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Chapter 9: The Dharmaśāstra Tradition: Sources, Texts and Interpreters

Dharmaśāstra, “the science of dharma”, is the name of a Sanskrit scholarly tradition that for some two thousand years set out the rules of right conduct for the members of Brahmanical society. Its texts range from the prose Dharmasūtras of the last centuries BCE, through the verse treatises (smṛti) of Manu, Yājñavalkya, Nārada and others, to the commentaries and the vast topical digests (nibandha) of the medieval period. They deal with ritual and daily conduct, with the stages of life and the duties of the varṇas, with marriage, inheritance and the family, with the king’s duties and the conduct of lawsuits, and with penances for wrongdoing. Under British rule a narrow selection of this literature became the basis of “Hindu law” in the courts (Chapter 19), and it is still read, admired and denounced in modern India.

This chapter introduces the tradition as a whole: what its authors meant by dharma, where they located its authority, how the literature developed, how it was interpreted, and how far it can be called “law”. The Manusmṛti and the later smṛtis are treated in Chapters 10 and 11, and the main areas of legal doctrine in Chapters 12–15.

9.1 Dharma in the Śāstras

In the Dharmaśāstras, dharma is above all a matter of duty specific to one’s position. The texts speak of the dharma of the varṇas (varṇadharma), of the stages of life (āśramadharma), of the king (rājadharma), of women (strīdharma), and of times of distress (āpaddharma). They also recognise a set of virtues common to all (sādhāraṇa dharma) — the Manusmṛti lists non-injury, truthfulness, not stealing, purity and control of the senses as the dharma of all four varṇas in brief (Manu 10.63) — but the weight of the literature lies on the differentiated duties of particular persons. Dharma in this sense is not a universal moral law addressed equally to everyone; it is a highly differentiated order in which a person’s duties depend on varṇa, gender, stage of life and circumstance.

The early history of the word is discussed in Chapter 2. By the time of the Dharmasūtras, it had become the term for the whole body of religiously sanctioned norms that a Brahmin expert could teach. The legal scholar Robert Lingat stressed that dharma combines duty and law, ritual and morality; Donald Davis has argued that the centre of the tradition is the householder and that Dharmaśāstra is best understood as a “theology of the household” that also regulates the institutions — castes, guilds, temples, villages — through which households lived (Lingat 1973; Davis 2010).

9.2 The Sources of Dharma

9.2.1 The Canonical Lists

From the beginning the tradition was concerned with the question of authority: how is dharma known? The Dharmasūtras answer with short lists. Gautama names the Veda, the tradition and practice of those who know it (GDh 1.1–2); Āpastamba bases dharma on “the agreement of those who know dharma and on the Vedas” (ĀpDh 1.1.1.2–3); Vasiṣṭha names the Veda, tradition and the practice of cultured people (śiṣṭa). The Manusmṛti gives the most famous formulation:

Manusmṛti 2.6

vedo ’khilo dharmamūlaṃ smṛtiśīle ca tadvidām
ācāraś caiva sādhūnām ātmanas tuṣṭir eva ca
“The root of dharma is the entire Veda, and the tradition and practice of those who know the Veda, the conduct of good people, and what is pleasing to oneself.”

A few verses later Manu restates the list as four “visible marks” of dharma: the Veda, tradition, the conduct of good people and what is pleasing to oneself (2.12). Later interpreters read the order as hierarchical: where two sources conflict, the earlier prevails.

9.2.2 Veda

The Veda is the first source, but it contains few rules of the kind the Dharmaśāstras discuss. The tradition solved this problem by a theory of indirect authority. Smṛti rules, it held, are based on Vedic texts that have been lost or are no longer recited but whose existence can be inferred from the fact that learned people remember and practise the rules. The Mīmāṃsā school of Vedic hermeneutics developed this theory with great care. Its foundational text, the Mīmāṃsāsūtra of Jaimini, argues that a smṛti has authority because it can be presumed to rest on the Veda, but that where a smṛti contradicts an extant Vedic text it is to be disregarded (MīS 1.3.3) (Lingat 1973; Davis 2010).

