Chapter 7: Non-violence and Truth: Ethical Ideals Across Traditions¶
savve pāṇā savve bhūyā savve jīvā savve sattā na hantavvā…
esa dhamme suddhe ṇiie sāsae
No breathing, existing, living, sentient creature should be killed … This is the pure, unchanging, eternal law.
— Ācārāṅga Sūtra 1.4.1 (Jain canon)
7.1 Two Ideals, Many Traditions¶
Non-violence (ahiṃsā) and truthfulness (satya) head almost every Indian list of virtues. They are the first two of the five great vows of Jain monks and nuns, the first two restraints (yama) of Patañjali’s Yoga, and the first two of the common duties in many Brahmanical lists; Buddhist ethics gives them a place in its precepts and in the noble eightfold path; and in the twentieth century Gandhi made them the twin foundations of his politics. It is tempting to conclude that they were the shared core of “Indian ethics”. They were indeed widely shared, but each tradition understood them differently, set different limits to them and argued with the others about those limits. This chapter traces those differences.
7.2 The Rise of Ahiṃsā¶
7.2.1 Sacrifice and its critics¶
The Vedic religion centred on sacrifice, and many sacrifices involved killing animals. Already in the later Vedic ritual texts there are signs of unease: animals are killed by suffocation outside the sacred enclosure, the victim’s consent is ritually sought, and some passages speak of the victim taking revenge in the next world. The Chāndogya Upaniṣad lists non-injury (ahiṃsā) among the “gifts” that a person makes as an inner sacrifice, together with austerity, generosity, uprightness and truthful speech (3.17.4), and its final passage praises the householder who “does not harm any creature except at holy places” (8.15) — an exception that shows how the ideal was reconciled with sacrifice (Olivelle 1998).
The decisive impulse came from the renunciant movements of the eastern Ganges valley. Both the Jains and the Buddhists made non-injury fundamental and attacked animal sacrifice as cruel and useless. Ludwig Alsdorf’s classic study argued that the Brahmanical tradition’s growing preference for vegetarianism and its veneration of the cow were in large part responses to this challenge; D. N. Jha has documented the extensive references to meat-eating, including beef, in the Vedic and early Brahmanical texts (Alsdorf 2010; Jha 2002). The history of these practices is contested and politically sensitive in modern India, but the textual evidence that early Vedic religion included animal sacrifice and meat-eating is not in serious dispute among historians.
7.2.2 The Mīmāṃsā defence of sacrifice¶
The Brahmanical exegetes of the Veda did not simply concede the renunciants’ case. The Mīmāṃsā school, whose task was to interpret the Vedic injunctions, faced a direct question: the Veda commands certain animal sacrifices, while a general rule, accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas themselves, forbids injury to any being. How can both be valid? The answer developed by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (seventh century) and others was that the general prohibition and the specific injunction operate in different domains: the injunction to sacrifice establishes that the sacrifice achieves its ritual result, while the injury involved may still carry its own consequence, or, on another view, injury performed at the Veda’s command is not the forbidden injury at all. A maxim often repeated in later literature put it bluntly: Vedic killing is not killing. The Manusmṛti (5.39, 5.44) adopts this position, declaring that the Self-existent created animals for sacrifice and that injury enjoined by the Veda is to be regarded as non-injury. Buddhists and Jains rejected the argument as a pretext for cruelty, and the materialist Cārvākas, as reported in the fourteenth-century Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, ridiculed it: if an animal killed in the sacrifice goes to heaven, why does the sacrificer not offer his own father? The exchange is one of the clearest examples of the long argument between the Vedic and renunciant traditions, and it shows that the Brahmanical acceptance of ahiṃsā was gradual and contested rather than original.
7.2.3 Jain non-violence¶
In Jainism non-violence is the supreme principle from which the other vows follow. The Jain universe is crowded with souls: besides humans and animals, there are souls embodied in earth, water, fire, air and plants, which have only the sense of touch, and myriads of minute creatures. The second chapter of the Tattvārthasūtra classifies living beings by the number of their senses, from one-sensed beings (earth-bodies, water-bodies, fire-bodies, air-bodies and plants) through worms (two senses), ants (three), bees and flies (four) to humans, animals, birds and fish (five) (Umāsvāti 1994). Every action risks harming some of them. Jain monks and nuns therefore carry a whisk (rajoharaṇa) to brush insects from their path, filter their water, do not eat after dark, and in some Śvetāmbara orders wear a cloth over the mouth. Lay Jains take lesser vows that forbid intentional violence to mobile beings while recognising that some harm is unavoidable in worldly life. Jains became strict vegetarians, avoiding also honey, alcohol and, in stricter practice, root vegetables, whose harvesting kills the plant and the many beings in the soil (Dundas 2002; Jaini 1979).
