Chapter 6: Revenue, Administration and the Political Economy of the Arthaśāstra¶
“All undertakings depend on the treasury” (AŚ 2.8.1). The Arthaśāstra’s account of government is to a large extent an account of how a king obtains, guards and spends wealth. Its second book, the longest in the work, describes a kingdom run through some thirty departments, each under a superintendent (adhyakṣa), which manage crown lands and workshops, regulate trade, collect tolls and taxes, and keep accounts. This chapter examines that political economy: the place of economics among the sciences, the king’s revenue, the administration of land, labour, markets, money and trade, and the accounting and control of officials. Its focus is on the state; the history of the Indian economy, guilds, coinage and trade in its own right is treated in Volume 19 of this series.
Two cautions apply throughout. First, the Arthaśāstra is a normative text, composed between c. 50 BCE and 300 CE (Chapter 3). It describes what its authors thought a well-run kingdom should do, not the administration of the Mauryan empire or of any other known state. Second, the Arthaśāstra’s aim is the strength and wealth of the king; the prosperity of the subjects matters because, and in so far as, it supports that aim. Labels such as “mixed economy” or “welfare state” fit it badly for that reason (Olivelle 2013; Trautmann 2012).
6.1 Vārttā: Economics among the Sciences¶
The Arthaśāstra counts economics among the four sciences a king must master (Chapter 3). “Agriculture, cattle-rearing and trade constitute vārttā” (kṛṣipāśupālye vaṇijyā ca vārttā, AŚ 1.4.1); it is useful because it yields grain, cattle, money, forest produce and labour, and “by means of it the king brings under his control his own and the enemy’s party, with the help of the treasury and the army” (AŚ 1.4.2). Economics, in other words, is the material basis of power. The same passage presents daṇḍanīti as the science that secures the acquisition and preservation of wealth.
The Dharmaśāstras assign the same three occupations, together with money-lending, to the Vaiśya varṇa (Manu 1.90, 10.79–80), while permitting other varṇas to practise them in times of distress. In practice, as inscriptions and literary sources show, merchants, artisans and cultivators came from many communities, and the rigid scheme of the law books was never a description of economic life.
6.2 Revenue¶
6.2.1 The Collector and the Treasurer¶
Two high officers manage the state’s finances. The collector (samāhartṛ) is responsible for revenue: he organises the countryside into divisions and supervises the record-keepers who register land, households and livestock (Chapter 4). The treasurer (sannidhātṛ) is responsible for the storehouses: the treasury proper, the granary, the warehouse of forest produce, the armoury and the prison. The Arthaśāstra lists the “bodies” of revenue (āyaśarīra) under seven headings — fort (the capital and its levies), countryside, mines, irrigation works and gardens, forests, herds and trade routes — and gives a detailed scheme for classifying income and expenditure (AŚ 2.6). Its accounts office (akṣapaṭala) keeps registers of every department, and accountants present their accounts annually, on the full-moon day of the month Āṣāḍha (AŚ 2.7).
6.2.2 The Land Tax¶
The principal tax was the king’s share (bhāga) of the harvest. The Dharmaśāstras give it as one-sixth, one-eighth or one-twelfth of grain (Manu 7.130), and “the sixth” became proverbial: the king was often called “the taker of the sixth part”. The Arthaśāstra assumes a share of one-sixth on private land, alongside a variety of other levies on the countryside: a tax in kind (bali), payments in money, contributions for the army, levies on fruits and vegetables, and dues on fisheries, ferries and forests. Crown lands (sītā) were cultivated directly for the king under the superintendent of agriculture, using slaves, hired labourers and convicts working off fines; or they were leased to sharecroppers for half or a lesser share of the crop (AŚ 2.24). Water from state irrigation works was charged for at rates varying with the method of irrigation.