9.2.3 Smṛti

Smṛti, “what is remembered”, means in this context the tradition preserved by those who know the Veda — in practice, the texts of the Dharmasūtras and Dharmaśāstras, which are themselves called smṛtis. They were attributed to sages and divine figures, which gave them authority: Manu was the primordial ancestor of humanity; Yājñavalkya a celebrated Upaniṣadic teacher; Nārada a divine sage. The Yājñavalkyasmṛti lists twenty authors of dharmaśāstras: Manu, Atri, Viṣṇu, Hārīta, Yājñavalkya, Uśanas, Aṅgiras, Yama, Āpastamba, Saṃvarta, Kātyāyana, Bṛhaspati, Parāśara, Vyāsa, Śaṅkha, Likhita, Dakṣa, Gautama, Śātātapa and Vasiṣṭha (Yājñ 1.4–5). Later lists of eighteen or more “smṛti authors” vary, and many of the texts that circulate under these names are late compositions.

9.2.4 The Conduct of the Good

The third source — ācāra, sadācāra or śiṣṭācāra, the practice of good or cultured people — opened the śāstra to custom. The texts define the “cultured” narrowly: for Baudhāyana and Vasiṣṭha they are Brahmins free from envy and greed, learned in the Veda; Manu speaks of the practice handed down in Brahmāvarta, the land between the Sarasvatī and Dṛṣadvatī rivers (Manu 2.17–18). But the texts also recognise the customs of regions, castes and families. Gautama declares that the laws of regions, castes and families are authoritative if they do not contradict the Veda, and that cultivators, merchants, herdsmen, money-lenders and artisans are authorities for their own groups (GDh 11.20–21). Baudhāyana lists five practices peculiar to the south — among them marrying the daughter of one’s maternal uncle or paternal aunt — and five peculiar to the north, such as going to sea and dealing in wool, and reports the view that each region should follow its own practice (BDh 1.2.1–4). Custom is the subject of Chapter 16.

9.2.5 What Is Pleasing to Oneself

The fourth source, ātmatuṣṭi or “what is pleasing to oneself”, has attracted much modern attention as a recognition of individual conscience. The commentators interpreted it narrowly: Medhātithi, for example, limits it to the satisfaction of a person learned in the Veda in matters where the other sources allow a choice. Davis has argued that it refers to the inner disposition of a learned and virtuous person rather than to private conscience in a modern sense (Davis 2010). It is not a licence to set aside the texts.

9.3 The Development of the Literature

9.3.1 The Dharmasūtras

The oldest surviving texts are four Dharmasūtras, composed in the terse prose of the Vedic ancillary sciences and attributed to Āpastamba, Gautama, Baudhāyana and Vasiṣṭha. Āpastamba and Baudhāyana belong to the Kalpasūtras of schools of the Black Yajurveda, alongside manuals of solemn and domestic ritual; the others were attached to Vedic schools by tradition. Older scholarship placed them as early as 600 or even 800 BCE. Patrick Olivelle’s translation and study have established a much later chronology: Āpastamba, the oldest, belongs to about the early third century BCE, Gautama and Baudhāyana to the following two centuries, and Vasiṣṭha perhaps to the first century BCE or a little later. The Dharmasūtras as a genre thus belong to the third to first centuries BCE — to the time of Aśoka and after, not to the age of the Buddha (Olivelle 1999).

Their contents are already broad: the student’s life, the householder’s duties, marriage, impurity, food, the king’s duties, judicial procedure, inheritance and penance. Each is characterised briefly below.