Jain thinkers analysed violence with great subtlety. They distinguished violence by body, speech and mind; violence done, caused to be done and approved; and, above all, the passions — anger, pride, deceit and greed — that make violence binding. Intention mattered; but so did carelessness. The Jain ideal culminates, for a few, in the vow of ending one’s life by gradual fasting (sallekhanā) when death approaches, a practice the community regards as the opposite of suicide because it is undertaken without passion. In 2015 a High Court ruling that it was suicide provoked large Jain protests, and the ruling was stayed by the Supreme Court.
7.2.4 Buddhist non-harming¶
The first of the five precepts taken by Buddhist lay people is “I undertake the training rule to abstain from taking life”. The Buddha’s emphasis on intention (Chapter 6) shaped Buddhist non-violence: killing is wrong because of the hatred or greed behind it, and its gravity depends on the being killed and the state of mind of the killer. The positive counterpart is loving-kindness (mettā) and compassion (karuṇā). The Karaṇīya Mettā Sutta (Sutta Nipāta 1.8), recited daily in Theravāda countries, wishes that all beings, weak or strong, seen or unseen, near or far, born or yet to be born, may be happy, and asks the practitioner to cultivate towards all a boundless mind, as a mother protects her only child (Harvey 2000).
On diet, Buddhist traditions diverged. The Pali Vinaya allows monks to accept meat provided they have not seen, heard or suspected that the animal was killed for them; the Theravāda tradition has largely followed this rule. Several Mahāyāna sūtras, notably the Laṅkāvatāra, condemn meat-eating, and Chinese Buddhist monasticism became vegetarian. Tibetan Buddhists, living where vegetables were scarce, generally ate meat. The emperor Aśoka, a Buddhist, records in his first rock edict that the animals killed daily for the royal kitchen had been reduced to two peacocks and a deer, and that even these would soon not be killed; his fifth pillar edict lists species protected from slaughter (Thapar 2002).
7.2.5 The Brahmanical synthesis¶
The Dharmaśāstras absorbed the ideal of non-injury while preserving Vedic sacrifice. Manu condemns meat-eating in strong terms — “meat can never be obtained without injury to living beings” (5.48), and the one who permits, cuts, kills, buys, sells, cooks, serves and eats are all “killers” (5.51) — but he also declares that animals were created for sacrifice and that “the injury sanctioned by the Veda” should be regarded as non-injury (5.39, 5.44), and he permits meat in rituals and in times of distress (Olivelle 2005). The tension is left unresolved; the commentators debated it for centuries. The Mahābhārata repeatedly declares that “non-injury is the highest dharma” (ahiṃsā paramo dharmaḥ), particularly in its didactic books, while also telling stories in which killing is a duty. One passage of the Anuśāsanaparvan calls non-injury the highest dharma, the highest self-restraint, the highest gift and the highest austerity. A line often quoted in modern popular sources as the continuation of the phrase — that “violence in defence of dharma is also dharma” — is not found in the critical edition of the epic and appears to be a modern addition; it should not be cited as scripture.
7.2.6 Tamil and other voices¶
The Tamil Tirukkuṟaḷ (c. 5th century), a collection of 1,330 couplets on virtue, wealth and love, gives whole chapters to “abstaining from meat” (chapter 26) and “not killing” (chapter 33); its author’s religious affiliation is disputed, but its ethics shows the influence of Jain ideas (Volume 8). The sant poets of north India were mostly vegetarian and mocked ritual slaughter by Hindus and Muslims alike. The Sikh tradition left diet largely to individual conscience, but the Sikh code of conduct forbids eating meat slaughtered by the Muslim ritual method; and the tenth Guru, Gobind Singh, in the Persian Zafarnāma attributed to him, defended the use of the sword when all other means have failed. At the Mughal court, Jain monks persuaded Akbar to forbid animal slaughter on certain days (Chapter 16).
