Under the Company, “Muhammadan law” was administered alongside “Hindu law”, at first through Muslim law officers and later through English translations of texts such as the Hidāya and the Fatāwā-yi ʿĀlamgīrī; the result, “Anglo-Muhammadan law”, was similarly rigidified and textualised. The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act of 1937 directed courts to apply Islamic law to Muslims in matters of family and succession in place of local customs that had sometimes differed from it, and the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act of 1939 gave Muslim women grounds for judicial divorce. In independent India, the debate over a uniform civil code, and cases such as the Supreme Court’s decisions on maintenance for divorced Muslim women (1985) and on “triple ṭalāq” (2017), have kept the relation between religious law and constitutional equality at the centre of public life. The comparison shows that both Hindu and Muslim law in India were transformed by colonial codification, and that both now operate within the framework, and under the scrutiny, of a secular constitution.

5.10 Dharma Beyond India

Dharmaśāstric ideas travelled with Indian culture into Southeast Asia, where they were adapted in Buddhist kingdoms. In Burma (Myanmar), a genre of law books called dhammasat (from dhammasattha, the Pali form of dharmaśāstra), written in Pali and Burmese from about the thirteenth century, traced their authority to a sage named Manu who was said to have found the law inscribed on the wall of the universe; their content, however, was largely local customary law on inheritance, marriage, debt and contract, and they omit the Brahmanical rules of varṇa. Siamese law was shaped by similar texts, and the Thai code compiled in 1805, known as the Law of the Three Seals, opens with a Buddhist version of the story of Manu. In Bali, Old Javanese law texts drew on Sanskrit Dharmaśāstra and were applied in a Hindu society with its own system of caste. These adaptations show that the name and prestige of Manu could be separated from the content of his code, and that Indian legal ideas were reshaped by the societies that received them, much as Roman law was received and transformed in medieval Europe.

5.11 Caste Beyond Hinduism

Caste is often described as a feature of Hinduism alone. The social reality is otherwise: caste distinctions, in varying forms, have existed among Indian Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists. Among Muslims, a distinction is commonly drawn between the ashrāf (“noble”) groups claiming descent from Arab, Persian, Turkish or Afghan ancestors or from high-caste converts, the ajlāf, mostly descended from artisan and cultivating converts, and the arzal, descendants of converts from communities regarded as untouchable; endogamy, occupational specialisation and social hierarchy persist among them, although Islamic law and theology recognise no such distinctions. The “Pasmanda” (“those left behind”) movement among backward-caste Muslims has made this hierarchy a political issue. Among Christians, as noted in Chapter 16, Dalit converts have often faced discrimination within churches. Among Sikhs, whose Gurus rejected caste, separate places of worship and endogamous marriage have persisted. Jain communities are divided into endogamous castes, mostly of merchant status.

The persistence of caste in religions that reject it in principle shows that caste in India has been a social institution as much as a religious doctrine. It also complicates the comparison of religions: the egalitarian teachings of Buddhism, Islam, Sikhism and Christianity did attract many low-caste converts, and offered them real dignity, but conversion did not by itself abolish the social structures from which they sought to escape. The Indian state’s policies of reservation, which apply to Scheduled Castes only among Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists, have made the question of caste among Muslims and Christians a matter of continuing legal and political debate.

5.12 The Subtlety of Dharma

5.12.1 Dharmasaṅkaṭa: conflicts of duty

If the legal texts sometimes present dharma as a code, the epics present it as a problem. The Mahābhārata repeatedly declares that “dharma is subtle” (sūkṣmo dharmaḥ), and it is built around situations in which duties conflict. Arjuna, on the battlefield, must choose between his duty to fight and his duty not to kill his kinsmen and teachers; the Bhagavadgītā is the answer given to him, but the epic does not pretend that the answer removes the cost. When Draupadī is dragged into the assembly after the dice game, she asks whether her husband Yudhiṣṭhira, who had already lost himself, had the right to stake her; the elders, including Bhīṣma, cannot answer, and Bhīṣma says only that the way of dharma is subtle. Yudhiṣṭhira, famous for never lying, tells a half-truth about the death of “Aśvatthāman” (an elephant of that name) to make his teacher Droṇa lay down his arms, and his chariot, which had always floated above the ground, sinks to the earth. In the dialogue with the Yakṣa in the forest, as the vulgate text has it, Yudhiṣṭhira gives a celebrated answer to the question “what is the path?”. The verse is not in the constituted text of the Critical Edition, whose Yakṣa dialogue (3.297) omits it:

Mahābhārata (vulgate), Āraṇyakaparvan, Yakṣa episode

tarko ’pratiṣṭhaḥ śrutayo vibhinnā naiko ṛṣir yasya mataṃ pramāṇam
dharmasya tattvaṃ nihitaṃ guhāyāṃ mahājano yena gataḥ sa panthāḥ

Reasoning has no firm footing; the scriptures differ; there is no single sage whose view is authoritative. The truth of dharma is hidden in a cave. The path is the one by which the great have gone.