9.3.2 The Smṛtis

The next stage is represented by the great verse treatises, beginning with the Manusmṛti (c. 2nd century CE; Chapter 10). They are written in the śloka metre, address society as a whole rather than one Vedic school, and organise their material in a more systematic way. Manu introduced the classification of litigation into eighteen titles (vyavahārapada, Manu 8.4–7), which became standard (Chapter 12). The Yājñavalkyasmṛti (c. 4th–5th century CE) arranged its material in three books on conduct, legal procedure and penance; the Nāradasmṛti (c. 5th–6th century) is devoted entirely to law; and the treatises of Bṛhaspati and Kātyāyana (c. 6th–7th century), which survive only in quotations, developed the law of procedure and evidence further (Chapter 11). The Viṣṇusmṛti (or Vaiṣṇava Dharmaśāstra), a later work presented as the teaching of the god Viṣṇu to the Earth, and the Parāśarasmṛti, which claims to be the law for the present Kali age, are among the many other smṛtis.

9.3.3 Commentaries and Digests

From the second half of the first millennium CE the creative work of the tradition shifted to commentary. Commentators explained the root texts, resolved contradictions between them, and adapted their rules to new circumstances, often by ingenious interpretation. The great commentaries include those of Medhātithi on Manu and of Vijñāneśvara (the Mitākṣarā) and Aparārka on Yājñavalkya. From the twelfth century, scholars also compiled digests (nibandha), which gathered quotations from all the smṛtis on a topic, arranged them systematically and harmonised them. Many were composed at royal courts or by ministers, and they show how the tradition was organised in different regions. Table 9.1 lists some of the most important works.

Table 9.1. Selected commentaries and digests (dates approximate; after Kane, Derrett and Lingat)
Work Author Date Notes
Manubhāṣya Medhātithi 9th–10th c. Oldest complete commentary on Manu; probably Kashmir
Mitākṣarā Vijñāneśvara c. 1100–1120 Commentary on Yājñavalkya; court of Vikramāditya VI (Kalyāṇa)
Kṛtyakalpataru Lakṣmīdhara 12th c. Early comprehensive digest; minister of Govindacandra of Kanauj
Dāyabhāga Jīmūtavāhana 12th c. Treatise on inheritance; Bengal
Commentary on Yājñavalkya Aparārka 12th c. Śilāhāra king of the Konkan
Smṛticandrikā Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa c. 1200 Influential in the south
Caturvargacintāmaṇi Hemādri 13th c. Vast digest; Yādava court of Devagiri
Commentary on Manu Kullūka Bhaṭṭa 13th–15th c. Became the standard commentary in modern editions
Vivādaratnākara Caṇḍeśvara 14th c. Mithilā; law of disputes
Parāśaramādhavīya Mādhava 14th c. Commentary-digest on Parāśara; Vijayanagara
Vivādacintāmaṇi Vācaspati Miśra 15th c. Mithilā
Smṛtitattva Raghunandana 16th c. Bengal
Vīramitrodaya Mitra Miśra 17th c. Digest; court of Orchha
Vyavahāramayūkha Nīlakaṇṭha 17th c. Authoritative in western India
Nirṇayasindhu Kamalākara­bhaṭṭa 1612 Ritual decisions; Banaras
Dharmasindhu Kāśīnātha Upādhyāya 1790–91 Late digest of ritual practice

9.3.4 The Dharmasūtras in Outline

A brief characterisation of each Dharmasūtra shows the range of the early literature (Olivelle 1999).

  • Āpastamba, the oldest, belongs to the Taittirīya school of the Black Yajurveda. Its first part deals with the student and with the duties of the snātaka; its second with the householder, inheritance, marriage, the king and penance. It is notable for the independence of its views: it rejects some customs approved by other authorities, and in its closing passage it reports the opinion that the remaining dharmas may be learned from women and from people of all varṇas.

  • Gautama, the most systematic, arranges its material by topic and devotes considerable space to the king, witnesses, debts, inheritance and penance. It contains one of the earliest lists of the saṃskāras and of the virtues of the self, and recognises the customs of regions, castes and families.

  • Baudhāyana, also of the Black Yajurveda, survives in a composite text with later additions. It discusses the differing customs of north and south, the mixed classes, inheritance and the āśramas, and preserves much ritual detail.

