Chapter 1: Introduction: Polity and Law in Indian Traditions¶
This volume is about how people in the Indian subcontinent, over some two and a half thousand years, thought about political power and about law: what kings were for and how they should rule; how states should be organised, financed and defended; how disputes should be settled and wrongs punished; how families, castes, guilds and villages should govern themselves; and how all of this related to the order of the world and to the good life. Its main sources are the Sanskrit treatises on polity (arthaśāstra, nītiśāstra) and on dharma (dharmaśāstra), together with the Sanskrit epics, Buddhist and Jain texts, inscriptions, Islamic legal and political writings, colonial law reports and the Constitution of independent India.
The subject has been surrounded by two opposed distortions. One, common in popular and some nationalist writing, treats the classical texts as a storehouse of timeless wisdom that “anticipated” modern constitutional government, welfare states, human rights, consumer protection and international law, and passes quickly over their hierarchy of caste and gender. The other, found in colonial and some later writing, treats the same texts as evidence of an unchanging, despotic and priest-ridden society. This book tries to avoid both. It follows the texts closely and dates them according to current scholarship; it presents their intellectual achievements, which are considerable; and it states plainly what they prescribed for Śūdras, Dalits and women, and what modern critics — above all B. R. Ambedkar — made of those prescriptions. It also places the Brahmanical śāstras in a wider landscape that includes Buddhist and Jain political thought, customary and local law, Islamic law and Mughal administration, and the transformations of the colonial period.
1.1 Key Terms¶
1.1.1 Rājanīti, Arthaśāstra, Daṇḍanīti¶
Rājanīti means “royal policy” or “the conduct of kings”, and is used here, as in modern Indian languages, for the whole field of political thought and statecraft. The classical Sanskrit name for the discipline was arthaśāstra, “the science of artha” — material well-being, wealth and power, and above all the territory and people from which a king’s power derives (Chapter 3). It was also called daṇḍanīti, “the policy of the rod”, because its central concern was the king’s coercive power (daṇḍa) and its proper use, and nītiśāstra, “the science of policy”, a term that covers later verse manuals and collections of maxims. The one complete surviving treatise of the discipline is the Arthaśāstra ascribed to Kauṭilya, a composite work of c. 50 BCE–300 CE.
1.1.2 Dharma and Dharmaśāstra¶
Dharma is notoriously difficult to translate. Derived from the root dhṛ, “to hold, support”, it came to mean the order that upholds the world and society, and the duties, rights and rules of conduct that sustain that order: religious obligations, moral virtues, the duties of one’s varṇa and stage of life, the customs of one’s community, and law in the sense of rules applied in courts (Chapters 2 and 9). Dharmaśāstra is the Sanskrit scholarly literature on dharma, from the Dharmasūtras of the last centuries BCE to the medieval commentaries and digests. In it, dharma is above all svadharma, one’s own particular duty, which differs according to varṇa, āśrama, gender and circumstance.
1.1.3 Vyavahāra, Daṇḍa, Prāyaścitta¶
Within Dharmaśāstra, vyavahāra (“transaction”, hence “lawsuit”) is the part dealing with courts, procedure and the titles of law (Chapters 12 and 13); daṇḍa is punishment by the king (Chapter 14); prāyaścitta is penance for sin. Ācāra, “conduct”, covers the rites of passage, daily duties, purity and the rules of the varṇas and āśramas (Chapter 15).
1.1.4 Varṇa and Jāti¶
Two terms for social groups recur throughout. Varṇa refers to the fourfold scheme of the texts — Brahmin, Kṣatriya, Vaiśya and Śūdra — in which the first three are “twice-born” and the Śūdra is assigned to their service, with groups regarded as untouchable placed below or outside the four. Jāti, “birth”, refers to the many endogamous hereditary groups of social life, which the English word “caste” usually denotes. The texts tried to map jātis onto varṇas and to rank them (Chapter 10). The relation between these textual schemes and social reality is a major problem of Indian history; this book uses “varṇa” for the textual categories and “caste” in the ordinary modern sense, and does not assume that either was static.