7.3 Non-violence and Its Limits¶
7.3.1 War and the warrior’s duty¶
None of the Indian traditions except the strictest Jain monastic ideal held that all violence is forbidden to everyone. The Brahmanical texts assigned warfare to the Kṣatriya class and elaborated rules of righteous war (dharmayuddha): warriors should fight only their equals, should not strike the fleeing, the unarmed or those who surrender, and should spare non-combatants. How far these rules were observed is another question, and the Mahābhārata itself shows them being broken by both sides. The ethics of war is discussed in Volume 20. The Bhagavadgītā is set on a battlefield and urges a reluctant warrior to fight; Gandhi read the battle as an allegory of the inner struggle, but most commentators, ancient and modern, have read it as a defence of the warrior’s duty. Buddhist kings fought wars, and Buddhist texts developed justifications for violence in defence of the Dharma. Non-violence was an ideal of great power, but in every tradition it coexisted with an acknowledged place for coercion.
7.3.2 Non-violence as royal policy¶
Before Gandhi, non-violence was occasionally made a principle of state policy, always within limits. Aśoka restricted the killing of animals and renounced wars of conquest while keeping his army and warning the forest peoples of his power (Chapter 5). In twelfth-century Gujarat, the Caulukya king Kumārapāla, influenced by the Jain polymath Hemacandra, is said by Jain chroniclers to have prohibited animal slaughter in his kingdom; the extent of the prohibition is uncertain, but the story shows the influence of the Jain merchant community on royal policy. Mughal emperors, as noted above, made concessions on animal slaughter at the request of Jain monks. None of these rulers abandoned war or the death penalty. The modern Indian state’s Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act (1960) and its laws protecting wildlife belong to a different, largely secular, tradition of animal welfare, though their advocates have often appealed to Indian religious ideals.
7.3.3 Buddhist ethics of war¶
Buddhist texts generally condemn killing, but Buddhist societies faced the same need for defence and punishment as others. Some Mahāyāna texts discuss whether a bodhisattva may kill to prevent a greater evil — for example, to stop a robber about to murder many people — and allow it as an act of compassion that the bodhisattva accepts at the cost of his own karmic suffering. The Sri Lankan chronicle Mahāvaṃsa (c. 5th–6th century) tells how the king Duṭṭhagāmaṇī, troubled by the killing of thousands in his war against the Tamil king Eḷāra, was consoled by monks who told him that only one and a half of those killed had been true Buddhists. The passage has been cited in modern times both as evidence of Buddhist justifications of violence and as a cautionary example. As with the Hindu and Jain cases, the ideal of non-injury coexisted with arguments for exceptions.
7.3.4 Non-violence and diet in modern India¶
In modern India the ideal of non-injury has been linked with vegetarianism and the protection of the cow. Article 48 of the Constitution, one of the non-binding Directive Principles, asks the state to take steps to prohibit cow slaughter, and most states have laws to that effect. In recent decades cow protection has also become the occasion of political mobilisation and of violence, much of it directed against Muslims and Dalits engaged in cattle trade or leather work. It is a sharp irony, and a warning against treating “ahiṃsā” as a simple national virtue, that an ideal of non-injury has been invoked to justify injury.
7.4 Truth¶
7.4.1 Ṛta and satya¶
In the Ṛgveda, truth (satya) is closely linked with cosmic order (ṛta); both are guarded by Varuṇa, and the “truth-act” — a solemn declaration of truth that compels the world to respond — appears in Vedic and later literature, including Buddhist tales. In the Upaniṣads truth becomes a name of ultimate reality itself. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka (1.4.14) identifies dharma with truth. The Taittirīya Upaniṣad’s charge to the departing student (1.11) begins: “Speak the truth; practise dharma; do not neglect your recitation.” The Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad provided the Republic of India with its national motto:
Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad 3.1.6
satyam eva jayate nānṛtaṃ satyena panthā vitato devayānaḥ
yenākramanty ṛṣayo hy āptakāmā yatra tat satyasya paramaṃ nidhānam
Truth alone prevails, not untruth. By truth is laid out the path to the gods, by which the seers, their desires fulfilled, ascend to where that highest treasure of truth is.