  • Vasiṣṭha, probably the latest, shows the influence of developing legal procedure: it recognises documents as evidence and has a substantial section on adoption and on the sons of different kinds.

These texts were transmitted in Vedic schools, which explains why they are attached to particular branches of the Veda. Their authors were Brahmin teachers addressing pupils, and their primary concern was the life of the Brahmin householder; the king and the law appear as one topic among many.

9.3.5 Kane’s Survey of the Literature

The first volume of Kane’s History of Dharmaśāstra (1930) is a survey of the literature: more than a hundred smṛtis and digests, with their authors, dates, contents and relations. Its later volumes are organised by topic — varṇa and āśrama, the saṃskāras, marriage, daily duties, gifts, the king and the law, penance, funeral rites, pilgrimage, vows and festivals, and the relation of Dharmaśāstra to other disciplines. For many of the texts mentioned in this chapter, Kane remains the only comprehensive account; but his dates, often earlier than those now accepted, must be checked against more recent work (Kane 1930, vol. 1; Olivelle and Davis 2018).

9.4 The Three Divisions

From the Yājñavalkyasmṛti onwards, the subject matter of Dharmaśāstra was commonly divided into three: ācāra, “conduct”, covering the saṃskāras, the duties of the varṇas and āśramas, daily rites, food, purity and gifts; vyavahāra, “legal procedure”, covering the courts, evidence and the eighteen titles of litigation; and prāyaścitta, “penance”, covering expiations for sins. The division is useful but should not be read as a modern distinction between private morality, public law and rehabilitation. Many matters crossed the lines: marriage was both a saṃskāra and a subject of litigation; some offences were punished by the king and also required penance; and the king was obliged to enforce the duties of the varṇas.

9.5 Interpreting the Texts

The Dharmaśāstra commentators borrowed their methods from Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, the school that had developed rules for interpreting the Vedic injunctions governing ritual. Its principles were applied to the smṛtis as if they were Vedic texts. Among the most important were:

  • the distinction between an injunction (vidhi) and an explanatory or laudatory statement (arthavāda), which has no independent force;

  • the distinction between a general rule (utsarga) and an exception (apavāda), the specific overriding the general;

  • the restrictive rule (niyama) and the exclusive specification (parisaṃkhyā), which govern whether a rule excludes alternatives;

  • the hierarchy of means of determining which rule applies to which act — direct statement (śruti), indicative mark (liṅga), syntactic connection (vākya), context (prakaraṇa), position (sthāna) and name (samākhyā) — with the earlier prevailing over the later (MīS 3.3.14);

  • and, where two equally authoritative rules conflict, the doctrine of option (vikalpa), under which either may be followed, which Mīmāṃsakas regarded as a last resort.

Commentators used these tools to reconcile apparently contradictory smṛtis, to limit the scope of rules they found objectionable or obsolete, and to extend old rules to new cases. Modern readers have noticed resemblances to the canons of statutory interpretation in common-law systems, such as the maxim that the specific overrides the general; the resemblance reflects the common problem of interpreting authoritative texts, not any historical connection (Lingat 1973; Davis 2010).

9.5.2 A Debate about Custom

The Mīmāṃsā discussion of custom shows how these methods were applied. Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtra considers whether practices followed by the people of particular regions — the example given in the later literature is a spring festival called holākā, observed by easterners — are authoritative for all, or only for those who observe them. The question is whether such a practice, like a smṛti rule, can be presumed to rest on a lost Vedic text, and if so whether that text would apply universally. The Mīmāṃsakas and later Dharmaśāstra authors debated the matter at length, some arguing that authoritative practices bind everyone, others that regional customs bind only those of the region. Behind this technical debate lay a real problem for a tradition that claimed universal validity while recognising the diversity of customs across the subcontinent; Dharmaśāstra authors generally resolved it by accepting regional custom for the region, provided it did not openly contradict the texts (Lingat 1973; Davis 2010).