1.2 The Sources¶
1.2.1 The Śāstras¶
The core sources are the śāstras: technical treatises in Sanskrit, written by and largely for Brahmin specialists, which set out the rules of a discipline. They are normative texts: they say how things ought to be done. They draw on and sometimes record practice, but they cannot be read as descriptions of how any particular kingdom was governed or any particular court decided cases. The relationship between śāstra and practice is one of the main themes of modern scholarship (Chapters 9 and 16) (Lingat 1973; Davis 2010).
1.2.2 The Epics and Other Literature¶
The Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa, composed over several centuries around the turn of the era, contain long discussions of kingship and dharma, and their stories of good and bad kings, of war and its moral costs, shaped Indian political imagination more than any treatise (Chapter 5). Story literature such as the Pañcatantra, framed as instruction for princes, taught political maxims to a wide audience. Tamil literature contributed its own tradition of political ethics in the Tirukkuṟaḷ.
1.2.3 Buddhist, Jain and Islamic Texts¶
The Pali canon of the Theravāda Buddhists and other Buddhist literature contain accounts of the origin of kingship, ideals of the righteous ruler and the most detailed procedural law of early India in the monastic code (Chapter 8). Jain authors wrote on polity and adapted Brahmanical social theory. From the thirteenth century, Arabic and Persian works of Islamic jurisprudence and political ethics, and the records of the Delhi Sultanate and the Mughal empire, provide another major body of evidence (Chapter 18).
1.2.4 Inscriptions and Records¶
Inscriptions on stone and copper plate — from Aśoka’s edicts in the third century BCE to the land grants and temple records of the medieval period — are the most important evidence for how kings presented their rule and how local institutions worked. Later, Mughal and colonial archives, court records and law reports document legal practice in detail.
1.3 Chronology¶
Dating Indian texts is difficult, and older books often give dates that current scholarship has revised. This volume follows the series standard: academic ranges are given first, and traditional dates are labelled as traditional. The most important dates for this volume are:
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Ṛgveda, c. 1500–1200 BCE (core); later Vedic texts c. 1200–500 BCE (Chapter 2).
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The Buddha, c. 480–400 BCE on the short chronology now widely accepted (traditional Theravāda dates 624–544 BCE); Mahāvīra an older contemporary.
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Aśoka, r. c. 268–232 BCE (Chapter 8).
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Dharmasūtras, c. 3rd–1st centuries BCE (Chapter 9).
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Arthaśāstra, a composite text of c. 50 BCE–300 CE (Olivelle); its attribution to Kauṭilya or Cāṇakya, minister of Candragupta Maurya (c. 300 BCE), is traditional (Chapter 3).
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Manusmṛti, c. 2nd century CE (Olivelle) (Chapter 10).
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Mahābhārata and Rāmāyaṇa, composed over several centuries, c. 400 BCE–400 CE.
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Yājñavalkyasmṛti, c. 4th–5th century CE; Nāradasmṛti, c. 5th–6th century; Bṛhaspati and Kātyāyana, c. 6th–7th century (Chapter 11).
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Kāmandaka’s Nītisāra, c. 500–700 CE.
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Mitākṣarā of Vijñāneśvara, c. 1100–1120; Dāyabhāga of Jīmūtavāhana, c. 12th century.
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Mānasollāsa, 1131; Kalhaṇa’s Rājataraṅgiṇī, 1148–49; Vijayanagara, c. 1336–1565 (Chapter 17).
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Delhi Sultanate, 1206–1526; Mughal empire, from 1526; Fatāwā-i ʿĀlamgīrī, compiled in the 1660s and early 1670s (Chapter 18).
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Hastings’s Judicial Plan, 1772; Indian Penal Code, 1860; Constitution of India, 1950; Hindu Code, 1955–56 (Chapters 19 and 20).