6.2.3 Tolls, Customs and Other Revenue¶
Goods entering the capital or crossing the frontier paid customs and tolls (śulka), collected at the city gate by the superintendent of customs; the rates varied with the kind of goods, and smuggling, false declaration and evasion were heavily fined (AŚ 2.21–22). Further revenue came from fines imposed by the courts; from the mint, which charged fees for coining; from state monopolies and workshops; from mines; and from the property of those who died without heirs. Brahmins learned in the Veda, along with certain others, were exempt from taxation, and land granted to Brahmins (brahmadeya) was to be free of taxes and fines (AŚ 2.1).
6.2.4 Revenue Terms in the Inscriptions¶
Land grants of the Gupta and later periods allow us to see some of these revenues in practice. The grants transfer to the recipient the king’s rights over a village, often listed in standard formulae: the share of the produce (bhāga), periodic payments in kind (bhoga), taxes (kara), payments in cash (hiraṇya) and, in many grants, forced labour (viṣṭi), together with fines and the right to treasure. They also specify immunities: the village is to be free from the entry of royal soldiers and police, and its inhabitants are told to obey the grantee and to deliver to him the dues they formerly paid to the king. The terms differ from those of the Arthaśāstra but reflect a similar range of exactions. Historians have used them to study the burdens on cultivators and the transfer of fiscal rights from the state to Brahmins, temples and officials (Sharma 1959; Singh 2008).
6.2.5 Moderation and Extraction¶
The texts recommend that taxation be moderate and regular. Manu’s image of the leech, the calf and the bee, which take their food little by little (Manu 7.129), was widely repeated, and both the Arthaśāstra and the Mahābhārata warn that excessive exactions drive subjects to flee or revolt. The Arthaśāstra also counsels the king to grant remissions of tax to new settlers and to those who build irrigation works. It is equally clear-eyed, however, about extraction. When the treasury is in difficulty, the king may demand a one-time contribution (praṇaya) from cultivators, merchants and others; may take a share of the property of temples and religious bodies; and may use secret agents to stage miracles, persuade the wealthy to contribute, or seize the property of the disloyal under pretexts (AŚ 5.2). Such advice belongs to the same book as the warning to take only ripe fruit from the garden of the kingdom (AŚ 5.2.70). The modern idea of “canons of taxation” — equity, certainty, convenience and economy — belongs to Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776); attributing it to the Arthaśāstra misreads a text whose concern is to maximise revenue without provoking revolt.
6.3 Land, Settlement and Production¶
6.3.1 Settlement and Irrigation¶
The Arthaśāstra’s model kingdom expands by settling new land with villages of cultivators (AŚ 2.1; Chapter 4). The king should also build irrigation works (setubandha) — reservoirs, tanks and channels — either with natural water or with water brought from elsewhere, and assist others who build them with land, roads, timber and implements. Those who construct new tanks receive a remission of taxes for several years; those who damage or neglect irrigation works are fined (AŚ 2.1; 3.9). Inscriptions from many periods show that the construction of tanks was in fact one of the most important forms of royal and private investment and of religious merit in India.
6.3.2 Crown Workshops and Monopolies¶
The superintendents of Book 2 manage a wide range of state enterprises: mines and metal-working, the mint, salt, forests and forest produce, the armoury, weaving, liquor and slaughter-houses. Mining and salt were state monopolies, worked either directly or by lessees paying a fixed share; liquor was produced in state establishments or under licence and sold only in licensed taverns; and private manufacture of weapons was forbidden. The superintendent of yarn (sūtrādhyakṣa) employed women to spin, especially widows, women with disabilities, women who did not leave their homes, “mothers of courtesans”, retired temple servants and women working off fines, paying them according to the quality and quantity of their work; women who did not leave home were to be sent work through maidservants (AŚ 2.23). The superintendent of courtesans (gaṇikādhyakṣa) regulated prostitutes, who paid the state a share of their earnings (AŚ 2.27). The superintendent of the slaughter-house enforced bans on killing protected animals and animals in sanctuaries (abhayāraṇya) (AŚ 2.26).
The picture is of a state that is a major producer and employer, not merely a regulator. Whether any ancient Indian state ran such a system is uncertain. The Arthaśāstra may reflect, in idealised form, practices of kingdoms in the centuries around the turn of the era, but it is not a description of the Mauryan economy.