9.5.3 The Commentator as Lawmaker

The commentators presented themselves as explaining what the texts had always meant. In fact they often changed the law. Medhātithi treated many of Manu’s rules of royal policy as resting on worldly experience rather than on the Veda; Vijñāneśvara’s doctrine that sons acquire a right in ancestral property by birth (Chapter 11) was a major juristic construction; and the nibandha authors created systems of inheritance and adoption out of scattered verses. Lingat compared their role to that of the jurists of Roman law or the judges of the common law, creating law through interpretation while maintaining the fiction that they were merely expounding a fixed tradition (Lingat 1973).

9.5.4 Law for the Age: Yugadharma and Kalivarjya

The tradition also allowed for change through time. The doctrine of the four ages (yuga) held that dharma declines from the perfect Kṛta age to the present Kali age. A verse of the Parāśarasmṛti assigns the laws of Manu to the Kṛta age, those of Gautama to the Tretā, those of Śaṅkha and Likhita to the Dvāpara and those of Parāśara to the Kali (Parāśara 1.24). Medieval authors compiled lists of practices permitted in earlier ages but forbidden in the Kali age (kalivarjya): among them the appointment of a man to beget a son on a widow (niyoga), the remarriage of a woman whose marriage had been consummated, sea voyages, the killing of cattle in sacrifice and the marriage of a man with a woman of a lower varṇa. Such lists could be used to set aside embarrassing older rules; they could equally be used to forbid practices — such as widow remarriage — that older texts had allowed in some circumstances. The doctrine was a mechanism for change, but not necessarily for liberal change.

9.6 Paṇḍits, Assemblies and Written Rulings

Dharmaśāstra was not only written; it was taught, recited and applied by learned Brahmins (paṇḍita, śāstrin) in schools attached to temples, monasteries and royal courts and in the households of scholarly families. The texts themselves provide for an assembly of learned men (pariṣad) to decide doubtful questions of dharma: Manu says that a matter not covered by the texts should be decided by an assembly of at least ten, or in need even of three, learned Brahmins, or even by a single Brahmin who knows the Veda, but not by thousands who are ignorant (12.108–114). Such assemblies prescribed penances, readmitted outcastes, and decided disputes about ritual and caste status.

In the early modern period, written rulings by paṇḍits — often called vyavasthā (“determination”) or nirṇaya (“decision”) — were issued in answer to questions put by individuals, communities or rulers, citing the authorities on which they relied. Collections of such rulings survive from Maharashtra, Banaras and Bengal, and they show the śāstras being applied to concrete questions of inheritance, adoption, marriage, penance and caste. Under the East India Company, the court paṇḍits’ answers to judges’ questions were similarly called vyavasthās, and some were printed for the guidance of the courts (Chapter 19). This living practice of consultation is one reason why historians now see Dharmaśāstra less as a dead letter than as a working tradition of legal expertise (Davis 2010; Rocher 2012).

9.7 Dharmaśāstra and Arthaśāstra

The relation between the two śāstras has been much debated. They share a great deal: the Dharmaśāstras’ chapters on the king and the courts draw on the same body of political ideas as the Arthaśāstra, and the Arthaśāstra’s Book 3 is a treatise on private law that overlaps closely with the smṛtis. Both texts accept the hierarchy of varṇa and the king’s duty to uphold it. The differences are of emphasis and audience. The Arthaśāstra addresses the king and his ministers, judges institutions by their usefulness, and accepts espionage, deception and covert killing; the Dharmaśāstras address Brahmin experts and the householders they advised, and judge actions by their conformity to dharma. The Yājñavalkyasmṛti states that where dharmaśāstra and arthaśāstra conflict, dharmaśāstra prevails (Yājñ 2.21).

Mark McClish has argued that the surviving Arthaśāstra was itself revised to bring it closer to dharmaśāstric norms, and that the two traditions should be seen as parts of a single developing discourse on royal power and law rather than as opposites (McClish 2019). The Mahābhārata’s Śānti Parvan, which combines both perspectives, shows that the same authors could hold them together (Chapter 5).