The first words of this verse, satyam eva jayate, were adopted in 1950 as the national motto of the Republic of India and appear beneath the Aśokan lion capital on the state emblem, in Devanāgarī script. The choice is an example of the selective use of tradition discussed in Chapter 5: a phrase from an Upaniṣad, in which truth is the path to the world of the gods and the treasure of the seers, has become a civic maxim about the victory of truth in public life. The reinterpretation is legitimate, and Gandhi’s identification of truth with God gave it a modern meaning that many Indians share; but it is a reinterpretation. In its Upaniṣadic setting the verse concerns the inner discipline of the seeker, not the honesty of governments. That modern India chose a maxim about truth for its motto, and an emblem from a Buddhist emperor’s pillar for its seal, nonetheless says something about the self-image its founders hoped to project: a state founded on truth and righteousness rather than on conquest or faith.
7.4.2 Truth and its competitors¶
If truth was praised everywhere, the tradition also recognised that truthfulness can conflict with other duties. Manu (4.138) advises: “one should speak the truth, one should speak what is pleasant; one should not speak an unpleasant truth, nor a pleasant falsehood: this is the eternal dharma.” The commentary on the Yogasūtra (c. 325–425 CE) attributed to Vyāsa holds that speech should agree with what has been seen and inferred, and that it should be uttered for the benefit of all beings; speech that harms is not truth but a semblance of virtue. The Mahābhārata tells the story of the ascetic Kauśika, who had vowed always to tell the truth; when robbers asked him which way some fleeing travellers had gone, he told them, the travellers were killed, and Kauśika went to hell. Kṛṣṇa tells the story to persuade Arjuna that dharma cannot be reduced to a rule. The epic also tells, against this, the story of Yudhiṣṭhira’s half-lie and its consequences (Chapter 5).
The most famous Indian exemplar of truth at any cost is King Hariścandra, who in the version of the Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa gives up his kingdom, his wife and son and his own freedom rather than break his word. Gandhi records in his autobiography that a play on Hariścandra, seen in his boyhood, haunted him and made him ask why all should not be truthful like him (Gandhi 1927).
7.4.3 Truth in the yoga and Buddhist paths¶
Patañjali lists truthfulness as the second of the five restraints (yama), after non-injury, and adds that when the restraints are practised without exception of class, place, time or circumstance they constitute the “great vow” (mahāvrata) (Yogasūtra 2.30–31) (Maas 2013). The Buddhist path includes right speech: abstaining from lies, divisive speech, harsh speech and idle chatter. The Buddha’s discourses advise speaking only what is true, beneficial and timely, and sometimes keeping silent even when a statement would be true.
The Jain vow of truthfulness is subordinated explicitly to non-injury. Jain texts on monastic conduct instruct monks and nuns to avoid not only false speech but true speech that would cause harm — harsh words, words that reveal a hiding animal to a hunter, words that provoke violence — and to prefer silence or carefully qualified statements in such cases. The Jain treatment thus resolves in advance the dilemma that the Brahmanical story of Kauśika, discussed above, leaves troubling: where truth and non-injury conflict, non-injury prevails, but the solution is silence rather than a lie. The three traditions agree that truthfulness is a fundamental virtue; they differ, in instructive ways, on what to do when it collides with others.
7.4.4 Truth and many-sidedness¶
The Jains combined the vow of truthfulness with a distinctive epistemology. The doctrine of “non-one-sidedness” (anekāntavāda) holds that reality has infinite aspects, and that every assertion is true only from a particular standpoint (naya); the method of “conditional predication” (syādvāda) expresses this by qualifying statements with “in a certain respect” (syāt) and by a sevenfold scheme of predication. The famous parable of the blind men and the elephant, each of whom describes the animal by the part he touches, is told in Jain, Buddhist and Hindu sources in different forms. Modern Jains often present anekāntavāda as a philosophy of tolerance, and it can support one. Classically, however, it was also a weapon of debate: Jain logicians used it to show that the one-sided views of their opponents were partial, and that the Jain view alone integrated the partial truths (Dundas 2002). It is, in other words, another inclusivism.