A fuller chronology is given at the end of the volume.
1.4 Rājanīti and Dharmaśāstra: Two Traditions¶
The two halves of this volume’s title name two Sanskrit traditions that overlapped and argued with each other: one written for the king and his ministers and judging policy by its effects on power and prosperity, the other written for Brahmin experts and householders and judging conduct by its conformity to dharma. Both took a hierarchical society for granted, and the Yājñavalkyasmṛti ruled that where they conflict, dharmaśāstra prevails (Yājñ 2.21). Their shared ground and their differences are discussed in Chapter 9; the Mahābhārata, which incorporates both, dramatised the tension between them in the figure of a king who must use violence to protect dharma and is tormented by the cost (Chapter 5).
1.5 A Vocabulary of Rule¶
Sanskrit political writing has a rich vocabulary, and several words recur so often that it is useful to introduce them here. The ruler is rājan (king), nṛpa or narapati (“lord of men”), bhūpati or pṛthivīpati (“lord of the earth”) and, in the Arthaśāstra’s analysis, svāmin, “owner” or “lord”. The ruled are prajā, a word that means both “subjects” and “offspring”, so that the king’s relationship to his people is constantly compared to a father’s to his children. The territory is rāṣṭra, janapada or deśa; the kingdom as a whole is rājya. The king’s officials are amātya or mantrin, and his chaplain the purohita. Political action is described in terms of nīti (policy, leading), naya (prudence), upāya (means) and yoga (application); its goals are the protection (rakṣaṇa, pālana) of the subjects and the “acquisition and secure possession” of good things (yogakṣema); its instrument is daṇḍa.
Legal vocabulary is equally developed. A lawsuit is vyavahāra; its parties are the plaintiff (vādin, arthin) and the defendant (prativādin, pratyarthin); the judge is the prāḍvivāka or dharmastha, the assessors the sabhya; evidence is pramāṇa; witnesses are sākṣin; documents lekhya; possession bhukti; ordeals divya. The texts distinguish ownership (svatva, svāmya) from possession, debt (ṛṇa) from deposit (nikṣepa), and the property of women (strīdhana) from that of the family. A glossary at the end of the volume lists the most important terms.
These words did not have fixed meanings across two millennia. Dharma, as Chapter 2 shows, had a long history before it became the name of a science; rājan meant a tribal chief in the Ṛgveda and an imperial monarch in the Gupta inscriptions; sabhā could mean a Vedic gathering, a royal court of justice or the assembly of a Brahmin village. Reading the sources historically means paying attention to such changes.
1.6 Beyond the King¶
Indian political thought is often equated with the theory of kingship, and the texts on which this book is based were indeed written for or about kings. But monarchy was not the only form of rule in early India, and kings were not the only holders of authority. The gaṇa or saṅgha polities of the Buddha’s time, governed by assemblies of the heads of ruling clans, survived in parts of northern and western India for several centuries, and the Arthaśāstra devotes a book to them (Chapter 8). Within kingdoms, guilds, merchant associations, temple bodies, caste councils and village assemblies regulated much of social and economic life, and inscriptions record their rules and decisions (Chapters 13 and 16). Brahmin scholars, Buddhist and Jain monastic communities and, later, Muslim jurists exercised a different kind of authority, based on learning and religious prestige rather than force.
The texts were also written in many languages. Sanskrit dominates this book because the major treatises on polity and law were written in it; but Pali Buddhist texts, Prakrit inscriptions, the Tamil Tirukkuṟaḷ and Caṅkam poetry, Persian works on statecraft and ethics, and Arabic works of Islamic jurisprudence are equally part of the history of Indian political and legal thought. The volume gives them a place, though it cannot treat them all at the length they deserve.