B. K. Matilal argued that the Mahābhārata should be read as a sustained reflection on moral dilemmas, comparable to Greek tragedy, which deliberately refuses the comfort of a rule that settles every case (Matilal 1989; Matilal 2002). This is one of the most valuable things the Indian tradition has to offer to comparative ethics, and it is a quite different thing from the claim that dharma provides a harmonious code for every situation.

5.12.2 Āpaddharma: dharma in distress

The legal texts themselves recognised that normal rules could not always be followed. In times of distress (āpad) a Brahmin might live by the occupation of a Kṣatriya or Vaiśya, forbidden food might be eaten to save life, and the twelfth book of the Mahābhārata devotes a section to the “dharma of distress”. The provisions are a recognition that dharma must bend to circumstance; they are also carefully limited, and they are mostly written from the point of view of the higher classes.

5.12.3 Rājadharma and punishment

The duties of the king receive extensive treatment in the epics, the Dharmaśāstras and the Arthaśāstra (a composite text of c. 50 BCE–300 CE, traditionally attributed to Kauṭilya or Cāṇakya, c. 300 BCE). Without royal punishment (daṇḍa), these texts warn, society would fall into the “law of the fish”, in which the strong devour the weak. Manu puts it in a memorable verse:

Manusmṛti 7.18

daṇḍaḥ śāsti prajāḥ sarvā daṇḍa evābhirakṣati
daṇḍaḥ supteṣu jāgarti daṇḍaṃ dharmaṃ vidur budhāḥ

Punishment governs all the subjects; punishment alone protects them; punishment keeps watch while they sleep. The wise know punishment to be dharma.

Polity and law are the subject of Volume 18 (Olivelle 2013).

5.12.4 The education of a king: the Śāntiparvan

The fullest Brahmanical reflection on the dharma of kings is in the twelfth book of the Mahābhārata, the Śāntiparvan (“Book of Peace”). After the war, Yudhiṣṭhira, overwhelmed by grief at the slaughter, wishes to renounce the kingdom he has won; the dying Bhīṣma, lying on his bed of arrows, instructs him at great length in the duties of a king, the conduct proper in times of distress, and finally the dharma of liberation. The teaching is realistic and often harsh. The king must punish, wage war, use spies and deceive enemies; without him the world would fall into anarchy. Yet he must also protect the weak, honour the learned, take only a fair share of his subjects’ produce, and remember that his authority comes from his duty to protect. The book’s arrangement — from the dharma of kings through the dharma of distress to the dharma of liberation — suggests that the realities of power are to be understood, used and finally transcended. Hiltebeitel’s study of dharma in the epic examines this structure (Hiltebeitel 2011).

5.12.5 Buddhist and Jain kingship

Buddhist and Jain traditions developed their own ideals of rule. The Buddhist texts describe the “wheel-turning” king (cakravartin) who conquers the world by dharma rather than force, and the Aggañña Sutta (Dīgha Nikāya 27) offers a theory of the origin of kingship as a contract: when theft and disorder arose, the people chose the most handsome and capable among them to maintain order in return for a share of the rice — the “great elect” (mahāsammata). Aśoka’s edicts are the most famous attempt to rule by Buddhist ideals. Jain texts celebrate kings who protected the community and its non-violent ethic, and Jain writers produced works of statecraft, such as Somadeva’s Nītivākyāmṛta (10th century), that adapted the Arthaśāstra tradition. The comparison shows that “rājadharma” was not one doctrine but a field of competing theories of legitimate power (Volume 18).