7.4.5 Truth in law¶
The legal texts were concerned with truth in a practical setting: the testimony of witnesses. Manu (8.79–101) prescribes how witnesses are to be questioned and solemnly exhorted to tell the truth, and warns of the terrible consequences of false testimony in this life and the next. Yet he also allows (8.103–104) that where telling the truth would lead to the death of a person of any class, a falsehood is to be preferred, and prescribes a small expiation for it. Where evidence failed, the law-books provided for ordeals (divya) — by balance, fire, water or poison — in which the gods were believed to reveal the truth; the Yājñavalkya Smṛti and later digests give detailed procedures (Volume 18). The combination of exhortation, permitted exception and ordeal shows a legal culture that valued truth highly and knew how hard it was to establish.
7.4.6 Truth in philosophy¶
Indian philosophers also asked what truth is and how it is known; the debate between Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā about whether a cognition’s truth is established from outside or is intrinsic to it, which invites comparison with the correspondence and pragmatist theories of modern Western philosophy, is set out with the theory of the means of knowledge in Chapter 4. Buddhist philosophers distinguished two levels of truth. The Madhyamaka philosopher Nāgārjuna (c. 2nd century CE) wrote:
Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 24.8
dve satye samupāśritya buddhānāṃ dharmadeśanā
lokasaṃvṛtisatyaṃ ca satyaṃ ca paramārthataḥ
The Buddhas’ teaching of the Dharma rests on two truths: conventional, worldly truth and truth in the ultimate sense.
Conventional truth is the world of persons, things and causes as ordinarily understood; ultimate truth is their emptiness of intrinsic nature. Advaita Vedānta adopted a similar distinction between the empirical and the ultimate standpoints (Chapter 9), with a very different account of what is ultimately real. In both traditions the highest truth was held to be beyond the reach of ordinary language, though not beyond the reach of argument. Mark Siderits’s introduction shows how these Buddhist arguments can be engaged with by contemporary philosophers (Siderits 2007).
7.4.7 Gandhi’s truth¶
In the twentieth century Gandhi made truth the centre of his religion and politics. He called his autobiography The Story of My Experiments with Truth and named his method of resistance satyāgraha, “holding firmly to truth”. He explained that he had first held that “God is Truth” and later came to say that “Truth is God”, a formulation he thought could be accepted even by an honest atheist. For Gandhi truth and non-violence were inseparable: no one possesses the whole truth, so no one is entitled to impose his truth by violence. This is discussed further in Chapter 12.
Gandhi’s methods had antecedents in Indian practice as well as in his reading of Tolstoy, Ruskin and Thoreau (Chapter 12). Colonial observers described the custom of “sitting dharnā”, in which a creditor or petitioner sat fasting at the door of a debtor or official until his claim was met, and Brahmins in some regions threatened to fast to death to compel kings; Jain ascetics fasted as spiritual discipline, and fasting was a familiar religious practice in Gandhi’s own family. Gandhi transformed these practices by joining them to an explicit ethic of non-injury and truth and by using them in mass political campaigns. The continuity and the transformation are both important: satyāgraha was neither a simple revival of tradition nor an import from the West.
7.4.8 Non-violence and its critics in the freedom struggle¶
Gandhi’s non-violence was never the only strategy of the Indian freedom movement, and Indian critics argued with it vigorously. Revolutionary groups in Bengal, Maharashtra and Punjab from the 1900s onwards used bombs and assassinations, often justifying themselves from the Gītā’s teaching of action without attachment to results. Bhagat Singh (1907–1931), hanged for the killing of a British police officer, wrote while awaiting execution an essay “Why I Am an Atheist” and statements that defended revolutionary violence as a response to the violence of the colonial state; he became, and remains, one of the most popular heroes of the national movement. Subhas Chandra Bose, twice president of the Congress, broke with Gandhi and during the Second World War led the Indian National Army, formed with Japanese support, against the British. Ambedkar criticised Gandhi’s fasts as a form of coercion when directed against the Depressed Classes (Chapter 12). Historians continue to debate how far independence was won by non-violent mass movements, by the threat of violence, or by the weakening of Britain in the Second World War. What is clear is that the Indian tradition of argument about non-violence, traced in this chapter from the Vedic sacrifice to the renouncers, continued vigorously in the twentieth century.