1.7 Voices of Dissent¶
The hierarchical vision of the Brahmanical texts did not go unchallenged within Indian traditions. The Buddha and Mahāvīra rejected the claim that birth determined worth (Chapter 8). In the twelfth century, the Vīraśaiva poet-saint Basavaṇṇa and his companions in the Kannada country composed devotional sayings (vacana) that mocked caste pride and ritual purity and welcomed devotees of every caste into their community. Bhakti poets in many languages — among them the Tamil Āḻvārs and Nāyaṉmārs, Cokhāmeḷā and Tukārām in Marathi, Kabīr and Ravidās in the north — proclaimed that devotion, not birth, made a person acceptable to God, and several of them came from castes regarded as low or untouchable. The Sikh Gurus, from Guru Nānak (1469–1539) onwards, rejected the authority of caste in religious life and instituted the common kitchen (laṅgar) in which all ate together. These movements did not abolish caste in society, and many of them were later absorbed into caste structures; but they show that the language of equality before God was available in Indian traditions long before modern constitutional law. Volumes 4 and 8 of this series discuss them further.
1.8 How Modern Scholarship Came to These Texts¶
The modern study of Indian polity and law began in the colonial courts. From the 1770s the East India Company commissioned digests of Hindu and Islamic law and translations of the Manusmṛti and other texts, in order to administer “native law” in its courts (Chapter 19). William Jones, H. T. Colebrooke and their successors created the first European scholarship on Dharmaśāstra, and their translations shaped both colonial law and European ideas of India. In the later nineteenth century, philologists such as Georg Bühler and Julius Jolly published translations of the main smṛtis in the Sacred Books of the East (Bühler 1886; Jolly 1889), and Jolly’s Recht und Sitte (1896) was the first scholarly history of Hindu law.
The discovery of the Arthaśāstra in 1905 transformed the field (Chapter 3). It seemed to show that ancient India had possessed a secular, practical science of government, and Indian historians of the nationalist period — K. P. Jayaswal, N. N. Law, R. C. Majumdar, A. S. Altekar and others — used it, together with the epics and inscriptions, to argue that India had a tradition of constitutional government, representative assemblies and corporate self-rule comparable to that of Europe (Jayaswal 1924; Majumdar 1918; Altekar 1958). Their work was a response to colonial claims of “oriental despotism”, and it collected much valuable evidence, but it often read modern institutions into ancient texts. U. N. Ghoshal and, later, R. S. Sharma subjected these claims to critical scrutiny; Sharma in particular related political ideas to the social and economic history of the periods that produced them (Ghoshal 1959; Sharma 1959). A. L. Basham’s general survey of 1954, written for a wide readership, gave a generation of students outside India a sympathetic but measured account of ancient Indian kingship and law (Basham 1954).
The history of Dharmaśāstra was transformed by P. V. Kane’s History of Dharmaśāstra (1930–62), an encyclopaedic survey of the entire literature, and by the work of Robert Lingat, J. D. M. Derrett and Ludo Rocher, who studied the relation between śāstra, custom and colonial law (Kane 1930; Lingat 1973; Derrett 1968; Rocher 2012). Since the 1990s, critical editions and translations by Patrick Olivelle and others have revised the dates and the textual history of the main works, and scholars such as Donald Davis and Mark McClish have proposed new ways of understanding the relation between the śāstras and legal and political practice (Olivelle 2005, 2013; Davis 2010; McClish 2019).
A second line of critical scholarship came from those whom the texts placed at the bottom of society. Jotirao Phule in the nineteenth century and B. R. Ambedkar in the twentieth read the Brahmanical texts as instruments of caste domination, and Ambedkar’s historical studies of the Śūdras and of untouchability remain important works of scholarship as well as of politics (Ambedkar 1946). After Ambedkar, Dalit and Dalit-Bahujan writers and scholars — among them Gopal Guru, Kancha Ilaiah and Anand Teltumbde — carried this critique into political theory, sociology and the study of constitutional practice (Section 20.2). From the 1980s, feminist historians such as Uma Chakravarti examined the same texts as sources for the history of patriarchy (Chakravarti 1993, 2003), and Kumkum Roy studied how the Brahmanical ritual and legal texts recorded the emergence of monarchy in north India (Roy 1994). Historians of Islamic India — among them Irfan Habib, Muzaffar Alam and John Richards — have shown how the Sultanate and Mughal states governed a plural society (Habib 1963; Alam 2004; Richards 1993), and historians of colonial law, such as Bernard Cohn, Marc Galanter and Radhika Singha, have shown how the British transformed what they claimed to preserve (Cohn 1996; Galanter 1989; Singha 1998). This volume draws on all these traditions of scholarship.