6.3.3 The Superintendents¶
Book 2 describes the duties of more than two dozen superintendents. Table 6.1 lists the principal ones. The list is useful less as a description of any real administration than as a map of what its authors thought a king’s government should control.
| Officer | Responsibility |
|---|---|
| samāhartṛ | Collector: revenue, records of the countryside, secret agents in the countryside |
| sannidhātṛ | Treasurer: treasury, granary, storehouses, armoury, prison |
| akṣapaṭalādhyakṣa | Records and accounts office |
| kośādhyakṣa | Treasury; examination of gems and precious goods |
| ākarādhyakṣa | Mines and metallurgy; salt (with the lavaṇādhyakṣa) |
| lakṣaṇādhyakṣa, rūpadarśaka | Mint; examination of coins |
| suvarṇādhyakṣa | Goldsmiths’ workshop |
| koṣṭhāgārādhyakṣa | Granary and stores |
| paṇyādhyakṣa | Trade: state goods, prices, demand and supply |
| kupyādhyakṣa | Forest produce |
| āyudhāgārādhyakṣa | Armoury and weapons |
| pautavādhyakṣa, mānādhyakṣa | Weights and measures; measures of space and time |
| śulkādhyakṣa | Customs and tolls |
| sūtrādhyakṣa | Yarn and weaving |
| sītādhyakṣa | Crown agriculture |
| surādhyakṣa | Liquor |
| sūnādhyakṣa | Slaughter-houses; protected animals |
| gaṇikādhyakṣa | Courtesans and entertainers |
| nāvadhyakṣa | Shipping, ferries and ports |
| go’dhyakṣa | Cattle |
| aśvādhyakṣa, hastyadhyakṣa, rathādhyakṣa, pattyadhyakṣa | Horses, elephants, chariots and infantry |
| mudrādhyakṣa | Passes for travel |
| vivītādhyakṣa | Pasture lands and the safety of roads |
| nāgaraka | City superintendent |
The superintendent of agriculture (sītādhyakṣa) illustrates the level of detail. He is to collect seeds of all kinds, know the science of agriculture and of plants, and supervise the sowing of crown lands in their proper seasons according to the rainfall; the text records the expected rainfall of different regions and describes a vessel for measuring it at the storehouse. He must ensure that slaves, labourers and convicts working the land are supplied with tools and draught animals, and that the work of artisans who make implements is not delayed (AŚ 2.24). Similar detail is given for mines (the identification of ores and the processing of metals), for forests (the reservation of forests for elephants and the collection of timber and forest produce), and for the care of cattle, horses and elephants.
6.4 Markets and Merchants¶
6.4.1 The Superintendent of Trade¶
The superintendent of trade (paṇyādhyakṣa) is to ascertain the demand and supply of goods, high and low prices, and the costs of transport, and to arrange for the sale of state goods (AŚ 2.16). Trade in goods produced in the kingdom is to be centralised in one place; foreign goods are to be sold in many places. Merchants bringing goods from abroad are to be encouraged with remissions and protected from suits for debt by local creditors.
6.4.2 Regulation and Penalties¶
Book 4, on the “removal of thorns”, treats merchants and artisans as potential sources of harm to the public, alongside thieves (AŚ 4.1–2). The superintendent of weights and measures (pautavādhyakṣa) inspects scales and measures every four months, and false weights are fined. Merchants are allowed a fixed margin of profit: the superintendent is to fix “a profit of five per cent on local goods and ten per cent on foreign goods” (AŚ 4.2.28), and those who raise prices beyond this, or who conspire to withhold goods or to fix prices, are fined. Adulteration and the sale of inferior goods as superior are punished; so are artisans who fail to deliver on time or misappropriate materials. The state itself may buy up surpluses and sell when prices are high.
These provisions are sometimes described as “consumer protection” and “anti-cartel” law. Ancient states commonly regulated weights and prices, and the Arthaśāstra’s rules are unusually detailed; but they belong to a system in which the state is itself a merchant and in which the trading community is regarded with suspicion as a source of fraud. They protect the king’s revenue and public order as much as the buyer.