5.13 Dharma in Narrative: The Many Rāmāyaṇas

For most Indians, dharma was learned less from law-books than from stories, and above all from the Rāmāyaṇa. Vālmīki’s Sanskrit epic presents Rāma as the embodiment of dharma: the son who accepts exile to keep his father’s word, the king who rules justly. The epic also contains episodes that have troubled its readers for centuries: Rāma’s killing of the monkey-king Vālin from ambush, his demand that Sītā prove her purity by fire after her rescue, his later banishment of her on the strength of popular gossip, and, in the last book, his killing of the Śūdra Śambūka for practising austerities. Later tellings responded to these problems in different ways. Kampaṉ’s Tamil Irāmāvatāram (c. 12th century) and Tulasīdās’s Awadhi Rāmcaritmānas (begun 1574) recast the story as devotional poetry in which Rāma is fully divine; some versions introduce an illusory Sītā who suffers the abduction and the ordeal in place of the real one. Jain versions make Rāma a Jain hero who renounces the world, and give Lakṣmaṇa, not Rāma, the killing of Rāvaṇa; Buddhist Jātaka versions differ again.

A. K. Ramanujan’s essay on the “three hundred Rāmāyaṇas” argued that these are not corruptions of a single original but a family of tellings, each responding to its own audience. In the twentieth century the story was reread from below: Periyar’s attack on the Rāmāyaṇa as a charter of Aryan and Brahmin domination over the Dravidian south (Chapter 14), feminist rereadings of Sītā’s trials, and Dalit readings of Śambūka. These debates are debates about dharma: about what righteousness requires of a king, a husband and a society, and about whose suffering counts. They show that the tradition’s most influential model of dharma has always been an object of argument as well as of devotion.

5.14 Dharma as “Religion” and “Sanātana Dharma”

In the nineteenth century, Indian writers needed a word for “religion” in the European sense — a bounded tradition with doctrines and adherents — and they increasingly used dharma: hindū dharma, bauddha dharma, islām dharma. The phrase sanātana dharma, “eternal dharma”, was adopted by defenders of orthodoxy as the name of their tradition, and later by many Hindus as a preferred name for Hinduism. The phrase is old: Manu (4.138), for example, closes his rule on speech that is both true and pleasant (Chapter 7) with the words “this is the eternal dharma”. But in the classical texts it describes particular rules or customs as ancient and binding, not a religion. Hacker and Halbfass traced how dharma was reinterpreted in the modern period as a universal religion or ethic, in dialogue with European ideas of religion and morality (Hacker 1995; Halbfass 1988). Wilfred Cantwell Smith’s history of the concept of “religion” itself is a useful companion (Smith 1963).

This history matters for comparison. When dharma is compared with Western “natural law”, with the Confucian li (ritual propriety) and ren (humaneness), or with Kant’s categorical imperative, the comparison is illuminating only if we specify which dharma is meant. The Mahābhārata’s subtle dharma, which knows that duties conflict, invites comparison with Aristotle’s practical wisdom or with the moral dilemmas of tragedy; the Dharmaśāstra’s codified dharma, with its graded duties by birth, invites comparison with other hierarchical legal orders, such as the estates of medieval Europe; Aśoka’s dhamma invites comparison with Hellenistic royal philosophy; the Buddhist dhamma, with other teachings of liberation. To speak simply of “the dharmic worldview” is to lose all these distinctions.

5.14.1 Careful comparisons

Three comparisons, carefully made, show what dharma shares with other ethical traditions and where it differs.

Natural law.

The Stoic and Thomist tradition of natural law holds that moral norms are grounded in the nature of the world and of human beings and can be known by reason. Brahmanical dharma resembles natural law in grounding duty in the order of things; it differs in holding that dharma is known primarily from the Veda and tradition rather than from reason (the Mīmāṃsā school insisted that dharma cannot be known by perception or inference at all), and in making duties depend on class, stage of life, region and family rather than on a universal human nature.

Confucian ritual.

The Confucian concept of li, ritual propriety, resembles dharma in binding together cosmic order, ritual and social roles, and in teaching that each person fulfils his humanity by performing the duties of his station — as ruler, subject, father, son, husband, wife, elder or younger brother, friend. The Confucian tradition, however, gave no place to rebirth or to liberation from the world, and it located the source of moral order in the example of sage-kings and in human cultivation rather than in revelation.

Kant.

Kant’s categorical imperative requires one to act only on maxims that can be willed as universal law, and to treat persons always as ends. The Gītā’s ethic of action without attachment to results resembles Kant’s emphasis on duty for its own sake, a resemblance that Indian philosophers of the colonial period often noticed. But the Gītā’s duty is the duty of one’s own station (svadharma), not a universal law; and its ultimate aim is liberation, not the autonomy of a rational will.

Such comparisons are useful precisely because they reveal differences. To say simply that dharma is “India’s natural law” or “India’s categorical imperative” is to lose what is distinctive in each.