1.9 A Note on Translation and Citation¶
Every translation of these texts involves choices that shape how they are understood. Dharma has been rendered as “law”, “duty”, “religion”, “righteousness”, “virtue” and “order”; each captures part of its meaning and each misleads if taken alone. This book usually leaves the word untranslated, and specifies the sense intended where the context requires it. Varṇa is rendered “class” and jāti “caste”, following common scholarly practice; the English word “caste” itself comes from the Portuguese casta, “lineage” or “breed”, applied by sixteenth-century Portuguese observers to the communities they encountered, and it does not correspond exactly to either Indian term. Rājan is translated “king”, although the Vedic rājan was often a tribal chief rather than a monarch in the later sense; rājya and rāṣṭra are rendered “kingdom” or “realm”, and “state” is used, with caution, where the Arthaśāstra’s conception of an organised apparatus of government justifies it. The phrase “Hindu law” is itself an English creation of the colonial period: the Sanskrit texts speak of dharma and vyavahāra, not of a law belonging to a religious community called Hindus (Rocher 2012; Davis 2010).
Citations of primary texts follow the usual conventions. The Arthaśāstra is cited by book, chapter and sentence in Kangle’s numbering, which Olivelle’s translation retains (thus AŚ 1.19.34). The Manusmṛti is cited by chapter and verse in Olivelle’s critical edition, which differs only slightly from the older vulgate numbering. The Yājñavalkyasmṛti is cited in the vulgate numbering used by the Mitākṣarā, which differs from that of the older commentary of Viśvarūpa. The Mahābhārata and Rāmāyaṇa are cited by book, chapter and verse of the critical editions prepared at Poona and Baroda; many older works cite them from the vulgate editions, whose numbering differs considerably. Aśoka’s inscriptions are cited by edict (Rock Edict, Pillar Edict) in the edition of Hultzsch (1925). The abbreviations used for texts in references are listed after the table of contents; note that MīS is the Mīmāṃsāsūtra, while the Manusmṛti is cited simply as “Manu”. Where the numbering of a verse is uncertain or varies between editions, this is noted, and readers who check a quotation against another edition should expect occasional discrepancies.
Translations are based on the published translations listed in the bibliography, especially those of Olivelle for the Arthaśāstra, the Dharmasūtras and the Manusmṛti and of Lariviere for the Nāradasmṛti, sometimes adapted for consistency of terminology. Diacritics follow the International Alphabet of Sanskrit Transliteration for Sanskrit and Pali, and the usual scholarly systems for Tamil, Persian and Arabic; modern Indian personal and place names are given in their familiar English spellings.
1.10 Approach¶
1.10.1 Texts in Context¶
This volume treats its sources as historical documents. Each was written at a particular time, by particular kinds of people, for particular purposes. The Manusmṛti was composed by Brahmin authors in the second century CE, in a world of foreign dynasties and powerful heterodox movements; the Arthaśāstra was compiled from earlier sources and revised over several centuries; the Mitākṣarā was written at a Deccan court in the twelfth century. Reading them in context means neither condemning them for failing to hold modern values nor exempting them from judgement by those values.