6.4.3 Guilds¶
Merchants and artisans in early India were organised in guilds and corporations: the śreṇī (guild of artisans or traders), the naigama (association of merchants), the pūga and gaṇa (associations of various kinds), and the sārtha (caravan). Inscriptions from the second century BCE onwards record guilds of weavers, potters, oil-pressers, corn-dealers, bamboo-workers and others making donations to Buddhist monasteries and acting as bankers: an inscription of Uṣavadāta at Nasik (early 2nd century CE) records permanent endowments of money deposited with two weavers’ guilds at Govardhana, the interest of which was to provide robes and other needs for monks (Majumdar 1918; Thapar 2002). The Dharmaśāstras recognise the conventions (samaya, saṃvid) of guilds and require the king to enforce them, and they give guilds judicial authority over their members (Chapters 12 and 13).
The Arthaśāstra is wary of corporate power: it treats armed corporations and confederacies as potential threats (Book 11) and considers how the king may use or divide them. Its attitude to guilds is therefore ambivalent — they are useful sources of troops and revenue, but rival centres of power.
6.5 Money¶
Coinage in India began with silver punch-marked coins, which archaeology dates from about the fifth or fourth century BCE; they continued in use into the early centuries CE, alongside cast and die-struck copper coins and, from the second century BCE, the coinages of Indo-Greek, Śaka, Kuṣāṇa and other rulers (Thapar 2002). The Arthaśāstra describes a mint under the superintendent of coinage (lakṣaṇādhyakṣa) that strikes silver coins — the paṇa and its half, quarter and eighth — and copper coins — the māṣaka and its fractions down to the kākaṇī — specifying their alloy, and an examiner of coins (rūpadarśaka) who certifies coins in circulation and the treasury (AŚ 2.12). Fines, wages and prices throughout the text are reckoned in paṇas. Counterfeiting is punished, and the punishments listed for offences against the coinage are severe.
6.6 Wages, Labour and Slavery¶
6.6.1 Salaries of State Servants¶
The Arthaśāstra gives a scale of annual salaries in paṇas for the servants of the state (AŚ 5.3). At the top, the sacrificial priest, the teacher, the counsellor, the chaplain, the commander of the army, the crown prince, the king’s mother and the chief queen receive 48,000 paṇas; the chamberlain, the head of the harem, the commandant, the collector and the treasurer 24,000; princes, the city judge, the director of factories, the members of the council of ministers and the frontier commanders 12,000; and so on downwards through officials, physicians, soldiers and artisans to servants and labourers at 60 paṇas. The ratio of 800 to 1 between highest and lowest is an index of the steep hierarchy that the text takes for granted. It suggests that the king should pay salaries rather than grant land, and that if the treasury is short he may pay in kind — forest produce, cattle or land.
6.6.2 Hired Labour¶
Book 3 regulates the relation of employer and labourer (AŚ 3.13–14). A labourer who does not work as agreed, or an employer who does not pay, is fined; where no wage was agreed, the labourer receives a customary share of the produce — a tenth of the crop for a cultivator, a tenth of the butter for a herdsman, a tenth of the goods for a trader’s assistant. Labourers who are unable to work because of illness or misfortune are to be given time or allowed to substitute another worker. These rules are a precise and interesting record of how labour relations were imagined; they are not a “labour code” in the modern sense, and they apply within a society in which a great deal of labour was unfree.
6.6.3 Slavery and Bondage¶
The Arthaśāstra and the Dharmaśāstras accept slavery (dāsa) as a legal institution. The Arthaśāstra’s chapter on slaves (AŚ 3.13) is notable for its restrictions. “An Ārya shall never be made a slave” — though the same chapter allows an Ārya to be pledged as a bondsman in distress, and to be enslaved as a judicial punishment — while Mlecchas (foreigners or outsiders) may sell or pledge their own offspring without fault. Kinsmen who sell a minor Śūdra who is an Ārya are fined. A slave may keep what he earns without prejudice to his master’s work and inherit from his father, and can regain freedom by paying his value; a master who makes a slave carry corpses or dirt, or abuses a female slave sexually, loses the price paid for the slave; and a female slave who bears her master’s child is to be freed together with the child. The Manusmṛti, by contrast, lists seven kinds of slave — including the man captured in war, the man who serves for his food, the slave born in the house and the man enslaved as a punishment — and declares that a Śūdra, whether bought or not, may be made to perform servile work, “for he was created by the Self-existent to serve the Brahmin” (Manu 8.413–415).