7.5 Comparisons¶
Comparisons with other traditions help to clarify what is distinctive here. Christian traditions include strong currents of non-retaliation and pacifism, from the Sermon on the Mount through the Anabaptists and Quakers to Tolstoy, who influenced Gandhi directly; but they generally restrict moral concern to human beings. Islamic law developed detailed rules limiting the conduct of war and protecting non-combatants. The Confucian virtue of humaneness (ren) centres on human relationships. What distinguishes the Jain tradition in particular is the sheer extent of the beings it brings within the scope of non-injury, and the rigour with which its monks and nuns tried to live accordingly. What distinguishes the Indian traditions more generally is the long, sophisticated and still unfinished argument among them about where the limits of non-injury should be drawn: between Vedic sacrifice and renunciant critique, between the warrior’s duty and the monk’s vow, between Theravāda and Mahāyāna monks on meat, between Gandhi and his critics on the use of force (Table 7.1). Christopher Chapple’s study of non-violence towards animals, the earth and the self in Asian traditions gives an overview of these debates (Chapple 1993).
| Tradition | Scope of non-injury | Recognised limits or exceptions |
|---|---|---|
| Jain | all living beings, including those with one sense (earth, water, fire, air and plant bodies); intention and carelessness both count | lay vows graded; unavoidable harm in household life minimised rather than eliminated |
| Buddhist | all sentient beings; the first precept forbids intentional killing | intention decisive; Theravāda monks may accept meat not killed for them; debates about war and kingship |
| Brahmanical | a general duty (Manu 10.63), increasingly emphasised | Vedic sacrifice, the warrior’s duty, punishment by the king |
| Sikh | compassion (dayā) as a virtue; the communal kitchen (laṅgar) serves vegetarian food, though views on meat-eating vary | armed defence of the oppressed as a last resort |
| Gandhian | non-violence in thought, word and deed as a political method and a way of life | Gandhi held that violence is preferable to cowardice |
7.5.1 Animals in other traditions¶
Concern for animals was not unique to India. In the Greek world, Pythagoras and his followers abstained from meat, partly on the ground that souls pass between human and animal bodies, a doctrine that ancient writers sometimes connected, without good evidence, with India; Empedocles condemned animal sacrifice as the killing of kin; and the Neoplatonist Porphyry (third century CE) wrote a treatise On Abstinence from Animal Food. In the Islamic tradition, the Qurʾān describes animals as communities like human communities, and Islamic law prohibits cruelty to animals and regulates slaughter; but it permits the eating of meat and requires sacrifice at the festival of ʿĪd al-Aḍḥā. In modern Western philosophy, the case for moral concern for animals was made by Jeremy Bentham and, in the twentieth century, by Peter Singer and Tom Regan on the basis of the capacity to suffer or of animals’ inherent value. These arguments are secular and do not depend on rebirth, but modern animal-rights and vegetarian movements in the West have often drawn inspiration from Indian, and especially Jain and Buddhist, examples.
7.5.2 Non-violence as a world tradition¶
The modern idea of non-violent resistance was formed by exchanges across continents. Gandhi drew on Thoreau’s essay on civil disobedience (1849) and on Tolstoy’s Christian pacifism, whose influence on him is described in Chapter 12; Tolstoy’s “Letter to a Hindu” (1908), written to an Indian revolutionary, urged Indians to free themselves by refusing to cooperate with evil rather than by violence, and Gandhi translated it and corresponded with its author until Tolstoy’s death in 1910. Gandhi’s methods in turn were adopted and adapted by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, whose Khudai Khidmatgar (“Servants of God”), founded in 1929, organised Pashtun Muslims in non-violent resistance on the North-West Frontier; by Martin Luther King Jr., who visited India in 1959 and described non-violence as the method and Christian love as the motive of the American civil-rights movement; and by many others discussed in Chapter 12. Non-violence, in its modern political form, is thus a joint creation of Indian, Christian, Muslim and secular traditions, which is itself a good example of what samanvaya can mean.
Truth, too, was argued about. The Indian traditions did not simply praise truthfulness; they asked whether truth must always be spoken, whether it may be withheld for the sake of others, whether any one standpoint can grasp the whole truth, and whether ultimate truth can be expressed in words at all. Those questions remain open, and they are one of the richest legacies of the traditions surveyed in this volume.
Further Reading¶
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Chapple (1993): non-violence in Jain, Buddhist and Hindu traditions.
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Alsdorf (2010) and Jha (2002): the history of vegetarianism and of meat-eating in India.
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Jaini (1979): the Jain path, including non-violence and many-sidedness.
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Harvey (2000): Buddhist ethics.
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Gandhi (1927): Gandhi’s own account of his “experiments with truth”.