1.10.2 Quotations¶
Quotations from primary texts are given only when their wording and reference could be checked against standard editions and translations, and they are kept short. Many passages that circulate in popular books as quotations from the śāstras are garbled, misattributed or invented, and they are not used here. Where a passage is paraphrased, the reference is given. Verse numbers follow the editions cited (for the Manusmṛti, Olivelle’s critical edition; for the Arthaśāstra, Kangle and Olivelle); numbering in other editions may differ slightly. Readers who wish to use any passage for scholarly purposes should consult the editions themselves.
1.10.3 Modern Comparisons¶
Comparisons between Indian and other political and legal traditions — with Greek and Roman thought, Machiavelli, Hobbes, the Geneva Conventions or modern constitutional, company and criminal law — can be illuminating, and they are made here where they help. Every such comparison in this book is a comparison by modern readers, not a claim that the Indian texts “anticipated” later ideas or were their source; nor does a resemblance between particular rules imply that two systems served the same ends. The policy is stated once, here, and the later chapters take it for granted rather than repeat it. Where earlier writers have claimed priority or influence, the book says briefly why the claim fails.
1.10.4 Caste, Gender and Critique¶
The classical texts on polity and law are, among other things, charters of hierarchy. They assign rights, duties and punishments by varṇa and sex; they exclude Śūdras and women from Vedic learning; they describe some groups as untouchable; and they make women perpetual dependants of men. These features are not marginal; they are central to the texts’ vision of the good society, and they shaped Indian law until the twentieth century. The volume treats them openly, with the primary references, and it gives space to the critics who exposed them: the Buddha’s challenge to Brahmin claims of birth, the bhakti poets, Jotirao Phule, Tarabai Shinde, Pandita Ramabai, E. V. Ramasamy, B. R. Ambedkar and modern feminist and Dalit scholars (Ambedkar 1936; Chakravarti 2003; Sharma 1958).
1.11 Indian Traditions in Comparative Perspective¶
Readers coming to this subject from other traditions of political and legal thought will find much that is familiar and much that is not. Like the political philosophers of classical Greece and China, Indian writers asked what makes a ruler legitimate, how a state should be organised, and how justice can be secured. Like Roman jurists and the scholars of Islamic and Jewish law, Indian jurists developed elaborate classifications of obligations, rules of evidence and methods of interpreting authoritative texts. These parallels are instructive, and comparison can help to bring out the distinctive features of each tradition.
Several features of the Indian materials deserve emphasis. First, political theory and law were developed largely by Brahmin scholars within a religious framework, in which the king’s duty was to uphold an order of varṇas and āśramas believed to be grounded in the cosmos and the Veda. Deliberation was not unknown — the assemblies of the gaṇa-saṅghas, the formal procedure of the Buddhist order, debates at royal courts and the village assemblies of the Cōḷa country all record it (Chapters 2, 8 and 16) — but no literature of political philosophy arising from such public debate survives, as it does from the Greek city-states. Second, the most systematic work on statecraft, the Arthaśāstra, was a technical manual for rulers rather than a philosophical inquiry into the best form of government; it does not ask, as Plato and Aristotle did, which constitution is best, but how a king can preserve and enlarge his power. Third, legal thought was organised around the duties of particular persons rather than general rights, and its central institutions — the household, the caste, the guild — were corporate. Fourth, the tradition was plural in its sources of authority: Veda, smṛti, custom and the king’s command each had a place, and their relationship was a matter of continuing debate.
These features have led some writers to describe Indian political thought as “duty-based” rather than “rights-based”, and to present it as a corrective to modern individualism. The contrast contains some truth, but it can easily become a caricature. Classical Indian law recognised many entitlements — of creditors and debtors, owners and heirs, wives and widows — and protected them through courts; and modern rights-based constitutions, including India’s, impose duties as well as conferring rights. The more useful contrast is between a legal order in which entitlements depended on birth, sex and status, and one in which they belong equally to all citizens. Chapter 20 returns to this question.
1.12 The Plan of the Book¶
The book has twenty chapters, in four groups.
Foundations and statecraft.