9.8 Was Dharmaśāstra Law?

Under British rule, judges treated Dharmaśāstra texts as a code of “Hindu law” to be applied in court (Chapter 19). Modern scholars have asked whether that was a misunderstanding. Three positions can be distinguished.

  • A scholastic tradition of norms. On one view, the texts are the products of Brahmin scholars describing an ideal order; they were studied and transmitted as learning, and their relation to the actual decisions of kings and local bodies was loose. Derrett emphasised the gap between śāstra and practice and the importance of custom (Derrett 1968).

  • A record of customary law. Richard Lariviere argued that the Dharmaśāstras should be read as compendia of what was accepted practice, and that the irony of modern Indian legal history is that judges came to treat these flexible records of custom as binding statutes (Lariviere 1989a).

  • A jurisprudence of institutions. Donald Davis has argued that Dharmaśāstra functioned as a jurisprudence — a theory of law — for the many legal institutions of medieval India (castes, guilds, temples, monasteries, village assemblies and royal courts), which applied their own rules within a framework the śāstras defined and legitimated. Inscriptions and medieval documents show such bodies invoking dharma and the śāstras while deciding cases according to their own customs (Davis 2010).

These views are not mutually exclusive. What is clear is that Dharmaśāstra was never a code enacted by a sovereign and applied uniformly by state courts; it was a learned tradition with great prestige, which shaped how disputes were thought about and decided, alongside custom, royal orders and the rules of corporate groups. It was also, throughout, a Brahmanical tradition: its authors were Brahmins, its norms privileged Brahmins and men, and its prestige helped to entrench varṇa hierarchy and patriarchy (Chapters 10 and 15).

9.9 Regional Traditions

Although the smṛtis claimed universal authority, the commentaries and digests reveal regional traditions — the Dāyabhāga and Raghunandana in Bengal, Caṇḍeśvara and Vācaspati Miśra in Mithilā, Nīlakaṇṭha in western India, the Smṛticandrikā and Mādhava in the south, and the Mitākṣarā over much of the subcontinent — which the British courts later hardened into territorial “schools” (Chapter 11). Some communities followed customs that departed sharply from the smṛtis: the matrilineal Nāyars of Kerala are the best-known case (Chapter 16), and cross-cousin marriage, condemned by northern authors, was common in the south and accepted by southern commentators.

9.10 Dharmaśāstra and the State: The Case of Nepal

The one pre-modern state in South Asia that enacted a comprehensive legal code explicitly based on caste hierarchy was not in India but in Nepal. The Mulukī Ain (“Law of the Land”) of 1854, promulgated under the Rana prime minister Jang Bahadur, codified the law of the kingdom in a single text. It classified all the kingdom’s population into a hierarchy of caste groups — “wearers of the sacred thread” at the top, “liquor-drinking” groups below them, and impure and untouchable groups at the bottom — and laid down rules of commensality, marriage, punishment and penance according to rank, drawing on Dharmaśāstric principles while incorporating the diverse peoples of the Himalayan kingdom. Andras Höfer’s study of the code showed how it used the categories of the śāstras to construct a national caste order for a state that had never been organised in that way. The code was replaced in 1963 by a new law that abolished caste discrimination (Höfer 1979).

The Nepalese case shows what Dharmaśāstra could become when adopted as the law of a centralised state. In India, by contrast, no pre-colonial state codified Dharmaśāstra, and the closest approximation was the colonial “Anglo-Hindu law” (Chapter 19).

9.11 Beyond the Subcontinent: Law Books in Southeast Asia

Indian political and legal vocabulary travelled to Southeast Asia from the first centuries CE. Sanskrit inscriptions appear in Borneo, Java, Champa and Cambodia from about the fifth century; kings took Sanskrit titles, employed Brahmin chaplains and were consecrated with Indian rites; and local elites adopted the Indian categories selectively for their own purposes, a process that O. W. Wolters called “localisation” (Wolters 1982). Law books were part of this exchange, and their history shows what happened to Dharmaśāstra when it was carried into societies that did not share the varṇa order.