These provisions reveal a society in which slavery, debt bondage and forced labour (viṣṭi) were normal. Modern presentations that highlight only the Arthaśāstra’s restrictions on the enslavement of Āryas, and omit the institution itself, give a misleading picture. Uma Chakravarti and others have shown how slavery and the servile status of the Śūdra were intertwined in the social theory of the period (Chakravarti 1987; Sharma 1958).
6.7 Calamities and Relief¶
The Arthaśāstra lists “eight great perils” that come from fate rather than from human agency: fire, flood, disease, famine, rats, wild animals, snakes and evil spirits (AŚ 4.3). For each it prescribes remedies, practical and ritual. Against fire, villages are to take precautions in summer and the king is to make offerings to Agni; against floods, villagers living near rivers are to move to higher ground and keep boats and rafts ready; against disease, physicians are to treat the sick with medicines while ascetics perform propitiatory rites; against rats and other pests, traps, poison and the protection of granaries. In famine the king should distribute seed and provisions, undertake public works such as the building of forts or waterworks in which people can earn their food, share his own stores, ask his allies for help, or even migrate with his people to another region with good harvests, or settle them near rivers and lakes and have them cultivate grain, vegetables and roots. The chapter combines empirical measures with religious ones, and it shows a realistic awareness that the king’s revenue and security depended on the survival of the cultivators in bad years.
Records from later periods show that famine relief of this kind — remission of revenue, distribution of grain, the employment of the hungry on public works — was practised by many Indian rulers, as it was by the Mughals and, with notorious failures, by the colonial state. The Arthaśāstra’s recommendations are an early chapter in this long history of the state’s response to subsistence crises.
6.8 Forests and Forest Peoples¶
The Arthaśāstra’s kingdom is surrounded and penetrated by forest, and its attitude to forests and their inhabitants is revealing. Forests are a resource: the king is to establish forests for producing timber and other materials, and reserved forests for elephants, which were essential to his army; whoever kills an elephant in the royal forests is to be put to death (AŚ 2.2). Forests also served as sanctuaries for animals and as places of retreat for ascetics.
The peoples of the forest (aṭavī, aṭavika) appear in the text chiefly as a problem. They are listed among the possible sources of trouble for a kingdom, and their chiefs are to be watched, won over with gifts or set against one another; forest troops are listed, last and least reliable, among the kinds of troops a king may employ (Chapter 4); and the frontier officers (antapāla) and the officers of the pasture lands are to protect travellers and caravans from them. Aśoka’s thirteenth Rock Edict similarly warns the forest peoples within his empire that, though he has renounced conquest, he still has the power to punish them (Chapter 8). The texts thus record, from the side of the state, the long history of tension between expanding agrarian kingdoms and the communities of the forest, whose own traditions of law and governance are discussed in Chapter 16 (Thapar 2002; Singh 2017).
6.9 Trade and the Wider World¶
The Arthaśāstra knows a wide world of trade. It discusses whether the land route to the north or to the south is more profitable — the teachers prefer the northern route, which brings elephants, horses, perfumes, ivory, skins, silver and gold; Kauṭilya prefers the southern route, which brings conch shells, diamonds, gems, pearls and gold, and has many mines (AŚ 7.12). It lists precious goods from many regions, including silk “from the land of China” and coral from Alexandria (AŚ 2.11). The superintendent of ships (nāvadhyakṣa) supervises ferries, river and coastal shipping, port towns and fisheries, levies tolls and port dues, and is to help ships in distress (AŚ 2.28).