Chapter 2 traces the Vedic background: ṛta, truth, the early history of dharma and the Vedic assemblies. Chapter 3 introduces the Arthaśāstra as a text: its date, structure, method and reception, including Kāmandaka’s Nītisāra, the principal later treatise of the discipline. Chapters 4–7 examine its theory of the state’s seven constituents, the theory of kingship (rājadharma) in the śāstras and the epics, the political economy of revenue and administration, and the theory of the circle of kings, diplomacy, espionage and war. The chapter on rājadharma (Chapter 5) draws more on the epics and the Dharmaśāstras than on the Arthaśāstra, but it is placed immediately after the theory of the seven constituents because it treats the first and most important of them, the king, and because the later Arthaśāstra chapters on revenue and foreign policy presuppose the account of his duties that it gives. Chapter 8 turns to Buddhist and Jain political and legal thought, including Aśoka’s dhamma and the monastic law of the saṅgha; it closes the first group because it offers the main early alternatives to the Brahmanical theories of kingship set out before it.
The Dharmaśāstra tradition.
Chapter 9 surveys the Dharmaśāstra literature, its sources of authority and its methods of interpretation. Chapter 10 is devoted to the Manusmṛti, including its provisions on varṇa and women and their modern critics. Chapter 11 discusses Yājñavalkya, Nārada and the later smṛtis, and the Mitākṣarā and Dāyabhāga.
Law.
Chapters 12–15 examine the main areas of classical law: courts, procedure and proof; debt, contract, property and inheritance; crime, punishment and penance; and family, saṃskāra and the position of women. Chapter 16 turns to custom and local justice: the authority of custom, village and caste assemblies, matriliny and tribal law.
From the regional kingdoms to the Republic.
Chapter 17 reads the records of the regional kingdoms of c. 500–1700 — copper-plate charters, scribes’ formularies, the medieval treatises on kingship, Kalhaṇa’s history of Kashmir, Vijayanagara and the Ahom state — for what they show of law and government in practice. Chapter 18 describes Islamic law and the Indo-Persian state: the jurists’ method, criminal law, the qāḍī’s court, Persian political ethics, the Sultanate and Mughal empire, the Deccan, Malabar and Awadh, and the Maratha and Sikh states that succeeded the Mughals. Chapter 19 describes the making of Anglo-Hindu and Anglo-Muhammadan law under British rule. Chapter 20 considers the Constitution of India and the classical legacy, including the Dalit legal and political thought that has grown from Ambedkar’s critique.
A glossary of key terms, a chronology, notes on persons and a guide to the principal sources follow the select bibliography. Each chapter ends with a short summary and suggestions for further reading.
1.13 Summary¶
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Rājanīti (royal policy) and dharmaśāstra (the science of dharma) were two overlapping Sanskrit traditions of thought about political power and law. The first is represented above all by the Arthaśāstra, the second by the Dharmasūtras, the smṛtis of Manu, Yājñavalkya and Nārada, and the medieval commentaries and digests.
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Their texts are normative śāstras written by Brahmin specialists. They must be dated carefully — the Arthaśāstra c. 50 BCE–300 CE, the Manusmṛti c. 2nd century CE — and read in context; they are not descriptions of how particular states were governed.
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The volume places these traditions alongside Buddhist and Jain political thought, Tamil literature, customary and local law, Islamic law and the Mughal state, and the colonial and constitutional transformations of the last two and a half centuries.
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The classical texts combine real intellectual achievements with an explicit hierarchy of varṇa and gender. Both are presented here, with the primary references and the work of modern critics.
Further Reading¶
For general introductions see Lingat (1973) and Davis (2010) on Dharmaśāstra, Olivelle (2013) on the Arthaśāstra, Sharma (1959) and Ghoshal (1959) on political ideas, and Singh (2017) on political violence. Kane (1930) remains the indispensable reference work, and Olivelle and Davis (2018) summarises current scholarship on Dharmaśāstra.