9.11.1 Java and Bali

The Old Javanese legal literature, of which the best-known work is the Kuṭāramānava associated with the Majapahit kingdom (fourteenth to fifteenth century), invokes Manu among its authorities and arranges its rules under headings that correspond to the eighteen titles of law (Chapter 12): debt, deposit, sale, boundaries, theft, violence, defamation, the relations of husband and wife, and the rest. Its substance, however, is largely Javanese: fines are stated in local currency, many offences concern local forms of property and status, and Brahmanical rules on varṇa are much reduced. In Bali, where a Hindu courtly culture survived the Islamisation of Java, related texts continued to be consulted by Brahmin judges in the courts of the Balinese kingdoms, and the Dutch colonial government later used them in its own courts for Balinese litigants. The Javanese and Balinese texts are thus the furthest extension of the Dharmaśāstric genre, but they are adaptations, not translations (Hooker 1978).

9.11.2 The Dhammasattha of Burma

In Burma (Myanmar) and the neighbouring Mon, Tai and Lao lands, law books called dhammasattha (Pali for “dharmaśāstra”; Burmese dhammathat) are attested from the thirteenth century, when the word appears in an inscription of the Pagan kingdom. They were written in Pali, Burmese and Mon, often in bilingual form, and survive in hundreds of manuscripts. Their tradition traced their authority to a sage named Manu, but in a Buddhist guise: Manu was a hermit who, having attained supernatural powers, travelled to the wall that encircles the world and found the law written there in enormous letters, which he copied and brought back to the king. The law was thus presented not as the command of a creator god or the teaching of the Veda but as an order inscribed in the structure of the cosmos and discovered by a wise man (Lammerts 2018).

The content of the dhammasattha deals with inheritance, marriage and divorce, debt and pledge, slavery, theft, assault and the procedure of the courts, often grouped in categories that echo the Indian titles of law. Its rules reflect Burmese society and Buddhist ethics more than Brahmanical ones: divorce by mutual consent is permitted, the wife’s share of the marital property is substantial, and there is no varṇa hierarchy, though distinctions of rank, debt-bondage and slavery are prominent. Burmese kings commissioned new compilations, among them the Manusāra of the mid-seventeenth century, composed by a lay jurist and a monk, and the Manugye of the 1750s under the Konbaung dynasty. Christian Lammerts has shown that these texts were the work of an indigenous Buddhist legal scholarship, with its own commentaries and debates, rather than degenerate copies of the Manusmṛti; their relationship to Indian Dharmaśāstra lies in a shared genre and shared categories more than in borrowed rules (Lammerts 2018). Under British rule, an English translation of the Manugye (1847) became an authority for the colonial courts, which applied “Buddhist law” to Burmese Buddhists in matters of succession, marriage and religious usage — a Burmese counterpart of Anglo-Hindu law.

9.11.3 Siam and the Wider Region

The Thai Law of the Three Seals (1805), described in Chapter 8, opens with a Phra Thammasat that tells a version of the same story of the hermit Manu, followed by royal laws on procedure, property, family, slavery and crime; related texts circulated in Laos and Cambodia. Across mainland Southeast Asia, then, the name of Manu and the form of the śāstric law book became the vehicle for law codes that were Buddhist in ethics and local in substance. The contrast with Nepal is instructive. The Nepalese code of 1854 took the hierarchy of the śāstras as the organising principle of a national law; the Southeast Asian law books kept the authority of the genre while discarding most of that hierarchy (Hooker 1978; Lammerts 2018).