5.15 Dharma and Human Rights

The language of universal human rights, codified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations in 1948, poses a sharp comparative question for the dharma traditions. Brahmanical dharma is a law of duties that differ according to class, stage of life and gender; human rights are entitlements that belong equally to every person as such. Can the two be reconciled?

Indians took part in drafting the Declaration. Hansa Mehta, a member of the Commission on Human Rights, is credited with securing the change of the wording of Article 1 from “All men are born free and equal” to “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”. The Indian Constitution, adopted the following year, gave legal force to many of the same rights. Its framers drew on British, American, Irish and French models and on the international discussions of the period; Ambedkar, as noted above and in Chapter 12, traced its principles of liberty, equality and fraternity to the Buddha.

Scholars have responded to the question of compatibility in different ways. Raimon Panikkar, a Catholic priest and scholar of Indian and Spanish parentage, argued that the concept of human rights presupposes a Western view of the individual and of society, and that dharma could serve as a “homeomorphic equivalent” — a concept performing a comparable function within a different understanding of the world — that would correct the individualism of the rights tradition by placing persons within an order of relationships and duties (Panikkar 1982). Amartya Sen, by contrast, rejected the claim that “Asian values” are opposed to individual liberty, pointing to the defence of toleration and public reasoning by Aśoka and Akbar and to the variety of the Indian argumentative tradition (Sen 2005). Dalit critics have answered more bluntly: the hierarchical dharma of the Dharmaśāstras is incompatible with equal rights, and the Constitution represents a break with it, not its continuation.

Each of these positions captures something. The Dharmaśāstric scheme of differentiated duties cannot be made into a doctrine of equal rights without abandoning its central principle. Other strands of the dharma traditions — the “common dharma” of non-injury and truthfulness owed to all, the Buddhist and Jain extension of moral concern to all beings, the devotional denial that God respects caste, Aśoka’s edicts on toleration — offer real resources for a culture of rights. And the language of duties has its own value as a complement to the language of rights, as Gandhi argued when he said that rights flow from duties well performed. A comparative account need not choose a single verdict; it should show which parts of the tradition support which conclusions.

5.16 Dharma in Modern India

The modern history of the concept is a history of reinterpretation. Gandhi treated dharma as the moral law, identified it with truth and non-violence, and defended a reformed varṇa without untouchability (Chapter 12). Ambedkar rejected the Brahmanical dharma and turned to the Buddha’s dhamma, which he presented as a social ethic of liberty, equality and fraternity. The Constitution created a secular state, often described in Hindi as dharmanirapekṣa, “neutral with respect to dharma”, using the word in its modern sense of “religion”. Hindu nationalist writers have used dharma to describe a national culture. Each of these uses has a history and a politics, and each can be traced back to one strand of a very old and plural tradition.

The symbols of the republic also draw on the vocabulary of dharma, selectively. The wheel at the centre of the national flag is the Aśokan dharmacakra, the wheel of the law, from the Sarnath capital; the motto of the Supreme Court of India, yato dharmas tato jayaḥ (“where there is dharma, there is victory”), is a phrase that recurs in the Mahābhārata. In both cases a Buddhist or epic symbol has been given a new meaning as the law of a secular, democratic state. The choice illustrates the way in which modern India has used its traditions: not by adopting the Dharmaśāstras as law, which the Constitution firmly rejected, but by reinterpreting their most general ideals — order, justice, righteousness — in the light of constitutional values.

Debate about Ram Rajya, the “rule of Rāma”, illustrates the same process. Gandhi used the phrase for his ideal of a just and non-violent society, in which the ruler serves the poorest, and he insisted that he meant by it the kingdom of God on earth rather than a Hindu state; Muslim and Dalit critics pointed out that the Rāmāyaṇa’s Rāma also killed the Śūdra ascetic Śambūka for practising austerities forbidden to his class, and banished his wife on the strength of rumour. The phrase has since been used by political movements with very different aims. Here, as with dharma itself, an ideal drawn from tradition carries the whole of that tradition’s history, including the parts its modern users would prefer to forget.

Further Reading

  • Olivelle (2009) and Hiltebeitel (2011): the semantic and literary history of dharma.

  • Olivelle (2005): critical edition and translation of Manu.

  • Davis (2010): an account of Hindu law in practice.

  • Kane (1930–1962): the classic survey of Dharmaśāstra.

  • Dumont (1980), Smith (1994), Dirks (2001) and Chakravarti (2003): contrasting approaches to caste and gender.

  • Ambedkar (1936): the most influential modern critique.

  • Matilal (1989): essays on moral dilemmas in the Mahābhārata.