Other sources show that the period in which the Arthaśāstra took shape was one of expanding overland and maritime commerce: the routes known as the uttarāpatha and dakṣiṇāpatha linked the Gangetic plain to the north-west and to the Deccan; the Indian Ocean trade connected the ports of western and southern India with the Roman world, the Gulf and East Africa, and the east coast with Southeast Asia. This history belongs to Volume 19.
6.10 Controlling Officials¶
A distinctive concern of the Arthaśāstra is the honesty of its own officials. It lists forty ways in which officials embezzle, from delaying receipts to falsifying accounts (AŚ 2.8), and observes that it is as impossible to know when an official appropriating revenue is doing so as to know when a fish in water is drinking (AŚ 2.9.33). Its remedies are characteristic: frequent transfers so that officials cannot entrench themselves; joint responsibility of several officers for each department; rewards for informers, who receive a share of what is recovered; secret agents who watch officials and test them with temptations; and punishments graded by the amount embezzled. Officials who increase revenue by ruining the countryside are themselves to be punished, because they “eat up” the kingdom. The modern language of “audit”, “whistle-blowing” and “anti-corruption agencies” captures something of this; the system as a whole, however, rests on surveillance and mutual suspicion rather than on public accountability.
6.11 Town and Country¶
The city superintendent (nāgaraka) keeps registers of the inhabitants of each ward, controls travellers and lodging-houses, enforces a night curfew, and is responsible for fire precautions — each house is to keep pots of water, ladders and hooks, and cooking in summer is restricted — and for sanitation, with fines for throwing dirt or carcasses in the street (AŚ 2.36). On certain festivals and on the king’s birthday, prisoners are to be released. The text’s countryside is similarly ordered, with records of every household, its members, occupations, income, expenditure and livestock.
Such provisions are often cited as evidence of “urban planning” or “public health” in ancient India. They show the Arthaśāstra’s ideal of a closely supervised population, in which the king’s officers know who lives where, what they own and what they do. They should be read alongside the text’s chapters on espionage and coercion (Chapters 3 and 14).
6.12 Assessment¶
The Arthaśāstra’s political economy is a remarkable intellectual achievement: a systematic treatment of the economic foundations of state power, written with close attention to detail. Thomas Trautmann has described it as the earliest Indian “science of wealth”, and has argued that it presents a distinctive, state-centred theory of economic life that should be understood on its own terms rather than as a forerunner of European economics (Trautmann 2012). Its central idea — that the king’s power rests on a productive, settled and closely administered population, and that the state should actively organise production and trade to fill the treasury — belongs to its own world of competing kingdoms in early historic India.
6.13 Summary¶
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The Arthaśāstra treats economics (vārttā: agriculture, cattle-rearing, trade) as one of the four sciences and the treasury as the basis of all undertakings.
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Its kingdom raises revenue from a land tax (customarily a sixth of the crop), crown lands, tolls and customs, fines, mines, monopolies and many other sources, recorded by an elaborate system of accounts; it also describes means of extracting money in emergencies by deceit.
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Some thirty superintendents manage state enterprises — mines, mint, weaving, liquor, forests, crown agriculture — and regulate trade, weights and measures and prices, with a fixed profit margin for merchants.
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Labour was hired, bonded and enslaved; the Arthaśāstra regulates slavery, forbidding the enslavement of an Ārya except in specified cases, while Manu regards the Śūdra as created for servitude.
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The text’s control of officials relies on rotation, joint responsibility, informers and spies. Its forest policy treats forest peoples mainly as a danger and a resource. Throughout, the aim of this political economy is the power and wealth of the king.
Further Reading¶
AŚ Books 2 and 5 are translated and annotated in Olivelle (2013) and Kangle (1960). Trautmann (2012) is the best short study of the Arthaśāstra’s economics. On guilds see Majumdar (1918) (dated but still useful); on the social history of labour and slavery, Sharma (1958) and Chakravarti (1987); on the wider economic history, Thapar (2002) and Singh (2008), and Volume 19 of this series.