9.12 From Manuscript to Print

Until the nineteenth century Dharmaśāstra texts circulated in manuscripts, copied by hand on palm leaf, birch bark or paper, and studied with teachers. Manuscripts of the same text often differ, and many works survive in only a few copies; others are known only from quotations. The colonial period brought printing. Texts were printed in Calcutta, Bombay, Banaras, Madras and Poona from the early nineteenth century onwards, first for the use of the courts and of colonial scholars and then for Indian readers; series such as the Bibliotheca Indica of the Asiatic Society, the Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series of Poona and the publications of the Nirṇaya Sāgara Press of Bombay made many smṛtis, commentaries and digests available in print. Printing standardised texts that had varied in manuscript, often on the basis of a few manuscripts and without critical method, and it made them available to lawyers and reformers who had not studied with traditional teachers. Modern critical editions, such as Olivelle’s of the Manusmṛti, reconstruct the history of the text from all available manuscripts and commentaries, and sometimes show that the familiar printed text differs from the one the early commentators knew (Olivelle 2005).

9.13 P. V. Kane and Modern Scholarship

The modern study of Dharmaśāstra rests above all on the History of Dharmaśāstra of Pandurang Vaman Kane (1880–1972), published in five volumes (some in several parts) between 1930 and 1962. Kane, a Sanskritist and advocate of the Bombay High Court, surveyed the entire literature — texts, authors, dates and doctrines — with an exhaustiveness that has never been equalled; he received the Bharat Ratna in 1963 (Kane 1930). His work remains indispensable as a reference, though its chronology has been revised and its interpretive stance — sympathetic to the tradition and broadly reformist — reflects its time.

Since Kane, the field has been transformed by critical editions and translations, above all those of Patrick Olivelle (the Dharmasūtras, the Manusmṛti and the Yājñavalkyasmṛti) and Richard Lariviere (the Nāradasmṛti); by Ludo Rocher’s studies, including his translation of the Dāyabhāga; by J. D. M. Derrett’s work on the relation of śāstra, custom and colonial law; by Robert Lingat’s synthesis; and by Donald Davis’s work on Dharmaśāstra as jurisprudence (Olivelle 1999, 2005, 2019; Lariviere 1989b; Rocher 2002, 2012; Derrett 1968; Lingat 1973; Davis 2010). The collective volume edited by Olivelle and Davis, Hindu Law: A New History of Dharmaśāstra (2018), summarises current knowledge (Olivelle and Davis 2018). Critical perspectives from social history, Dalit studies and feminist scholarship — notably the work of B. R. Ambedkar, R. S. Sharma and Uma Chakravarti, and of the Dalit scholars who followed Ambedkar — have also reshaped how the tradition is read (Chapters 10 and 15; Section 20.2).

9.14 Summary

  • Dharmaśāstra is the Sanskrit scholarly tradition on dharma: the duties of persons according to varṇa, āśrama and sex, the duties of kings, legal procedure and penance. Its literature runs from the Dharmasūtras (c. 3rd–1st centuries BCE) through the smṛtis to the commentaries and digests of the second millennium.

  • The tradition located the authority of dharma in the Veda, in smṛti, in the practice of the good and, to a limited extent, in what is pleasing to oneself; it recognised the customs of regions, castes and families, within limits.

  • Its interpreters used the methods of Mīmāṃsā to reconcile and apply the texts, and in doing so they made new law.

  • Scholars debate whether Dharmaśāstra was law: a scholastic ideal, a record of custom, or the jurisprudence of a world of corporate legal institutions. It was never a code enacted by a state, and it was throughout a Brahmanical tradition with Brahmanical priorities.

  • Outside India the form of the śāstric law book passed, much transformed, into the law books of Southeast Asia, while Nepal’s code of 1854 made the śāstric caste hierarchy the basis of national law.

Further Reading

The best introductions are Lingat (1973), Davis (2010) and the essays in Olivelle and Davis (2018) and Lubin et al. (2010). Kane (1930) is the indispensable reference. On Southeast Asia, see Hooker (1978) and Lammerts (2018). Olivelle (1999) translates the Dharmasūtras with an introduction on their date. Derrett (1973) surveys the literature; Lariviere (1989a) and Rocher (2012) discuss its relation to practice.